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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the political science literature by exploring why minor parties arise 
and decline.  This thesis explores the rise of Australian minor parties in Australia from the time 
of the Labor ‘Split’ in 1955 that led to the formation of the DLP through to the rise and 
continuing rise of the Australian Greens in the 1990s and beyond.  In that time the Australian 
Democrats emerged in 1977 and in 1996 and 1997 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation first appeared.  
The thesis goes behind these parties to explore and analyses the underlying factors that caused 
these parties to be established in the first place and succeed electorally, before, in the case of 
three of the parties, meeting their decline.  The Australian Greens have not declined to any 
significant degree and One Nation has experienced a political resurrection.  The four parties 
considered in this thesis were the minor parties that were in the Federal parliament as at 1 
January 2009 or had being in the Federal parliament and had lost all of their seats in parliament 
before that that date. 
The appearance of this thesis is very timely given in very recent times the rise of a number of 
minor parties in the Australian Senate over the last four years, some of which have met their 
demise. Undoubtedly future research will explore the successes and failures of those parties. 
This thesis uses Pedersen’s typology on the life spans of minor parties to graph 
diagrammatically the life span of each of the parties considered in this thesis.  The thesis has put 
forward a number of changes to Pedersen’s model to take account of Australian conditions and 
to make the model more empirically accurate. 
This thesis explores dissatisfaction with the policy priorities and the sense of relevance of the 
major parties as being major causes in the the rise of minor parties.  I argue that because major 
parties tend to become oligarchic and over time show less attention to the concerns and interests 
of the electorate (including constituents, vested interests, and their own party members, as a 
result other voices are encouraged to establish new attentive parties.  Another cause for the rise 
of minor parties is a move towards post-materialism and this is noted in the rise of both the 
Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens. 
The thesis also adds to the scarce stock of literature on the fall and demise of political parties by 
researching the reasons for the fall of the DLP, the Australian Democrats and in 1998, the fall of 
One Nation.  The thesis concludes that the reasons for a party’s fall or demise is largely caused 
through irrelevance in terms of policy and divisions and splits that are often very public, within 
the party.  Divisions and splits along with major problems make for good stories to sell 
newspapers and boost the listener ratings.  The role of the media in a party’s rise and fall is a 
very significant one. 
I argue that structural weaknesses in the party organisation can contribute to the demise of a 
minor party.  Structural issues considered include the usage of various companies within the 
party that can serve to hide the real operators of the party at the expense of the party 
membership.  Participative politics is another structural issue that can create problems for the 
party when it is used for voting for the parliamentary party leadership. 
The research for this thesis was conducted by interviewing members of the minor parties 
analyzing the records of these minor parties held in the manuscripts collection of the NLA and 
the NAA, as well as some private collections of papers on those parties. 
xiv 
I also analyse the reasons for the sudden resurrection of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation at the 
2016 double dissolution election. 
I conclude that minor parties emerge for a specific reason or set of reasons.  The minor parties 
that gain seats in parliament usually do so because the party is led by a high profile and well 
known leader.  To remain in existence and not meet their demise, minor parties must remain 
united and have policies that the electorate sees as relevant.
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Chapter One: Thesis Overview 
Introduction 
This thesis appears at a very opportune time.  The amendments passed by the Federal 
Parliament in early 2016 relating to the introduction of a partial optional preferential voting 
system relating to the elections of Senators did not prevent a number of candidates from smaller 
parties from being elected, or some cases re-elected, at the July 2016 double dissolution election 
for the Senate.  That election also saw the ‘political resurrection’ of Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation party with four candidates elected to the Senate including Hanson herself and another 
PHON Senator from Queensland. 
The finishing touches were made to this thesis just as Senator Cory Bernardi announced his 
resignation from the Liberal Party and his representing his new party the Australian 
Conservatives, in the Senate. 
Minor parties are a perennial part of Australia’s political system, yet are much understudied as a 
recurring phenomenon.  This thesis builds on and contributes to the research into the politics of 
minor parties, by considering the role minor parties play in Australian politics using historical 
trajectories.  This chapter provides the background, explaining why this thesis was written in the 
light of the power a minor party can wield.  The main concern of this thesis is why minor parties 
emerge in the first place, often holding significant power and influence, but later through 
various reasons, declining in power and influence and often meeting their demise.   
The impetus for this research came about after a career of 30 years in the Australian public 
service.  Much of that time was spent in various policy areas across two departments, the 
Australian Taxation Office and the Department of Social Security.  In terms of getting the 
resultant legislation through parliament, a significant group of players in the parliamentary 
process were the various minor parties, such as the Australian Democratic Labor Party (DLP), 
the Australian Democrats (ADs) and later the Australian Greens (AGs), all three holding the 
balance of power in the Senate at various times.   
Although scholarly studies of party politics have occasionally examined the operations of 
individual minor political parties, there has been not been so much research in why minor 
parties in general, commence operating and the factors that cause these parties to fall and 
disappear altogether.  In this thesis, I study four Australian minor parties which have had at least 
two candidates elected to the federal parliament.  In this thesis, I have chosen to study the four 
Australian minor parties that were in the Federal parliament as at 1 January 2009 or had being in 
the Federal parliament and had lost all of their seats in parliament before that that date.  In 
addition each of these parties had at least two candidates elected to the federal parliament.  The 
2 
thesis considers these parties in chronological order from the DLP in 1955 to the Australian 
Greens of more recent times.  My thesis provides additional insight into the reasons why minor 
parties exist and prosper as well as examining how the actions of the major parties tend to 
encourage this fragmentation of party identification. 
This analytical focus on minor political parties provides another contribution to Australian 
Politics.  This thesis analyses not only why new minor political parties come into existence, but 
also explains the reasons for their demise.  It also attempts to determine the indicators that may 
lead to a minor political party declining in significance and even disappearing. 
Although numerous studies have identified and classified minor political parties (for example 
Smith 2006), little analytical attention has been paid to why they meet their demise.  This issue 
is addressed in this thesis by taking four minor political parties in Australia, the Australian 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP), the Australian Democrats (ADs), Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(PHON) and the Australian Greens (AGs).  The central area of focus is the Australian federal 
parliament but some comparisons are made with the performance of minor parties in state 
parliaments. 
The thesis explores the reasons why two of these more historically dated parties met their 
demise, while in respect of the Australian Greens, why that party continues to survive and as 
part of this survival, the thesis poses the question, has the Australian Greens learnt the lessons 
from the demise of those two parties?   Additionally, the thesis explores the reasons for the 
rocky initial history but also the ‘political resurrection’ of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party. 
The essential test for a minor party is to achieve representation in the parliament and many 
minor parties in Australia have failed to achieve this fundamental goal.  This thesis considers 
the minor parties that have gained representation in parliament and explores the reasons for this 
successful achievement.  Empirically, it is easier for minor parties to gain a representational 
foothold in Australia’s various upper houses of parliament, apart from Tasmania, with single 
member upper house electorates and the ACT with its much smaller multi-member electorates.  
Proportional representation, the voting method introduced in 1948 for the Senate is regarded as 
a very significant factor in assisting the rise of minor parties after 1949.  Some favorable 
coverage by the media is also an advantage.  Another key reason for gaining parliamentary 
representation is the cultivation of charismatic leadership from a well-known and popular high 
profile leader. 
The thesis explores the myriad of diverse reasons for the decline of previously significant minor 
parties in Australia.  The interactions of these reasons for decline and disintegration are also 
considered.  These factors of decline are often a combination of administrative and electoral 
shortcomings.  I maintain that these reasons for the rise, decline and disintegration of minor 
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parties are also applicable to other countries and show that for minor parties, decline and 
disintegration are possible and can happen quite suddenly. 
The rise and fall can be the same factors and different reasons can interact.  They do not operate 
in watertight compartments. For example, a minor party might begin with very good effective 
leadership and remain relevant.  But as time goes by the leadership of the party changes and the 
former leader may be unhappy losing leadership and publicly show that unhappiness, further the 
party ceases to remain relevant to policies that people can identify with - in other words the 
party fails to resonate with voters.  The party’s new leader could also be ineffective in leading 
the party. 
In the course of writing this thesis a number of party members were interviewed in person or by 
email.  In addition, a number of party officials provided access to party records and papers in 
their possession.  The National Archives of Australia and the National Library of Australia were 
consulted for various political party records and papers in their holdings. 
The major reason a new party emerges is that a group of voters, who may or may not be 
members of one of the major parties, strongly considers that their voices are being 
ignored by both the major parties.  To resolve this situation they either set up a new 
party or join an existing party other than one of the major parties.  If they were only 
ignored by one of the major parties, then their vote or support would ‘swing’ to the 
other major party. 
Therefore, minor parties fill a distinct void which is caused when the major parties fail to pay 
attention to policy areas that are of concern to party members, party supporters and other voters.  
A distinct cause of this neglect is the cartelisation of the major parties whereby the major parties 
interact primarily with the leaders of the corporate world who for significant monetary 
contributions, gain membership of exclusive party forums that guarantee exclusive access to 
party leaders and ministers for policy discussions and input.   
As a consequence, ordinary rank and file members of the party are not been listened to by the 
party leadership and party hierarchy.  Feeling neglected and not getting value for their party 
membership they are very receptive when a newly formed party announces that it will listen to 
their concerns and indeed has policies that resonate. 
Minor parties have been able to gain representation in the Senate due to the electoral changes 
for the Senate which were enacted just before the 1949 Federal election.  These changes made it 
much easier for minor parties to get elected to the Senate.  They could gain election to the lower 
house with its preferential system but this would mean the party would have to concentrate its 
vote in one area, which the National Party has been able to do effectively over its lifespan.  This 
is in vast contrast to the USA where minor parties have not been able to get candidates elected 
to the Congress. 
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Having the necessary finance to operate a political party and contest elections is another 
problem area for minor parties.  For example, the DLP had continual problems with finding the 
necessary finance to fight an election, having to rely heavily on ‘silver circles’ and similar fund 
raisers to finance election campaigns.  This impacted on the DLP’s ability to employ staff and 
be able to campaign effectively in elections. In the early days, the Australian Democrats had 
similar financial problems.  The situation changed significantly from the 1984 federal elections 
when public funding became available to political parties if they polled greater than 4 per cent 
of the first preference vote in an electorate, state or territory.  Currently that funding, which is 
indexed twice yearly, is 262.7 cents for each first preference vote that the party receives.   
This public funding that the party receives is a ‘war chest’ to fight future elections.  However, if 
the party’s support falls below 4% or even if the party’s vote falls, the party is left with a 
shortfall in funding and this makes it much harder for the party to fight the next election.  The 
party then has to find the finance from other sources such as internal party fundraising or ‘scale 
down’ the election campaign which can impact on getting the message out to the electorate and 
the resultant level of electoral support.  Therefore, monetary problems can also impact heavily 
upon a minor party’s lifespan leading eventually to its demise. 
Holding the balance of power in the Senate, at various times, has given the DLP, the Democrats 
and the Greens, much influence and the ability to insist upon various amendments to legislation 
before they would support its passing through parliament.  The parties grew ultimately to hold 
the balance of power, but in the case of the DLP and the Democrats, both suffered big defeats 
and lost the balance of power going from being a key player to being insignificant.  Their level 
of support from the voters was very small at the end of their lifespan.  Their second preferences 
were not decisive in determining the winning candidate in any electorate.  
The Structure of this Thesis 
Chapter two reviews the literature in relation to political parties in general and in respect of the 
four minor parties that make up this study.  It is significant that while there is much literature on 
the rise of minor political parties there is a paucity of literature on the decline and demise of 
minor parties. 
Chapter three discusses the theory of political parties with reference to minor parties and 
explores where the power of minor parties lies.  The chapter also analyses the other factors 
instrumental in the success or failure of a minor party and these include the electoral system and 
voting behavior and the role of the media and its power.  Finally, I discuss Mogens Pedersen’s 
concept of political party lifespans and suggests some modifications to Pedersen’s model 
(Pederson 1982). 
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Chapter four empirically explores the rise of the Australian Democratic Labor Party (DLP), 
which was the product of the third split in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 1955 primarily 
over the issue of the rise of Communism in the unions.  The party was led by former members 
of the Australian Labor Party who had split from that party to join the DLP.  Those who formed 
the DLP considered that both the ALP and the Coalition parties were not doing enough to 
curtail the threat of Communism to Australia.  The DLP in 1955 was encouraged and actively 
supported by the Catholic hierarchy in Victoria and by Mr. BA Santamaria and his National 
Civic Council.  Throughout its lifespan, the DLP was largely concerned about the threat of 
Communism, foreign affairs and the defence of Australia. 
Over its lifespan, as well as showing that minor parties could be elected to the Senate thanks to 
proportional representation, with the preferential electoral system for the House of 
Representatives, the DLP used its second preferences to keep the ALP out of office from 1955 
until 1972 when the DLP’s preferences to the Coalition parties was insufficient to prevent the 
ALP from winning government. 
Chapter Five goes on to consider the reasons for the decline and demise of the DLP.  After a 
spectacular performance in the 1970 Senate election, where the DLP polled its best ever Senate 
vote thanks mainly to voter disillusionment with the major parties, the DLP started to unravel.  
In 1972 when the DLP failed to keep the ALP out of government, communism had ceased to be 
the threat it was in the 1950’s and an increase in defence spending was no longer a priority.  In 
that environment of change, the DLP ceased to remain relevant to the electorate, preferring to 
still champion defence spending, warn of the spread of Communism and promote moralistic 
policies with a much more liberal Catholic church, whose stance on ‘the evils of communism’ 
had vastly changed and indeed had become much less emotional in its tone. 
The party’s change of leadership in the Senate was very poorly handled with one old Senator 
being replaced by another old Senator instead of a younger one.  The former leader quite 
publicly showed his resentment in losing the leadership.  In early 1974 amidst great controversy 
and total surprise, the former leader accepted from the Labor government the ambassadorship to 
Ireland, a role to which he was totally unsuited. 
After the demise of the DLP, the ‘new DLP’ came into being.  This party which was formed by 
some members of the old DLP, had differences from the party that was wound up in 1978.  
Notwithstanding that the new DLP was able to have a Senator (Madigan) elected for a six year 
term, a discussion of the new DLP is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter six empirically reviews the rise of the Australian Democrats, a party that was founded 
in 1977 following the resignation of Don Chipp from the Liberal party.  Chipp was a former 
minister and a prominent and well liked member of that party.  He was considered to be 
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progressive and trendy in his political outlook and thinking.  The Australian Democrats came 
into being as a result of the amalgamation of the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement. 
Chapter seven discusses the reasons for the decline and demise of the Australian Democrats 
after many years of holding the balance of power in the Australian Senate and negotiating a 
number of changes and amendments to key legislation.   
The Australian Democrats faded away in 2004 and 2007 after the party decided to support the 
very unpopular GST legislation.  In addition, after the retirement of the very popular Don 
Chipp, the party had numerous changes of leaders.  These numerous leadership changes largely 
came about because of the party’s strict following of participatory democracy where firstly 
party members could vote for the parliamentary party leadership and secondly if they were 
dissatisfied with that leadership, party members could organise a petition of at least only 100 
party members to have parliamentary party leadership positions declared vacant and a ballot of 
the entire membership of the party would then take place to elect new parliamentary party 
leaders. 
Chapter eight considers the colorful rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) in 1997 
following the withdrawal of Hanson’s endorsement as a Liberal candidate for the Federal seat of 
Oxley in the 1996 Federal elections.  Hanson went on to win the seat and sit in parliament as an 
independent prior to forming PHON.   
Chapter nine discusses the factors that lead to the demise of PHON after a very short lifespan 
from 1996-97 to the defeat of its Queensland Senator in the 2004 Federal elections.  None of the 
major parties Liberal or Labor second preferenced PHON, in fact these two parties chose to 
second preference each other before preferencing PHON. 
In 1996 in her first speech to the Parliament, just before she set up the One Nation party, 
Hanson stated that Asians in Australia were moving around in ghettos and failing to assimilate. 
Hanson offered no proof to support this allegation.  In fact, she lost her seat in the House of 
Representatives at the next election.  Her party’s Senator lost his seat after one term.  In addition 
to having one Senator elected for one term, One Nation and Hanson had also tasted initial 
electoral success in Queensland with the election of 11 members of the Legislative assembly 
and over 24 per cent of the vote.  After this honeymoon period the party virtually imploded, 
with numerous resignations of the One Nation members in the Queensland parliament.  Hanson 
however continued to contest elections under her own name.   
With the success of its ‘political resurrection’ Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party is a very good 
example of a party resonating with the voters and remaining relevant.  In the 2016 election 
Hanson became relevant to elector’s concerns when she campaigned not on Asian immigration 
and Aboriginals, but on three main issues, namely fear of multi culturalism, political 
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correctness, and the impact of globalization.  Spectacularly in 2016 she returned to the federal 
parliament with four senators.  In her party’s election to the Senate in 2016 Hanson moved on 
from 1996 when she was first elected to parliament.  She did this by ensuring that she and her 
party were relevant to the issues that resonated with electors in 2016. 
Chapter ten considers the rise and persistence of the Australian Greens.  Very significantly, the 
Greens have been able to have a member re-elected to the lower house and none of the other 
parties in this study have been able to do this.  However, while the Greens have become a major 
player in the Senate, they have struggled to secure representation in sub-national jurisdictions 
and especially in the lower houses of parliament.  The chapter also discusses whether the 
Australian Greens learnt from the fall of the other minor parties discussed in this thesis.   
Significantly, like the Australian Democrats, the Australian Greens also practice participatory 
democracy.  However, unlike the Australian Democrats the Australian Greens elect their 
Parliamentary leaders with a ballot of the Parliamentary party and not the entire party 
membership as the Democrats did.  In fact, the Greens have had two leadership changes with the 
leaders on each occasion voluntarily stepping down and not being voted out of the leadership.  
The former leaders actively supported the new leadership team, ensuring a smooth transition.  
This change in leadership is in stark contrast with both the DLP and the Democrats. 
The Australian Greens have managed to keep themselves relevant in the eyes of the electorate 
as well as embracing environmental and green policies, the Australian Greens have also heavily 
embraced social policies. The Australian Greens can be described as a post-materialistic party. 
Finally, chapter eleven presents some conclusions to this study and analyses common reasons 
for the rise and fall of a political party as opposed to reasons that are unique to one party.  It 
discusses if it is possible to forecast the possible emergence and later the forthcoming fall of a 
minor political party. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The central underlying research question of this thesis is firstly, what are the underlying factors 
that enable a minor political party to emerge and gain representation in parliament?  Secondly 
what are the factors that might cause a minor party to decline and lose its seats in the 
parliament?  In that light, this chapter explores the literature relating to political parties in 
general and specifically to minor parties in terms of why these parties rise and fall and where 
the support for minor parties comes from.  It also reviews the literature on minor parties in 
terms of electoral performance and leadership.  The chapter then examines the existing literature 
relating to the four Australian minor political parties discussed in this thesis. 
From the outset, it is apparent that the literature on minor political parties provides some 
reasons for the rise of the party but provides very little in the way these reasons interact with 
each other.  In terms of the decline of minor parties there is a scarcity of extant literature.  For 
example, the literature on the fall of the DLP is small in quantity and largely very dated mainly 
around the middle of the 1970s for example Henderson (1975) and McManus (1977).  The only 
exception is Lyons (2008) which is the most recent.  In the eyes of many Australians the rise 
and fall of the DLP is a subject that should be confined to the discipline of Australian history 
and not politics.  However, this thesis shows that there are many valuable lessons to be learnt in 
today’s political climate from the split of the ALP in 1955 which gave birth to the DLP up to the 
demise of the DLP in 1974 through division and a lack of relevance in the modern world. 
The literature on the more recent decline of the Australian Democrats is also very scarce, with 
only preliminary writing in this area.  For example, Madden (2009) provides a list of reasons for 
the party’s demise while Ghazarian (2015) provides some preliminary reasons, namely the 
party’s structure and reliance on participatory democracy in a very formal sense.  Floyd (2014) 
only provides anecdotal information on the rise and fall of the Democrats.  Fortunately, the 
records of the Australian Democrats are housed in the National Library of Australia and those 
records were consulted in the preparation of this thesis.  
Popular literature on the spectacular rise of One Nation is a useful resource (often written by 
adherents but see Leach, Stokes and Ward (2001)).  However, the literature on the decline and 
resurrection of One Nation is almost non-existent.  Although many writers have explored the 
reasons for the rise of One Nation, most of this literature discusses the party’s policies, with a 
strong emphasis on the immigration and guns policies. 
In terms of the rise of the Australian Greens, a variety of literature discusses the party’s policies 
and the party’s rise into the Australian parliament.  But there is very little written on whether the 
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Greens have learnt anything from the demise of the other minor parties, taking on board the 
lessons learned.  There is very little written on the strategies adopted by the Greens to ensure 
that the party remains both relevant and united.  This thesis has been able to draw conclusions 
by comparing the Greens with the other minor parties.  For example, the Greens have remained 
relevant by not restricting their policy appeal solely to green issues and the environment, as they 
have also concentrated their focus on broader social policies.  The party has adopted some 
elements of participatory democracy but not in a pure sense.  Party state and federal conferences 
are used as instruments of policy development and not solely as a means of keeping the rank 
and file party members up to date.  Finally, the Greens do not employ participatory democracy 
to elect the parliamentary party leadership; that election is solely in the hands of the 
parliamentary party members. 
This chapter argues that while there is literature discussing the rise of these parties, there is little 
or no discussion about what factors also contributed to the fall of these parties.  In relation to the 
demise of the parties the available literature is extremely scarce. 
Political Parties in Context  
Political parties can either be major or minor political parties.  A major political party can be 
defined as a political party that stand candidates for election to parliament and has enough 
candidates elected to either form or join government or the party of opposition and alternative 
government depending on the number of candidates elected. 
 A minor party can be defined as a party that is relatively smaller in support or elected members 
than the larger established (or major) parties.  A minor party can stand candidates in a few or all 
electorates (or list variable numbers of candidates) for election.  The minor party’s size in the 
legislature will be numerically small.  Its power and influence may be immense or negligible 
depending on the circumstances of other political outcomes and alignments.   
In Australia, there are two major party blocks, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Coalition between the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party of Australia (the 
Nationals).  In addition to these major parties, many other groups in society, for various reasons, 
form minor parties.  These parties are considered to be minor because of their small size 
compared to the major parties and are unlikely ever to be considered a party able to form 
majority government. 
Some of these minor parties such as the DLP were the result of a split occurring in a major 
party, in that case the ALP.  Other parties have emerged as the result of a transition from a 
social movement to a political party.  For example, social movements concerned with the 
environment transitioned to a political party structure in order to stand candidates for 
parliament. 
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The Categorisation of Minor Parties 
Australia’s two party system consisting of the Liberal-National Coalition and Labor parties has 
never existed unchallenged in absolute terms; minor parties have regularly arisen and appealed 
to the electorate and therefore complicated the prevailing two party model.  Examples include 
protectionists, free traders, country progressive parties, Lang Labor, the Australia Party, the 
Liberal Movement, the Shooters and Fishers Party, various communist parties etc. 
Key (1964:254ff) has categorised minor parties into three groupings;  
 secessionist (these parties form when there is a split in a party and one section of the 
party breaks away to form a more pure version of the original party),  
 aggrieved minority (these are parties of mainly economic interests but there could be 
other or even alternative interests).  The party forms because of some resentment 
regarding these interests be they economic or other interests; and  
 doctrinal (these minor parties promote a particular doctrine both in season and out of 
season, examples include communist, Nazi and socialist parties.  
Richmond (1978:331) has attempted to categorise minor parties in Australia according to the 
Key typology.  Richmond’s categorisation appears as follows: 
Table 1:  Categorisation of Minor Parties 
Secessionist Aggrieved Minority Doctrinal 
DLP New State Communist Parties 
Australia Party Progressive Party Nazi Parties 
Liberal Movement Australian Conservative Party Social Credit Parties 
New Liberal Movement Defence of Government Schools The Australian Greens 
National Liberal Independents  
Workers Party   
Australian Democrats   
 
Significantly, Richmond’s table does not include two very significant minor parties, as they 
were formed after 1978.  These parties are the Australian Greens and One Nation.  One Nation 
would largely fall into the doctrinal grouping: its doctrine was primarily no additional Asian 
immigration to Australia; while the Australian Greens would typically come under the 
‘aggrieved minority’ category.  In the view of the Australian Greens, no other party seems to be 
very concerned about the environment and other ‘green’ issues.  However, as Richmond notes 
(332) no categorisation method is absolutely perfect and the DLP could also fit into the 
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Aggrieved Minority category.  Likewise, a case could be made to include One Nation in the 
Aggrieved Minority category and the Greens could also be described as a doctrinal party, in that 
the issues of environmentalism could be seen as a doctrine. 
Minor parties may be seen to be successful in gaining representation in parliament by having 
well known high profile leaders and this factor certainly contributes to their recognition and 
relevancy.   
While this basic classification may be useful for classifying minor parties, it gives no indication 
as to why some minor parties rise to the extent that they gain parliamentary representation, even 
to the extent of holding the balance of power in the Senate.   
Significantly, Wear (2012:1) considered that third or minor parties depend for their success on 
voter disillusionment with all major political parties. Therefore, when popular resentment is 
directed overwhelmingly at one side of politics in a bipolar party system, there is little scope for 
a significant populist third party to emerge.  This is because the voter would ‘swing’ or change 
their vote from one major party to the other. 
Jaensch (1994:8-9) has identified four different types of minor parties. These types are, 
Doctrinal, Issue Parties, Secessionist or Fragment parties and Protest parties.  Jaensch defined 
issue parties as emerging ‘on the basis of a specific issue’.  He considered ‘the proliferating 
Green parties’ being among the ‘classic examples of issues parties.’  This thesis considers the 
Greens to be a part of the aggrieved minority or protest categories.  The chapter on the Greens 
in this thesis shows that the Green’s policies are concerned with the issue of the environment, 
but the Greens are concerned with other policy areas as well.  Social issues and integrity of the 
parliamentary system being two such policy areas. 
Jaensch defined protest parties as having been ‘based on a reaction to a specific economic, 
social or even religious trend or event.’  In Jaensch’s view, protest parties may show: - 
a concern with, say, the environment, cultural issues, social issues . . . education or 
religious issues – but they may also be an electoral aspect of an economic division, for 
example unemployment. 
A protest party could also be an electoral aspect of another division such as the environment or 
social issues.  Thus, the Greens easily fit into the category of a protest party that is seen as 
relevant in Australia and this is shown by that minor party’s electoral successes. 
A fragmentary party is a party whose founders have split from another party usually a major 
party. Ghazarian (2015) explored Australian minor parties, primarily examining their 
performance in the Senate.  Ghazarian considered the rise and fall of these fragmentary parties 
in a quite general way without exploring in any detail the various factors that led to the rise and 
fall of the various parties.  Ghazarian however provided another classification for more recent 
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minor parties.  Using a two-part classification Gharzarian (2015:12) divided fragmentary parties 
into either issues-based, or issues-competitive parties.  He argued that the older minor parties 
that won seats in the Senate were fragmentary parties.  These parties were the DLP, the Liberal 
Movement and the Australian Democrats.  The more recent successful minor parties that won 
seats in the Senate were issues-based parties, such as the Australian Greens and One Nation.  
These parties arose to promote an issue or issues that that the new party believes the major 
parties have ignored.  Issue competitive parties, such as the Australian Greens, go further in the 
parliamentary environment; these minor parties compete with the major parties in order to get 
their policy concerns onto the government’s policy agenda.  This can be done by the issue 
competitive minor party playing a tactical role in the parliamentary committee system or 
making deals in the usage of the balance power in the upper house. 
Analysing the rise and fall of a minor party 
As a means of viewing minor and micro parties overall, Weeks (2010:481) has put forward the 
following schema for analysis of minor and micro parties: 
 The electoral performance of the minor party; 
 Influence – what has the minor party achieved? 
 Why did the party emerge and disappear? 
 What is the source of their electoral support? 
The emergence and disappearance of the party are two distinct events and should be considered 
separately and not together.  Often these two events can be twenty or more years apart as they 
were with both the DLP and the Australian Democrats.  Leadership is another important factor 
in any political party.  A well-known charismatic leader is a vote winning asset for a minor 
party.  On the other hand a poor performing leader can be a disaster for a minor party.  As an 
example the leadership of the DLP by Gair ended up as a disaster with poor media performances 
and a divisive change in leadership, the electoral fortunes of the DLP suffered as a result.  
Therefore, Weeks’ schema should be recast in the following way 
 Why did the party emerge? 
 What is or was the source of the minor party’s electoral support? 
 What was the overall electoral performance of the party? 
 How well was the party led? 
 Influence what did the party achieve? 
 Why did the party disappear? 
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The individual points in this schema are not watertight compartments but interact with each 
other.  A significant fact is these parties do not move beyond their minor status.  The various 
points of Weeks’ model, as recast, are considered throughout this thesis. 
Electoral Machinery 
Minor parties have benefitted from the changes, enacted by the federal parliament in 1949, to 
the method used in voting in elections for the Senate, as well as an increase in the number of 
Senators from 36 to 60 or from six for each state to ten from each state and then 12 from each 
state. 
This very significant change is discussed in some detail in the next chapter.  Under the 1949 
Senate voting changes a party only had to win a quota under a proportional voting method.  
Under the previous pure preferential voting system, the result was distorted as a party could win 
most of the 36 seats that were in the Senate prior to 1949.  As an example, after the 1946 
election the ALP held 33 Senate seats, with 52 per cent of the vote, to the Coalition’s 3 seats 
with 43.3 per cent of the vote.  
Electoral dynamics are crucial to the party system.  For instance, McAllister (2011:1) has 
commented that: - 
A country’s electoral institutions – which form what is often referred to as ‘the rules of the 
political game’ – are perhaps the most visible of all the political institutions in how they 
shape the manner in which politics is conducted.  In particular, the rules will dictate how 
political parties approach the business of attracting the support of voters, and how voters go 
about responding to the appeals made to them by parties and politicians.  
McAllister goes on:- 
The institutional context of an election therefore determines how and in what manner 
electoral competition takes place.  Institutional rules and individual voter behaviour interact 
in subtle and systematic ways to shape electoral outcomes.  To ignore the rules of the 
electoral game is to miss one vital part of the equation that shapes the voting decision. 
Federally the ‘rules of the electoral game’ are largely responsible for the success of minor 
parties in the Senate with its proportional representation voting system, and very minimal 
success in the House of Representatives with a preferential voting system.  In the next chapter, 
this thesis examines the interaction between minor political parties and the electoral system.  In 
fact, Weeks (2010:491) considered that the electoral system is the ‘primary institution affecting 
minor parties.’  This thesis reflects Weeks’ finding that there is a very strong relationship 
between minor parties and the electoral system in terms of the minor party’s performance and 
its allocation of second preferences and the impact of those second preferences on the final 
result in the electorate. 
Another factor in Australia is the fact that voting is compulsory.  Hill (2002) and (2002a) along 
with Pringle (2012) discuss voting as a duty with voting in Australian being compulsory.  This 
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thesis carries on their work to argue that in the light of a duty of voters, with an electoral system 
with a distinct voting mechanism, minor parties have been legitimately elected to parliament 
and as such take their place in parliament legitimately and are not in parliament with some sort 
of ‘nuisance value’. 
While electoral machinery may be considered to be merely ‘an institutional factor’, the electoral 
machinery provides an environment or avenue for a minor party to contest an election, such as a 
Senate election, and have some chance of success or influencing the outcome through 
preference allocations.  
The Role of the Media 
Media coverage is highly important to the plight of minor parties.  McNair (2003:21ff) suggests 
five functions of the media in advanced democratic societies and these functions are: 
 inform citizens (a surveillance or monitoring function); 
 educate as to the meaning and significance of the facts; 
 provide a platform for political discourse, including the provision of space for the 
expression of dissent; 
 Give publicity to government and political institutions - the watchdog role of journalism; 
and 
 serve as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints. 
Each of these five functions is significant for a minor party.  A minor party provides an alternative 
perspective in the polity and often a significant channel of dissent from the major parties.  This 
thesis considers that just as advertising has a significant impact on demand curves in economics, 
in a similar way, the press with its potential for influence on voters has an impact on the success 
or failure of minor parties. 
However, while much has been written about the role of the press in covering party politics 
(Lloyd 1988, Flint 2005, Clarke 1962) very little has been written about the interaction of the 
press with minor parties.  What factors attract the press towards minor parties and what factors 
drive the press away from minor parties to the point of ignoring a minor party altogether?  One 
Nation has also claimed bias by the press in its reporting of that party and likewise the DLP was 
very critical of the role of the press in that it largely ignored the DLP and its policies.  This 
thesis will test the allegation that the press is biased towards minor parties.  This raises a further 
question, do minor parties understand and appreciate the role of the press in modern society and 
how could their understanding of the press could be enhanced?  Social media is now a way for 
minor parties to bypass the mainstream media and get their message out to the voters directly. 
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Pedersen’s typology of Party Lifespans 
Pedersen (1982:1-16) put forward a typology of party lifespans and minor parties with various 
thresholds of as a means of ‘mapping’ political parties in terms of their strength and influence.   
Pederson (1982:9) considers that political parties have distinct lifespans which pass through 
various thresholds and in doing so, ‘parties, as mortal organisations, are born, parties live and 
parties die.’  These thresholds are the declaration, authorisation, representation and relevance 
phases and these phases will be discussed later in this chapter.  The party’s lifespan can be 
graphed overtime passing through or even failing to pass through one or more of these 
thresholds.  The determinant for passing though the various thresholds is the level of electoral 
support which is shown as a lifespan curve.  Therefore, any event that has influence on the level 
of electoral support will influence the party’s progress through these thresholds.   
Pedersen’s model can be applied to both federal and state parliaments and both upper and lower 
houses of parliament.  Pedersen’s model is useful for showing the rise and fall of a party and for 
provoking an analysis to explain the reasons for the rise and fall of the party.   
Pedersen’s work is instructive in that he poses and answers the question, how can the rise and 
fall of a minor party be mapped or graphed over a period of time?  Pedersen’s model can be 
used to illustrate the potential ‘drivers’ or causes that influence the party’s rise and fall. 
Pedersen’s model is shown below (Pedersen 1982:8). 
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The first threshold is declaration in which the party declares its intention to participate and 
stand candidates for election and thus becomes a party in accordance with Pedersen’s definition 
and not an interest or pressure group.  The second threshold is the authorisation threshold, in 
which the party satisfies any legal requirements under the Electoral Act to set up a party and 
contest elections.  Crossing this threshold at the very least allows the party to nominate 
candidates for election. 
In Australia, the declaration and authorisation phases tend to fuse into one.  While any party is 
free to form and contest federal elections in Australia, there are big advantages in going through 
the authorisation phase.  This phase involves an application for registration of the party, to the 
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).  Authorisation or approval of registration from the 
AEC provides big advantages to a party, for example the party’s name appears alongside the 
name of the party’s candidate on the ballot paper and the party can have a group of candidates 
on a senate ballot paper allowing its supporters to vote in one box only above the line (a black 
line at the top of the ballot paper.)  In this way, a voter only has to fill in one square on the 
ballot paper and not all squares below the line.  In this way, the order of preferences is 
determined by the party voted for, and not by the voter.   
But perhaps the most important advantage of all is that authorisation allows the party to qualify 
for public funding if certain conditions are satisfied.  The main condition is that the party’s 
candidate in an election must achieve at least 4% of the formal first preference votes.  
Many minor parties in Australia reach the authorisation threshold and go no further; they 
eventually fade from the political scene altogether.  However, in contesting an election using 
preferential voting, a minor party’s preferences can be crucial to the outcome, assuming that the 
minor party allocates preferences to a given party and leakages of preferences are very small as 
to be insignificant to the final result. 
The third phase is the representation threshold.  In crossing this threshold, the party is 
successful in having one or more candidates elected to the parliament.  The level of effective 
representation can vary and indicators include performance in parliament and on parliamentary 
committees.  The representation threshold is crossed by the party at an election when the party 
wins seats in the parliament.  The big test for a minor party is to get representation in the 
parliament.  Many parties in Australia are formed (declared) and pass through the authorisation 
stage, but never make it to the representation stage.   
The final threshold is relevance.  Relevance in this sense means relevance in terms of making or 
affecting the decisions and/or the operations of the legislature.  In his definition of a party, 
Sartori discusses relevance ‘with power in mind, he deals only with winners’ (Herzog 
1987:318).  However, this paper argues relevance can also include holding the balance of power 
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or sharing the balance of power with another party or parties, as well as being a party of 
government or alternative government (opposition).  Relevance also includes the sole member 
of a minor party joining the government party as a minister with a portfolio in that government. 
There are two criteria of relevance:  A minor party is discounted as irrelevant when it remains 
superfluous over time as it is not needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority.  But it 
is relevant (regardless of size) if it is in a position to determine over time at least one of the 
government majorities for example coalition potential or utilisation of support in return for 
concessions (Sartori 1976:22-23).  However, in the Australian Senate, a minor party can make 
itself relevant in work on various parliamentary committees and by attracting the attention of the 
press in a positive way. 
Pederson considers that it is the goal of any minor party to pass the threshold of relevance and 
become an influential at best a ruling party. However, he considers these thresholds to be not 
just markers on a continuum, but the thresholds divide up the history of the party in discrete 
phases, each with its own dominant and different quality.   
Hardly ever is the lifespan curve perfectly bell shaped, with the point of culmination in the very 
centre of the lifespan curve.  More often than not however, the lifespan curve is not a neat 
uniform curve and the point of culmination is not right in the centre of the graph. It would 
appear that Pedersen drew a bell-shaped curve to provide a ‘base point’ for comparison or to 
show a ‘neutral’ setting. 
Pedersen suggests four different dimensions of a party’s life span curve, these dimensions are: 
 Modality; 
 dispersion; 
 flatness; and  
 skewness.  
About modality, Pedersen considers that a party will only reach one culmination point in their 
lifespan, in other words, claims Pedersen, ‘parties will only normally pass the thresholds up-
bound once in their lifespan.’  However, Pederson (1982:12) cites the Danish Communist Party 
as one party that suffered a defeat of all of its candidates in 1960, and made a comeback in 
1973, which was a long 13 years later.  In Australia, the Family First party has managed to cross 
the representation threshold twice.  The first time with the election of Senator Steve Fielding 
from Victoria in 2004 and his defeat in 2010 and again nine years later in 2013 with the election 
of Senator Bob Day a Family First Senator from South Australia, who was re-elected at the 
2016 double dissolution election.   
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Pauline Hanson’s One Nation has also crossed the representation threshold for a second time.  
The first time was in 1998 when Len Harris was elected to the Senate, Pauline Hanson herself 
was a dis-endorsed Liberal Party candidate when she won in 1996.  Hanson was defeated in 
1998 and Harris in 2004, after one term in the Senate.  Eighteen years later at the 2016 double 
dissolution elections, Hanson herself won a seat in the Senate for the state of Queensland, 
joining three other One Nation Senators in the new parliament.  The One Nation ‘resurrection’ 
from the politically dead is considered in the chapter on the demise of One Nation in this thesis. 
In terms of a party’s lifespan dispersion, a party’s life span can be very short, ranging over only 
a few years, or the lifespan could be longer, ranging over a few decades or even centuries.  
‘Minor parties are frequently short lived and tend to be led by small cadres of elites’ (Mack 
2011:14).  Compared to the major parties, the minor parties in this study are short lived with the 
life or dispersion of the lifespan ranging from seven years up to 30 years.  A large lifespan is 
largely due to the elites leading the party, these elites are often former well known members of 
one of the major parties, for example Don Chipp.  
Pedersen offers no reasons for a party’s lifespan curve coming to an end.  This thesis explores 
the reasons for a party’s demise and for its commencement.  The reasons for commencement 
and demise are the drivers that influence the party’s path along the lifespan curve. 
A party’s life span will exhibit flatness when it reaches a point, such as just above the 
representation threshold and stays at that point for a noticeable period of time.  In Pedersen’s 
view flatness, can distinguish ‘two polar categories of parties’.  These are firstly, parties with a 
long dispersion who in a shorter time period appear to be stable or showing only moderate 
trends up or down.  The second polar category is a party with a short lifespan, reaching its point 
of culmination quickly and then vanishing of the lifespan graph altogether. 
The final dimension skewness, shows ‘the degree of symmetry of the curve.’  From this 
dimension, Pedersen considers that there are three distinct categories of lifespans and these are:- 
 The suddenly appearing but gradually disappearing party (positively skewed Lifespan 
curve); 
 The gradually appearing, but suddenly disappearing party (negatively skewed Lifespan 
curve); and  
 Parties with symmetrical lifespans. 
This thesis will consider these four dimensions in terms of four Australian minor parties, the 
DLP, the Australian Democrats, One Nation, and the Australian Greens. 
Pedersen (1982:6) considers parties to be ‘mortal organisations’.  He goes on to comment that 
‘seldom will a party disappear by disintegrating or dissolving itself’.  Minor parties in Australia 
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have eventually disintegrated, for example the DLP and the Australian Democrats and a 
discussion on the life spans to the Liberal and Labor parties is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
Minor parties have disintegrated through becoming irrelevant in their policies and thus not 
appealing to the electorate.  While other minor parties have suffered from poor leadership often 
of a very divided party.  A divided poorly lead party is not appealing to the electorate.  These 
factors causing the fall of minor parties are explored in subsequent chapters.  
However, while Pedersen’s typology is a useful idealised ‘graph’ of a party’s progress, this 
thesis argues that the thresholds of representation and authorisation are very broad and need to 
be reworked in order to present more detail in terms of the party’s actual power and influence.   
When a party reaches the point of culmination, the party finds it difficult to maintain its current 
level of support and influence to the extent that it had done.  For example, after an election, the 
party no longer holds the balance of power in its own right or its level of representation falls, 
resulting in more work for its remaining members.  The diagram above, shows some examples 
of Pederson’s life spans (Pederson 1982:8).   
There has been no evaluation or critique of Pedersen’s typology in any of the literature.  In the 
interests of greater accuracy, Pedersen’s typology is more accurate when it is presented on 
graph paper instead of blank paper.   
Pedersen was not the first to use the concept of party ‘lifespans’.  Rawson (1969:313) 
introduced the concept of party life-spans, but in Pedersen’s view Rawson’s ideas were not 
utilised by students of political systems (Pedersen 1982:15).  Rawson was concerned with 
various Labor Parties and their relationship with ‘sponsorship’ such as trade unions, in a number 
of countries.   
The next chapter evaluates Pedersen’s typology and considers that while Pedersen’s lifespans 
and associate thresholds are useful, they do not accurately reflect the lifespans of minor parties 
in the Australian Parliament.  This thesis proposes additional thresholds in order to more 
accurately map a minor political party’s influence and power in the context of the Australian 
Parliament. 
A lifespan curve is an historical trend which picks up and presents a pattern that does not apply 
to all parties.  
The Australian Democratic Labor Party 
There is a variety of literature on the formation and rise of the DLP, but there is a scarcity of 
literature on the demise of the DLP.  Much of the literature on the rise of the DLP covers only 
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limited areas as a result there is absence of discussion on the interactions of the various reasons 
for the rise of the DLP.   
Murray (1970) is an historical account of the Labor split that resulted in the formation of the 
DLP.  Murray discussed the rise of the influence of Communism in the unions and the setting 
up of the industrial groups by the ALP to counteract this influence.  He also gave a detailed 
account of the split.  However, he did not discuss what exactly the role of the DLP was to be or 
whether the better course of action would have been to stay in the ALP and fight Communism 
without forming another party with all of the associated uncertainties. 
Reynolds (1974) discussed the DLP in terms of its rise and the various organisations that played 
a role in that rise, such as the Catholic hierarchy and the industrial groups.  Reynolds also 
discussed the influence of communism in the formation of the DLP.  Reynolds’ final chapter 
was a very speculative discussion on the future of the DLP and Reynolds’ publication appeared 
in bookshops the week the 1974 double dissolution was announced.  Therefore, Reynolds did 
not consider such events as the ‘Gair affair’ and the results of the double dissolution election 
and their impact on the DLP’s lifespan. 
Strangio (2012) discussed the Split and the rise of the DLP in terms of their effect on the ALP.  
He discussed Santamaria and his approach in his anti-Communism mission.  Strangio presented 
the Split as an event that happened only after much division and hostility with in the ALP.  In 
Strangio’s view this division and hostility reached a point where reconciliation and unity were 
impossible.  Furthermore, Strangio believed that a major influence in the Split was sectarianism. 
Mayer (1960) was a very factual account and a review of the DLP from its founding in 1955 to 
mid-1960.  Mayer considered the membership numbers of the DLP and the party’s finances.  
Mayer also discussed the divisions in the Catholic hierarchy which dispelled the idea that the 
DLP was a ‘Church party’.  Mayer also commented on the divisive 1959 Victorian State 
Conference.  However, Mayer drew no conclusions nor did he explore the interactions between 
the different ‘players’ that either made up the DLP or were responsible for its formation. 
Wertheim (1960:3) examined only the issue of what was the role and purpose of the DLP.  Was 
the DLP   the true Labor Party or was the party a third force in Australian politics?  Wertheim 
concluded that primarily the DLP was an anti-communist party. 
Duncan (2001) viewed the DLP from the perspective of the Catholic Church and the anti- 
Communist struggle in Australia.  Duncan’s discussion commences at the time of the origins of 
Catholic Action to a divided Catholic church in the early 1960s. Duncan’s account discusses the 
ALP split from the position of BA Santamaria, the National Civic Council and the Catholic 
hierarchy. 
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Mackerras (1970) explored the DLP’s second preferences strategy from the view point of how 
the preferences were distributed by the voters.  Mackerras considered that the position of the 
DLP candidate on the ballot paper was of some significance.  However, Mackerras did not 
discuss the reasoning behind why the DLP in all elections refused to second preference the 
Labor candidate. 
Duffy (1967:334ff) considered the origins and operations of the DLP as a political party.  He 
explored the role and influence of the industrial groups.  He considered that the major policies 
of the DLP were in terms of defence and foreign affairs.  The DLP’s main support came from 
the state of Victoria and the party was advantaged by the Senate electoral system which saw the 
election of DLP Senators.  While in the House of Representatives the DLP’s preferences had a 
strong influence on the Liberal Party’s electoral successes.  Duffy questioned whether the DLP 
was a veto or ‘nark’ party.  Much of Duffy’s paper explored the future of the DLP.  This thesis 
explores the issues that Duffy raised with the benefit of hindsight and in greater depth. 
Strangman (1975:204ff) who had spent some time as the DLP leader’s private secretary, 
discussed the DLP in terms of power; the power of second preference allocation and the balance 
of power in the Senate.  He explored the DLP’s power from the discovery of power, the exercise 
of power and finally the loss of power in 1972 and 1974.  Strangman argued that the DLP learnt 
from its experiences such as the importance of tightly disciplined second preferences in the 
1961 election, in which ‘DLP preferences went wild’.  This thesis examines and comments on 
Strangman’s claims using the research of others who have written on the DLP. 
Duffy (1987:435ff) discussed the DLP in the seventies.  He claimed that the DLP entered the 
1970s ‘with some valuable assets and some large-scale problems’.  In its favour according to 
Duffy was ‘a solid if narrow electoral base, the balance of power in the Senate, and a strong 
bargaining power with a non-Labor Government’.  Duffy considered that the DLP’s difficulties 
‘were in getting a clear definition of what it wanted to be – a minority third party or a coalition 
partner of one or more parliamentary groups’ 
Costar, Love and Strangio (2005) in the 50th anniversary of the Split, published a collection of 
papers.  The majority of these papers deal with the origins of the DLP, with perspectives from 
the State level in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia.  The next two 
sets of papers deal with ‘the prelude and protagonists’ and ‘religiosity and the split’.  ‘The 
prelude and protagonists’ section contains two papers that in part consider Dr HV Evatt’s role in 
the split.  This thesis considers Dr Evatt’s role in the split in some detail and critically discusses 
his leadership abilities in the light of events leading up to, and after the split. 
Recently Coleman (2016 forthcoming) has written about the rise of the DLP in a biography of 
his grandfather, the late Les Coleman, a member of the Victorian parliament and a founder of 
the DLP in Victoria.  Coleman strongly emphasis the role of the Catholic Church in the Split as 
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well as the leadership of Dr Evatt.  As this work is primarily a biography, there is not the 
detailed explanation for the rise and fall of the DLP that a reader would expect in a 
contemporary work on the DLP. 
This thesis considers not just a few but a number of reasons for the rise of the DLP.  In addition, 
this thesis discusses and then analyses the interactions between these reasons and the role of 
organisations such as the Catholic hierarchy, Santamaria and his National Civic Council and the 
parliamentary Labor Party. 
Only three writers have discussed the demise of the DLP, in chronological order they are 
Henderson (1973 and 1975), Reynolds (2005) and Lyons (2008).  This thesis provides and 
analyses further reasons for the demise of the DLP. 
Henderson (1973:75-80) commented on the DLP’s performance in the 1972 Federal election in 
which the DLP failed to keep the ALP from government by its second preference allocation to 
the coalition parties.  Henderson concluded after reviewing the DLP’s performance in the 1970 
Senate election that the Party’s Senate vote was ‘holding tight’.  However, with regard to the 
1972 House of Representatives elections, the DLP vote continued to decline.   
Henderson went on to discuss the issues that had a bearing on the DLP’s performance in 1972.  
These issues included a softening on communism and the recognition of Communist China by 
the USA.  Henderson also considered that the DLP’s 1972 election campaign had some crucial 
errors.  The DLP ran a campaign on ‘permissive issues’ in other words moral or religious issues. 
Three years later Henderson made a more in depth analyse of the DLP’s declining fortunes 
(Henderson (1975:77-89).  Henderson believed a major problem was the DLP considered its 
support was its Senate vote but its real support was shown in its slowly declining vote in the 
House of Representatives over the years. 
Henderson went on to examine the proposed merger between the DLP and the Country Party 
which was discussed between the two parties in 1973.  Henderson observes the merger was not 
universally supported by either party and showed the poor decision making within the DLP on 
national issues. 
Henderson went on to give an analysis of the DLP’s leadership transition from Gair to 
McManus in 1973.  Henderson believes the transition in leaders was poorly handled being 
allowed to drag on through 1973 with mounting damaging speculation from the DLP’s political 
opponents and the press. 
Finally, Henderson considered the 1974 double dissolution and subsequent election.  He 
questioned why the DLP would want to vote to block supply given the uncertainty of re-election 
24 
of its Senators.  In Henderson’s view in 1974 the electors saw the DLP as irrelevant and 
incapable of changing with the times. 
As the DLP finally wound up in March 1978, Henderson’s account is more an account of the 
state of play of the party in its dying stages.  In other words, Henderson gives a warning to the 
party that it had to find solutions and improve its performance if it wanted to survive and find its 
way back into the Parliament. 
Reynolds (2005:290) provided a discussion on the demise of the DLP in Costar, Love and 
Strangio (2005).  Reynolds account is very broad.  After discussing where the DLP’s support 
came from, he went on to discuss the DLP second preference strategy.  He then discussed the 
general role of minor parties in the Senate. 
The most recent discussion of the demise of the DLP was Lyons (2008:426) In Lyons’ view the 
DLP became irrelevant with its overwhelming focus on foreign affairs and defence issues and 
this irrelevance played a large part in its failure as a political party – in early 1970s its strident 
anti-communism was incompatible with mainstream community opinion.   
Overall the literature on the rise of the DLP only considers one or two of the organisations 
responsible for the rise of the party, with very little discussion on the interactions between those 
organisations.  There is only a small volume of literature on the demise of the DLP.  This thesis 
adds to the literature on the demise of the DLP and explores the interactions between the 
organisations and reasons responsible for the rise of the DLP. 
The Australian Democrats 
The Australian Democrats resulted from a merger of two previous minor parties, the Australia 
Party and the Liberal Movement in South Australia.  Literature on both these parties is very 
scarce.  However, various records relating to these parties were tracked down in the manuscripts 
room at the National Library of Australia.  These records have been consulted in the writing of 
this thesis and they have provided a valuable insight into the reasons why these parties emerged 
and then started to decline.  An examination of other records detailed the early attempts to 
merge the two parties and then seek out Don Chipp who recently resigned from the Liberal 
Party as a leader of the merged party.  At the time Chipp was very well known and had a 
reputation for modern and progressive thinking. 
Warhurst (1997) has amassed a collection of papers discussing the rise of the Australian 
Democrats.  One of the papers discusses the Australia Party (Warhurst 1997b:23-36), while 
another discusses the Liberal Movement (LM) (Jaensch 1997:37-48).  These papers discussed 
the rise of those two parties, but did not consider their individual decline and transition into the 
Australian Democrats.  With a publication date of 1997, the GST and its debate were some three 
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years away and the wrangling and lack of voter support that heralded the party’s demise were 
yet to come. 
This thesis argues that both the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement emerged, but 
then started to decline.  The two parties arrested that fall by agreeing to amalgamate into one 
party and at the same time successfully finding a high-profile leader, the ex-Liberal Don Chipp, 
to lead the new party. 
Reviewing the very scarce literature on the Australia Party, Blackshield (1972) gave a history of 
its founding and early days.  This party was founded by Gordon Barton.  In fact, the party’s 
founding was a reaction to a newspaper advertisement Barton placed in The Australian 
newspaper in 1966 protesting about Australia’s involvement in Vietnam.  The reaction was a 
number of people contacted Barton asking what could they do.  The result was a hastily formed 
party which fielded candidates in the 1966 Federal election.   
Warhurst (1997b:23) considered that the Australia Party was founded in the mid-1960s when 
the ‘political party contest’ changed from the influences of the 1950s Cold War politics 
demonstrated by the DLP’s ‘ensuring office’ for the Coalition parties.  At that time the ALP was 
‘struggling to emerge from the split’ and ‘the Liberal Party was at odds with itself’ and finally 
‘the Country Party was little changed’ with the times. 
As a consequence, Warhurst argued, there was considerable animation in the electorate in the 
form of challenges to settled Australian ways of doing things.  Warhurst listed as examples, the 
Vietnam War, conservation of the environment and women’s rights among others.  The 
Australia Party was part of that challenge. 
The Liberal Movement was a breakaway group from the Liberal Country League in South 
Australia.  The Liberal Movement was led by the former Premier of the State, Steele Hall. 
Jaensch and Bullock (1978) provided the first scholarly account of the rise of the Liberal 
Movement and the reasons behind the splitting of the Liberal Party which brought on the 
Liberal Movement. Jaensch and Bullock also explain the New Liberal Movement and the start 
of the merger that formed the Australian Democrats.  Jaensch and Bullock’s account of the 
Liberal Movement was written at the time it happened.  This thesis explores the rise and fall of 
the Liberal Movement and the merger that formed the Australian Democrats in hindsight after 
nearly 38 years. 
Jaensch (1997:37) gave an account of the formation of the Liberal Movement (LM) in South 
Australia.  The Liberal Movement was at first a mere faction of the Liberal Country League, but 
later became a party in its own right.  Jaensch listed the reasons for the rise of the Liberal 
Movement, the major one being the ‘Playmander’.  The ‘Playmander” was the aligning of South 
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Australian electoral boundaries in the 1930s, by Premier Sir Thomas Playford, to significantly 
advantage the Liberal Country League and markedly disadvantage to Labor Party. 
Jaensch (1997:42 traced the transition of the LM as a faction into a political party in its own 
right, after the 1973 State election in which members associated with the LM did very well.  In 
Jaensch’s words ‘the party within a party was clearly a potent force’.  As a consequence, the 
LM was declared ‘an outside political body’ to which LCL members could not join.  Hall 
retaliated by resigning from the LCL and setting the LM as a separate political party. 
The Liberal Movement fell after the Liberal Country League commenced merger talks in 1976 
(Jaensch 1997:44).  The LM was ‘deeply in debt’ and Hall had acknowledged that the LM had 
‘dramatically changed the LCL (Jaensch 1997:46).  
Robin Millhouse and some others refused to re-join the ‘reformed’ LCL and responded by 
forming ‘the New Liberal Movement.’  It was this party that merged with the Australia Party to 
form the Australian Democrats. 
Some of the earlier Democrat Senators were members of one of the two formative parties, for 
example Siddons was a member of the Australia Party, Evans and Haines were members of the 
New Liberal Movement.   
With regard to the literature on the rise of the Australian Democrats, Warhurst (1997a:3-22) 
considered the first 20 years of the party, up to 1997.  Warhurst mentioned the ructions in the 
party with six leaders over 20 years, three of which were short term leaders.  Warhurst also 
discusses the Democrats participatory ethic which also caused the party problems, which were 
increased by the party’s shrinking membership base.  This thesis explores in some depth the 
leadership problems of the Democrats and argues that these problems were exacerbated by the 
party’s adherence to participatory democracy in a very pure form.  The thesis goes on to argue 
that this pure form of participatory democracy was a major cause in the party’s eventual demise. 
Gauja (2010:486-503) firstly evaluated the Democrats long term electoral impact.  She then 
evaluated the party’s unique organisation and its impact on Australian political culture.  Thirdly 
she analysed the party’s parliamentary role and its contribution in promoting the Senate as a 
house of review.  However Gauja did not explore the lack of an ideology in the Australian 
Democrats and the resultant ability to attract a distinct group of voters.  Nor did she discuss the 
more significant olicies of the Australian Democrats and their impact, for example the decision 
to support the goods and services tax. 
Floyd (2014) who was a member of the Australian Democrats, discussed the rise and the fall of 
the Australian Democrats.  Commenting on the rise of the Democrats, Floyd discussed the role 
and influence of Don Chipp.   According to Floyd, in early days of the party:-  
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. . .  the media spotlight was on Don Chipp.  To many it must have seemed if he was the 
Australian Democrats.  From its inception and through 1977 he was its voice and spirit – 
and he drove himself relentlessly through gruelling feats of endurance to publicise its aims 
(Floyd 2014:12). 
With regard to the demise of the Australian Democrats, in Floyd’s view leadership of the 
parliamentary party and resignations of Senators were significant factors.  However much of the 
blame can be attributed to the debate within the party and the ultimate support for the GST.  In 
addition, Floyd considers the negotiations with the Liberal leadership of Howard and Costello 
was poorly conducted resulting in much negative publicity for the Democrats. (Floyd 
2014:188). 
As with the DLP, there is a scarcity of literature on the decline and fall of the Australian 
Democrats.  Madden (2009) listed several reasons for the demise of the Democrats, but she 
provides little more than a list with no in depth discussion of those reasons.  Economou and 
Ghazarian (2008) considered the main reason for the fall of the Democrats were the rules and 
the structure of the party.   They saw the parliamentary party’s decision to support the GST 
legislation in 2000, as a catalyst to the party’s decline and demise.  This thesis provides an in-
depth study of the reasons behind the fall of the Democrats and identifies a number of other 
reasons for the party’s fall. 
Ghazarian (2015:90ff) considered that the usage of participatory democracy was a major reason 
for the demise of the Australian Democrats, as it ‘allowed leadership tensions to perpetuate.’ 
This thesis has explored other reasons for the demise of the Democrats and has explored the 
reasons given by Madden along with Economou and Ghazarian in greater detail. 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
There is a significant amount of mainly journalistic literature on the rise of One Nation, given 
the short time span of the party and the short period of time that the party was represented in the 
federal and Queensland parliaments.  This literature mainly explores the policies of One Nation 
and in particular the party’s immigration policy, with scant regard to the party’s other policies 
on such areas as gun control, taxation and citizens initiated referenda.  Due to its very recent 
occurrence, there is no literature regarding One Nation’s rise again, or in other words its 
‘resurrection from the political dead’ at the 2016 federal election in which the party won four 
seats in the Senate.  This thesis provides an analysis for this ‘political resurrection’. 
Grant (1997) contains an edited collection of 14 papers.  This collection of papers is primarily 
an exploration of the policies of One Nation and the implications of those policies if 
implemented.  In Grant’s words, the book analyses ‘specific aspects of the Hanson phenomenon 
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in the context of Australian politics’ (Grant 1997:7).’  This book was published in October 1997 
at the very early stages of the One Nation party which at the time was yet to contest an election. 
However, one paper makes an attempt to examine the future of the party. Hughes (1997:129) 
made an attempt to peer into the future in an attempt to discover what would happen to Hanson 
and One Nation at the next election, in 1998.  Hughes discussed three possibilities, firstly that 
Hanson would run as a candidate for the House of Representative in her own seat of Oxley.  
Alternatively, she would run in another seat (which she ended up doing, running in neighboring 
Blair).  Finally, Hughes considered that Hanson might run as a candidate in Queensland for the 
Senate.  In his discussion, Hughes discusses some of the weaknesses in One Nation.  For 
example, David Ettridge the Executive Officer of One Nation ‘openly admits, he knows, or 
understands, little about politics’.  Another problem that Hughes noted, was Hanson’s tendency 
to dump advisers, ‘once they displease her’, so much for ‘frank and fearless advice’!  
Furthermore Hanson ‘attracts supporters with little or no political acumen.’  All of these factors 
in their own way, helped to contribute to the quick demise of the party.  This thesis discusses 
those factors in some depth. 
Leach, Stokes and Ward (2000) is a collection of papers on the rise and fall of One Nation.  
Many of the individual papers consider the rise of One Nation, however few consider the fall 
and demise of the party.  The fall of One Nation is discussed in the book’s introduction and in 
Reynolds (2000).  Reynolds pointed out some of the factors, but not all, that led to or aided the 
demise of One Nation.  One example he gave, was the seating of the One Nation members at the 
far end of the Queensland Legislative Assembly chamber.  This led to the party being referred 
to by the Deputy Premier as ‘that mob down the back’ (Reynolds 2000:172).  Reynolds also 
showed the tactlessness and inexperience of One Nation parliamentarians (at page 173).  Leach, 
Stokes and Ward (2000) did not present an in-depth account of the demise of One Nation, 
referring to it only briefly in passing. 
At the time this collection of papers was prepared, One Nation had been in existence for about 
three years and the party had contested the 1998 Federal election and the Queensland state 
election earlier that year.  Arklay and Wanna (1999) provided an initial analysis of One Nations 
electoral performance in the 1998 Queensland and federal elections.  They commented that One 
Nation emerged by accident over 1996-97 and not by ‘a premeditated act of astute political 
calculation and from her election in March 1996 until her first speech in the parliament six 
months later in September.  This thesis explores this ‘accidental rise’ in some detail.  By the 
year 2000, Hanson had lost her seat in parliament and the approach of the major parties was 
clear, preference One Nation and Hanson last.  In addition, the parliamentary One Nation party 
in the Queensland parliament was unravelling at a fast rate.  However, One Nation was yet to 
contest the 2001 election and One Nation retained a presence in the Queensland parliament for 
some years after 2000. 
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Gibson, McAllister and Tami Swenson (2002:823ff) analysed the performance of One Nation in 
the 1998 Federal election, using the 1998 Australian Election Study, conducted at ANU in 
Canberra.  In their view, Hanson’s vision was the ‘Fortress Australia of the 1950s:  self-
sufficient, united and ethnically homogenous’.   
Gibson, McAllister and Tami Swenson concluded that the results for the election study would 
appear to show that individual level characteristics determine the One Nation vote rather than 
any contextual effects apart from living in a rural area.  In other words, the individual makes a 
conscientious decision to vote One Nation without any external influences except living in a 
rural area as opposed to an urban or metropolitan area. 
Goot and Watson (2001:157) posed the questions; what sorts of people vote for PHON and what 
distinguishes these voters from those who have voted for other parties?  In addition, what does 
the nature of PHON’s electoral support say about PHON as a party of protest, its chances of 
survival and its place in the Australian party system? 
They found that support for PHON was much stronger in Queensland than in other states.  
Support for PHON was higher outside metropolitan areas.  It was the Nationals rather than the 
Liberals or the ALP vote that PHON put at risk.  PHON’s base vote was higher the smaller the 
town or city.  Goot and Wilson’s research again showed that minor parties have one state in 
which they are particularly strong while being weak in the others.  In the case of One Nation 
this state was Queensland, while with the DLP for example, the state of greatest support was 
Victoria. 
There was also an ‘urban fringe’ effect with PHON’s vote rising dramatically to a peak in the 
outskirts of a city, the urban fringe effect was noticeable if these areas contained unskilled 
workers in blue collar industries, few indigenous Australians or people born overseas and a high 
number of home owners or people saving to own their own home.  However, in inner city areas 
with a high multicultural population with high incomes, PHON was likely to fare poorly.  
Therefore, the party depended on voters with no tertiary education, blue collar workers, mainly 
men, albeit with no distinctive age profile. 
Goot and Wilson concluded that there is little evidence that PHON voters are ‘quintessentially 
petit bourgeois’ that is, coming from small business backgrounds.  Nor does PHON support 
represent a working-class revolt against policies that have abandoned tariff protection.  This is a 
little surprising because in the lead up to her first speech and in the formation of PHON, Hanson 
advocated strongly for an abandonment of ‘market forces’ economic policies which includes the 
lowering of tariffs and dismantling of industry protection.  In her first speech to parliament this 
issue was overshadowed by her comments on Asian immigration. 
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Turnbull and Wilson (2001:512) disagreed, arguing that economic security was a factor in 
PHON’s support.  This, they argue, was shown by the importance that Goot and Wilson place 
on the city country divide in PHON’s support.  Goot and Wilson responded (Goot and Wilson 
2001A:512) expressing their disagreement. 
Forrest, Alston, Medlin and Amri (2001:167) also found that the Nationals were the losers in 
voter support with the entry of PHON in the 1998 federal election.  They state that PHON was 
characterised as the party of ‘old Australia’, that is those least able to cope with the pace of 
recent social and economic changes, such as rationalisation and centralisation of services and 
the movement of people from the rural and regional areas to urban areas.  Forrest, Alston, 
Medlin and Amri use as their case study the electorate of Farrer in NSW.  
In his discussion of One Nation, Ghazarian (2015:113ff), considered that Hanson, a ‘right 
populist party type’ was the critical driver of the party.  She received the support of voters and 
not One Nation.  Ghazarian believes that the combination of Hanson’s background, charisma 
and message was a potent mix (at p 119). 
Ghazarian (2010:6), argued that the structure of One Nation gave Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield 
extensive powers, including automatic expulsion of members based on a suspicion that they 
were somehow working against the party.  In Ghazarian’s view the structure of One Nation was 
one of the major reasons for its demise and the rise in Queensland of the City Country Alliance 
in 2000.  The One Nation parliamentarians in Queensland rejected the structure of One Nation.  
Disputes followed in One Nation along with the resignation of Hanson, while Ettridge and 
Oldfield removed themselves from the day to day operation of the Party.  Ghazarian also notes 
that One Nation also ‘deliberately sought to exclude its members from the decision-making 
processes.’ 
Ghazarian (2015:128ff) commented on some of the reasons for the demise of One Nation.  He 
noted that the party’s policy formulation was poor, for example ‘printing money’ and the ‘easy 
tax’ were poorly thought through and thanks to media publicity turned the party into a joke.  In 
the Western Australian state election of 2001, One Nation decided to preference all sitting MPs 
last regardless of party as a response to One Nation not receiving second preferences from either 
of the major parties.  This response seemed rather childish and an example of sulking.  It is 
surprising that Ghazarian did not comment on One Nation’s unwillingness to at least negotiate 
with ether of the major parties for second preferences. 
Ghazarian has described the decline of One Nation, but has not explored the reasons why the 
decline happened.  In the rise of One Nation, Ghazarian did not mention the role of the ‘Pauline 
Hanson Supporters Movement’ and the poor utilisation and management of this movement by 
Hanson and her advisers.  This thesis explores the role of the ‘Pauline Hanson Supporters 
Movement’ and how it could have been better used and managed by Hanson and her advisers. 
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This thesis explores the rise of One Nation with the benefit of some hindsight.  It takes the 
various reasons for the demise of the party and considers these reasons in greater detail 
considering how many of these reasons together caused the party’s decline.  Finally, this thesis 
explores the reasons for the ‘political resurrection’ of One Nation at the 2016 federal double 
dissolution elections. 
The Australian Greens 
The Australian Greens are different to the other parties considered in this thesis.  The Australian 
Greens were not a ‘break away’ party, but evolved from environmental social groups such as the 
‘Lake Pedder Action Committee’ in Tasmania.  The Australian Greens appear to be on the ‘rise 
and rise’.  This Party is not on a decline leading to an eventual demise.  This thesis explores 
why the Greens have been so successful.  This thesis poses the question is the Australian Greens 
a party that has learnt the lessons from the demise of other minor parties and avoided the 
pitfalls? 
Considering Green parties in general, much of the literature has a European focus, but with 
lessons for Australia and indeed some similarities to Australia.  Rootes (2002) considered that 
environmental awareness may have been a precondition for the rise of Green parties, but the 
prevailing electoral systems such as proportional representation, and the conditions of political 
competition determine whether potential is translated into votes.  With regard to Australia he 
observes that the Greens breakthrough in 2001 came in elections to upper houses elected by 
proportional representation but not in lower houses where majoritarian systems prevail.  
However, since then the Australian Greens have been successful gaining one House of 
Representatives electorate and a few lower house seats in various state parliaments. 
Rootes (2002:78) commented that Green parties are seldom grown automatically out of 
environmental movements. He considered that the anti-nuclear movements and campaigns of 
the 1974 were also factors in the rise of the Green parties.  Rootes also considered that the 
Greens parties’ greater success has come from being also seen as a protest party. 
Rootes (2002:79) noted that the Greens were, in many countries, pioneers of making the 
environment a central political issue.  Furthermore, once they had put environmental concerns 
on the agenda and demonstrated it was not merely a passing fancy but had a relatively stable 
constituency, other parties in varying degrees and for varying reasons, also embraced 
environmentalism at least rhetorically. 
He went on to comment that the result is the Greens no longer have the environment issue to 
themselves. However, because more mainstream parties do not attend to the environment as 
convincingly or as consistently, so as to ‘follow the barometer of public opinion’, Green parties 
continue to be the most closely identified with, and trusted, on environmental issues. 
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Muller-Rommel (2007:149) also considered that proportional representation ‘has indeed been 
shown to facilitate the development of new parties while majority electoral systems hinder the 
electoral prospects of these parties unless they are regionally concentrated. 
Muller-Rommel (2007:146) spoke of a new politics culture which has strongly supported the 
rise of the collective identity mood among socially or politically marginalised citizens.  The 
adherence to new political issues provide three options in voting behavior: exit, loyalty or voice.  
Exit means the voters no longer participate in politics. Regarding loyalty, the voters vote for the 
established parties although as voters, they are dissatisfied with the party’s policy making.  
Muller-Rommel noted that these voters are usually the older voters who have a strong 
historically rooted party identification. Those voters who choose voice can do this in two ways: 
either inside or outside the party system.  Outside the party system, the discontented voters have 
established new social movements.  Inside the party system the discontented voters have found 
their parliamentary arm among the green parties. 
Muller-Rommel (2007:146) considered that there are at least three characteristics of Green 
parties.  Firstly, most of these parties follow the basic ideas of the ‘new politics’ concept.  In 
short, these parties hold a general left-wing utilitarian position and introduce programmatic and 
ideological thinking which is less consistent with the traditional left-to-right dimension. They 
also advocate a set of alternative values that differ significantly from those of the established 
parties.  Secondly, Green parties have a much stronger preference for participatory party 
organisation than any established party.  This thesis has found that while the Australian Greens 
have adopted a participatory politics approach, it differs from the participatory politics model 
used by the Australian Democrats.  The Australian Greens parliamentary party chooses its 
leadership team in the parliament and not the rank and file.  Secondly the Australian Greens like 
other Australian parties use party state and federal conferences for policy formulation.  The 
Australian Democrats used those conferences primary as ‘training sessions’ on various subjects 
for the party rank and file.  
Thirdly Green party voters differ significantly from voters who support established parties.  
Greens voters are mainly younger, highly educated, and occupy white collar and government 
jobs with traditional class conflict being virtually non-existent.  This thesis notes that this 
characteristic is also true of the Australian Greens. 
Muller-Rommel (2007:148) commented that the characteristics of the political and the 
economic setting of the country are responsible for the electoral strength of Green parties. He 
also considered cartelisation to be significant in the Green party’s success. 
Muller-Rommel (2007:150) expanded the concept of the cartel parties thesis and its influence 
on the rise of Green parties.  He argued that large established parties are losing sight of their 
electoral support base in society and this is has led to the foundation of new challenger parties 
33 
 
such as the Greens and a decline in electoral support for the established parties.  As a reaction 
against this decline and in order to maintain their commanding position, the main established 
parties rendered their relationship with state structures much closer, by means of control of the 
mass media; of the spread of party patronage and the level of state support received.  In other 
words, a cartel type arrangement exists when all major established parties collectively cooperate 
with each other successfully in linking themselves with state structures and in resisting the 
programmatic and organisational challenges from newly found parties such as the Greens.  This 
thesis has found this situation to be a key factor in Australia. 
The cartelisation of the major parties has resulted in a rise in the number of minor parties in 
Australia along with an increase in the level of their electoral support.  The Australian Greens 
have benefitted in terms of cartelisation helping to ensure their continuity and their current level 
of overall support.  In fact, attempts by the major parties to change the rules to make it harder 
for minor parties have not been successful in terms of the Australian Greens.  The Greens have 
qualified for significant sums of electoral funding from the public purse and the recent changes 
to the voting rules in respect of Senate, which were supported by the Greens, has not 
significantly lessened the number of Greens in the Australian Senate. 
The major piece of Australian literature regarding the rise of the Greens is Jackson (2016).  
Jackson explored a number of aspects of the Australian Greens, however he did not consider if 
the Australian Greens have learnt from the demise of the other parties discussed in this thesis 
and whether or not the Australian Greens have put in place mechanisms to ensure the party does 
not suddenly meet its decline.   
Lohrey (2002) provided an historical account of the rise of the Australian Greens.  She traced 
the Greens from the first Greens organisation in Australia, the United Tasmania Group, up to 
2002 when the Australian Greens held seats in the Federal parliament and a number of State 
parliaments.   
Lohrey’s account is very general.  Lohrey made some comparisons with the Australian 
Democrats but no other Australian minor party.  Her main concern was the Australian 
Democrats refused a number of requests to amalgamate with the Australian Greens.  There is no 
mention or acknowledgement in Lohrey’s writing of the Greens learning any lessons from the 
Australian Democrats’ usage of participative democracy or the Democrats numerous changes of 
party leader. 
The Greens are an organic party in the sense they have evolved over a lengthy period of time 
and out of several community campaigns organised at the grass roots.  Overall their support has 
grown steadily.  The Greens were not founded through the personal fiat of one individual as was 
the Australian Democrats and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation.  It has evolved in to a real 
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constituency, something more than just a broad-based protest vote.  The Greens are not based on 
individual policy items but on a new paradigm or grand narrative of what politics is all about the 
ecological.  (Lohrey 2002.2)  
In Lohrey’s view the problem facing the Australian Greens is ‘not having too narrow a focus or 
being marginal or fringe’.  Rather the Party’s difficulty will be ‘in keeping up with the 
complexity of expansion within the ecological constituency and in maintaining a balance of 
forces within their own movement’ (Lohrey 2002:82)  
However as with Jackson, Lohrey has not considered what the Greens have learnt from other 
minor parties to ensure the Greens will not meet a sudden demise. 
Conclusion 
This literature review has considered the literature relating to minor parties.  It has found that 
while literature on the rise of the various minor parties is both plentiful and diverse, literature on 
the demise of minor political parties and the demise of, or a lack of electoral support for three of 
these parties along with the electoral resurrection of one of them is almost nonexistent. 
Most minor party literature concentrates on the origins and emergence of the minor party rather 
than considering the changing political environment and threatening factors both within the 
party and externally that could jeopardise the party’s survival, or lead to its eventual demise 
Notwithstanding Rawson’s reference to political party lifespan curves, no literature to date has 
political party lifespans as depicted in Pedersen’s model in an Australian context and suggested 
enhancements to Pedersen’s model. 
The next chapter considers minor political parties in general in terms of their leadership, 
structure and roles, along with the voting systems that either enhance or inhibit their successes 
in elections. 
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Chapter Three: Minor Political 
Parties in General 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by exploring what is a ‘political party’, then extending the analysis to 
examine what is a minor and a micro party.  The chapter then goes on discuss the expected 
functions of a political party, including those of the minor or micro parties.  The chapter also 
discusses the voter behavior that supports a minor party.  The electoral system including the 
voting system for the House of Representatives (preferential voting) and the Senate 
(proportional representation) are explored and discussed.  The methodology used to explore the 
rise and fall of a political party is discussed and the question is posed: how can a political party 
be usefully categorised?  The chapter also analyses the role and expectations of leadership and 
the implications of a change of leadership of a minor party. 
This chapter briefly considers the implications for minor parties of the changes in early 2016 to 
voting in elections for the Senate.  Apart from the political resurrection of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation, this thesis considers events that took place prior to those changes in Senate voting.  
Parliament amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act in early 2016 to abolish group voting 
tickets which allowed parties themselves to allocate preferences to other parties, the voter only 
had to vote for one party.  The preferences were then allocated by the Electoral Commission as 
detailed by that political party.   This voting method allowed some candidates to be elected to 
the Senate with a very small first preference vote which could be as low as two percent of the 
vote.  It also allowed some electoral strategists to ‘game the system’ by negotiating very 
secretive preference deals between parties. 
The amendments to the electoral act abolished the system of voting for one party and 
preferences allocated in accordance with that party’s instructions.  Under the new system, a 
voter had to mark at least six squares above the line a vote for the parties, or at least twelve 
squares below the line, a vote for candidates.  In sponsoring the legislation, the government 
considered the amendments were prevent the secretive deals and preference allocations and as a 
result make winning a seat in the Senate much harder for minor parties. 
What is a political party? 
A political party can be defined in many ways.  Firstly, a political party can be defined as an 
organisation (political, military, class, community etc) that seeks to govern.  Rose (1964:36) for 
example saw a political party as ‘a large scale organisation whose purpose is to control the 
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personal and policies of the government’.  In addition, Janda (1970:83) defined political parties 
as ‘organisations that pursue goals of placing their avowed representatives in government 
positions.’   
A political party could also be defined as an organisation that aims and campaigns to have its 
candidates elected to public office that is holding seats in the parliament.  In that light, Smith 
(2006:11) defined a political party as ‘an organisation that aims to influence public policy in 
favour of an ideology or set of interests, primarily by attempting to gain and retain control of 
public offices.’  Smith went on to note that Australian political scientists ‘have struggled to 
produce a sensible basis for distinguishing minor from major parties’. 
In the standard political science literature, Sartori (2005:64) defined a political party as ‘any 
political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing though elections, candidates 
for public office’.  In Sartori’s view, ‘parties which fail to win seats in parliament should be 
discounted’.  But ‘minor parties must be counted, no matter how small they are, if they either 
have “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential”’ (Sartori 2005:122.-23).  Herzog (1987:318) 
bluntly observed that. ‘Sartori examines relevancy (of a political party) with power relations in 
mind; he deals only with the winners’.  In respect of Sartori a minor party can have “blackmail 
potential” in the allocation of tis second preferences without it winning any seats in the 
legislative chamber, the DLP in House of Representative elections is a good example.  Janda 
and Rose’s definitions also dealt only with ‘winners’ namely ‘representatives in government 
positions’. 
The concept of political power is an important element of a political party.  In Australia, this 
political power can include making a decision as to which major political party should be 
preferenced over the other.  In that light, Forell (1995:41) defined a political party as ‘an 
organisation of people of broadly similar ideas or interests, whose aim is to gain political 
power.’ 
A more encompassing definition of a political party can also include an organisation that 
declares its intention of nominating its candidates for election to parliament.  Pedersen (1982:5) 
offered the broader definition of a political party as, ‘an organisation – however loosely or 
strongly organised – which either presents or nominates candidates for public elections, or 
which, at least, has the declared intention of doing so.’  Unlike Sartori and Janda, Pedersen has 
widened the definition of a party to include a political organisation before it has contested its 
first election, it has only ‘declared its intention of doing so’. 
Such largely restrictive definitions may fit the larger parties but largely exclude minor parties 
with their emphasis on power and strategies, which may be motivated by balance of power 
strategies and the power of questioning and reporting in parliamentary committees.   
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So, what is a minor political party and what distinguishes it from a major party?  A minor party 
simply is a party that is relatively smaller in support or elected members than the larger 
established (or major) parties.  A minor party can stand candidates in a few or all electorates (or 
list variable numbers of candidates) for election.  The minor party’s size in the legislature is 
numerically restricted.  Its power and influence may be immense or negligible depending on the 
circumstances of other political outcomes and alignments.   
For example, in a hung parliament where no major party has a majority in the house of 
government, the lower house, a minor party’s ‘balance of power’ position is a very powerful 
one.  On the surface, a minor party could obstruct the legislation of the major party in 
government.  Alternatively, the minor party could negotiate with the major party for passage of 
the legislation, ensuring that various demands of the minor party are incorporated in the 
legislation before it gains the support of the minor party.   
Gauja (2010:489) believed that the Australian Democrats were regarded as a minor party for the 
following reasons: - 
 the party had not participated in government (although this is not a fundamental 
exclusion); 
 The party had a relatively small size and vote share; and  
 It had not been historically regarded as part of Australia’s two party system 
Gauja’s definition can be readily applied to all the four minor parties which are the subject of 
this thesis.  None of them had participated in government at a federal level and none of them, 
unlike the National Party, had ever been regarded as part of Australia’s two party system.  
Finally, all four parties have a small size and vote share.  The size of the parties has ranged from 
two members of parliament up to 11 members or Senators.  Their share of the vote has never 
exceeded 15 per cent nationally in either house. 
Smith (2006:11-12) quite simply defines minor parties by inclusivity and influence as ‘parties 
that consistently fail to achieve inclusion in the government of the day’, a definition that would 
not fit European multiparty systems where minor parties often do join coalition governments.  
Smith goes on to develop that definition by stating that: - 
One common sense Australian approach to distinguishing minor and major parties is that 
minor parties are any parties other than the Labor, Liberal and (usually) the National (or 
country) parties.  
Richmond (1978:317) also defines minor parties in the negative as the ‘other parties’ not 
included in the major parties grouping.  In Richmond’s view activities, such as holding the 
balance of power in the Senate, ‘illustrates the position of a successful minor party’.  The key 
part of this success for a minor party is gaining representation in the parliament.   
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Considering minor parties in general Mayer (1980:345) commented that: - 
Minor parties in Australia are often seen as a nuisance and obstructionist.  A new party 
would require special efforts from its supporters and would compete for electoral support 
and would want its share of scare parliamentary resources.  To survive it must in some way 
differentiate itself from the established norms and it will be seen at the very least a nuisance 
if not a threat. 
. . . major parties see minor ones as irrational and impractical or potentially obstructive and 
dangerous splinters. 
This would be true where the minor party has elected representatives in the Australian Senate 
and in addition the party holds the balance of power in that chamber.  Under a balance of power 
situation conflict will arise where the minor party refuses to support a key piece of the 
government’s legislation.  The minor party in that situation could be seen as ‘obstructionist’ 
both by the major party and the mass media as well as any interest group that has a strong 
interest in the legislation in question. 
This thesis considers the rise and fall of minor political parties from an Australian perspective.  
Pederson’s (1982:8) ‘lifespan bell curves’ (Ls curves) for political parties is utilised as a means 
of mapping or modelling a party’s lifespan.  However, this thesis proposes a number of changes 
to Pedersen’s model in order to make it particularly more relevant to minor and micro parties 
and to the Australian political scene. 
What are the core functions of a political party? 
Reynolds (2007:95) comments that political parties perform a number of functions which 
include, policy formulation and articulation, recruitment of political activists, training for 
leadership through internal party mechanisms and parliamentary service, operating as electoral 
machines and finally demarcating differing ideological positions within the polity.  A further 
function is providing for and facilitating the circulation of political elites via the transfer of 
power. 
A minor party has all of the above roles.  It formulates and then articulates policy as a part of 
developing and promoting its party platform or manifesto as an alternative to the major parties.  
Minor parties also hold annual state conferences and from time to time, federal conferences.  
These conferences can provide an opportunity to discuss and debate the party’s policy over the 
next few years and importantly assist in keeping the party relevant to the needs and desires of 
the electorate.  A minor party, as a political party also attracts and recruits party activists who 
believe in the party’s ideology and policies.  Some of these people could in time, stand as 
candidates for the party at a parliamentary election or as a senior office bearer in the party. 
Operating as an electoral machine can be a very significant function for a minor party, even for 
a party that is not represented in parliament.  The minor party’s allocation of its second 
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preferences can be a major determinant as to which major party gains government.  In fact, the 
DLP played this role quite decisively.  Although it was a ‘labour party’ in name, it did not 
preference the Australian Labor Party from which it had split, but rather the Liberal Party.  In 
this way, the DLP helped keep the Liberal Party in government from 1955 to 1972, denying 
government to the ALP for all of this time. 
As well as initiating legislation, a minor party’s role can be expanded to include a watchdog role 
and if the party has sufficient members in the Parliament to either hold or share the balance of 
power in the parliamentary chamber.  It is misguided to say that a minor party can do absolutely 
nothing in the chamber.  In fact, the operation of the Australian Senate is very conducive to 
members of minor or even micro parties.  Senators can take part in Senate committee hearings 
as ‘participating members’ without being members of the committee.  This opportunity can be 
useful to a minor party and its Senator(s) at contentious hearings such as departmental 
estimates. 
Richmond (1978:319) considered another function of a minor parties is to show the major 
parties that the issue or issues that the minor party campaigned on is important and a vote for 
the minor party is therefore, not a wasted vote.  This is evidenced by the number of votes that 
the minor party won and such a result serves as a reminder to the major parties that the issue in 
question is important to the electorate.  This would be true where a minor party campaigns on 
one or two major issues and attracts a significant vote for doing so.  That argument would not be 
convincing if the minor party ran on a number of issues and attracted a very small percentage of 
the vote.  Minor parties can often ‘drag’ major parties in their direction through electoral 
competition (for example the Greens siphoning off Labor votes has caused Labor to become 
‘greener’.) 
Growth of Support for Minor and Micro Parties 
Election to the House of Representatives is difficult for a minor or micro party due to the 
requirement to win a majority of the votes to be elected in a preferential system.  The following 
table shows the level of support at Senate elections for the major parties (the Coalition and 
Labor) compared to minor parties over a 60-year period.  The Senate is significant for its 
proportional representation voting system which can assist minor and micro parties to have 
candidates elected to the Senate. 
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Table 2:  Growth of Support for Minor and Micro Parties in Australian Senate elections 
Election ALP Coalition Minor Parties 
1951 45.9 49.7 4.4 
1953 50.6 44.4 5.0 
1955 40.6 48.8 10.7 
1958 42.8 45.2 12.0 
1961 44.7 42.1 13.20 
1964 44.7 45.7 9.7 
1967 45.0 42.8 12.2 
1970 42.2 38.2 19.60 
1974 47.3 43.9 8.9 
1975 40.9 51.7 7.40 
1977 36.8 45.6 17.70 
1980 42.3 43.5 14.30 
1983 45.5 39.8 14.70 
1984 42.2 39.5 18.30 
1987 42.8 42.0 15.10 
1990 38.4 41.9 19.60 
1993 43.5 43.0 13.40 
1996 36.2 44.0 19.90 
1998 37.3 37.7 25.1 
2001 34.3 41.8 23.70 
2004 35.0 45.1 18.20 
2007 40.3 39.9 19.70 
2010 35.1 38.6 26.20 
2013 29.6 37.0 33.40 
2016 29.79 27.47 35.04 
Source: AEC and Parliamentary Library  
The highest and lowest level of support in each decade is bolded. 
The rise of the DLP in 1955, coupled with a fall in support for the ALP, is reflected in the 
doubling of support for minor parties in that year.  The credit squeeze of 1961 is responsible for 
a fall in support for the coalition and increases in support for the ALP and minor parties.  In the 
1970 Senate election, strong dissatisfaction for the two major parties is evident with a 19.60 
level of support for minor parties. 
Support for minor parties slumped in the double dissolution elections of 1974 and 1975 as those 
elections were very presidential with leader versus leader rather than party versus party.  In the 
1977 election support for the minor parties jumped up to 17.70 percent with the rise of the 
Australian Democrats lead by the popular Don Chipp.  As the Australian Democrats started to 
41 
 
fall, the Australian Greens support level rose with the level of support for minor parties staying 
well over ten percent.  In fact, at a number of elections crossing over the 20 per cent threshold. 
However, the real indicator is table three which shows an increasing trend in the level of support 
over the seven decades covered by table one.  While both the lowest level of support fluctuates 
very slightly, the overall trend is a steady increase over time in support for the minor parties.   In 
the same period support for the two major parties has declined.  There are a number of possible 
reasons for this.  One reason is the policies of the minor parties are seen to fill a void which has 
not been addressed by the major parties.  Another reason is minor parties lead by well-known 
charismatic leaders such as Pauline Hanson, Don Chipp and Bob Brown. 
Table 3:  Minor Party vote percentage by decade highest and lowest 
Decade Highest Lowest Decade Average 
1950s 12.0 (1958) 4.4 (1951) 8.03 
1960s 13.20 (1961) 9.7 (1964) 11.70 
1970s 19.60 (1970) 7.40 (1975) 13.40 
1980s 18.30 (1984) 14.30 (1980) 15.60 
1990s 25.10 (1998) 13.40 (1993) 19.50 
2000s 23.70 (2001) 18.20 (2004) 22.70 
2010s 35.04 (2016) 26.20 (2010) 31.55 
Source: extracted from data provided by the AEC and the Parliamentary Library  
The categorization of minor parties 
Ghazarian (2015:17) considers the DLP to be a ‘fragmentary party’ because it arose as a result 
of fragmentation with a major party, the ALP.  He also considered the Australia Party and the 
Liberal Movement as fragmentary parties as they arose from fragmentation with the Liberal 
Party of Australia.  He also believed that the Australian Democrats commenced as a 
fragmentary party Ghazarian (2015:90).  He considered that: - 
The rise of the Australian Democrats was the result of the coming together of the three 
manifestations of fragmentation of the Liberal Party: The Australia Party, the Liberal 
Movement and Don Chipp. 
Ghazarian (2015:x) claimed around 1984 the Democrats attempted to ‘reposition itself’ from a 
fragmentary party to an ‘issues competitive party’.  Green-Pedersen (2007:609) defines an 
issues competitive party as a party which forces ‘political opponents to pay attention to issues 
they would rather see disappear’ and pay attention to issues that are not necessarily attractive in 
electoral terms.’  Ghazarian however considered that the Democrats failed in this transition 
through firstly its participative democracy structure and secondly competition from another 
issues competitive party, the Australian Greens. 
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He also regarded Pauline Hanson’s One Nation as another ‘issues competitive party’ Ghazarian 
(2015:113).  Hanson was competing with the major parties for the issues of immigration, 
aboriginal affairs and globalisation to be placed on the policy agenda. 
There is much pessimism about the longevity of minor parties.  For instance, Warhurst has 
argued ‘The conventional wisdom has been that most minor parties have no success at all, but 
that if they do they flare up quickly and briefly before fading into oblivion’ (Warhurst 1997:4).  
Given that the DLP had a lifespan of 19 years, the Australian Democrats 30 years and One 
Nation a lifespan of around eight years, there is validity in Warhurst’s comment.  However, the 
Australian Greens are still going strong after 20 years and when one minor or micro party fades 
away from the Senate, it appears another quickly springs up to take its place.   
The DLP faded away in May 1974, the Democrats won seats in the Senate in December 1977, a 
little over three years later and as the Australian Democrats were starting to fade, the Australian 
Greens were starting to dominate the minor party spectrum.  With its very few members in the 
parliament in a very brief time, One Nation could be described as no more than ‘a flash in the 
pan’ at that time. 
However, One Nation experienced a political ‘resurrection’ at the 2016 double dissolution 
election with the election of Pauline Hanson to the Senate along with three other additional 
candidates from that party being elected to the Senate.  However as argued in chapter nine, the 
One Nation party was reconstituted under a more professional management team. 
Papadakis and Bean (1995:97) considered that minor parties are: - 
Politically vulnerable on two important fronts: they lack a distinctive clientele in the form 
of a consistent appeal to well-defined social groups and they face institutional arrangements 
such as electoral systems which favour entrenched interests. 
They go on to argue that 
Both of these factors make minor parties susceptible to sudden changes of fortune (even if 
they enjoy a run of success for a time) and constitute major challenges to their longer term 
political prospects. 
This is true of the DLP; it lacked a distinctive clientele after the fading away of those who 
remembered the fear of communism in the 1940s and 50s.  As will be seen in the Chapter on the 
demise of the DLP, the leaders of that party also alienated young university students, some of 
who could have been seen as a part of the DLP’s future support base. 
A quick study of the recent changes of additions and deletions to the Australian Electoral 
Commission’s register of political parties will show that while many parties are being 
deregistered, others are being successfully added to take their place.  So, while minor parties 
spring up and fade away, they are quickly replaced on the ballot paper by new minor or micro 
parties for the voter’s consideration. 
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The Electoral System 
Weeks (2010:491) has noted that ‘The primary institution affecting minor parties is the electoral 
system’.  Majoritarian electoral systems arguably discourage the proliferation of minor parties, 
while generally proportional systems encourage their proliferation.  In the House of 
Representatives, the electoral system is preferential voting, while in the Senate the voting 
system is one of proportional representation using a preferential system to allocate preferences.  
In both Senate and House of representatives, voting is compulsory. 
Exhaustive preferential voting predates the introduction of compulsory voting.  Under this 
system, a vote is valid only if all the candidates on the ballot paper are ranked; importantly, 
those who vote for a minor party ultimately have to express a preference for one of the major 
parties on the ballot. Where no candidate enjoys a majority, preferences are distributed until one 
candidate prevails. Occasionally, this changes the plurality result (Goot 2006:191). 
The main argument in support of preferential voting is that under first past the post voting, a 
candidate could easily be elected without winning greater than 50 per cent of the primary vote. 
Carter (2002:133) notes that majoritarian electoral formulae in which the winner takes all, 
discourages multipartyism, promotes parliamentary majorities and reflects a concern for the 
stability of the political system.  By contrast, the proportionality formulae allow votes to be 
translated into seats.  Seats are distributed in some proportion to the votes cast for individual 
parties or candidates. 
Where preferences are likely to be distributed - and in federal politics this is increasingly the 
case - minor parties have a base from which to bargain (Farrell and McAllister 2003:296-97). 
Minor parties are able to negotiate with the major parties for an exchange of second preferences. 
This can result in changes in the policies of a major party in order to gain the second preference 
votes of a particular minor party.  Thus, a vote for a minor party is not in itself a wasted vote. 
Minor parties are in a position of power in deciding which major party will receive the minor 
party’s second preferences at an election. 
However, some degree of multi-party competition can take place in the Australian House of 
Representatives where a minor party concentrates its vote in select regions of a state.  A 
persistent example in Australia is the National Party which concentrates its votes in certain rural 
areas of various states.  In recent times the Australian Greens party has concentrated enough of 
its voting support in the State of Victoria to have a Greens candidate elected for the House of 
Representatives electorate of Melbourne.  Significantly both the DLP and the Australian 
Democrats were unsuccessful in this area, while One Nation only had a member in the House of 
Representatives through its member being a dis-endorsed Liberal party candidate. 
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Tavits (2007:113) commented that: - 
the emergence of new parties and their electoral success hinders the stable link between 
parties and voters. . . .  Large scale redistribution of votes, in turn, prevents parties from 
making long term policy commitments.   
While that may be applicable to countries with a ‘first past the post’ method of voting, the 
outcome can be much different under a preferential or proportional system of voting.  Both of 
those systems operate on the allocation of preferences and established parties can negotiate or 
bargain for those preferences.  Part of that process can, and often does, include the realigning 
of major policies by a major party to satisfy at least in part the demands of the minor party 
providing the second preferences.  A strong example of this is the allocation of the DLP’s 
second preferences to the Liberal Party and in return the Liberal Party increased defence 
spending and the defence presence in South East Asia. 
As McAllister (2011:5) noted, following a preferential block majority with compulsory 
preferences, the Senate voting system was changed to one of proportional representation with 
compulsory preferences beginning at the election of 1949.  This voting system eventually made 
it much easier for minor parties to compete and win a seat in the Senate and thus become more 
persistent and powerful.  They did not have to win an absolute majority as in the single member 
electorates of the House of Representatives.  They only had to win a quota (14.28 per cent of the 
vote) 1.   
Thompson (2000:20) commented that: - 
The change to proportional representation in 1948 meant that electoral discontent with the 
major parties could be reflected institutionally because proportional representation gave 
new parties and independents the chance to be elected – groups of a reasonable size (able to 
gain at least seven per cent of the vote in a state) stood a reasonable chance of gaining 
representation in the Senate. 
Thompson went on to observe that seven years later in 1955 that voting system resulted in the 
election of a senator from a minor party, the DLP and in 1977 this same system resulted in the 
election of Senators from another minor party, the Australian Democrats. 
                                                     
1 The quota for the Senate election is determined by dividing the number of candidates to be elected plus one, into the total number 
of formal votes, and adding one to the result. For example, there are six candidates to be elected and 700,000 formal votes have been 
cast. (700,000 / 7 (six candidates plus one) gives 100,000 and 1 giving a quota for election of 100,001).  If the party wins more votes 
than the quota, the surplus votes are transferred according to their preferences, but only at a fraction of a full vote.  The transfer 
value fraction is obtained by dividing the elected candidate’s total surplus votes by his or her total preference votes. In the example 
above if the first elected senator won 200,000 votes their transfer value would be 100,000 / 200,000 giving a transfer value of .5 of a 
vote. However, if a candidate is eliminated, the number of votes they received is transferred according to their preference at full 
value.  The reason being those votes had not already elected a Senator. 
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Crisp (1955:219) stated that the change to proportional representation was introduced: - 
 to avoid the grotesque results of two previous systems of election to the Senate whereby 
one side or the other had often swept all of that half of the Senate seats. . .  (that were up for 
re-election)  
An example of what Crisp was referring to was the Australian Senate after the 1946 elections 
comprised 33 ALP Senators but only 3 Coalition Senators.  The change to proportional 
representation certainly prevented a recurrence but at the same time made election to the Senate 
much easier for minor and micro parties. 
Richmond (1978:321-22) echoed a similar point, by explaining that: - 
The voting and electoral system can be most important in assisting the growth and 
determining the role of minor parties. 
He went on to comment that: - 
Minority parties tend to perform well in Senate elections.  Their success is attributable to 
the Senate electoral system:  Multi member electorates (the states and territories) and the 
use of the proportional representation (PR) system of voting. 
Compulsory voting  
Voting in Australia in all federal and state elections is compulsory, with fines issued to those 
who fail to vote without a valid excuse.  Thus, parties do not have to ‘persuade electors to cast 
their vote by organising and managing ‘turnouts’.  Under compulsory voting, the turnout of 
electors to vote is very high (often in excess of 90 per cent.)  Organising turnouts for a political 
party is very time consuming and is, put simply, persuading electors to vote and if necessary 
transporting those electors to the nearest polling booth and home again. 
Minor parties also benefit as they do not have to spend time and money in persuading voters to 
actually go and vote in the election.  As the electors have to attend the polling booth to vote, itf 
they are dissatisfied with the major parties, the minor parties would gain the vote of those 
electors, unless the voter for whatever reason decided to vote informal. 
Hill (2002:437-8) has argued that ‘the state –enforced compulsion to vote is a reasonable 
imposition on personal liberty.’  She goes on to defend compulsory voting ‘on the grounds that 
voting is a public good and therefore a problem of collective action which can be resolved only 
by collective means’.  In this context ‘collective action’ can be defined as action by the 
community or society and not solely by an individual.  In Hill’s view voting is a collective 
action because it ‘yields a number of clear and important benefits to society and individuals.’ 
In considering the ‘important benefits’ Hill (2002:438) argued that compulsory voting:- 
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serves to protect the democratic desiderata, such as representativeness, legitimacy, 
accountability, political equality and minimisation of elite power.  In this way, compulsion 
could be said to engender good or at least better government.   
Legitimacy in the context of this thesis means that minor parties are elected in an election where 
a majority of electors vote, due to the fact that they are legally required to do so.  Voting is not 
the preserve of those citizens with property or citizens who are enthusiastic enough to make the 
effort to go out and vote.  Parties themselves are not required to actually persuade voters to go 
and vote.  Electors do not vote because they have been ‘herded up’ by party workers and 
transported to the polling booth.  Minor parties win seats in the legislature because they were 
elected in an election where the majority of electors vote, not just the opportunistic few. 
Kleppner (1982:5) stated that: - 
Voting is the participatory act most accessible to the largest number of citizens and the 
political act in which most citizens engage than in any other.  Voting remains the 
mechanism that most believe to be the only one available to them for influencing what the 
government does. 
In an environment of non-compulsory voting, Lijphart (1997:1) considered that low voter 
turnout was ‘a serious democratic problem’ because ‘unequal turnout is systematically biased 
against less well to do citizens’ and also ‘unequal turnout spells unequal political influence’. 
In most countries voting is voluntary, Australia is one of the very few countries in the world to 
have compulsory voting.  Hughes (1966:81) constructed a cumulative list from the 
parliamentary debates (Hansard) giving the reasons for and against compulsory voting.  The 
reasons given for compulsory voting include: - 
 voting is an important civic duty with a very light burden, once or twice very three 
years; 
 voting is analogous to other civic duties such as giving evidence in court and jury 
service; 
 democratic government means majority rule and the expression of an opinion by a 
majority of electors; and 
 the right to vote has been fought for, and therefore should be used. 
The reasons against compulsory voting include, compulsory voting cannot ensure a formal vote 
or an intelligent vote and further, compulsory voting is an infringement of liberty. 
Hill (2002:438) argued that:- 
voting itself does not appear to be compulsory; instead it is registration and attendance at a 
polling place that is really compulsory.  In this way, it is the opportunity to participate 
rather than the participation itself that is being actively sought. 
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In the minds of many electors having had to make the effort to participate, the next logical step 
then is to in fact participate and make a valid vote. 
In that light, the electoral rules in Australia (compulsory voting) significantly account for the 
success of third parties by restraining the behavior of disaffected voters.  Further, major 
established parties may come to be perceived as unresponsive – increasingly detached from 
their electoral bases and from the population in general (Belanger 2004:1056).  Compulsory 
voting means that a dissatisfied voter who does not wish to vote for either of the major parties 
still must vote, possibly for a minor or micro party as a ‘protest vote’ secondly as all squares on 
the ballot paper have to be filled out the voter must allocate preferences often from a minor or 
micro party to one of the major parties.  In a marginal electorate, such an allocation of 
preferences can decide the final result.  This situation, or the possibility of it, places a minor 
party in a powerful position in deciding which major party to preference above the other. 
Without compulsory voting those dissatisfied with the major parties might be inclined to sit out 
the election, however with compulsory voting, they might choose to vote for a minor party 
instead (Mackerras and McAllister 1999:229).  Rather bluntly Hill (2002A:81) commented that 
‘aside from its few critics, compulsory voting has never, apparently, bothered Australians.’  
Pringle (2012:428) claimed that ‘the duty to vote requires electors to mark their ballot papers’.  
Pringle went on (at page 429) to observe that the focus should be on ‘voting as marking ballots, 
rather than on turnout, in measuring democratic vitality.’  As with the impossibility of ensuring 
that a formal vote is made, enforcing voters to actually mark their ballot papers and not leave 
them blank is an impossibility given the secrecy of the ballot.  Perhaps the real offence is 
publicly inciting voters to place their ballot papers in the ballot box unmarked. 
Pringle (2012:429) observed that the focus should be on ‘voting as marking ballots, rather than 
on turnout, in measuring democratic vitality’.  Like providing a formal vote, enforcing voters to 
mark their ballot papers is very much an impossibility, given the secrecy of the ballot.  The real 
offence would seem to be the inciting of voters to place their ballot papers in the ballot boxes 
unmarked. 
A voter dissatisfied with the major parties can send a message to those parties by voting for a 
minor party.  This message is largely lost by voting informal or not voting at all.  An informal 
vote or not voting at all, could occur through dissatisfaction with the major parties.  But 
informal voting is more likely occur, and indeed seen to occur, through negligence in 
numbering the ballot paper or an ignorance of the correct method of voting.  There are 
numerous reasons for not voting at an election. 
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Voter Behaviour 
Electors vote for minor parties for various reasons.  The first quite obvious reason is that the 
elector believes in what the minor party stands for; the minor party’s policies and ideology both 
strike a chord with the voter.  Another reason closely associated with party loyalty is the 
‘cartelisation thesis’, which will be considered later in this chapter.  Many minor parties start 
life as a split-off from existing parties that disillusion some supporters.  Put simply a voter who 
supported one of the major parties and was possibly a member of that party, resigns from the 
party and no longer supports it.  This is because the voter considers that the major party has 
become non-responsive to the voter and former party member.  Major parties can become aloof 
and establishment orientated.  They can form relationships with and then dialogue with groups 
of business people and corporations in exchange for significant donations to their party.  This is 
usually in the form of membership payments to a ‘policy forum’ which gives the person not 
party membership but privileged access to the member and other parliamentarians through such 
means as ‘briefing sessions’ and corporate breakfasts and dinners.  From this style of 
relationships flow both policy ideas and campaign funds.  This leaves party members feeling 
very redundant except for handing out ‘how to vote’ cards on polling day. 
A new minor party releases its policies to the general public, its policies appeal to the former 
member of the major party and the person supports the new minor party by voting for it and 
often contributing to the minor party’s campaign funds as well. 
However, another important reason is that the minor party serves as a protest vehicle for the 
voter to express this temporary disapproval against the major party that they normally vote for.  
This was the case in the Senate elections in both 1967 and 1970 in Victoria where the lead DLP 
Senate candidates won quotas for election in their own right.  In 1967, much of the DLP’s 
support in Victoria came from electors who normally voted Liberal, who used the Senate 
election to show their disproval of the then Holt government.  In 1970 the protest was against 
both major parties. A protest vote in the Senate does not impact on a party losing government, 
government is formed and lost in the House of Representatives only. 
However, in the protest vote situation, the question usually is which party gains the second 
preference vote?  If it is the major party that the elector usually votes for, then in reality the 
voter has still voted for the usual major party that they support but in a deviated manner.  
Mackerras (1972) commented that DLP supporters with their very tight second preference flow 
to the Liberal party were in effect defacto Liberal voters. 
Another reason for support for a minor party is the ‘donkey vote’.  Electors vote for a minor 
party candidate who is at the top of the ballot paper and in a donkey vote, numbering the ballot 
paper sequentially from top to bottom, the minor party candidate gets the number one vote. 
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Second Preferences and their Power 
Jaensch and Mathieson (1998:12) contended that ‘parties with low levels of support, that is 
parties which do not win seats, are unimportant and not justifiable’.  That may be true in a ‘first 
past the post’ method of election, however Australia’s preferential method of voting empowers 
voters of minor parties, allowing them to cast second and third etc preferences (ultimately 
electing the least unpopular candidate). 
Richmond (1978:320) explained that: - 
A more pragmatic party such as the DLP . . . campaigns with the express intention of 
allocating preferences to a major party with which it is aligned on some major policy. 
In elections, all squares on the ballot paper have to be filled in, therefore voters for minor 
parties, like all voters, have to distribute preferences to other candidates. Political parties aid in 
this process by publicly announcing how they would like their voters to allocate their 
preferences.  This information is significantly communicated to the voter through the party’s 
how to vote card.  As this thesis shows, this preference allocation from minor parties can be 
very significant to major parties by providing preferences to get their candidate elected and in 
some cases to get their candidate elected from behind the other major party’s candidate.  This 
preference allocation gives the minor party additional power, as the minor party can demand 
policy changes and other concessions in exchange for this preference allocation.  Therefore, a 
minor party can have a significant influence on the election outcome without itself wining any 
seats in the legislature.  
Sharman et al. (2002:548) have categorized the different preference trading relationships and 
they are shown in the following table. 
Table 4:  Preference Types 
Preference Type Bargaining Relationship Example 
Coalition Maintenance Bilateral: large party with 
small party 
Liberals and Nationals since 
1919 
Hostile Unilateral: small party 
against large party 
DLP from 1955 to 1972 
Policy Influence Bilateral: small party with 
potential governing party 
Defence of Government 
Schools (DOGS) 1969 
Punishing Bilateral: small party against 
particular candidates 
Shooters Party 1988 also 
RTL Victoria 1982 
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Preference Type Bargaining Relationship Example 
Interest Group Unilateral: interest group in 
favour of political candidates 
Women’s Electoral Lobby 
1972 
Ideological similarity Bilateral: small party with 
another small party 
Aust Democrats with 
Greens Parties, 1998 
 
Discriminatory Multilateral: all other 
parties against an insurgent 
party 
All parties against the One 
Nation Party 1998  
Indirect Bilateral: large party with 
small party 
ALP ‘Green Strategy 1990 
No allocation Unilateral: small party Australian Democrats 1977 
Cross institutional Bilateral: large and small 
parties 
Green Parties in Senate 
elections since 1990 
 
Note: The preference types in bold relate to the parties discussed in this thesis. 
A minor or micro party is not obligated to allocate preferences in its ‘how to vote’ ticket.  The 
party could choose to have an ‘open ticket’ where the party does not direct preferences, but 
instead leaves the decision of preference allocation to the voter.  Sharman et al describe this 
scenario as ‘no allocation’.  The Australian Democrats used that scenario in the early years of 
the party in the late 1970s. 
A voter is not legally required to follow any party’s how to vote card and the voter can allocate 
preference to which ever candidate they please. A preference allocation not in accordance with 
the parties how to vote card is a preference leakage and this thesis argues that although there 
always will be some leakage of preferences to at least a small degree, a significant leakage 
weakens the power of the minor party in terms of its power and influence in terms of preference 
allocation to other parties.  This thesis acknowledges with minor parties, the preference 
allocation is usually adhered to quite strongly with over 80 or 90 per cent of second preferences 
following the how to vote card and going to the designated party.  For example, Mansfield 
(2012:151) reported that in 1955 in the electorate of Corio in Victoria, 82 per cent of DLP 
candidate’s preferences flowed to the Liberal candidate, as directed on the DLP ‘how to vote’ 
card.  An examination of preference flows from the Australian Greens show the party’s second 
51 
 
preferences flow as directed to the Labor Party very frequently at a rate greater than 80 per cent 
with a few exceptions.   
Table 5:  House of Reps Elections Greens Preferences to Major Parties 
Election Labor Liberal 
2007 79.21% 20.24% 
2010 77.13% 21.76% 
2013 79.89% 18.62% 
Source: AEC – note figures do not sum to 100 per cent due to a small percentage of preferences being allocated to 
other minor parties. 
A problem with Pedersen’s party lifespan model is that this power of minor party preferences 
cannot be shown on the model. 
Leadership of Minor Political Parties 
One reason for the rise of a political party into parliament is the party’s leadership, with a high-
profile leader who is popular and well known in various quarters and even charismatic.  A party 
leader with a high profile can appeal to the press and media. 
This thesis will explore the role of such leadership in the rise of minor parties and the effects on 
minor parties when party leadership becomes divided or non-existent.   
Mayer commented on the hardships that he considered minor parties faced in making an impact 
(Mayer 1980:345), however he does not consider the role of party leadership to bring about 
these special efforts and to articulate to the electorate what the new party stands for and what it 
would do if it was elected. 
Power (2004:11) commented that a leader needs to be recognisable – not as an individual, but as 
(paradoxically) ordinary.  A leader should fit in with the crowd.  In other words, they should be 
‘one of us’.  A key ingredient of leadership is character and that can be defined as a person’s 
inner self.  That is the why the party leader orients him or herself towards life – not for the 
moment but enduringly.  A leader has to use ‘rhetoric in a powerful way – simple, clear and 
plain messages which reached over and beyond the day to day mechanical management of 
government and indeed parliament’. 
Power’s comments give a perspective of the requirements and role of a party leader as a key 
spokesperson for the party.  Cunningham and Jackson (2014:498) observed that: - 
Hierarchical leadership has been perceived as ‘normal’ during the last century in Australia, 
when the major parties  . . . have dominated parliament and played the politics of power and 
leadership, ruthlessly.  In this party-government world view, party leaders manage their 
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parliamentary colleagues to attain solidarity for Cabinet decisions and parliamentary party 
room. 
However, this solidarity only comes about by a vote on a particular issue and after robust debate 
in the party room.  Party leaders cannot be total dictators as they are voted in and out of office 
by their parliamentary colleagues. 
Leadership is important to a minor party, but leadership is not the main subject of this thesis. 
Change of leadership 
At the federal level, all four of the minor parties analysed in this thesis had a change in 
leadership over their respective lifespans.  Both the DLP and the Democrats changed leaders 
frequently, and more recently the federal Greens have witnessed leadership transitions.  One 
Nation leader Pauline Hanson lost her seat in the House of Representatives, but the party won a 
single senate seat.  The new Senator, Len Harris, therefore became the leader of One Nation.   
Bynander and t’Hart (2006:707) comment that: -. 
However good and powerful they may be, all leaders have a limited “sell by” date.  They 
get old, weary and sick.  They get out of tune with the times or anesthetized by their own 
power.  Sooner or later they become an embarrassment to the people who put them in office 
or those who kept them there.  A leader who stays on for too long provides a painful 
spectacle.  
With the other minor parties there have been leadership changes.  Some of these leadership 
changes were quite seamless for example the two leadership changes in the Australian Greens, 
after the retirement of the incumbent leader, and again the leadership change in the Australian 
Democrats after Don Chipp’s retirement.   
It is clear that Chipp and the two Greens leaders Bob Brown and Christine Milne, wanted to quit 
the leadership role before their ‘sell by date’ and thus avoiding a ‘painful spectacle’ by 
becoming an ‘embarrassment’ to their parliamentary party colleagues and supporters. 
However other leadership changes have not gone at all smoothly, the leadership change in the 
DLP from Gair to McManus is a good example.  Gair deferred any leadership show down for a 
long as he possibly could.  He was getting old in years and performed poorly on television, his 
best days were clearly behind him, he was ‘old weary and sick’ and ‘out of tune with the times’.  
The Gair leadership will be discussed in the chapter on the demise of the DLP. 
Another example is the large number of changes of leadership in the Australian Democrats 
which did not go smoothly.  Leadership shortcomings in the Democrats was a major reason for 
the party’s demise.  A significant factor in that party’s leadership trouble was the heavy reliance 
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on participatory democracy and the ability of party rank and file members to launch a 
‘leadership spill.  The Democrats’ leadership problems will be explored in the chapter on the 
demise of the Australian Democrats. 
Bynander and t’Hart (2006:713) present the following model showing the role choices for the 
incumbent leader in a succession context: -. 
 
Role Choices for the incumbent leader in succession contexts 
 
As the model shows the leader has three strategic role options, denial, resistance and 
acceptance.  As can be seen from the model Gair’s choice was ‘deny exit’ by hoping that the 
leadership issue in the DLP would blow over after a few months, it did not and in fact quite 
painfully for the DLP, it persisted.  Gair then resisted an exit from the leadership by being 
reactive, hoping that the succession issue would ‘blow over.’   
The Greens leadership on the other hand seems to fit more in the acceptance category.  Two 
federal leaders have accepted their exit (and they themselves announced it) then the party sought 
consensus to find the new leadership of the party. 
From Social Movement to Minor Party 
One of the minor political parties considered in this thesis emerged out of a social group.  That 
party is the Australian Greens which did not evolve from a split in another party but from the 
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formation of a political party by various social groups as means of getting candidates into 
parliament. 
The Australian Greens party had its origins in Tasmania with the ‘Lake Pedder Action 
Committee’.  This group was an environmental social group that had its beginnings in the anti-
dams movement in Tasmania.  In 1972 after the flooding of Lake Pedder by the Tasmanian Hydro-
electric Commission, the Action Committee convened a meeting which carried the following 
motion: - 
In order that there is maximum usage of a unique political opportunity to save Lake Pedder 
now, an issue of national and global concern and to implement a national, well-researched 
conservation plan for the State of Tasmania, there be formed a single Independent Coalition 
of primarily conservation-orientated candidates and their supporters. 
Vromen, Gelber and Gauja (2009:264) state that ‘social movements often emerge during times of 
political and social upheaval’.  Environmental social groups such as the anti-dams group sprung 
up in the time when pollution and environmental impacts were starting to be of concern to a 
growing number of people in the community. 
Mass Media 
Media coverage is a key issue in a minor party gaining popular recognition and relevance.  Media 
and the press are far less interested in a party with outdated policies and limited relevance.  Once 
a minor party appears to lose its relevance the media and the press are no longer interested in the 
party and its leaders.  This loss of interest by the media can be accelerated by a minor party 
showing lack of leadership or division.  In fact, a division and disunity in a minor party will attract 
press publicity, but publicity of a very negative value which can only damage the party, or if 
serious media outlets run critical campaigns against the party.  
The media - its role and power 
Tiffen (1989:7) quite bluntly noted that ‘the centrality of the news media in political 
communications makes them a strategic arena in the struggle for power.’ 
Griffiths (1973:654-655) believes that there are six characteristics of the mass media and its 
power.  Firstly the mass media is crisis orientated and this means that the news coverages tends 
towards conflict sensationalism, drama and violence.  Secondly according to Griffiths the mass 
media avoids the consequences and meanings of acts and events because dealing ethical questions 
would challenge the system which is the source of the journalist’s power and status. 
Thirdly Griffiths also acknowledges that the mass media are increasingly subject to commercial 
pressures or economic considerations.  Fourthly the information entertainment mix in the mass 
media has an ideological role.  Entertainment neutralizes information.  In other words the 
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television news is watched and the newspapers are read more for entertainment value than 
analysing the news of the day. 
Errington and Miragliotta (2007:42) have noted that ‘the sneaking suspicion’ is that ‘the 
rationality of the human mind is inherently fragile, and that individuals have the potential to 
absorb messages and ideas uncritically and can be easily swayed by media content. In short 
emotionalism and drama play a major role in the presentation of news. 
Griffith’s fifth point is that the mass media are personality orientated in that the more an event 
can be seen in personal terms, due to the actions of specific individuals, the more probable it will 
become a news item.  A result of this is scapegoatism, which is blaming for example blaming 
minor parties for being obstructionist in the Senate, blaming minor party leaders for being a 
nuisance and wasting time. 
Griffith’s final point is the mass media are cultural arms of industrial systems and as such, 
reinforce the cultural norms and discourage nonconformity and they also structure and define the 
agenda of public discourse.  The mass media in this role also provide dominant perspectives from 
which priorities, actions and policies might be viewed. 
Errington and Miragliotta (2007:3) commented that the power of the media is seen to be held in 
check by three key factors: - 
 A belief that adults are self-selecting and rational with different needs and wants; 
 The media’s power to influence the individual is thought to be diluted by powerful 
economic considerations; and 
 Power in society is effectively defused in that there is no permanent power elite that is 
capable of exacting its influence over society 
These three factors are compromised by the fact that mass media has to sell its products 
in order to survive.  In addition a story about personalities such as a party leader and 
divisions within a party attract the attention of the mass media because news about such 
events and people is eagerly followed by readers and viewers. 
A minor party’s concern is successfully attracting media attention and coverage of the 
minor party’s positive events such as policy launches and the rebuttal of the major 
parties and their leaders.  Negative events such as party disunity and resignations of key 
players in the party, quite easily attract media attention because as noted above 
‘everyone enjoys a crisis’ and the reporting of such events sells newspapers and boosts 
television ratings.  An example is the DLP who in the 1974 and 1975 double dissolution 
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elections received very scant media attention but the winding up of the party in 1978 
was widely reported in the media. 
Is the media a friend to minor parties or a foe?  The media as a friend can be defined as the serious 
press dutifully publishing or broadcasting the informative news press releases of political parties 
and giving the party a lot of publicity of a positive nature that recognises the political party (the 
party’s ‘brand name’) and its policies. On the other hand, the media could be described as a minor 
party’s foe or biased towards the party if the press and the media deny the party any publicity 
and/or and give no publicity for the party’s policies. Media can also be a foe if the party’s only 
publicity is big and prominent write ups for conflict and division or resignations in the party. 
In this thesis, the media includes newspapers and other printed material such as magazines and 
journals as well as radio television and the newer forms of media via the Internet such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and email.  Errington and Miragliotta (2007:3) comment that: - 
the ‘media’ refers to an instrumentality that is capable of communicating information, facts, 
opinions, and ideas via a number of different platforms such as, but not limited to, newspapers, 
books, DVDs, radio, television, video cassettes, telephones, magazines, cinemas, the internet 
and MP3 players. 
Meadows (1997:89) comments that ‘our attention should focus on the media, rather than on the 
individual, for the media become the agents of power in legitimising some statements by giving 
them greater prominence than others’. 
This involves not concentrating on an individual journalist, but rather the publication or program 
that he or she worked for and in turn, concentrating on the media as a whole.  What is significant 
is not what one journalist or newspaper does, but what the media as a distinct entity does.  For 
example, in the mid-1990s the majority of the mainstream media appeared to ‘duchess’ Pauline 
Hanson because she was different, she seemed relevant to a complaining electorate and she made 
‘news’ that readers and viewers wanted to know about.  Later on, it was the media as a whole that 
shied away from Pauline Hanson and One Nation, the novelty effect soon went and One Nation’s 
policies such as the ‘easy tax’ and citizens initiated referenda, were seen by many to be 
meaningless. 
There is no doubting the power of the media.  This includes a ‘gate keeper’ function of 
determining what does and does not make into the newspaper or onto the television news or 
current affairs program.  However, at times this power can be expressed by way of interference.  
Young (2006:17) comments that ‘the most obvious type of interference-the one most people 
worry about-is when media proprietors use their print or broadcast outlets to push a political 
agenda. This happens, and some outlets are even willing to brag about it’. The examples Young 
provides are the 1972 and 1975 Australian elections. In 1972 Murdoch in his papers played an 
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active role in Labor’s election campaign, but by 1975 Murdoch had fallen out with the 
government. His papers then supported the anti-Labor parties. 
Some minor parties allege quite openly that they have been the victims of media interference by 
way of not reporting any information about their political party except for news that is adverse to 
the minor party’s interest. Both the DLP and One Nation assert in no uncertain terms that the 
media were hostile towards them. But a major thrust of this section of the chapter is exploring the 
question were the minor parties guilty or subject to media interference or was the lack of media 
coverage due to the party’s own incompetence and ignorance of the press and the media and its 
requirements.  
Relevance 
In the environment of intense competition for media space, minor parties can struggle to find or 
maintain relevance.  In other words, minor parties have to be able to provide the media’s readers 
and viewers with what they want and what is topical for them because it is the readership and the 
viewers that ultimately determine the circulation of the media and its advertising revenue.  A party 
has to articulate clearly what it stands for in a more competitive political arena and to get its 
message heard. 
A party also has to ensure that its policies remain relevant to modern society and not some 
bygone era.  In Australia that is a key test of a party’s relevance to the electorate and to the 
parliament. 
In that light, by the time of its demise the DLP with its fascination for moral issues and anti-
communism was no longer seen to be relevant.  As the chapter on the demise of the DLP shows, 
those issues were no longer relevant as Australian society had changed as had the international 
scene.  One Nation was relevant to a section of society in terms of immigration and 
globalisation issues, but met its demise through a lack of support by way of second preferences 
from the major parties.  The major parties decided as One Nation was perceived to be a racist 
organisation, it should be preferenced last.  The Australian Democrats had policies that were of 
relevance to modern society, in terms of nuclear power, the environment and social issues.  But 
the Democrats were beaten in the competition for voter support by the Australian Greens who 
were more united and attracted second preferences from the Australian Labor Party.  The 
Australian Greens are still quite relevant in modern Australian society. 
Incumbency Advantages 
Members of Parliament have incumbency advantages (Kelly 2006:3).  Although these 
advantages have increased in recent years with increases in postage and printing allowances, 
they have always existed.  A member of parliament has always been able to utilise the 
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institution of parliament to make their views known and to question ministers, both in the 
chamber and in parliamentary committees.  These advantages are not open to the aspiring non-
member. 
It is questionable whether or not those members of the ALP who split from the party in 1955 to 
form the DLP concerned themselves with the inevitable loss of incumbency and its advantages.  
Pauline Hanson never had any incumbency in parliament in the first place, however Don Chipp 
did and when he resigned from the Liberal Party in March 1977, he was careful enough not to 
resign from the parliament itself.  Therefore through 1977, during the discussions that lead to 
the formation of the Australian Democrats and in the lead up to the federal election later that 
year, Chipp was never out of federal parliament and could use the facilities of the House of 
Representatives to the advantage of the newly formed Australian Democrats. 
Bob Brown did not have the advantage of incumbency when he stood for the Tasmanian 
Legislative Assembly, but in the small state of Tasmania, he was well known as a medico and as 
a passionate demonstrator against what he saw as desecration of wilderness areas.  In addition, 
his willingness to get arrested at anti-logging and other demonstrations made him well known as 
a sincere advocate of the Greens cause.  He resigned from the Tasmanian Parliament in 1993 to 
contest a seat in the House of Representatives election but failed to get elected.  Winning 
election for a lower house seat is always difficult for a minor party having to win a majority of 
votes and preferences and not one of a number of quotas as in the Senate.  Brown was elected to 
Senate as a Greens Senator for Tasmania in 1996.  
How Pedersen’s Typology could be more relevant and more 
accurate 
The previous chapter introduced and explained Pedersen’s Typology of party lifespans.  
Pedersen’s typology would be more informative if it was presented on graph paper; this would 
make the distance between the thresholds easier to see and to measure.  Also party officials and 
candidates could plot the life span curves (including projected curves) with more accuracy than 
a blank piece of paper would provide.  The declaration and authorisation thresholds are quite 
straightforward.  Much of the activity leading up to the declaration phase would be carried out 
away from the public eye and the detailed requirements of registering a political party with the 
electoral commission are beyond the scope of this paper.   
However, the thresholds of relevance and representation each cover a wide area in terms of 
performance within the parliamentary chamber.  For example, when a minor party crosses the 
representation threshold do the party’s parliamentary members or sole member just sit in the 
chamber making speeches rarely and writing to ministers when required by their constituents or 
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does the member or do the members make frequent and strategic use of question time and 
committee membership?   
It is significant that in the Australian Senate, a Senator, while not a member of a committee can 
be a ‘participating member’ of that committee, and thus attend public hearings of the committee 
and ask questions of witnesses.  A strong performance on committees identifying issues and 
asking searching questions on those issues can give a parliamentarian a strong reputation and 
valuable publicity.   
This thesis considers relevance and representation purely from the perspective of performance 
of the minor party and its parliamentary members within the chamber using the facilities and 
opportunities provided in that chamber.  These facilities include question time and membership 
of and performance in parliamentary committees.  A party’s performance in connecting to the 
electorate and interactions within interest groups are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The representation threshold could be shown as a ‘ladder of representation’ which I have drawn 
up the ladder starts at the top and progressively works its way down.  The further a party moves 
down the ladder the greater is its impact in terms of representation.  The ladder has the 
following phases. 
Contest and win the election 
Represent constituents 
Represent constituents and 
champion their concerns 
Ask searching questions of 
ministers 
Make hard hitting speeches in 
parliament and elsewhere 
Have a publicity strategy that gets 
results 
Get involved in parliamentary 
committees 
 
Crossing the threshold of representation and merely representing constituents to a minimum 
level and speaking in parliament only when necessary (the first non-bolded two rungs on the 
ladder) would be weak representation with a minimal parliamentary performance.  Another 
threshold should be inserted above the representation threshold, ‘representation – strong’, this 
would indicate that the party and its members were capitalising on the opportunities for asking 
searching questions and a showing a strong performance in committees and making itself 
known.  (This would represent the remaining bolded rungs on the ladder of representation.)  
These rungs of the ladder of representation show the criteria for determining whether a party’s 
representation is strong or weak. 
Having crossed the threshold of representation, the next hurdle for a minor party is to cross the 
threshold of relevance; sub thresholds would make the level of relevance much clearer.  Just 
crossing the threshold would indicate sharing the balance of power.  A threshold above that 
would be ‘balance of power’, in other words the party holds the balance of power in its own 
right.  Two other thresholds would go above that namely ‘opposition’ and above that, 
‘government’.  These two thresholds are self-explanatory and would be used to chart the major 
parties and coalition partners. 
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These thresholds could also be shown as a ladder, ‘the ladder of relevance’.  That ladder which I 
have drawn up is shown below (again starting at the top and working down). 
Share the balance of power with 
another party or parties 
Hold the balance of power – in the 
party’s own right 
Main opposition party or coalition – 
the alternative government 
As a minor party member, be a 
minister in the cabinet 
Party of government – junior or 
senior coalition partner 
Be in government in the party’s own 
right 
 
The revised party life-span diagram, without any party lifespans graphed, is shown below: 
 
 
The various factors discussed in this thesis that cause the rise and demise of a minor 
political party are the influences or drivers that move the party along the party lifespan 
curve up through thresholds while the party is emerging and attracting support and 
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downwards when the party is experiencing its demise through such factors as losing 
support at the ballot box and relevance in its policies. 
In this thesis, the chapters that discuss the rise of the four parties discuss the various 
factors that caused the particular party’s lifespan curve to rise up through the thresholds.  
The chapters that discuss the demise of the parties explore the causes for the party’s 
lifespan to crash down through the representation threshold to remain at a point above 
the authorisation threshold. 
In Conclusion 
This chapter has defined minor parties as parties that have less support and representation than 
the established major parties and have not largely participated in government.  Although minor 
parties are smaller they can grow and an analysis of voting figures over a number of federal 
elections shows support for minor parties is increasing, now rising to 23.23 per cent of the 
House of Representative vote in 2016 and 35.03 per cent for the Senate.   
These parties do not just ‘spring up’ but rather a number of contextual factors affect their rise. 
These factors include the cartelisation of the major parties.  As a result of this cartelisation with 
its movement towards big business, big unions and the like, major party members feel their 
party no longer listens to them and they join a newly formed minor party that caters for or 
listens to their needs and or ideas. 
Many minor parties, in their formation, identify a need or even needs that present as being 
neglected.  This identification can take place through the work of a social groups or groups 
concerned about an issue.  Social group activity and not the split from another party saw the rise 
of the Australian Greens.  The DLP came into being through the third major split in the 
Australian Labor Party, with the underlying issue being the feeling that the ALP was not anti-
Communist enough.   
The Australian Democrats was the product of the merger of two existing but fading minor 
parties, the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement which both split from the Liberal 
Party.  Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party was formed as a result of dissatisfaction with the 
major parties’ immigration and Aboriginal policies.  An additional area of dissatisfaction was 
the movement of the major parties in adopting globalisation and economic policies that 
emphasised ‘market forces’ with minimal or no government intervention.  The cartelisation 
thesis had at least some role in the formation of One Nation, with One Nation members feeling 
deserted by the major parties, some of the One Nation members were former members of either 
of the major parties, ALP, Liberal or National.  The current Katter Australia Party presents as 
another One Nation party, but minus the Aboriginal and immigration issues.  An analysis of the 
Katter Australia Party is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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All of these parties were commenced and indeed enhanced by high profile leadership.  Former 
members of the ALP were involved in the formation and leadership of the DLP.  The well-
known and modern thinking Don Chipp was the first leader of the Australian Democrats, while 
Bob Brown was a household name in Tasmania, the foundation state of the Australian Green 
movement.  Pauline Hanson quickly gained publicity and recognition through being an 
outspoken disendorsed liberal candidate and a humble fish and chip shop operator. 
This chapter has also shown that a favourable electoral system coupled with effective second 
preference trading strategies and compulsory voting has helped minor parties.  ‘Sitting out’ the 
election is not an option for an Australian voter, they have to vote and they have to allocate 
preferences which can and do make a difference to the final result in lower house electorates.  
An examination of the recent changes to the voting method for the Australian Senate is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
A number of factors can lead to the demise of a minor political party.  These factors include a 
lack of relevance in the party’s policies.  This lack of relevant policies coupled with image 
problems causes the party to appear as anachronistic and out of touch. 
Leadership including the transition to a new party leader, is a major cause of the demise of a 
minor party.  A leader is very much the ‘public face’ or principal spokesperson of the party.  A 
leader also has to keep the party united and take a main role in the resolution of conflict.  A 
change of leadership is a major event for a minor party.  From the circumstances that brought 
about the leadership change to the transitioning of the party to the new leader, conflict and 
disunity can arise and destabilise the party. 
Most if not all minor parties have experienced money problems.  Most minor parties that cross 
the representation threshold are able to win the required percentage of first preference votes to 
receive public funding for each first preference vote.  Problems have arisen in parties prior to 
the introduction of that funding, the DLP was a prime example.  With the availability of public 
funding money problems arise for the minor party contesting its first election as public funding 
is provided on the basis of prior results and not potential ones.  Likewise, the party fails to 
qualify for any public funding because it is in decline and fails to have candidates elected or its 
candidates are elected in the Senate on low first preferences votes and large numbers of 
preferences.  That was the position the Australian Democrats found themselves in throughout 
their demise. 
A party can also resort to other forms of funding such as donations, ‘silver circles’ and other 
forms of raffles.  In fact, some parties have been able to set up arrangements with such 
businesses as travel agencies and insurance brokers to receive commissions from business 
provided by party members and supporters. 
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The role of the media is another impact on the success or failure of a minor party.  Minor parties 
are successful when they can gain the attention of the media for the promotion of their policies 
and activities.  However, a minor party does not want to attract the media over matters of 
disunity and other adverse situations. 
Finally, this chapter analysed Pedersen’s typology of the lifespans of minor parties and made 
improvements to the typology in order to make it more applicable to Australian conditions with 
compulsory voting and the balance of power held by minor parties in the Senate. 
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Chapter Four: The Rise of the 
Australian Democratic Labor 
Party 1955 - 1970 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the reasons for ‘The Split’ in the ALP and the formation of the DLP in 
1955.  It initially analyses the threat of Communism, particularly in the union movement.  The 
Labor Party’s ambivalent response to the threat of Communism and the formation of the 
Industrial Groups is then analysed.  The instability of the parliamentary Labor party from the 
death of its leader Ben Chifley in 1951 up to and beyond the Labor party split of 1955 is 
identified as another significant factor in the formation of the DLP.   
The Catholic Church and its unwavering stand against Communism was another major 
influence in the formation of the DLP.  However, the Catholic hierarchy across Australia was 
deeply divided and this meant that while the DLP was strong in some states, in others it was 
weak.  Another significant player was BA Santamaria and the Movement that was formed 
through the influence of Archbishop Mannix.   This chapter argues that Mannix and Santamaria 
gave their own meaning to ‘Catholic Action’ to suit their own political ends.   
This chapter also discusses the workings and growth of the DLP through the 1950s and 60s.  Of 
particular significance is the allocation of the DLP’s second preferences which were not 
directed back to the ALP but to Labor’s traditional rival the Liberal and Country Party coalition.   
Critical to the DLP’s influence was its usage of the balance of power in the Senate.  This 
chapter argues that the DLP principally used the balance of power as a ‘veto’ instrument.  The 
DLP seemed unable or unwilling to negotiate changes to legislation, particularly in the Party’s 
dealings with the ALP government after 1972. 
This chapter uses Pederson’s (1982:8) representation of party life spans and discusses the 
various influences and drivers that caused the DLP to move around the party life span curve 
through the thresholds of declaration, authorization, representation and relevance. 
The chapter argues that a number of factors, organisations and key individuals, and not some 
single catalyst, were responsible for the DLP coming into being.  The DLP’s demise will be 
considered in the next chapter.  This chapter will firstly consider the precursors to the DLP that 
in fact influenced the beginning of the DLP. 
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The Unions from post-Depression to World War 2 
In the 1940s the ALP was not the only party to represent unionists, the Communist Party of 
Australia also represented unionists.  During the depression of the 1930s, the Communist Party 
began to make advances in the unions; it gained influence through its strident militancy and the 
apathy of fellow unionists.  It did this by ensuring that all of its members, who were members of 
a union, attended union meetings and voted at union elections.  In both their involvement and 
voting, these members were able to advance the cause of the Communist Party. 
Henderson (2015:142) comments that the communist strategy of the era was to seize control of 
various unions and then amalgamate them.  Amalgamation along with abolition of the secret 
ballot, made the amalgamated union harder for the members to control.  The amalgamated union 
would then support communist leaders, policies and tactics, such as militancy and general 
strikes. 
The rise of communism in the unions presented problems for the Labor party with affiliated 
unions being invaded by Communist members – a feature regarded by the Catholic Church as 
an alarming rise of ‘godless communism’.  Reynolds (1974:3) considers that two organisations 
formed in the 1940s led to the formation of the DLP in 1955.  Firstly, the establishment of the 
Catholic Social Studies Movement (the Movement) in 1942; and then the establishment in 1945 
of the Industrial Groups (the Groupers) sponsored by the ALP.  Both of these organisations will 
be considered later in this chapter. 
ALP and Communism 
By the mid-1940s, the Communist Party’s union strategy was starting to raise concerns in the 
Australian Labor Party, through its attempted takeover of various ALP affiliated unions.  The 
Communist party was also of concern to the Christian Churches, in particular the Roman 
Catholic Church given the Party’s non-belief in God and Christianity. 
However, the exact meaning of Communism in the Australian context was never very clear.  
Tennant (1981:313) suggests that 
Communism could mean anything from advocacy of state ownership of various enterprises 
to a mild protest against militarism. 
Yet whatever the meaning of implied policies, the fear of Communism was increasing.  
Henderson 2015:201 noted that 1951 saw the publication of ‘A Call to the People of Australia’ 
(The Call) drafted by the Adelaide based Catholic writer Paul McGuire who was a friend and 
associate of BA Santamaria.  Signatories included the Anglican Primate of Australia, the 
Moderator General of the Presbyterian Church, the President of the Methodist Church, the head 
of the world Council of Churches in Australia and Cardinal Norman Gilroy (in his capacity as 
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Catholic Archbishop of Sydney).  Some senior judges such as the Chief Justice of Victoria, Sir 
Edmund Herring, were also signatories. 
Henderson commented that 
The call begins, pompously, with the signatories declaring that ‘there are times in the 
histories of people when those charged with high responsibilities should plainly speak their 
minds’. Then it gets worse; ‘Australia is in danger. We are in danger from abroad we are in 
danger from moral and intellectual apathy, from the mortal enemies of mankind which sap 
the will and darken the understanding, and breed evil dissensions. Unless they are 
withstood, we shall lack moral strength and moral unity sufficient to save our country and 
our liberties’. The call ends with the exhortation: fear God, honor the king. 
We are in danger from abroad’ and ‘mortal enemies of mankind’ can be taken to mean or 
include Communists and Communism. 
Mannix was quick to use ‘The Call’ in the Catholic Church’s fight against the Communists. 
Henderson 2015: 202) comments that:- 
Mannix urged all Australians to work within key organisations of society to ensure they did 
not fall into the hands of evil or incompetent men. The first category-evil men-clearly 
included the communists. 
In addition, the attack on Communism was very emotive for a number of Catholics and their 
Bishops.  Probably as a reaction to ‘red terror’ in the Spanish Civil War.  Noone (1993:3) 
recalled that when nuns came in around 1952 to console his mother after his sister’s death, the 
nuns advised his mother:- 
Your daughter, Mrs Noone, is better off, because the Communists are going to take over 
very soon here in Australia and things are going to be very bad and there are going to be, 
you know, people strung up from lamp posts and so on. 
Noone went on to report that his mother ‘certainly did not believe’ this.  However, Noone went 
on to comment that people ‘certainly were influenced’ by similar comments from the clergy.  As 
a child growing up in a Catholic DLP family in Victoria, the author can also remember similar 
dire predictions. 
Tennant (1981:313) has commented that ‘capturing the ALP for the Faith was considered part 
of the Catholic duty to do battle against Communism.  It was a convenient pretext applied to 
anything of which the speaker disproved.’  As will be shown later in this chapter, the 
Santamaria forces had ambitions going well beyond cleansing the ALP of Communist 
influences, to ridding the ALP of anyone who they considered was not sufficiently anti-
Communist. 
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The Formation of Industrial Groups in the Unions 
The setting up of the Industrial Groups became the ALP’s solution to the rising influence of the 
Communists in the trade unions and through the unions the ALP itself.  In 1945 the ALP State 
Conference in NSW decided to form ALP Industrial Groups.  In 1946 Vic and SA agreed to do 
likewise and QLD formed Industrial Groups in 1947.   
Rigg (1997:9) defined an Industrial Group as:- 
An organised body of workers engaged in a particular job, but usually in scattered 
locations, who band together to combat organised Communist efforts to use unions for 
political purposes. 
In the Australian Railways Union, the members of the Industrial Group may come from 
every section and location, but meet regularly to organise themselves, both for the anti-
Communist fight and to decide and push industrial policies towards the improvement of 
wages and working conditions. 
The Industrial Groups were formed because of the alarm at increasing militancy of communists.  
Furthermore, there were doubts that non-Communist forces could alone control the 1945 ACTU 
biennial conference.  It was also considered by the ALP that Communists could infiltrate the 
ALP and could also instruct the delegates from their controlled unions on how to vote at state 
conference. 
What was the role of the industrial groups?  Rigg (1997:9) advised that Industrial Groups were 
formed to:- 
Combat Communist disruptions and subversive activities, through political strikes (such as 
the 1949 coal strike.) 
Reynolds (1974:7, 8) commented that the formation of the Industrial Groups was a practical 
solution to a pressing problem – Communist influence in the unions.  However little 
consideration seems to have been given in the early years of their formation as to what would be 
their eventual role, should they be successful in their immediate objectives.  This failure to 
define any such long-range plans or even identify a continuing role for the Industrial Groups 
meant that a potential source of friction within the ALP had been created. 
The ALP seemed to have little if any control over the Groups.  Campbell (1961:61) commented 
that the only effective control by the NSW State Branch of the ALP over the Industrial Groups 
was the State Branch Executive who had two nominees on the Central Executive of the Groups.  
However, the Party Central Executive was ‘reluctant to interfere in the day to day workings of 
the Groups’.  
An additional problem was the issue of ‘unity tickets’.  A ‘unity ticket’ is ‘a how to vote advice 
or other material in which members of the ALP are coupled with non-members so that members 
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and non-members do not oppose each other for individual positions. . . . most such tickets 
coupled ALP members with Communists’ (Stephens 1983:55).  However, unity tickets were 
against the Party rules and ‘led to automatic expulsion’. (Murray 1970:25). 
Cameron 1987:120) considered the unity tickets were successful because:- 
Candidates for union office will always place industrial aims ahead of Party political 
considerations. 
Tennant (1981:317) observed that Labor initially supported the Grouper organisations until they 
decided that the Groupers were dangerous, some key Labor supporters included Dougherty in 
NSW, Cameron in SA, and Bukowski in Qld. 
Lloyd (1968:2) recalled that many Labor figures displayed ‘a soft spot for those Industrial 
Groupers, who with little public recognition or support, have fought against great odds to 
prevent the Communists and their contemptible stooges from wrecking the trade union 
movement.’ 
Yet by the 1950s concerns over the growing influence of Groupers caused the ALP to curtail 
their activities.  The ALP in SA through the strong influence of Clyde Cameron, was the first 
State to disbanded the Groups.  Cameron (1987:119-120) advised that the Industrial Groups in 
South Australia were disbanded at the 1951 ALP State Convention.  He advised delegates that 
the Industrial Groups were operating outside their charter.  However, the abolition of the 
Groups in SA caused some angst within the Parliamentary Labor Party.  Cameron (1990:92 -93) 
remarked that at the first Caucus meeting after the Convention, John Mullens, a strong supporter 
of the Groups:- 
Became quite hysterical and pointing his finger at me, began shouting, ‘Judas Iscariot 
Traitor, Judas, you Judas.’  I was dumbfounded and asked him if he was all right.  I did not 
at first connect his outburst with my success in abolishing the Groups. 
However, the ALP made a major mistake in not disbanding the Industrial Groups in all of the 
other States when the Communist Party’s influence in the Unions started to wan sharply.  The 
Groups started to look at other areas in the ALP where they could exert their power. 
Reynolds (1974:7) comments that little consideration appeared to have been given as to what 
would be the role of the Groups should they be successful in defeating the Communists in the 
unions.  In fact, in the early to mid-1950s members of the Groups started to question and 
publicly attack members of the ALP who were considered to be not sufficiently ‘anti-
communist’. This activity presented the ALP as a publicly divided party and was very damaging 
(Daly 1984:110).  This was also the era of McCarthyism in US politics. 
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Murray (1970:26) commented that:- 
In a party beset by personal and ideological rivalries, the creation of the Industrial Groups 
and commitment of the Party as a whole to a war against Communism caused an internal 
upheaval. The Groups created new centres of power and new issues, with bitter factional 
strife as the result. 
Party support for Industrial Groups was withdrawn at the 1955 ALP Federal Conference in 
Hobart.  The motion withdrawing ALP recognition of the Groups read in part:- 
We are of the opinion that any form of industrial organisation designed to combat 
Communist activity in the unions should be a matter for the sole determination of the union 
concerned. (ALP 1955:41). 
Church meets the State - The Australian Catholic Hierarchy 
The relationship between the Church and the State, is a very uncertain area with very poorly 
defined boundaries.  The Australian Catholic Church leaders in the 1950s and 60s were very 
much the Archbishops and Bishops (the Hierarchy).  They were divided on the problem of 
Communism in Australia and the best solution to the problem. 
The Catholic Church in Australia was ‘naturally concerned about the social destructive and anti-
Christian forces of Communism’ (Vodola 1997:69).  In 1955, at the height of the split the 
Hierarchy issued a ‘pastoral letter’ to all Catholics regarding Communism.  They regarded 
Communism as ‘atheistic’, as well as ‘aggressive and ruthless’ in its operation (Catholic bishops 
1955:1).   
The Australian Catholic Hierarchy is significant in the rise of the DLP because of the amount of 
influence the Hierarchy had over the lay members of the Church (those not ordained to the 
priesthood). A number of members of the hierarchy were not averse to publicly commenting on 
political issues.  In the 1950s and early 1960s a number of Catholic lay people questioned the 
religious appropriateness of political sermons from the pulpit on Sundays, along with an 
admonition of the evils of voting Labor.   
Calwell (1972:144) commented that when Archbishop Simonds became Archbishop of 
Melbourne in 1963, the Archbishop received 17 letters of protest from Catholic people who 
named priests as having ‘offended by using their pulpits for political purposes’.  According to 
Calwell, Simonds told his priests that he ‘intended to forget these incidents, but if it happened 
again, he would deal with the matter severely.’ 
Santamaria (1981:24) described the Irish-born influential Archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel 
Mannix was an ‘open unabashed nationalist’.  He was proud of his church and considered himself 
very loyal to his country of birth and also to the country he migrated to.  He saw himself as a 
citizen of the state with the right to comment on state and political issues as the opportunity arose. 
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The most controversial series of incursions into political issues were the various comments from 
Mannix.  In 1916, he publicly opposed conscription. Mannix was of course not the only person to oppose 
conscription, many in the Labor Movement were against it and so were the trade unions.  Through opposing 
conscription Mannix became quite well known, both in Melbourne and beyond.  From the end of World 
War One, Mannix went very quiet politically until the rise of Communism in the mid-1940s. 
Later during a television interview with Gerard Lyons, Mannix was questioned on his 
involvement in political issues.  Mannix commented: 
When a man becomes a bishop, he doesn't cease to be a citizen, and as a citizen and a 
responsible man he has the right to make up his own mind and his own conscience and to 
follow it. . . .  
I have been always protesting that I was speaking not as an Archbishop but as a citizen, and 
that's my attitude down to the present day. I don't want anybody to take my view because I'm 
an Archbishop. . . . in matters that are not solely religious, when I'm speaking as a citizen I 
expect to be listened to as a citizen and to be taken at my citizen value (Murphy 1972:234). 
In his response Mannix is clearly speaking as an ‘open unabashed nationalist’.  What Mannix 
failed to realise was he was well known and recognized as the Archbishop.  As such whenever he 
spoke publicly his words carried significant prestige to influence the thinking and views of his 
followers. 
Mannix in a message to the National Civic Council stated that:- 
The enemy (namely ‘atheistic’ Communism) you were – and are – fighting has never been 
equaled in the hatred he bears for Christ and his Church (Mannix 1955:2). 
Mannix went on to comment: 
The seizure of political power was only a means as far as the Communist was concerned.  
His real end was to use that power to destroy freedom and religion.  You would defend 
freedom as citizens and religion as Christians.’ 
For Mannix then, his opposition to Communism was primarily of a moral or religious nature.  In 
his comments, Mannix had no qualms in mixing religion and politics. 
Allen (1988:28) considered that other historical reasons were part of the reason for the 
formation of the DLP.  Catholics were not very effective at using existing political parties for 
specifically catholic purposes.  Irish Australian Catholics never succeeded in making the ALP 
an ethnic party – the ALP has remained fearful that too many concessions for particular ethnic 
minority groups (especially for Irish Catholics) might provoke an electoral backlash.  Poor 
working class Irish Catholics in Australia turned to the ALP because the ALP supported them as 
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an ‘out group’ in Australian society.  Furthermore, Archbishop Mannix’s leadership was able 
and an important catalyst for political action by Catholics even after Mannix’s death.  
The Catholic Church of the 1950s has been described as having a ‘most unforgiving orthodoxy’ 
which ‘bound’ a few members of the ALP right at that time (MacCallum 2001:37).  However, 
the Catholic Hierarchy’s role in formation of the DLP is further complicated because the 
Australian Catholic Hierarchy was by no means united, it was very divided regarding 
Santamaria’s Movement and the DLP and this division was both very public and quite 
noticeable.  Its members can be broadly divided into two groups.  The group in favour of the 
DLP and the NCC and its operations included Mannix as its leader and chief spokesman, along 
with the other Bishops from Victoria. 
Those against included, Cardinal Gilroy from Sydney, his auxiliary Bishop James Carroll, 
Archbishop Justin Simmonds who was Mannix’s Coadjutor in Melbourne and Bishop Mathew 
Beovich the Archbishop of Adelaide.  
Simonds who was to succeed Mannix in 1963 in Melbourne commented after the 1958 Federal 
Election, over the involvement of the church in bitter political controversy, ‘whenever the 
church’s ministry and spiritual mission becomes befogged with political issues the cause of 
religion always suffers.’  Molony (2010:152) reports that in a conversation with him in the early 
1950s in Rome, Simonds told him that ‘it was fatal for the church to allow itself to be used in 
the political arena.’  The Simonds approach to the Church and politics seemed to be a very 
minimal involvement in politics, a sharp contrast to the Mannix style. 
With regard to the divisive nature of the Australian Catholic bishops, Mayer (1960:16) drew up 
a list of the Bishops in office in 1960 of those who were for Mannix with his support for the 
DLP and those who were against. 
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Chart 4.1 The Australian Catholic Hierarchy – Pro and Anti DLP  
Pro-DLP (Mannix Line)    Anti-DLP (the Gilroy Line) 
Victoria      Victoria 
Daniel Mannix (Melbourne)    Justin Simonds (Melbourne) 
Arthur Fox (Melbourne)    New South Wales 
Francis Lyons (Sale)     Norman Gilroy (Sydney) 
Bernard Stewart (Sandhurst) (Bendigo)   James Carroll (Sydney) 
James O’Collins (Ballarat)    James Freeman (Sydney) 
New South Wales     South Australia 
Edward Doody (Armidale)    Mathew Beovich (Adelaide) 
Francis Henschke (Wagga)    James Gleeson (Adelaide) 
Queensland 
William Brennan (Toowoomba) 
Andrew Tynan (Rockhampton) 
Tasmania 
Guilford Young (Hobart) 
In addition, Mayer listed those Bishops who could be regarded as ‘fluctuating’.  They were 
Redmond Prendiville of Perth who changed support to being rather anti-DLP and Bryan 
Gallagher of Port Pirie in South Australia. Prendiville went so far as to ban an issue of his 
Archdiocesan Magazine which urged support for the DLP.  Other Bishops aimed to be neutral 
in their approach and these Bishops included Archbishop James Duhig of Brisbane and the 
scholarly Archbishop Eris O’Brien of Canberra Goulburn. 
Mayer also believed that this division in the Catholic Hierarchy was also reflected in the 
Catholic press.  In Victoria, The Melbourne Advocate, Tribune and Light in Ballarat were pro-
DLP, The Catholic Weekly in Sydney was neutral or hostile to the DLP, refusing to publish DLP 
election advertisements.  The Southern Cross (SA) and Catholic Record (WA) ignored the DLP 
altogether.  
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Easson (2012) comments that when in 1955 the ALP split occurred:-_ 
There were two factors that weighed with the men and (some) women in the party: the 
strong support of the NSW Catholic hierarchy for the ALP - "stay in and fight" - and the 
memory of the numerous debilitating splits in the 30s during which Lang and Ben Chifley, 
who hated each other, ran candidates for different Labor parties to unseat each other. 
In late 1955, at St Paul's Seminary at Kensington, Bishop James Carroll gathered the NSW 
Movement's luminaries and announced the cardinal's wish that they stay in the Labor Party. 
T the leaders of the Catholic Church in NSW and Victoria were publicly divided in terms of 
their support for the DLP.  It is therefore, no surprise that Catholic support for the DLP was far 
from unanamous from the Catholic Bishops, Priests and lay people.   
Santamaria, Catholic Action and the Movement 
Bartholomew Augustine (Bob) Santamaria was born in Melbourne in 1915 in Brunswick a 
Melbourne suburb to Italian immigrant parents who operated a fruit shop in that suburb.  
Santamaria was educated by the Christian Brothers, he then went on to Melbourne University to 
study Arts and graduating in Arts and Laws.  Santamaria was a member of the Campion 
Society, which was a small association of study groups made up mostly of university men.  
(Santamaria 1997:14). 
In the early 1930s the concept of Catholic Action began to come to prominence in Australia.   
Catholic Action can be defined as:-    
The principle espoused in papal directives in the 1930s.  Catholic Action meant that lay 
members of the Church ought to engage in social activities aimed at spreading the 
principles of their religion into the workplace and into recreation (McConville 1987:158). 
Mannix, as an influential member of the Catholic Hierarchy, approached Santamaria in 1937 to 
help in the formation of the Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action (ANSCA).  
Santamaria was appointed assistant director, becoming director in 1947 after the original 
director was subtly deposed while overseas.  ANSCA was the coordinating body for Catholic 
Action throughout Victoria and then Australia.  It was headquartered in Melbourne.  The 
ANSCA involvement was Santamaria’s first position. 
Under ANSCA a number of constituent bodies were established e.g. YCS (Catholic Action in 
Schools) which Santamaria did not control– and the National Catholic Rural Movement 
(NCRM) which Santamaria did control.  ANSCA was dissolved by the Bishops in 1954. 
Santamaria’s second position was Secretary, and driving force, behind the NCRM from its 
founding in 1939 up to 1960.  The NCRM supposedly was to bring catholic action and ideas to 
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rural areas, it was in fact the Movement in rural areas.  In the words of Kevin Peoples (2012) 
Santamaria ‘pressed the NCRM into acting as his anti-communist arm in rural Australia’. 
Blaxland (2015:116) reported that although Santamaria was the ‘public face of both the NCC 
and the DLP’ and a ‘prolific writer and commentator’, ASIO management saw Santamaria’s 
views as ‘unremarkable’.  As one ASIO officer commented on one of Santamaria’s pamphlets:- 
Simply expressed it is the old conspiracy theory modernised.  The plot is simplified by 
reducing it to a simple black and white issue . . . there are some very serious defects in the 
whole thesis. 
Molony (2004:129) defines Catholic Action as ‘simply those things officially done by the laity, 
men and women, in the name of the Church.  That definition clearly excluded political action.’  
However, as events unfolded it was quite clear that Mannix and Santamaria intended Catholic 
Action in Australia to include political action where they thought it appropriate. 
The Catholic Social Studies Movement (The CSSM or The Movement) began in 1941 ‘as a 
loose Melbourne network’ (Morgan 2007: xiv).  It was set up by BA Santamaria and Bert 
Cremean to combat communism in the unions.  Cremean was a Labor member of the Victorian 
Parliament.  ‘It was Cremean who first suggested the co-ordination of Catholic trade union 
groups to combat communism; from this idea 'the Movement' emerged’ (Geoff Browne 1993). 
The Movement’s existence was not announced and it was not part of Catholic Action.  The 
Movement assisted and supported the industrial groups.  Santamaria was described as the 
liaison officer between the CSSM and the Bishops – this was his third position.  However, 
Santamaria was seen as the de facto head of the CSSM (Morgan 2007:xiv).  It was the 
Movement that Evatt denounced in 1954. 
Members of the Movement became heavily involved in the Groups in the fight against the 
Communist influence in the Unions.  Movement members who were engaged in that activity 
were known as ‘Groupers’, and some observers such as SA’s Clyde Cameron (1990:86, 92) 
believed that the Movement was the driving force ‘behind the Groups’. 
McManus (1977:35ff) discussed the Movement’s involvement with the Industrial Groups.  He 
put forward the view that the activities of Santamaria’s Movement were not secret and that the 
ALP members in the Victorian Trades Hall knew of Santamaria’s activities.  Santamaria’s 
interactions with the Victorian Trades Hall and ALP members was facilitated by HM Cremean 
who was both Deputy leader of the Victorian Parliamentary Labor Party and Secretary of the 
Fire Brigades Union 
To be eligible to be a member of the Movement a person had to be a Catholic.  The Movement 
though not formally linked to the Industrial Groups, provided a considerable part of their 
muscle.  The term ‘Grouper’ was applied to both groups. 
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Bramble and Kuhn (2011:65) comment that ‘as the Groupers prospered, the Movement 
expanded its influence within the ALP which started to sound alarm bells.  The ALP officials 
were happy to help the Groupers to get rid of their Communist opponents but were not so 
pleased when the Groupers began to move against Labor union leaders and politicians labelled 
corrupt or insufficiently anti-communist.’ 
Movement members joined the Industrial Groups and contributed to their activity.  Ormonde 
(1996:62) claimed that the Movement operated behind the cover of the officially sponsored 
ALP Industrial Groups – ‘and the term Grouper ultimately became almost synonymous with 
being pro Movement.’  Similarly, Allen (1988) claimed that ‘without Movement support the 
Industrial Groups would probably not have achieved most of their successes’.  
Morgan (2007:75) indicated that a letter written by Santamaria to Mannix dated 11 December 
1952 showed that Santamaria’s ambitions went well beyond ridding the ALP of Communist 
influence.  Santamaria wrote:- 
The Social Studies Movement should within a period of five or six years be able to 
completely transform the leadership of the Labor movement, and to introduce into Federal 
and State spheres large numbers of members who possess a clear realisation of what 
Australia demands of them, and the will to carry it out.  Without going into details, they 
should be able to implement a Christian social programme in both the State and Federal 
spheres, and above all, to achieve co-ordination between the different states in so doing.  
This is the first time that such a work has become possible in Australia and, as far as I can 
see in the Anglo-Saxon world since the advent of Protestantism.  
In addition, Dalziel (1967:138) reported that in the Bombay Examiner (the newspaper of the 
Catholic Archdiocese of Bombay), Santamaria was reported as speaking of ‘permeating and 
penetrating organised Labor which was allegedly under the threat of takeover by Communist 
infiltrators’. 
Santamaria’s letter to Mannix shows an agenda that went much further than merely ridding the 
Labor party of communists.  The Santamaria agenda including hijacking the ALP’s policies in 
order to put in place a ‘Christian social program’.  Significantly Santamaria does not define 
what a ‘Christian social program’ means or who will decide if the social program is ‘Christian’ 
or not. 
Ormonde (1996:62) claimed exposure of the Movement was also supported by prominent 
Catholics amongst others because of a ‘powerful conviction’ that Santamaria had a quasi-
religious as well as a political vision for the Labor Party, both being pursued by the process of 
‘secret permeation.’  This process would cleanse the Labor Party of not only its ‘crypto 
communists’, but also of its political liberals and agnostics.  
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Murray (1970:56) commented that:- 
Santamaria as well as being a militant anti-communist also had the politician’s instinct for a 
good issue, soon made ‘the threat from the North’ into a high priority issue for the 
Movement. 
Santamaria did much to paint China, Vietnam and Indonesia as threats to Australia’s security 
and very much ‘unknown quantities’ as near neighbours to Australia. 
After the 1955 split in the ALP the Catholic Bishops were divided over the Movement – it had 
ceased to be a unified organisation.  In July 1956, most Movement officials had resigned and 
formed a new body the Catholic Social Movement (CSM).  Santamaria was head of the CSM, 
which was his fourth position.  About half the Bishops supported the CSM.  The CSM was short 
lived, as following a ruling from the Vatican that the Catholic Church should not be involved in 
political activity, the CSM was dissolved. 
Most of the CSM officials joined a new body the National Civic Council (NCC) formed in 
1957, which was, and still is today, a private secular organisation, with very little or no 
involvement by the Australian Catholic Hierarchy.  This was Santamaria’s fifth and final 
position. 
The National Civic Council spelt out its strategy with regard to the DLP in 1959 (Morgan 
2008:316-17).  Its basic policy included creating a second Labor party – the DLP with 
disciplined preferences. Then to divide the ALP into two sections – the Left and the Right 
creating unity between the Right and the DLP resulting in the majority Labor party which will 
endorse industrial groups that will fight in the Communist unions 
These objectives show a plan to reunite with the ALP, but only to the right wing of the party 
and not the left.  It seems there was to be no compromise at all in respect of the left wing of the 
ALP.   Further the dividing of left and right in the ALP seems a very ambitious objective with 
no certainty of success.  What would the left of the ALP do?  Forming a new party would not be 
out of the question.  The end result could still be a divided Labor movement with a very vocal 
left wing party. 
Molony (2010:308) commented that Santamaria followed where Mannix had led and betrayal of 
the divine mission of the Church . . .  had been taking place since the late 1940s in Australia and 
primarily in Melbourne.  That Mannix must be regarded as the principal actor in the betrayal 
rather than Santamaria is unquestionable. 
Santamaria was seen in some quarters as a person who saw threats and enemies everywhere.  He 
was a ‘behind the scenes man’ rather than operating in public forums (McCallum 2001:38).  He 
was also one who was not amenable to party discipline (McManus 1976). 
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Interaction of the DLP and the National Civic Council was complex, secretive and religious not 
political in nature (Brennan 1972:11).  The interactions of Santamaria and his various 
organisations add a level of complexity to the DLP.  Given that Santamaria was never a member 
of the DLP.  Santamaria was pushing for an ALP free of communist influence.  However, he 
went much further than that.  As previously mentioned in this chapter, Santamaria was 
engineering towards a ‘takeover’ of the ALP.  
The 1949 Election and the change of leadership from Chifley 
to Evatt 
In 1949 the Chifley Labor Government was defeated and Chifley led the ALP in opposition 
until his death in 1951.  The Parliamentary ALP in the early 1950s was much divided over the 
issue of Communism.  In fact, the Liberal Party whip Jo Gullett (1974) reported that in 1950 
Chifley confided in him that the Labor party was divided over the issue of Communism, but 
Chifley was confident that he could keep the Party together, but he doubted that after he ‘went’, 
the new Leader would be as successful, and a split would be inevitable (Gullett 1970). 
The 1949 Federal election saw the election of three Labor members who were the spokesmen 
for the ALP Industrial Groups and for Catholic Action in the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, 
namely Stan Keon in the electorate of Yarra, Jack Mullens in Gellibrand and William Bourke in 
Fawkner.  The left and right of Caucus differed on the stand on Communism.  This was also the 
time of the Korean War which saw Australia at war again.  
On 23 March 1950 Chifley the Leader of the Labor Party spoke in the Parliament and Keon in 
following him as the next Labor speaker in the debate, publicly disagreed with Chifley.  The 
Menzies Government being aggressive anti-communist, sharpened the divisions in Caucus.  The 
Communist Party Dissolution bill and secret ballots legislation forced members of Caucus to 
take sides.  On March 15 1951, Keon criticised Evatt in a caucus meeting and this was reported 
in the Sydney Morning Herald the next day. 
After Chifley died the Deputy Leader Bert Evatt was elected by Caucus as Leader of the ALP 
and Leader of the Opposition.  Evatt’s style of leadership was in marked contrast to that of 
Chifley.  Daly (1984:109) described Evatt as ‘intellectual, controversial, Machiavellian, 
egotistical, unorthodox and unpredictable.’ Whitington (1964:54) commented that Evatt ‘had an 
inordinate vanity, an ego that brooked no opposition and no criticism.’ 
In Crockett’s view (1993:279) Evatt should have accommodated the diverse views and high 
emotions of ALP members.  Crockett (1993:279) describes Evatt as intrusive, at times 
disruptive, as a leader he lacked flair for compromise, integrity in dealing with Caucus and 
facility with people and party groupings.  Crockett went on to comment that ‘Evatt presented his 
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leadership as inspirational - for others to admire, but not to induce them to follow his example 
of repeatedly working outside party structures.’ 
Evatt was accused by the ALP Senator Allen Fraser of acting with ‘unpredictable 
individualism’, Evatt’s excuse being that ‘it was essential to act quickly in the Party’s interest’ 
(Crockett (1993:279). 
Fitzgerald and Holt (2010:105-106) comment that attempts to get rid of Evatt as leader, 
consolidated his position.  He was the embodiment of anti-Santamaria orthodoxy in the Party.  
In other words, Evatt was one person in the Labor Caucus who could and would stand up to 
Santamaria and no doubt also to those in Caucus who openly supported Santamaria. 
Tennant (1981:317) suggested that ‘staunch Labor men’ held the view that by accusing the 
Groupers and bringing them out into the open, Evatt could defeat their tactics of preferred 
secrecy.  ‘Labor rank and file were impatient at the arrogance of the Groupers and their 
assumption that they could pretty well do what they pleased and dictate as they wished.’ As ‘the 
state of Catholic Action was not malleable to compromise, the split in the ALP was inevitable 
and unavoidable’ (Tennant 1981: 324).   
Crockett (1993:279) comments that the ‘principal cause of the ALP’s internal problems lay in 
long standing differences of opinion about how to deal with the influence of Communism in the 
ALP’s political and industrial wings (the unions). 
Crockett (1993:295) considers that Evatt was ‘ill-equipped to unify and lead’. Evatt also failed 
to consult the party about vital matters’ and was also ‘mistrustful of his colleagues’ (Crockett 
1993:281-282). 
Crockett (1993:279) also noted that :- 
Party members had long objected to their leader’s neglect of party procedure, especially 
when he did not consult colleagues before releasing contentious public statements   
Murphy (2016:343) claimed that Evatt:- 
had little grasp of what was happening and little control over events in the deeper struggle 
in the Labor movement, it is hard to see his hand at work. . . . The powder keg  . . . (Evatt) 
touched off was already in place.  
A significant cause of the split was Evatt’s very erratic style of leadership with his failure to 
consult and lack of tact and very communication skills.  He was a brilliant legal mind with little 
or no leadership skills. 
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The 1954 Election and the Defection of Petrov 
Just before the dissolution of the House of Representatives for the 1954 election, held on 29 
May, Menzies made a statement to the House of Representatives advising that the Third 
Secretary of the Russian Embassy Vladimir Petrov had defected to Australia and that a royal 
commission enquiring into espionage would be set up. 
Whitington (1956:95) claimed that ‘there is little doubt that the Menzies government exploited 
the Petrov case for political purposes.’  Whitington goes on to claim that ‘there is very definite 
evidence for instance that the Prime Minister knew most or many of the facts at least six months 
before he announced them to parliament on the eve of the 1954 elections.’  In addition, 
Whitington goes on to claim ‘that first announcement with its solemnity, its underlying note of 
urgency, made a profound impression on the electorate.’  Thus, Communism was a major issue 
in the election campaign. 
Evatt expected to win the 1954 election and in fact the ALP won 50.1 per cent of the vote and 
the Coalition 47 per cent of the vote.  However, the majority of the votes that comprised the 
swing to Labor were cast in safe seats and not in the marginal seats that Labor needed to win 
government.  Consequently, the coalition was returned to government with a majority of five 
seats (59 Labor and Coalition 64 seats).  Evatt was bitterly disappointed. 
Faulkner and Macintyre (2001:213) claim that Labor lost the election due to a botched 1949 
redistribution of electorates and ‘Evatt’s extravagant campaign promises’ along with ‘Menzies 
opportunism’ and the ‘conveniently timed defection’ of Petrov. 
Buckley et al (1994:382ff) also considered that the Petrov affair was a catalyst for a major split 
in the ALP.  The ALP faced two threats, the first was the Communists ‘who sought to have 
themselves accepted as part of the ALP’.  The second was the Industrial Groups and their ‘alter 
ego’ the Movement, which was remarkably successful in infiltrating the Industrial Groups.   
In the view of Buckley et al, the Movement went beyond its original aims.  However, Evatt’s 
intervention prevented Santamaria from achieving his aims. 
Had Labor won the 1954 Federal election, it is likely that the 1955 split of the Labor Party 
would not have happened and there would have been no DLP and the long reign of the Menzies 
government might have never happened.  Australian history could have been much different. 
As could be imagined, the troubles and divisiveness in the ALP did not escape the attention of 
the research staff in the Liberal Party Secretariat.  In November 1954, this group submitted a 
confidential ‘appreciation’ to the Liberal Party hierarchy.  The ‘Appreciation’ (Document No 1) 
claimed (at page 1) the ALP was:- 
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 split into three main camps.  These were ‘a small aggressive right wing, an equally 
aggressive left wing and a large middle group which has striven to avoid a split in the party  
As to a likely outcome, the Appreciation considered that:- 
a complete victory for the right wing may be ruled out.  Although the anti-Evatt Group in 
Federal Caucus is large, the right-wing faction is small.  With Keon, Mullins and Bourke of 
Victoria ‘being the hard core’ and are ‘definitely regarded as the mouth pieces of Catholic 
action in Caucus. 
The Appreciation went on to note:- 
hostility to the groupers has been increasing in ALP branches for some time.  More 
important is the trade union hostility to the Groupers and to Catholic Action. 
The appreciation then notes (on page 2) that the Keon faction entered Parliament in 1949 and:- 
 since that time the Victorian Executive and the ALP Groupers are increasingly unpopular 
with the Labor rank and file for these reasons:- 
 They are regarded as a party within a party; 
 They are branded as the instruments of Catholic Action; 
 Catholic Action is criticised as a secret society within the Labor movement; 
  The right wing is blamed for the confused thinking in the ALP today, it is said that the 
anti-red fanaticism of the right wing has transformed the Labor Party from a socialist to a 
reactionary party. 
Compromise seems out of the question because of the bitterness on the issue is so deep.  
The left and the right wing are irreconcilable and compromise will not solve the problem.  . 
. .  a victory for the left depends on the line of votes at the ALP Federal Conference in 
Hobart, the signs are the left will have a majority. 
The appreciation went on to note that:- 
Dr Evatt and his supporters in the left would prefer a “root and branch purge”, which would 
result in the destruction of the Victorian ALP executive and the Keon faction, ‘which is the 
strongest prop the ALP Groups and Catholic Action possess.   
Already Evatt’s supporters have isolated the Victorian Executive from the most powerful 
trade union backing in Victoria.     
The ‘appreciation’ and its approach shows that the Liberal Party secretariat was very mindful 
that a waring and divided ALP would ensure the Liberals and their coalition colleagues the 
Country Party, would enjoy increased support from the voters at the next election.  What was 
not known at the time of the Split was the decision of the new party, the DLP, to second 
preference not the ALP but the Coalition parties.  The DLP’s strategies regarding preference 
allocation will be considered later in this chapter. 
Evatt’s Reaction to the loss of the 1954 Election 
Evatt looked for a scapegoat for the election loss and he found one in the Groupers, who he 
personally blamed for the defeat of Labor.  On 5 October 1954 Evatt released a press release.  In 
that press release Evatt commented on the federal election that was held in May.  He observed 
that the ALP ‘made gains in every state except Victoria’.  He went on to say:- 
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But in the election, one factor told heavily against us – the attitude of a small minority 
group of members, located particularly in the state of Victoria, which has, since 1949, 
become increasingly disloyal to the Labor movement and the Labor leadership. 
Adopting methods which strikingly resemble both communist and Fascist infiltration of 
larger groups, some of these groups have created an almost intolerable situation – 
calculated to deflect the Labor movement from the pursuit of established Labor objectives 
and ideals. 
Whenever it suits their real aims, one or more of them never hesitate to attack or subvert 
Labor policy or Labor leadership (quoted in Murray 1970:180). 
He went on to say; 
It seems certain that the activities of this small group are largely directed from outside the 
Labor movement.  The Melbourne News Weekly appears to act as their organ.  A serious 
position exists. 
The people Dr Evatt was referring to were BA Santamaria and his supporters in the Catholic 
Social Studies Movement and the groupers in various unions. 
Reactions to Evatt’s statement came very quickly.  First the press reported Evatt’s statement. 
The Argus of 6 October on page one reported ‘Evatt Denounces Victorian MP’s Group – 
Traitors’, the Sydney Morning Herald followed on 9 October reporting that ‘Victorian ALP 
Executive condemns Evatt’ and went on to report that; ‘the Executive declared that Dr Evatt’s 
attack had damaged the Party and was unworthy of a Federal Leader of the ALP.’  The Sydney 
Morning Herald reported again on 21 October with an account of a stormy ALP party meeting 
in Canberra.  These press comments would not have assisted the ALP as a party instead 
highlighting in a damaging way, disunity in the party.   
The Federal Secretary of the ALP Mr J Schemella received a letter dated 3 November 1954 
from the Amalgamated Engineering Union in Melbourne congratulating Dr Evatt on his stand 
‘against disruptive and disloyal elements within the ALP who we consider were responsible for 
Labor’s defeat in the (1954) Federal election.’  A similar letter dated 21 October was sent by the 
Maryborough Trades and Labor Council.  Gwen Stahl a Victorian wrote to the Federal 
Secretary on 27 October, informing him ‘that the actions of Keon, Mullens, and Bourke etc. 
have only confirmed their anti-Labor sympathies’.  She went on to ‘urge the Federal executive 
to support Dr Evatt on his stand against these elements’.  Mr LR Cotton of Bentleigh wrote on 9 
November 1954 supporting Evatt and accusing the industrial groups of ‘a misuse of power’.   
However, the Ballarat District Council of the Victorian Branch of the Federated Clerks’ Union 
in a letter dated 26 October criticised Evatt for his attack ‘without making specific charges’ and 
‘pledged their support to the Victorian Executive of the ALP’ as well as the Industrial Groups 
‘in their fight against the critical menace of Communism.’ 
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It is significant that all of these letters came from party members and Labor organisations in 
Victoria.  The letters show that support for the Victorian executive of the party was not 
universal throughout Victoria. 
The Federal Executive of the ALP met on 27 October 1954 and through November to 
investigate ‘a number of press statements by members of the party, including . . .  Evatt’. 
However, the Federal Executive investigated under four headings. 
 Disunity and lack of discipline in the Federal parliamentary Labor Party; 
 Charges and counter charges involving individual members of the Party; 
 That in effect, the Central Executive of the Party in Victoria is dominated and/or 
influenced by an outside body referred to as the ‘Movement’ to the detriment of the 
Labor Party’s basic principles; 
 That Industrial group organisation has developed away from its original purpose and is 
being used as a vehicle to further the political aims of an outside body referred to as the 
‘Movement’. 
The Federal Executive stated that ‘it is not intended to critically examine all those factors. 
Sufficient for the purpose of the Executive is to say that it is accepted as a fact.’  The Executive 
went on to make a finding that ‘the charges preferred against Dr Evatt are not sustained’. 
With regard to ‘Central Executive of the Party in Victoria being dominated and/or influenced by 
an outside body referred to as the ‘Movement’, the Federal Executive made a number of 
decisions.  These decisions included ‘all officers and members of the Victorian Central 
Executive  . . . shall be declared vacant’.  For administrative purposes, there were a few 
exceptions.   
The Executive ordered the Victorian Branch of the Party to hold a Special State Conference.  
The Victorian Central Executive refused to give effect to that decision, therefore the Special 
Conference was convened by the Federal Executive on 26 and 27 February 1955.  The Federal 
Executive also directed that the rule that delegates to the conference had to be members of the 
ALP for two years ‘shall not be observed for the purposes of the Special Conference’.  This 
meant, according to McManus (1977:67), that ‘delegates from unions need not be members of 
the Labor Party.’  Furthermore, disaffiliated unions could affiliate and send delegates to the 
Special Conference. 
As well as electing the officers and members of the Victorian Central Executive, the Special 
Conference was also empowered to elect the delegates to the Federal Conference to be held in 
Hobart in March 1955 notwithstanding that these delegates had been elected previously.  Those 
six delegates were FP McManus, JP Horan, J Riley, R Saker, J Neill and D Woodhouse.  
McManus (1977:72) explained that the last three delegates (Saker, Neill and Woodhouse) were 
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elected later, in place of Lovegrove, Carey and one other, who were ‘elected on both 
conferences, but notified that they would be representing the ‘new’ Executive.’ 
The Special Conference elected as delegates to the Federal Conference, JV Stout, JP Brebner, 
HO Davis, W Divers, PJ Kennelly and D Lovegrove.  
With regard to the ‘Industrial Group organisation’, the Federal Executive held that pending a 
determination by the Federal Conference in Hobart, regarding Industrial Groups, these groups 
would not be recognised by the Victorian Branch. 
Buckley et al (1994:389) argued that Evatt ‘was fundamentally concerned about the integrity of 
the ALP’, which was threatened by a subversive group whose aim was to ‘deflect the Labor 
movement from the pursuit of established Labor objectives and ideals.’  However, Crocker 
(1993: 279) adopted a different view on Evatt.  He described Evatt as:- 
Intrusive, at times disruptive, as a leader he lacked flair for compromise, integrity in dealing 
with Caucus, and facility with people and party groupings.’ 
In other words, Evatt was tactless and not a diplomat and lacking a flair for compromise. 
Hayden (1996:79) commented that Evatt’s October 1954 statement was made without 
consultation (presumably with Caucus) ‘in a desperate and inexcusably selfish effort to save his 
flagging leadership.  Not for the first or last time in his career Evatt put his personal ambitions 
ahead of any other interests, such as those of the Labor Party.’ 
Howard (2014:187), himself a former party leader has commented on Evatt and his leadership 
with the advantage of hindsight spanning 59 years.  On the issue of a party leader Howard 
considers that: 
It is a truism that the leader of a political party has greater influence on the perceptions and 
behaviour of that party than anyone else.  More than any other person, the leader has the 
authority and power to bring people together, to articulate what the party stands for, and to 
appeal to the party’s common interests, above the interests of individual persons or 
factions.  For these reasons, the leader also has the capacity to inflict more damage on the 
party than anyone else. 
The 1955 ALP Federal Conference in Hobart 
The final act that brought the DLP into existence was the ALP Federal conference of 1955 in 
Hobart.  Both of the delegations from Victoria went to the Federal Conference, both claiming to 
be the legitimate delegation.  The Federal Conference had to decide which one was the 
legitimate delegation.  Strangely the delegation elected at the Special Conference in Victoria 
was allowed to join the conference on the first day and vote on which delegation was legitimate.  
The delegation chosen after Federal intervention was then declared the bona fide delegation.   
McManus (1977:73) observed that:- 
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In desperation, Chamberlain and Stout decided not to accept the traditional Labor practice 
of having the other five states decide when there was a conflict on credentials; they decided 
to seat the six delegates of the ‘new’ Victorian Executive, and so make them judges on their 
own case. 
The delegation composed of delegates chosen before Federal intervention was excluded.  That 
delegation comprised mainly Groupers and their supporters.  That delegation then decided to 
split from the ALP and thus the DLP was formed, it originally named itself the Australian Labor 
Party Anti-Communist (ALP-AC). 
Writing in The Australian of 6 November, Evatt’s Deputy Arthur Calwell (1965) described the 
1955 split of the ALP as ‘Evatt’s last great fight’.  In Calwell’s view, it was a ‘gross distortion 
of history to say that Dr Evatt caused the split.’  Calwell considered that the split was the result 
of protective action by the Labor Party against a powerful move for outside control and the 
introduction of philosophies quite alien to its nature and traditions. 
The Labor Party split was fueled on one side by the non-Labor member Santamaria’s attempts 
to take over the Labor Party and expel any member who was not sufficiently anti-Communist.  
On the other side was Dr Evatt with his leadership style, together with Calwell his deputy who 
had a hatred for Santamaria and the Groupers and their parliamentary supporters.  Others who 
distrusted Santamaria and the groupers were, the unionists Stout, Chamberlain, Schemella and 
the Labor Member of Parliament, Pollard.  The anti-groupers were able to rearrange the rules to 
allow favourable delegates from disaffiliated unions and even non-Labor members who were 
unionists that were also anti-movement and anti- groupers to attend the special conference. 
The consequences of the Split was the banishment of Labor to the opposition benches until 1972 
federally and 1982 in the Victorian parliament.  The chance of a Labor government was 
severely restricted by the DLP flow of preferences to the Liberal and Country parties.  Thus, the 
Split caused much damage to the ALP as the DLP never became a third party or alternative 
Labor party; the real winners from the split were the Liberal and Country parties. 
The split in the ALP was not uniform throughout Australia.  In fact, it was far from uniform.  
The DLP’s main strength came from the State of Victoria.  Victoria was the home of Santamaria 
with Mannix, and the Bishops of the three other Catholic dioceses, and their influential support 
for the DLP. 
After the split in Queensland in 1957 over annual leave for workers, Queensland was the second 
strongest state for the DLP returning two DLP Senators in 1964 and in 1967, one of those 
Senators was the former ALP Premier of Queensland, Vincent Gair. 
In the early years from 1955, the DLP got enough support in Tasmania through the efforts of the 
former ALP Senator George Cole who also switched to the DLP in 1955 during the split.  
However, in the early 1960s Cole’s health started to suffer and his level of support started to fall 
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as a result.  He lost his Senate seat at the 1964 Senate elections and he died a few years later.  
The DLP’s support in Tasmania never recovered from that slump and the DLP failed to get any 
other candidate elected to the Senate from Tasmania. 
In New South Wales the Catholic Archbishop Cardinal Gilroy and his assistance Carroll were 
very open in their opposition to Santamaria, Mannix and the DLP.  In their view the dissatisfied 
members of the parliamentary Labor Party should have remained in the ALP and fought the 
Communist influence from that vantage point. 
However, the DLP was somewhat persistent in New South Wales to the point that John Kane 
who was involved in the Split was elected to the Senate for a three-year term in 1970.  Two 
reasons were the cause of Kane’s success, one was six senators were up for re-election and not 
five, thus the quota was lower.  The second reason was that the ALP in its allocation of 
preferences, favoured Kane and the DLP over some other parties.  Kane claimed he was aware 
of the preference allocation on polling day and actually thanked the ALP booth workers and 
other Labor officials for helping him and the DLP in such a way (Kane 1989 173:174). 
In Western Australia, the DLP’s support was always fairly weak but not as weak as in South 
Australia.  In Western Australia, the DLP had finance problems in maintaining and running a 
state office and thus the party relied heavily on donations from business interests and individual 
supporters.  In fact, in 1958 the DLP State President commented on ‘the grim struggle to 
survive in Western Australia’ (Clarke 1971:79).  Furthermore, Clarke found evidence in the 
DLP files in Perth of support from members of the Liberal Party to the DLP (Clarke 1971:82).   
In addition, the DLP in Western Australia was very prone to run an election campaign on 
morality issues such as abortion, the right to life and censorship.  In 1970 when the DLP in 
other states benefitted from the swing away from the two major parties, this swing did not 
translate to the DLP’s results in Western Australia.  An independent senator SA Negus won the 
fifth Senate seat, campaigning solely on the abolition of estate and gift duties, which were two 
very unpopular taxes - estate duty being levied on the capital value of a recently deceased 
person’s assets!  Negus’ victory was totally unexpected.  The DLP polled a disappointing 5.6 
per cent. 
Finally, in South Australia the DLP from 1955 polled very poorly.  Two reasons were the cause; 
the first reason was the dissolution of the Groups in South Australia in 1954.  The second reason 
was Mathew Beovich, the Catholic Archbishop of Adelaide switched his allegiances from 
Santamaria to an apolitical stance.  He did not approve of Santamaria’s policies and methods. 
What Actually Caused the Split? 
Murray (1970:5) believed that the Split was about:- 
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Power and personalities rather than ideology, but it was nevertheless ideology which 
formed the tense background against which this most complex and damaging of Australian 
Schisms opened.  Where ideas were discussed, they tended to become weapons in faction 
fights – in a political tradition that spread far beyond Australian Labor. 
Murray’s comments provide an accurate assessment of the Split, given Evatt’s authoritarian 
leadership, the fiery nature of Keon and the attitude of Calwell in not forgiving or forgetting 
those who he and his followers considered had ‘ratted’ on them or let them down in other ways.  
This was in an atmosphere of being accused of being a Communist merely through association 
or simply not being sufficiently ‘anti-Communist’.  
Three prominent reasons for the ALP split, were the perceived spread of communism, the 
quality of Dr Evatt’s leadership of the Labor Party and the influence and activities of Mr BA 
Santamaria.  However, Howard (2014:185) goes into more detail.  He claimed that there are 
four ‘versions’ or explanations regarding what caused the ALP split of 1955.  The first version 
was that the Split ‘was the culmination of a long dormant but slowly building, philosophical 
division’ in the Australian Labor Party between an anti -Communist right wing and a left wing 
‘which was less alarmed about the threat of Communism both domestically and international 
and had an almost child- like faith in the efficacy of the United Nations to solve mankind’s 
problems’. 
The second version was that the Split was predominantly sectarian in character.  For many 
years, the ALP was the ‘party of choice for the great bulk of Australian Catholics’.  Howard 
goes on to comment that ‘zealots amongst active Catholics in both the ALP and Catholic lay 
bodies saw this demographic circumstance, combined with the threat of Communism as a 
vehicle in which the ALP could be made even more ‘Catholic’ (anti- communist?)  This 
produced a protestant or anti-Catholic backlash, which ultimately lead to the Split. 
The third factor was a clash of priorities between keeping the Communists at bay in the unions 
and those who ‘saw Labor’s supreme mission as gaining and then holding Government both 
nationally and at a state level’.  
The fourth version Howard provided was that Dr HV Evatt the Leader of the Labor Party was to 
blame for the split, given the divisiveness of his October 1954 statement and that fact that he 
went from ‘flirting with the industrial groups and Santamaria to using them as scapegoats after 
he lost the 1954 Federal election and his leadership ‘had hit a new low’.  It is significant that 
Howard does not consider the role of Santamaria in the reasons for the split. 
Howard later suggested that any assessment of the Split includes elements of all of those 
explanations. 
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The Australian Labor Party (Anti Communist) (ALP (AC)) 
When Parliament resumed on 1955, the members of the ALP who had joined the ALP-AC sat as 
a group on the opposition cross benches in the House of Representatives.  Those who split from 
the ALP to Form the ALP (AC) are shown in the following table:- 
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Table 6:  Federal Parliamentary Members of the Australian Labor Party (Anti 
Communist) (ALP (AC)) 1955 
Member Electorate Religion Term in Parliament 
Andrews TW Darebin VIC Catholic 1949-1955 
Bourke WM Faulkner VIC Catholic 1949-1955 
Bryson WG Bourke VIC Catholic 1943-1946 
1949-1955 
Cole GR Tasmania (Senate) 
Sitting ALP Senator 
who held his seat 
after split 
Protestant 1949-1965 
Cremen JL Hoddle VIC Catholic 1949-1955 
(Vic State 1945-49) 
Joshua R Ballaarat VIC Protestant 1951-1955 
Keon SM Yarra VIC Catholic 1949-1955 
(Vic State 1945 -
1949) 
Mullens JM Gellibrand VIC Catholic 1949-1955 
(1937-1946 Vic 
State) 
McManus FP Victoria Senate 
(former Secretary of 
Vic ALP 
Catholic 1956-1962 
1965-1974 
Source:  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 
At the Federal election, later that year all members of the ALP-AC in the House lost their seats.  
However, in the Senate Coles’ term did not expire in 1955 and McManus, the former assistant 
secretary of the ALP in Victoria, was elected to represent the new party in Victoria. 
In the State of Victoria, a number of ALP State parliamentarians split from the Party to join the 
ALP (AC).  Their details are shown in the following table. 
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Table 7:  Victorian State Parliamentary Members of the Australian Labor Party (Anti 
Communist) (ALP (AC)) 1955-1958 
Member Electorate Religion Term in Parliament 
Barry WP MLA Northcote 
Member of Cain 
Ministry 
Catholic 1932-1955 
Leader of ALP (AC) 
Coleman PL MLC Melbourne 
West 
Catholic 1943-1955 
Leader of ALP (AC) 
In Leg Council 
Corrigan ST MLA Port 
Melbourne 
Catholic 1952-1955 
Hayes T MLA Melbourne Catholic 1924-1955 
Jones P MLC Doutta Galla Catholic 1938-1958 
Little JA MLC Melbourne Nth Protestant 1954-1958 
O’Carroll JP MLA Clifton Hill Catholic 1949-1955 
Randles PJ MLA Brunswick Catholic 1949-1955 
Scully FR MLA Richmond Catholic 1949-1958 
Source: Victorian State Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)  
McManus (1977:74) recorded that Cain the Victorian Premier was ‘ordered by Stout to recast 
his ministry and drop any who supported us.’  As a consequence, the Liberal opposition moved 
a motion of no confidence in the Labor government.  The motion was carried and at the 
subsequent election, a Liberal government was elected and remained in office, winning 
elections, until 1982.  At the same election, most of the ALP (AC) members lost their seats.  
However, three were able to survive and serve another term.  They were Jack Little MLC and P 
Jones MLC, whose six year terms had another three years to run, expiring in 1958 when they 
did lose their seats.  The third member was Frank Scully MLA, who was also defeated in 1958.  
In the Cain ALP government, Scully was an Assistant Minister as well as Secretary to Cabinet 
from December 1952 to March 1955. 
In 1956 the party changed its name to the Australian Democratic Labor Party (ADLP shortened 
to DLP).  In 1962, the Queensland Labor Party (QLP) merged into the DLP.   
  
91 
 
 
Table 8:  DLP Members of Federal Parliament 1955-1974 
Member State Birth 
Year 
Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work 
before 
Parliament 
Year 
Joined 
DLP 
Byrne, 
Condon 
QLD 1910 1951-1958 
1968-1974 
Post Grad 
Arts Law 
ALP Senator 1957 
Cole, 
George 
Tas 1910 -1955 
ALP 
1955-1964 
DLP 
Post Grad 
Arts 
Teaching 
School 
Teacher,  
ALP Senator 
1955 
Gair, Vince QLD 1900 1964-1974 Secondary 
School 
QLD Premier 1957 
Kane, Jack NSW 1905 1970-1974 Secondary 
School 
DLP 
Organiser 
1955 
Little, Jack Vic 1914 1968-1974 Post Grad ALP State 
Member, 
Trade 
Unionist 
 
1955 
McManus, 
Frank 
Vic 1905 1955-1961 
1964-1974 
Post Grad School 
teacher, ALP 
State 
secretary 
1955 
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 
Who voted for the DLP? 
Although the Party’s support varied from state to state, given the policies of the DLP, it would 
be fair to assume that the typical DLP voter and long term supporter would be strongly anti-
Communist, support increased defence spending as a result and support strict moral values such 
as no divorce, strict censorship and be anti-abortion and ‘right to life’.  A strong possibility is 
that they would be regular church going Roman Catholics. 
In addition, some of the DLP leaders such as McManus in particular (with the catchy slogan 
‘vote Mac back’), and Gair did enjoy a strong personal following.  George Cole the Party’s 
senator in Tasmania also enjoyed a strong personal following until ill health impeded his 
parliamentary representation and his lost his seat as a result, dying a few years later. 
Aitkin (1972:6) commented that  
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The DLP is not such a small group, nor are its members concentrated – with the important 
exception that they are much more numerous in Victoria than elsewhere 
The DLP voters were not concentrated as they were with the National Party, thus the National 
Party today gets candidates elected to the House of Representatives with a similar percentage of 
the vote as the DLP once achieved even though it could not get candidates elected to the House 
of Representatives as its vote was more dispersed.  Hence the Senate was the only place DLP 
candidates were likely to be elected.  The party’s main source of strength was Victoria, with the 
support of Santamaria and Mannix along with most of the parliamentary members who split 
from the ALP. 
Aitkin also commented that (page 7) 
There seems to be general agreement that the DLP has managed to attract as voters some 
non-Catholics who agree with its emphasis on foreign policy, defence and anti-
Communism or who vote for it in response to a temporary disaffection with their own 
party. 
Aitkin (1972:9) concluded that:- 
The DLP has a solid core of committed voters who are regular church going Roman 
Catholics; they make up around three per cent of the electorate and about half of those who 
vote for the DLP. 
Regarding the other half Aitkin concluded that:- 
Most of the other DLP voters are Liberals and Protestants, and it is likely that their choice 
of the DLP as a first preference is temporary only.  Such an analysis of the DLP vote is 
consistent with the known very high second preferences of DLP voters for the non-Labor 
parties and it is consistent also with the clear downward trend in which the DLP vote at 
elections is set. 
Aitkin’s comment is significant in that in Victoria at both the 1967 and 1970 Senate elections 
the DLP was the beneficiary of a sizable swing from the major parties.  In 1967, the Holt 
government was very unpopular and in the 1970 elections both the Liberal Party under the then 
Prime Minister Gorton and the ALP were both very unpopular.  In the same period, support for 
the DLP in House of Representatives elections continued to decline from previous elections.    
It is significant too that Mackerras (1972:3) considered DLP voters in House of Representatives 
elections to be in effect Liberal voters.  Mackerras argued that those voters who vote DLP, make 
a ‘nominal vote only’.  Those voters knew only too well, that the DLP candidate had almost no 
hope of being elected, so their real vote flowed straight through to the Liberal Party.  The DLP 
voters’ main aim was to keep the ALP out of government and this strategy worked until the 
1972 House of Representatives election. 
Many of the DLP candidates were Catholic and a number had been around at the time of the 
Split although not necessarily in parliament.  Some of the DLP candidates were young and in 
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Victoria some were also members of the Young Democratic Labor Association (YDLA) the 
Party’s youth wing.  Many DLP candidates were professional and some were primary 
producers. 
Proportional Representation 
Two aspects of the Australian electoral system enhanced the DLP’s appeal to its supporters and 
the electorate.  The first was the introduction in 1949 of a predominantly proportional 
representation method of voting for senate elections.  The other was the allocation of second 
preferences 
The change in the voting method used in the Senate allowed the DLP and later minor parties to 
gain some representation in the Senate.  In 1948 the Chifley Labor government amended the 
Electoral Act to alter the existing method of counting the Senate vote which had traditionally 
rewarded the majority party with a disproportionately large share of Senate seats. Labor itself 
had a Senate majority of 33 seats to 3 held by the Liberal Party after the 1946 election. 
According to Daly (1984:51-52), Arthur Calwell the then Minister for Immigration strongly 
advocated proportional representation for Senate elections.  Calwell argued that the ALP would 
retain a majority in the Senate after the next elections, due in 1949, and probably into the 
future'.  Daly reports that Chifley was personally opposed to PR and may well have voted 
against it in the cabinet. But Calwell ‘won the day by convincing sitting senators that they 
would be re-elected in 1949 and that the new voting system favored them in the future’. 
Proportional representation allows minor parties to win seats in the Senate and the DLP was the 
first minor party to take advantage of proportional representation for election to the Senate and 
in 1968 to hold the balance of power in the Senate.  In the Australian Senate proportionality, can 
be distorted to some degree through ‘preference deals’ between a number of minor parties to the 
extent that a minor party can receive around two per cent of the vote and get a senator elected 
by receiving the second preferences from a number of minor parties after their votes had been 
excluded. 
In the 1970 Senate elections, the DLP required 16.7 per cent of the vote in a state to gain a 
quota, which they did in Victoria and Queensland.  In NSW, the party only required 14.3 per 
cent for a quota as there were six senate vacancies and not the normal five.  In the 1974 double 
dissolution election, the DLP required 9.1 per cent of the vote in a state to gain a quota which 
they were unable to do in any state including Victoria which had been their power base. 
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Allocation of Second preferences 
The preferential voting system is used in electing members of the House of Representatives.  A 
minor party therefore has to decide which other party should receive their second preference 
votes and issue a how to vote card reflecting that decision. 
After the Split in 1955 the DLP made the spectacular and disloyal decision to second preference 
Labor’s traditional enemies the Liberal and Country Party coalition.  This surprising allocation 
of preferences ensured victory to the coalition in a number of electorates at the expense of the 
ALP and also ensured continued re-election of Coalition governments and banishment of the 
ALP to the opposition benches for many elections. 
Sharman et al (1991) classed the DLP second preferences as ‘hostile’ - that is a small party 
consistently preferencing against a large party. 
Commenting on the 1955 Federal election in the seat of Corio, Mansfield (2012:149) 
commented that the ALP (AC) candidate achieved his immediate objective when he persuaded 
thousands of ALP voters to consider abandoning the ALP.  Mansfield goes on to comment that 
the leader of the ALP (AC) Joshua said that the defence of Australia was his party’s priority 
‘but most people remained convinced that the ALP (AC) hatred of Evatt was its primary 
motivation.’ 
Chart 4.5 Flow of DLP Preferences in Corio and Ballaarat Electorates 
Corio 1954 Election 
Dedman (ALP)  21,487   48.6% 
Opperman (Lib)  22,703  51.3% 
 
Corio 1955 Election 
Loader (ALP)  16,632  41.0%  42.8% 
Opperman (Lib) 19,959  49.3%  57.2% (82% of ALP (AC’s) prefs) 
Singleton (ALP AC) 3,929  9.7% 
In the neighbouring electorate of Ballaarat (in later redistributions renamed Ballarat) 
Ballaarat 1954 
Joshua ALP  20,482 
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Pittard (Lib)  19,517 
 
1955 
Erwin (Lib)  15,763 
Dowling (ALP)  15,686 
Joshua (ALP AC) 9,757 
Second Preference Allocation 
Erwin (Lib)  23,852 (+8,089) 
Dowling (ALP)  17,354 (+1,668) 
The Liberal candidate, Erwin, received 83 per cent of the DLP preferences while the Labor 
candidate Dowling received 17 per cent of the preferences. 
Of significance in the Ballaarat Electorate was the 1961 election where the Menzies Liberal 
Government suffered big swings against it, the Liberal, Erwin actually improved his position 
and the DLP preferences to him were even tighter. 
Ballaarat 1961 
Erwin (Lib)  18,379 
Keane (ALP)  16,224 
Joshua (DLP)  7,557 
Second Preference allocation 
Erwin (Lib)  25,240 
Keane (ALP)  16,920 
The DLP candidate’s vote was down from 1955, but the DLP second preferences were even 
more tightly delivered to the Liberal Party in this electorate, only 16 of Joshua’s 7,557 votes 
leaked to the ALP!  It is also significant that in this electorate the DLP candidate was last on the 
ballot and thus could not provide a donkey vote second preference to the Liberal candidate. 
The Liberal Party took some time to recognise its good fortune.  According to Howson 
(1973:4/1/10), the Liberals were not at all certain that they would get the second preferences of 
the DLP at the 1955 election.  As Howson explained, ‘we hadn’t seen how effective the split 
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was going to be in our favour’.  One person in the Liberal Party who was quick to see the 
benefits of DLP second preferences was the senior Liberal, Richard Casey MP. 
On 13 June 1958 (Casey 1958A) wrote to Menzies advising that Casey had been in touch with 
‘a responsible and relevant source’ about the DLP’s prospects at the next (1958) election and 
the effects of DLP preferences to the Liberal Party.  These ‘effects’ were that in Victoria for 
example the DLP vote and preferences decided the result in 16 seats in favor of the Liberal 
Party and the percentage of preferences flowing to the Liberals was around 90 per cent, never 
falling below 80 per cent. In NSW the DLP was weaker and in Qld the vote to the then QLP 
was quite high.  Limited results only could be obtained from other states. 
On 25 June 1958, Menzies replied through his private secretary to Casey (Menzies 1958).  
Menzies merely observed ‘I think the DLP secures quite a lot of normal Liberal votes.  The 
Victorian elections showed this.  It is a point to be considered.’ 
On the 8th of July 1958, Casey responded (Casey 1958B).  Casey advised that he had spoken to 
his ‘responsible and relevant source’ who advised that the DLP vote in the 1955 elections for 
the Senate in Victoria flowed from the ALP and not from the Liberal Party.  Casey also advised 
that he had asked his ‘source’ that if the DLP did not exist would the DLP vote go to the Liberal 
Party?  The ‘source’ considered that around one third of the DLP votes and no more would go 
to the Liberal Party.  The balance, around two thirds, would be a swinging vote with a ‘distinct 
tendency to go to the ALP. 
In 1970 Malcolm Mackerras did a study of the DLP preferences and their flow from the 1955 to 
the 1969 election (Mackerras 1970).  Mackerras’ results have been updated to 1972 for the 
purposes of this thesis.  He was particularly interested in the ballot paper position of the various 
candidates.  It is important to realise that during the effective life of the DLP ballot paper 
positions were decided alphabetically by surname and not by draw from a hat which takes place 
today.  
Mackerras in his study came up with a number of types of ballot papers:- 
Table 9:  Mackerras model - Ballot Paper Types 
Type Description 
X DLP on top, followed by coalition with ALP in third place 
Y DLP on top, followed by the ALP with the coalition in third place 
Z DLP not on top and thus did not have the ‘donkey vote’ advantage 
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Mackerras considered that type Z ballot papers give the truest distribution of DLP preferences 
as there is no ‘donkey vote’ to distort the preference flow.  In allocation of type Mackerras 
disregards independent or micro party candidates above the DLP on the ballot paper, therefore a 
ballot paper with candidates in the order of Independent, independent, DLP, Liberal, Labor 
would be a ‘Type X’ ballot paper, notwithstanding the DLP is not at the top of the ballot paper. 
He found that once ballot paper position was taken into account over a third of distributed DLP 
preferences from 1958 to 1969 leaked to the ALP in those cases where the DLP candidate was 
on top followed immediately by the ALP candidate. However, where the DLP topped the ballot 
paper and the coalition was second on the ballot paper with ALP third, Labor got only 11.1% of 
DLP preferences, however where the DLP came first and the ALP in second place, followed by 
the coalition, the leakage to Labor jumped to 36.3% on average.   
In the state of Victoria, the DLP’s traditional power base, the leakage to Labor in seats where 
the DLP was on top followed by Labor was less - just under 30% and this is compatible, 
Mackerras believes with two different hypotheses either in Victorian there are DLP voters who 
believe more strongly in the official DLP ideology or there are special Victoria-based factors, 
possibly related to the origins of the split, the nature of the Victorian ALP, the local influence of 
sections of the Catholic Church and the presence of Mr BA Santamaria which account for these 
two hypotheses which are not mutually exclusive, it is not possible without a complex survey to 
say any more. 
Mackerras (1970:2) went on to note that the DLP spokesmen usually claim to have delivered to 
the Coalition all seats in which the Coalition needed any DLP preferences at all for a win.   
Which was 19 seats in 1958, 22 in 1961 etc. However, in many cases, the Coalition candidate 
was close to an absolute majority and needed only a small proportion of DLP preferences. 
Mackerras considers this to be a very poor way of determining how many seats were affected by 
DLP preferences even if it sounded good in DLP propaganda. 
Mackerras claims a better measure is those cases where a Labor candidate with a first 
preferences lead failed to win the seat as a result of the distribution of DLP preferences. That is 
the allocation of DLP preferences results in a change in leadership from ALP to Coalition and 
as a result the Coalition wins the seat at Labor’s expense. 
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Table 10:  DLP Preferences Allocation Leading to a Reversal of Labor’s Primary Vote 
Lead 1955-1972 
Election Year Number 
1955 5 
1960 (by-
elections) 
2 
1961 4 
1963 6 
1966 5 
1969 6 
1972 9 
 
Strangely in preferencing the Liberal National Coalition, the DLP never seemed to demand 
anything in return except for a strong anti-communist defence policy.  There was no demand 
for support for decentralisation or the indexation of social security payments, which were two 
other key aspects of DLP policy. 
Cain (1995:8) soberly observed that:- 
The astonishing thing was that the DLP demanded so little in return for what it was able to 
deliver; apart from a little patronage and assistance to non-government schools, the political 
price that the  . . . (Liberal) governments paid was a small one indeed.  The DLP is perhaps 
unique in Australia history in being there only for purely ideological reasons. 
The Balance of Power in the Senate 
The meaning and significance of the balance of power was discussed in chapter three of this 
thesis.  This part of the chapter examines how the DLP excised the balance of power.  This 
exercise of the balance of power in the Senate is significant because the DLP was the first party 
to be able to exercise this power. 
Until 1964 the DLP did not hold the balance of power in the Senate.  The best it could do was 
to negate a motion of the Senate from 1955 to 1958.  It shared this role with an independent 
from 1961 to 1968, so the DLP with the support of the independent Senator could use its 
numbers to negate a motion moved in the Senate.  The motion could be merely procedural or it 
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could be legislative.  A tied vote in the Senate, for example 30 ayes and 30 noes, results in the 
motion being defeated. 
From 1 July 1968 until its massive defeat at the 1974 double dissolution election, the DLP held 
the balance of power in the Senate.  It improved its position further in late 1970 with the 
election of the Party’s fifth senator.  Having five senators made the DLP an ‘official party’ 
whereby it got more resources and could institute debates on ‘matters of urgency’.  Also by this 
stage it was represented on just about every Senate and joint committee.   
Often the DLP supported the Coalition government in divisions in the Senate.  There were 
times however when the DLP voted with the Opposition.  For example, the 1970 States 
Receipts Duties Legislation and voting in this way, helped the DLP immensely to win Gair’s 
seat in the Senate elections that year. 
As the DLP soon learnt, for a minor party to exercise the balance of power it had to have the 
support of one of the major parties.  From time to time DLP Senators would propose 
amendments or measures and not get the support of either major party and the divisions lists in 
the Senate show the DLP Senators voting on one side (having four or five votes) and the Liberal 
and Labor parties voting on the other side (55 or so votes.) 
An example was the DLP’s amendment to the Address in Reply in early 1970.  In the Address 
in Reply debate both the ALP and the DLP proposed amendments to the government’s 
legislative agenda.  The DLP moved an amendment first and the ALP followed a while later, 
both amendments were very similar.  The ALP refused to support the DLP amendment because 
in their view a minor party such as the DLP had no right to instruct the government as to what 
should or shouldn’t be in its legislative program for the parliamentary session.  The DLP in turn 
did not support the Labor amendment when it was voted upon, resulting in neither amendment 
succeeding in the Senate.  This action showed the hatred between the ALP and the DLP was 
still very strong some 15 years after the Split. 
Another example was the DLP proposal to appoint a royal commission into primary industry in 
Australia.  This proposal, when debated, only gained the support of the DLP Senators.  Labor 
and Coalition Senators all voted against the proposal. 
After the Labor Party was voted into government in December 1972 with a majority of nine in 
the House of Representatives, the DLP still held the balance of power in the Senate, where the 
party line up was ALP 26, Liberal Party 21, Country Party 5, DLP 5 and Independents 3.  
Therefore, assuming the DLP voted with the Country Party and Liberals on a motion, the 
combined vote would 31, compared to a combined vote of 29 for the ALP and independents.  
Therefore, the Opposition could win divisions with a majority of two. 
100 
 
This situation could affect the government’s legislative agenda.  Furthermore, this would be the 
state of affairs until 1 July 1974 – just over 18 months away.  At that point in time a senate 
election would have taken place and the government’s situation may have improved. 
However, as Jim Odgers (1991:44) notes ‘the Senate was soon to show its resolve and 
independence.’   It did this by defeating a number of pieces of legislation that were designed to 
enact key points of the Government’s 1972 policy speech.  The Government claimed it had a 
mandate from the people, which Senators elected two or five years before that should have 
recognised and respected.  
The end result was the Labor government was able to gain a double dissolution of both houses 
and the DLP senators all lost their seats.   Thus, the DLP went from holding the balance of 
power to having no representative at all in the Parliament. 
Just as with the allocation of second preferences, to the Liberal and National Parties coalition, 
the DLP never seemed to demand anything for using its balance of power to support legislation 
or other motions before the Senate.  This is yet another example in what Cain (1995:8) noted as 
the DLP demanding ‘so little in return for what it was able to deliver’.   This is very true in 
1973 and early 1974 with the DLP and the Labor government.  The DLP’s approach to the 
Labor government was defeat and not negotiation or compromise with the usage of the balance 
of power.  This is particularly significant with regard to the balance of power and key items 
from the government’s policy speech. 
The DLP used the balance of power as a ‘veto power’ and not as a tool of negotiation or 
compromise.  Henderson (1975:78) has commented that:- 
The DLP seldom took the initiative in the Senate – especially after 1972 when Labor came 
to power.  Indeed in 1973 and early 1974 the DLP’s position became blurred with that of 
the other opposition parties in the Senate. 
The DLP and its Lifespan 
The lifespan of the DLP is shown in the following diagram and the DLP’s lifespan is far from 
bell shaped.  The DLP had a gradual rise, up to the ‘relevance’ threshold from 1955 to June 
1968.  It remained above the ‘relevance’ threshold from July 1968 until May 1974 when it 
crashed back to the basic ‘authorisation’ threshold where it stayed until the party decided to 
disband in early 1978 where it crashed further to below the ‘declaration’ threshold to its demise.  
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A number of the DLP Senators had the advantage of being former members of parliament.  Gair 
was a former Premier of Queensland, Little was a former member of the Victorian parliament 
and McManus was a former state secretary of the ALP. While Kane was a former ALP state 
organiser and Byrne was a former Queensland public servant, ALP Senator and ministerial 
adviser to Gair, Cole was a former ALP Senator. 
Thus, a minor party with a leader and or candidates with a high public profile would increase to 
some degree, the probability of being elected.  This would offset the cost of entry to parliament 
and the end result would be holding parliamentary office with possibly the balance of power in 
the upper house and or even allocating very decisive second preferences.  These would be some 
very significant payoffs (Tavits 2006:102).  The DLP was purely only a Senate based minor 
party. 
In Conclusion 
The DLP was a product of the Labor Split of 1955 and initially some experienced sitting 
members of parliament formed the basis of its representation.  But these parliamentary assets 
were soon lost although the DLP managed to have six senators elected and in three cases re-
elected.  Looking back Howard (2014:186) noted that writing in 1979 Neville Wran bluntly said 
of the split:- 
It is difficult to see that there was any inevitability about the split of 1955.  . . . Splits may 
be inevitable and may even be necessary if deep and insoluble issues of principle arise, 
although skillful leadership should always strive to limit or avoid the final tragedy.  But 
splits which involve no fundamental issue, but merely reflect an excess of factionalism, can 
never be condoned or justified. 
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From Wran’s advice ‘skillful leadership’ from Evatt the parliamentary leader, striving ‘to the 
limit or avoid the final tragedy’, was clearly lacking.  By way of negotiation and compromise 
the split should have been avoided.  The end result being a united Labor party with a real chance 
of being elected back into government.  The split in the ALP had the result of many more years 
in opposition and talented Labor members such as Keon and McManus cast out of the party into 
the political wilderness. 
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Chapter Five: The Demise of the 
Democratic Labor Party  
Introduction 
This chapter discusses and analyses the reasons for the DLP’s demise from the federal political 
scene.  The manifestation of the demise led to the total wipe out of the entire DLP parliamentary 
team at the May 1974 double dissolution election.  In the previous month, one of the five DLP 
Senators had resigned in quite controversial circumstances.  The former leader, Vince Gair 
accepted the Labor government’s offer of the ambassadorship to Ireland.  The leadership change 
from Gair to McManus was poorly handled with embarrassing consequences for the party.   
The DLP’s misguided electoral strategy which placed importance only on the Senate results was 
also a key factor in the party’s demise.  The party’s true level of support was reflected in its 
House of Representatives vote which had steadily declined at each election.  Many voters used 
the DLP vote in the Senate merely as a means of protest against the two major parties.  This was 
very much the case in the 1967 and the 1970 Senate elections. 
Although the proportional representation system of voting for the Australian Senate allowed the 
DLP to survive and grow in numbers and hold the balance of power in the Senate, the 
proportional representation voting system by itself, did not guarantee the DLP its continual 
existence.  Arguably the DLP failed to stay relevant to the world of the late 1960s and 1970s.  
Much had changed since 1955, defence was no longer the major strategic and emotional issue 
that the DLP made and continued to make of it.  Communism was not the big threat it once was 
and the attitude of the Catholic Church to communism had softened considerably.  Members of 
the Catholic hierarchy, such as Mannix, who supported Santamaria, had died.  As a result, BA 
Santamaria and his National Civic Council were voices crying in the wilderness, with little or 
no support from the Catholic Hierarchy.   
The DLP senators, all of whom experienced the events of 1955, were getting much older and 
sounding like a time warp.  Many young voters in Australia did not remember the events of 
1955.  The Australian Labor Party had reformed both at the federal level and a state level in 
Victoria.  The party under Whitlam was starting to act like a united alternative government and 
not a divided opposition party.  Furthermore, opposition to the Vietnam War was growing 
stronger by the early 1970s.  This was evidenced by the strong following for the Jim Cairns 
inspired Vietnam ‘Moratorium’ demonstrations in 1970. 
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In addition, the DLP blamed the media for its declining relevance and lacklustre performance 
and by the late 1970s the Party had serious financial viability problems in an era before public 
funding of political parties. 
This chapter considers these issues and their impact.  The chapter concludes that the DLP’s 
decline and disappearance was not due to any one single factor but rather the combination of 
several reasons.  The most important was a lack of relevance and appeal to younger voters.  In 
the 1970s a lack of unity and leadership also became major reasons for the demise of the DLP. 
Party Identity and Image Rhetoric  
The party’s identity was problematic from the start.  A fundamental issue from the early days of 
the party was the exact nature of its role and purpose.  Was it a ‘third party’ in the Parliament to 
rival the major parties in terms of policy?  Was the role of the DLP to be a ‘replacement’ Labor 
Party for the ALP?  Some members of the DLP saw the party as a ‘temporary arrangement’ 
until the ALP reformed itself.  The DLP members then could ‘re-join’ the ALP after that party 
‘reformed’ itself by becoming more anti-communist.  In that light, was the sole purpose of the 
DLP not so much parliamentary representation, but with the allocation of second preferences to 
the Coalition parties, the means to deny the Labor Party victory in the election and government? 
As mentioned in the last chapter Santamaria had other ideas.  His aim was to ‘takeover’ the 
ALP’ along with left wing unions and ‘transform the leadership’ and have the ALP ‘implement 
a Christian social program’ (Morgan 2007:75).  
Murray (1973:71) posited the view that a weak Labor vote in Victoria (from 1955 to 1970) 
would be conducive to forcing reconciliation with the ALP; this was a possibility although a 
remote one.  The 1972 election with strong Labor gains in Victoria eroded some of the DLP’s 
‘muscle’ in being able to force some sort of reconciliation with the ALP.  
Wertheim (1960:3) claimed when the DLP was first formed, some members of the party saw 
themselves as the true Labor Party, while others saw themselves as a third force in Australian 
politics.  Yet a third group in the DLP were the members of the National Civic Council headed 
up by BA Santamaria who himself was not a member of the DLP.   
From its inception, there was angst in the ranks of the DLP and indeed confusion regarding the 
role and influence of BA Santamaria.  This angst and confusion impeded the DLP’s image as a 
political party in the eyes of the voters at elections.  In voting for the DLP were they also voting 
for Santamaria and where exactly did he fit into the DLP?  This concern was more problematic 
given Santamaria was not a member of the DLP.  This situation led to conflict within the DLP. 
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Truman (1960:238) commented that ‘the DLP so fond of talking about the quarrels of the ALP 
is having its own internal dissentions’.  The internal dissentions that Truman was referring to, 
were the conflicts between Santamaria and his National Civic Council (NCC) on one hand and 
the DLP on the other.  In the words of McManus (1976) ‘Bob could never be a follower he had 
to lead.’  Peoples (2012:22ff) considered that Santamaria ‘was more interested in ideas than 
people.  . . .  His habit of acting was authoritarian.’ 
The conflict concerning the DLP-Santamaria relationship soon became openly public.  As Crisp 
(1983:222) reported, matters came to a head at the party’s Victorian State Conference in 1960.  
At that conference, WM Bourke, former ALP Member for Fawkner, claimed:- 
The DLP is being branded as a Santamaria or a church party.  Mr Santamaria is trying to 
get control of the DLP.  It is everywhere, straddles our shoulders, stopping us from making 
progress.  We should be completely independent and not be operated from behind the 
scenes.  
Bourke was supported in that view by the high-profile S M Keon.  For his troubles, Keon was 
stripped of his positions of delegate to the DLP Federal Conference and State Senior Vice 
President (Truman 1960:238). 
At the 1960 Victorian State Conference of the DLP, the Melbourne University DLP Society put 
forward a ‘supplementary item’ seeking to ban Mr BA Santamaria’s National Civic Council.  
Truman (1960:239) reports that the DLP Society for its actions was expelled from the State 
conference after a ‘Moscow Trial’.  
Declining Relevance 
A decline in relevance was a principal cause of the demise of the DLP – being strongly anti-
Communist and seeing Communism as a ‘perceived threat’ to Australia and defence being the 
major item of expenditure of government.  The DLP failed to keep pace with a changing 
Australia and a changing world scene.  In addition, the Vietnam War was becoming unpopular 
with enforced conscription at home and accounts of American atrocities.  The unpopularity of 
the Vietnam War was shown in the strong support for the Cairns inspired Vietnam War 
‘Moratorium’. 
Lyons (2008:426) considered that the DLP’s overwhelming focus on foreign and defence 
policies played a large part in its failure as a political party – in early 1970s its strident anti-
communism was incompatible with mainstream community opinion.  He reported that ‘in fact 
back in 1963 the Liberal Peter Howson considered the DLP to be ‘an enigma’ and ‘it is probable 
that it will decline in significance.’ 
To compound its image problems, the DLP was strongly against the permissive society.  The 
party’s policies were very much ‘thou shalt not’, to the point that the DLP presented as little 
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more than a very stern custodian of morals.  The problem of a party preoccupied by moral 
concerns will be discussed later in this chapter; however, the fixation with public morality in a 
permissive society shows again just how out of touch with society the DLP had become. 
In the Senate, the DLP Senators offered nothing new or exciting to mainstream Australia.  This 
was particularly the case after 1972 to 1974 with the Labor government in power.  Henderson 
(1975:79) considered that the DLP seldom took the initiative in the Senate especially after 1972, 
in 1973 and early 1974, the DLP’s position became blurred with that of other opposition parties 
in the Senate – in Henderson’s view that ‘blurring’ contributed to the party’s disastrous decision 
to push for a double dissolution. 
In addition, Henderson (1975:80) argued that ‘by the end of 1973 it was evident that the DLP 
was in the process of becoming irrelevant in Victoria’, finding its members ‘preferred myths to 
realities.’  Victoria had been the party’s strongest State in terms of voter support.  Henderson 
considered the party’s irrelevance was reflected in its falling voter support in the 1973 Victorian 
State election.  However, according to Henderson, the DLP considered its fall in support in 
Victoria was due to lack of ‘voter sophistication’ and ‘voter misunderstanding’.   
In considering the DLP in WA Hal Colebatch (1972:174) considered the 1970 Senate campaign 
in WA in which the DLP polled poorly.  In WA, it polled 5.6% of the WA vote which was 
about half of the party’s national average.  In Colebatch’s view a major reason for this was the 
DLP’s poor choice of a campaign issue, opposition to the liberalisation of abortion.  The DLP 
campaigned on this issue very strongly, which in Colebatch’s view turned away potential young 
non-Catholic voters who the DLP would have had to attract, in order to survive.  In any case the 
campaign ‘would have won the DLP no votes it would not have had anyway’ (1972:175).   
The Evaporating Threat of Communism 
In his PhD thesis, Stevenson (2007:451) observed that in the mid-1950s, Communism appeared 
monolithic on all fronts, but in spite of the fragmentation of Communism, both domestically and 
internationally, the DLP had not updated its viewpoint and was still calling for the need for 
strong defence against the Communist threat, even after the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s 
and the palpable easing of tensions after Nixon’s visits to China and Russia. 
Stevenson goes on to observe that the fragmentation of the Communist Party of Australia into 
three factions coupled with its miniscule support at the polls (after 1955 the Communist party 
never scored more than one per cent at a Federal election again), did not lead to an easing up of 
the anti-Communist rhetoric either.  Communist influence in Australian unions was also 
declining and more white collar unions who were apolitical were coming on the scene. 
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The Vietnam War - a Divisive War 
The threat of Communism also lead to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War from 1962 
to 1972, which the DLP eagerly supported.  As well as the fear of Communism with ‘perceived 
threats’ to Australia, the West’s attitude to Asia, was premised on ‘The Domino Theory’.  The 
‘Domino Theory’ considered that a communist victory in one nation would quickly lead to a 
chain reaction of communist takeovers in neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia such as 
Laos, Cambodia and Thailand and quite possibly other countries in the region India, Japan, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and even Australia and New Zealand.  Significantly when South 
Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese forces in 1975, ‘The Domino Theory’ failed to materialise. 
Many Catholic bishops and NCC leaders eagerly subscribed to the domino theory and supported 
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.  However, Australia’s involvement in Vietnam 
was increasingly not supported by the Australian Labor Party. 
The last chapter on the rise of the DLP described the Catholic Hierarchy and the divisions 
within it regarding Santamaria and the DLP.  The Vietnam War was to see the Catholic laity 
divided on Australia’s involvement in Vietnam.  While a number of Catholics particularly in the 
DLP’s power base (the State of Victoria), supported the DLP and Australia’s involvement in 
Vietnam, as a solution to the threat of Communism, The Catholic Worker and those Catholics 
who supported it, strongly opposed Australia’s involvement in Vietnam.  From the mid-1960s, 
Catholic opposition to the Vietnam War started to build up through various factors.  In October 
1965, Pope Paul VI in a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations took as his 
theme ‘no more war never again.’  In September 1966, the Pope in his Encyclical ‘Christi Matri 
Rosarii’ (the Rosary of the Mother of Christ) spoke of his concern regarding the Vietnam War 
and the possibility of atomic conflict.  
Protestant churches had been turning against the Vietnam War for some time before the Pope’s 
statement.  As a response to the Pope’s encyclical, the Catholic peace group Pax was formed in 
1966 after an advertisement was placed in The Advocate the weekly Catholic newspaper in 
Melbourne.  The advertisement carried the endorsement of some of Victoria’s leading Catholic 
laymen for example, Max Charlesworth, Owen Potter and Niall Brennan. 
Pax was described as an association of Catholics pledged to the quest for peace, with justice and 
freedom for the whole family.  Pax was anti-nuclear weapons and anti-violence and worked for 
international and internal understanding and for the development of a true community of 
nations.  Significantly, the fact that Pax was anti-nuclear meant that no member of the DLP 
could join Pax because the DLP was in favour of the usage of nuclear weapons. 
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The last chapter discussed the divided Catholic hierarchy, but with the formation of Pax a 
pronounced anti-DLP feeling spread from a divided Catholic Hierarchy to the DLP’s core 
constituency the Priests and the Catholic laity.   
Russians in the Indian Ocean 
On 14 August 1969, the then Minister for External Affairs Gordon Freeth MP presented a 
ministerial statement ‘The Soviet Union in Asia’, Freeth (1969:311-12) said:- 
During the past year or so, there has been increasing interest and activity by the Soviet 
Union in the Asian region.  Examples are the movements of ships of the USSR Navy in the 
Indian Ocean. 
Freeth then went on to tell the Parliament, that in the view of Russia, events are putting on the 
agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia. 
Freeth then told the Parliament:- 
Australia has to be watchful, but need not panic whenever a Russian appears.  It has to avoid 
both facile gullibility and automatic rejection of opportunities for cooperation. 
Freeth went on to advise:- 
The Australian government at all times welcomes the opportunity of practical and 
constructive dealings with the Soviet Union. . . . In principle, it is natural that a world power 
such as the Soviet Union should seek to promote a presence and a natural influence in 
important regions of the world such as the Indian Ocean area. 
Significantly it later transpired that Freeth’s statement was prepared for him by officers of his 
department but it was not cleared through the Cabinet.  Freeth himself had cleared the statement 
and then sought and received approval from the Prime Minister Gorton.  
In 1969 Freeth’s own department in a question time briefing note advised that Russia had 
‘maintained a virtually constant presence in the Indian Ocean over the last eighteen months.’  
Furthermore, Russian presence in the Indian Ocean was no more than ‘the normal exercise by a 
maritime power of the freedom of the high seas.’  In other words, the Russian presence did not 
involve trespass into any country’s (including Australia’s) territorial waters. 
For the strongly anti-Communist DLP the Freeth statement was a red rag to a bull.  The DLP 
accused the government of maintaining ‘a soft line on Russia’ (Farran 1972:51).  The DLP used 
the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean merely as a fear tactic to exaggerate the importance of 
defence and foreign affairs issues in the lead up to the 1969 election. 
Marr (1978:26) reported that Gorton stated that he:-   
Had Freeth float the idea that Australia should not get all tangled up in a knot because the 
Russians have got a ship in the Indian Ocean. . .  This idea caused enormous dramas and 
the DLP turned against us.   
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Andrew Farran (1972:46) considered Freeth’s Indian Ocean announcement was a ‘short lived 
attempt’ at presenting foreign policy issues ‘frankly and objectively’.  Farran posits that the 
DLP performed ‘incredible feats of political bluff’ with ‘a lack of political maturity.’  Farran, on 
secondment from the Department of Foreign Affairs, was Freeth’s private Secretary in 1969.   
It was a popular misconception among some DLP supporters that the DLP refused to second 
preference Freeth in the 1969 elections because of his attitude to the Russians in the Indian 
Ocean.  Freeth lost his seat at that election.  The results are shown below. 
Table 5.1 House of representative Election 1969 – Electorate of Forrest WA 
First Count 
   1969     1966 
Freeth (Lib)  19,955  42.87%      (20,834) 
Kirwin (ALP)  22,149  47.58%   (15,796) 
Montgomery (AP) 1,106  2.37%   - 
Sullivan (DLP)  3,332  7.15%   (4,163) 
In the primary vote, Kirwin (ALP) had a large swing to him or over 6,000 votes and the DLP 
candidate had a loss of support of over 800 votes. 
Second Count 
Freeth (Lib)  20,255  43.51% 
Kirwin (ALP)  22,542  48.43% 
Sullivan (DLP)  3,745  8.04% 
The Australia Party candidate has been eliminated and his preferences distributed. 
Third Count (final) 
Freeth (Lib)  22,744  48.86% 
Kirwin (ALP)  23,798  51.13% 
After the DLP candidate was eliminated 2,489 preferences went to Freeth and 1,256 to the ALP 
candidate.  This indicates preferences were directed by the DLP to Freeth notwithstanding the 
issue of the Russians in the Indian Ocean. However, at the same time there was a significant 
leakage of DLP preferences to the ALP candidate. 
Marr (1978:24) reported that Gorton in speaking of the DLP some years later, commented that 
if the Coalition government withdrew Australian troops completely from Vietnam in 1970, 
‘when in retrospect it probably was time to do so, the DLP would have turned handsprings.’  
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Gorton then went on to comment that ‘all the DLP cared about was defence, defence, defence . . 
. they would have gone on until they had the whole population in khaki.’ 
A Catholic Party? 
At the DLP Victorian State conference of 1960, Stan Keon, the former ALP member for Yarra, 
claimed that:- 
The DLP cannot win an election because many Australians regard it as a Catholic Party.  
Mr Santamaria’s attempts to gain control of the DLP are responsible for that label being 
attached to the DLP.  Mr Santamaria has no right to usurp the role of spokesman for the 
DLP as he has often done in Television interviews nor to attempt to use his supporters to 
turn the DLP into a specifically Catholic party for which there is no place in Australia 
(Crisp 1983:222-3). 
Allen (1985) has argued that Jack Little the ALP parliamentarian who joined the DLP, was 
preferred as a DLP candidate because he was not a Catholic. The DLP was popularly regarded 
as a Catholic party, and a non-Catholic candidate had electoral attractions. 
The Catholic issue was raised by Skinner the retiring Victoria State President of the DLP in 
1969.  Speaking at the Annual State Conference, Skinner commented:- 
The image of the DLP depicted by our adversaries and by the grace and favour of the press, 
is a sectarian one.  But there is a great deal of difference between a Catholic party and a 
party which includes many Catholics in its ranks – a difference quite discernible to those 
who examine, but indiscernible to those who do not wish to see. (DLP Vic 1969:4) 
However, the vast majority of DLP candidates were members of the Catholic Church and DLP 
policies were in very close sympathy with the Catholic Church and its teachings.  For example, 
the DLP was very anti-communist and very anti-permissive with regard to the ‘permissive 
society’ of the 1970s.   
Calwell (1972:146) commented that ‘the Catholic church in Australia thanks to the activities of 
the Movement, has had its theology perverted by the National Civic Council and the DLP.’  
However, a more accurate description would be that the policies of the DLP were influenced by 
the teachings of the Catholic Church.  What Calwell would appear to mean is that the Catholic 
Church after the rise of the DLP and the NCC operated more politically. In fact, Calwell goes 
on to complain about the number of ‘political sermons’ delivered by Catholic Priests of 
Melbourne in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  In a similar vein, Colebatch (1972:174) spoke of 
‘clerical fascism’. 
A Moralistic Party Motivated by Hate and Revenge 
The DLP was quite vocal as a party in its opposition to abortion, divorce and euthanasia along 
with its vocal support for very strong censorship laws.  The DLP ‘was an almost explicitly 
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Christian party in a post Christian nation, a very largely Catholic party incapable of accepting 
the implications of Vatican Two’ (Mackerras 1973:85).   
A moralistic approach to policy formulation was another cause of the fall of the DLP.  
For example, in the 1972 election it campaigned on morals and a range of ‘anti’ issues 
(anti-pornography, anti-permissiveness, and anti-abortion). 
The DLP could have campaigned on other issues in its platform.  It could have campaigned 
strongly on decentralisation, industry policies, support for farmers and trade unions, but these 
policies were ignored.  Ignoring these other policies was a poor decision in the DLP’s election 
campaign planning. 
Being seen as a hate or revenge party was another cause of the fall of the DLP.  The DLP was 
absolutely consumed by its hatred of the ALP, in fact its raison d etre was keeping its former 
colleagues, the ALP out of office.  In other words, it was a ‘nark party’.  For the DLP winning 
seats in the Senate and holding the balance of power wasn’t what really mattered (Kane 
1980:2:1/61.) 
A Lack of Finance 
During the life of the DLP, public funding to political parties based on their performance at 
elections was not available.  Therefore, all political parties running election campaigns and 
maintaining state and federal offices had some very big expenses to cover, including rent and 
advertising. 
McManus (1976:192) highlighted the DLP’s ‘inability to finance necessary staff and 
organisation, particularly in the smaller states.’  The lack of finance question was also taken up 
by Clarke (1971:79).  He considered the financial difficulties of the DLP in Western Australia.  
The question of finance and a political party is always a sensitive issue and Clarke admitted his 
analysis was ‘sketchy though broadly correct’.  Clarke considered the DLP’s attempts at fund 
raising, such as raffles and art unions.  He believed that the DLP was assisted by different 
business groups.  They saw in the DLP a party which could assist in the defeat of the ALP.  In 
fact, the DLP found ‘big business to be most generous.’  He also considered that the 
combination of the various sources of revenue brought the DLP in WA just enough money to 
survive on. (P83) 
In the State of Victoria, the DLP’s best state in terms of support, finance was also a problem.  In 
1969 the Victorian State Secretary, Frank Dowling, (1969: 10/1969) advised all branches that 
‘the executive is still carrying past debts and we are approaching a period of elections which 
will test our finance raising ability to the limit.’  The elections that Dowling was referring to 
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were the 1969 House of Representatives election, the 1970 Victorian State election and the 1970 
Senate election.  
On 6 November 1969 Dowling reported to the branches that ‘although our central campaign 
was kept to a minimum on this occasion (the 1969 Federal election) rising costs made it quite 
expensive’, Dowling then followed with an appeal to branches to ‘forward any available money 
to assist in reducing our large Federal election accounts’.  He went on to note:- 
We are required to pay a substantial number of debts incurred in the October election 
before the end of the year. 
For a number of years in Victoria the DLP raised much of its finance from an annual ‘silver 
circle’.  This activity was given wide publicity among DLP members and supporters.  In 1971 
the DLP in Victoria also ran a ‘phone-a-thon’ in an attempt to raise a target of $56,000.  This 
was necessary because income from the silver circle, which was known as ‘the DLP Gift’, was 
down by some $17,000 (DLP Vic 1971:2).  The method of the ‘phone-a-athon’ was that over a 
two-month period DLP supporters would contribute a fixed amount to the Party.  A ‘six-star 
sponsor’ would give between $500 and $1,000 a month, while a ‘one star sponsor’ would 
contribute Between $10 and $20 a month, with varying amounts and corresponding ‘stars’ in 
between for the sponsors.  In its first circular for 1972, dated 21 February (DLP Vic 1972B) the 
DLP advised that the ‘phone-a-thon’ had been a success with $54,319 promised or pledged and 
‘just under $50,000 actually received’ from 200 committee members and 1,600 sponsors (DLP 
Vic 1972B:2). 
The financial position of the DLP would undoubtedly have been very different, if the modern 
public funding of political parties was available during the lifespan of the DLP.  While the DLP 
never made the exact amount of its debt public at any one time, as shown above, the party did 
have significant debt to pay off and continually appealed and looked for novel pays to pay off 
this debt. 
Media Coverage and the Lack of It 
The DLP itself blamed the hostile press for its decline.  For example, in his interview with the 
National Library of Australia, McManus was quite scathing of the press.  He commented that 
after 1970 the DLP:- 
got a very poor deal from the press and the media . . . we had become a danger to the 
established parties.  I haven’t got any doubt at all that this freeze was due to the fact that we 
had done so well and they started to become scared of us.   
But it was not just McManus who was critical of the press.  Other former DLP members were 
also highly critical of the press (Curtis, Rigg, Launder and Evans (2010) also expressed strong 
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criticism of the press.  In the final issue of its journal, The Democrat, the DLP in Victoria 
devoted quite a bit of space to the press ignoring the DLP (Brosnan 1978:3). 
In their defence, the press raised the issue of relevance and fresh ideas and not the same old 
story (McCallum 1973).  The DLP in its later years did not change with the times, showing 
irrelevancy in many of its policies along with a sense of priorities that no one else seemed to 
share.  This detracted from the Party’s newsworthiness.   
In retrospect, it is surprising that in its parliamentary lifetime, spanning the 1950s, to 1970s, that 
the DLP did not employ qualified journalists who had been members of the parliamentary press 
gallery as press secretaries.  It could be argued that the DLP did not make any attempt to 
understand the press and its requirements.  As McCallum indicated, the press are simply not 
interested in being served up the same old rhetoric. 
Allen (1988:32) suggested that the press applied an almost complete censorship to the DLP after 
1972 thus reducing the DLP’s vote. 
The DLP’s Electoral Performance Federally 
With the DLP’s electoral performance, there was a continual difference between the party’s 
results in the Senate which were higher than the results for the party in House of 
Representatives elections.  A possible reason for this is voters voted DLP in the Senate because 
the party had a strong chance of getting a candidate elected, whereas there was no such chance 
in the House elections.  A further reason was that voters voted DLP in the Senate elections as a 
protest against the particular major party they normally voted for.  Governments are formed in 
the House of Representatives and not the Senate, thus a voter could vote against a major party in 
the Senate as a protest, without denying the party government in the House. 
The following table shows the DLP’s performance in Federal Senate and House of 
Representatives elections from 1955 to 1975. 
Table 11:  The DLP Vote in Federal Elections 1955 – 1975 
Year House of Reps Senate Difference 
1955 5.1% 6.1% 1.0 
1958 9.4% 8.4% -1.0 
1961 8.7% 9.8% 1.1 
1963 7.4%   
1964  8.4% 1.0 
1966 7.3%   
1967  9.8% 2.5 
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1969 6.0%   
1970  11.1% 5.1 
1972 5.3%   
1974 1.4% 3.6% 2.2 
1975 1.3% 2.7% 1.4 
 
There was no noticeable decline in the DLP Senate vote until after 1972 and the election of the 
Labor government.  Arguably its true level of support was in its House of Representatives vote 
which had steadily declined over the years.  By contrast, the party highlighted its vote in the 
Senate elections which had risen, particularly in 1967 and again in1970 as voters protested 
against the two major parties.  The DLP ignored its results in the House of Reps which was in 
steady decline and which gave a more accurate picture of its real support.  The DLP considered 
that the electorate had put its trust in the DLP senators and would continue to do so (Henderson 
1975). 
An example of the trust placed in the electoral appeal of DLP senators was included in a 
memorandum dated 2 February 1971 in which the DLP in Victoria enthusiastically told its 
supporters that:- 
There exists in the community now a splendid climate of goodwill towards the DLP. 
The re-election of Frank McManus last November was ensured by the support of more than 
300,000 Victorians.  One adult in every five not only voted DLP on this occasion but voted 
DLP with enthusiasm.  Some prominent personalities were publicly saying with pride in the 
days following the election that they also ‘Voted Mac Back’ (DLP Vic 1971:1) 
However, what the DLP failed to recognise in that comment, was that a significant proportion of 
the 300,000 votes would have been protest votes against the major parties, other votes would 
have been from swinging voters, and others would be strategic voters who supported the DLP in 
the Senate where there was a strong chance of a candidate being elected, but not in the House of 
Representatives where there seemed to be no such chance.  The reader is not told who the 
‘prominent personalities’ are, or how it could be ascertained that voters voted ‘DLP with 
enthusiasm’. 
There was also the very sharp falling away of electoral support at the respective party’s 
parliamentary demise.  For example, with the DLP the very steady decline in support in the 
House of Representatives vote from 1958 to 1966 is quite evident, as is the very sharp decline in 
support from 1966 to 1975, the House vote falling from 6 per cent to 1.3 per cent, this decline is 
oblivious to swings for and against each of the major parties, clearly the DLP was never a 
beneficiary of these swings.  It is also significant that the DLP very rarely won representation in 
the State parliaments. 
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The DLP never fully appreciated the serious problem that it polled much higher in the Senate 
than in the House of Representatives.  The DLP tended to regard the Senate vote as the true 
indicator of its support in the electorate – the House of Representatives vote represented its 
hard-core support base and this had been steadily declining since 1958 especially in Victoria. 
Speaking on the 3KZ Labor Hour on 25 October 1970, Whitlam saw the 1970 Senate election as 
providing  
an unequalled opportunity of displacing the DLP candidate McManus.  The consequences 
of such a success would be far reaching indeed.  Nothing would do more to return Australia 
to a two party democracy and to end the distortions of democracy which have occurred as a 
result of the interventions of a third party. 
In the Senate election, the DLP peaked at 11.1 per cent in 1970, following a result of 6 per cent 
in the 1969 House of Representatives election. The vote for the DLP then fell to 5.3 per cent in 
the 1972 House of Representatives elections, falling further to 3.6 per cent in 1974.  
Significantly, in 1974 and 1975 in respect of the House of Representatives the DLP only stood 
in Victoria, with a vote of 5.2% and 4.9% respectively. 
Newton (1970:272) considered the DLP to be a major force after the 1970 Senate election and 
not part of a transitory stage.  Newton went on to claim that the DLP’s national vote of 11.4 per 
cent was not far short of doubling its showing of 1955 when it first contested an election.  
Newton went on to claim that the DLP ‘must now be rated as a major political force.’  For 
Newton, the election of McManus on a straight quota after Senator Jack Little was also elected 
on a straight quota in 1967 was a very significant factor.  
In the 1967 and in the 1970 Senate elections, the DLP attracted votes because of the 
unpopularity of both major parties.  The 1967 and 1970 results were fortuitous and should have 
been viewed in that light by the party leadership.  In 1967, the Holt government was unpopular, 
with Holt’s leadership seen as the main reason.  In 1970, the Gorton government was unpopular 
as was the ALP.  In protest many voters voted for the DLP.  In Victoria in the seat of Murray, 
the DLP actually outvoted the Coalition.  However, this result did not flow through to the 
Murray by-election which was held early the next year. 
Donovan (2000:478) comments that when the size of the Federal Parliament increases or when 
there is a double dissolution, the quota for election to the Senate becomes lower.  However, that 
did not help the DLP in the 1974 double dissolution election where the party lost all its seats in 
the Senate despite the lower quotas.  A smaller quota by itself does not cause a minor party to 
win seats in the Senate.  The minor party still needs a platform and supporters of a doctrine or 
protesters against a major policy or an aggrieved minority.  As Donovan notes (2000:478) minor 
parties have to respond strategically to the incentives created by institutional forces that affect 
quotas. 
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In other words, the quota as opposed to an absolute majority is merely an added incentive for a 
minor party to contest the election.  A minor party such as the DLP still has to present creditable 
candidates and policies in order to fight an election and win seats in the parliament. 
Allocation of Second Preferences as a Blocking Tactic 
The DLP preferenced the Coalition at all times even if the candidate was a ‘trendy Liberal’ (a 
group of Liberals who were opposed to most of the DLP policies on censorship and similar social 
issues).  The DLP would never preference a Labor candidate even if he or she had strong family 
values, was anti-abortion and supported a strong defence force.  The DLP preferences were very 
decisive in close electorates; a significant number of marginal seats were won by the Liberal 
Party with DLP second preferences. 
This allowed the Coalition to take DLP preferences pretty much for granted - the usage of second 
preferences is a very powerful weapon for a minor party especially a party such as the DLP that 
does not have parliamentary representation in the lower single member chamber.  Poor usage of 
the very powerful second preference vote allocation also led to the DLP’s demise. (Kane 1987))   
A DLP press release of 17 November 1972 (DLP Vic 1972D) proudly announced for the 
forthcoming election, ‘the allocation of DLP preferences in Victoria will follow the same pattern 
as in previous elections for the past 17 years.  All sitting Liberal and Country Party MPs . . . will 
receive DLP preferences as usual.’ Maintaining the idea of hate or revenge for the ALP the press 
release went on to state that, ‘the DLP is more determined than ever that ALP candidates should 
receive no help from DLP preferences because a wide range of ALP policies are dangerous and 
even more unacceptable than in the past.’ 
This was in spite the Victoria DLP sending a letter dated 6 November 1972 to all candidates and 
campaign secretaries advising that preferences will be discussed by the Party’s Central Executive 
at its next meeting on 10 November.  The letter went on to request any views as to the allocation 
of preferences.  The second preferences decision however appeared to be a foregone conclusion 
(DLP Vic 1972C). 
Table 12:  The Power of DLP Federal Preferences 1955-1977 
General 
Election 
Seats where 
some or all 
preferences 
Distributed 
Seats Won after DLP 
Preferences Distributed 
Seats where First 
preferences lead reversed 
by distribution of 
preferences 
Won by 
Coalition 
Won by 
Labor 
 
1955 16 4 (4 Vic) 5 1 (1 Vic) 
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1958 31 21 (10 Vic) 8 8 (4 Vic, 1 Qld, 3 WA*) 
1961 37 27 (15 Vic) 8 7 (3 Vic, 2 NSW, 1 QLD, 
1 WA) 
1963 24 19 (9 Vic) 3 8 (2 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD, 
2 WA**, 1 Tas) 
1966 31 21 (8 Vic) 5 5 (2 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD) 
1969 40 28 (11 Vic) 3 12 (3 Vic, 3 NSW, 3 QLD, 
2 WA, 1 Tas) 
1972 48 29 (15 Vic) 9 9 (6 Vic, 1 NSW, 2 QLD) 
1974 31 8 0 1 (1 Vic) 
1975 22 2 1  
1977 46 12 (12 Vic) 3 None 
Note: In 1977 the Australian Democrats contested the election for the first time and their second preferences helped elected a 
number of candidates.  The second preferences of the Australian Democrats will be considered as part of the discussion on that 
party.  In that election, the DLP only contested seats in Victoria. 
Table 14 shows the power of DLP second preferences.  The Liberal Country Party coalition 
won the close 1961 and 1969 elections with small majorities thanks to DLP preferences.  In the 
1972 elections, the ALP majority would have been greater if the DLP second preferences were 
not a decisive factor in the 23 electorates won by the coalition in that election. 
Kane (1989:160 and 1980:1:2/49) speaks of a ‘road block’ strategy of blocking the ALP’s path 
to Government by deliberately second preferencing the Liberal and Country Parties. 
‘Out of touch’ DLP Senators were perceived as old male 
‘fuddie duddies’ 
At the later stages of the DLP’s life, DLP Senators were often referred to as a group of old 
‘fuddie duddies’ because of their respective ages.  The following table shows the ages of the 
DLP senators over selected years.  All of these senators were actively involved in the split of the 
ALP in 1955. 
Table 13:  DLP Senators Age at specific years of DLP’s life 
Senator Year of 
Birth 
Age 
1955 
Age 
1964 
Age 
1970 
Age 
1973 
Age 
1974 
Gair 1901 54 63 69 72 73 
McManus 1905 50 59 65 68 69 
Cole 1908 47 56    
Kane 1908 47 56 62 65 66 
Byrne 1910 45 54 60 63 64 
Little 1914 41 50 56 59 60 
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Note Cole lost his seat in 1964 and died in 1969 at the age of 61. 
Table 15 shows in the first part, the age of the DLP Senators in 1955, the year of the Split and in 
1964, the election of Gair and McManus.  In this part of the table the ages of the Senators looks 
quite respectable, in 1955 they were all under 55, Little being 41 and in 1964 they were all 
under 65, with Little and Byrne in their early 50s.  
In the second part, the table shows the ages of the DLP senators in 1970 which was the election 
of Kane and the Party’s best Senate result.  The table then shows the ages of the DLP Senators 
in 1973 when McManus replaced Gair as leader of the party and finally the table shows the ages 
of the Senators in 1974 when the Party was wiped out in the double dissolution election.  At this 
point in time the DLP Senators were showing their age, in 1970 Gair was still leading the party 
and running for the Senate at the age of 69. 
As a group, the DLP Senators and senior party officials could be seen as ‘out of touch’ old men 
– grand dads in grey suits and this presented an image problem for the DLP.  The party was not 
seen as a party for young people. 
An example of how far ‘out of touch’ from the younger generation was the party’s continual 
attack on university students.  The impression from these attacks was that university students 
were a group of left wing radicals who spent their entire time involved in violent 
demonstrations.  The state president of the DLP (Victoria) in his opening speech to the state 
conference advised delegates that the ‘university battle as a whole is not over yet’ (DLP Vic 
1972A:2).  He went on to advise the delegates, that in universities:- 
A bunch of spoilt kids, who have never known deprivation or want are seeking to enjoy the 
new thrill of imitation poverty, by copying each other’s uniform outfits of tattered jeans and 
bare feet, which are supposed to distinguish and set them apart from the law-abiding 
‘squares’ who support them. 
For good measure, he added; 
And it becomes sickening in the extreme, when these tertiary delinquents are urged on and 
encouraged by some middle-class academics, who themselves have always been cradled in 
the security and comfort they now profess to despise (DLP Vic 1972A:3). 
This outburst was made in August 1972 notwithstanding that not quite four months later, a 
Federal election was to be held in December.  A number of those ‘tertiary delinquents’ being 
over 21 would have been enrolled to vote, as would have been the ‘middle class academics’.  
The rather emotive outburst ignores the fact that the majority of students would even back then 
have been at university to gain qualifications and graduate.  It is difficult to see how the dress 
standards of those students would have added any value to the debate.  This shows the inability 
of the DLP to relate to young people, many of whom would not have remembered the ALP split 
of 1955 and the fear of Communism that then prevailed. 
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As Gerard Henderson observed:- 
Age also played its toll – the Senators aged as did the voters.  The Party could not inspire 
any significant support among the young (Henderson 1975:88). 
If the best the DLP could do was to refer to young people as ‘tertiary delinquents’ and ‘spoilt 
kids’ it is not surprising that young people did not take to the DLP. 
This ‘agedness’ of the DLP senators also had an impact on the Party’s leadership and electoral 
prospects.  These issues will be discussed next. 
Leadership and Failed Leadership 
In his PhD thesis on Gair, Stevenson (2007:452ff) identified poor leadership as a cause of the 
DLP decline and demise.  He assessed that after the 1970 Senate election that, ‘Gair was starting 
to show evidence of his age, he was a very poor performer on Television, he could not handle 
the probing style of interview that was a feature of current affairs programs such as Monday 
Conference’.  In short Gair was a poor leader, who was a liability for the party that he led.  
Gair was a heavy drinker and a ruffian who got into fights.  For example, in May 1972 in the 
Senate Gair provoked the Labor Senator Doug McClelland into an ugly confrontation in the 
Senate (Senate CPD 1972: 9 May:1453-1454).  Gair was not a modern cleanskin politician 
being very much a person and politician of a previous era.   
Significantly Gair was considered by the DLP rank and file as a very poor platform speaker on 
the hustings and a poor performer on Television, Gair was an old man with relational problems.  
For example McCallum (1973:1:2/44) commented that ‘Ansett planes . . .  as the result of 
continued complaints by air hostesses . . . got instructions never to seat Gair in an aisle seat 
because he continually goosed and groped etc, the air hostesses.’ 
Stevenson (2007:499) reported that a very senior ALP figure who knew Gair well from the 
1950s onwards observed that ‘Gair’s cavalier behavior towards young women dated back to his 
days in the Premier’s chair.’  Such an attitude towards women is hypocritical of the leader of a 
party that quite publicly adopts the high moral ground. 
However, the replacement of Gair as parliamentary leader by McManus in 1973 after a drawn 
out struggle to get his resignation caused much controversy.  Gair had first mentioned his 
resignation in January 1973 (McManus 1977:94).  However, Gair continually delayed his 
resignation which had the effect of building up speculation in the ranks of the Labor Senators 
and in the press regarding Gair’s impending resignation.  Such speculation had a destabilising 
effect on the parliamentary DLP.   
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Gair expected his Queensland counterpart, the younger and very capable Condon Byrne to be 
elected as the new leader of the DLP.  Byrne was a very skilled orator and debater, he 
commanded respect.  Nevertheless McManus, who was a mere four years younger than Gair, 
was elected leader.  Gair immediately saw the leadership exercise not as a chance to give the 
DLP a younger leader, but merely to transfer the leadership to McManus.  Byrne ‘the gentleman 
barrister’ declined to run for the leadership allowing McManus to win the leadership 
unopposed.   
Byrne’s concern was that although he had Gair and Kane’s support, as well as his own, the two 
Victorians Little and McManus would split the party if McManus was not elected leader, Rank 
and file members of the DLP in Victoria considered themselves to be the DLP and for them it 
was only proper that their man be the leader of the DLP. (Henderson 1975:82) 
Gair took the loss of the leadership of his party badly.  McManus (1976:96) commented Gair 
‘did everything he possibly could to make things unpleasant and difficult for everybody.’ “He 
(Gair) was continually complaining that he had been treated with gross treachery.’  Gair 
procrastinated over the change in leadership; it became a long drawn out affair from the start of 
1973 until late that year.  However, the balance of the blame belongs to the remaining Senators 
who instead of electing a younger more vibrant and dynamic Senator Byrne, elected a Senator 
who in the eyes of the electorate was a mere Gair facsimile (namely old and of a bygone era and 
lacking in relevance.)  
When McManus took over as leader he also had the disadvantage of having a fear of flying, 
travelling by train where ever possible.  Kane (1989:218) testifies to McManus’ fear of flying 
and in fact hatred of air travel.  Kane went on to note that ‘this left him out of touch for a long 
period at a time when party leaders had to be quick to respond to developing situations.’  
The DLP Senators had no succession plan as to who was going to replace them, when they 
retired from the Senate for even unexpected reasons such as sudden illness or even death in 
office. 
Chronic Loss of Appeal - The 1972 Election 
The election of the Whitlam government in Dec 1972 effectively destabilised the DLP as a 
party.  In that election, the DLP failed to keep the ALP out of government which was one of its 
key aims.   
Murray (1973:72) commented that in the lead up to the 1972 Federal election, the DLP had 
three distinct choices to decide from.  These choices were:-   
 Say that the ALP was still not ‘safe’ enough to govern because of left wing influence; 
122 
 
 Emphasise its own ‘positive’ policies on issues, for example, decentralisation or family 
assistance 
 Campaign on a sensational, attention getting new issue  
In the 1972 Federal election, the DLP chose the third option.  It switched its main campaign 
issue from the threat of communism to the permissive society (Stevenson 2007:128) 
Murray (1973:71) reports that ‘there had been a general turning away in the past year from the 
party even among its own young members, let alone supporters.  In fact, many said they would 
be voting for, even joining, the ALP.  In Murray’s view the DLP seemed to consider that a love 
of prohibition was seen as the solution to problems.  Yet another group alienated by the change 
in campaign issues were non-Catholics and lapsed Catholics who had supported the DLP for its 
defence policies or its stand against the communists or indeed its opposition to the pre-1970 
Victorian ALP.  The sudden change in policy and raison d’etre would have appeared to have 
turned many of these voters from the DLP. 
Another group would be, in Murray’s view, the swinging voters looking for a means to protest 
against the ALP or the Liberal Party.  Once the DLP ‘became the party of fierce, hard line 
Catholic morality’ their support dwindled.  In the past polling had shown this Liberal Party 
protest group was a significant source of support for the DLP.   
Amalgamation a strategy of survival for a declining party? 
In early 1973, the DLP outside Victoria seriously considered amalgamation with the Country 
Party as a means of survival. 
The DLP started to realise that it was running into serious difficulties and attempts were made 
to come up with solutions.  One proposed solution was a merger or an alliance with the CP.  The 
DLP saw this as link up with two parties with similar problems.  Kane (1989:184) stated that:- 
Two weeks after Whitlam’s election victory, I began talks with Doug Anthony the Country 
Party’s federal parliamentary leader.  Queensland Senators . . . were enthusiastic.  At the 
end of January 1973 the DLP federal executive unanimously endorsed the principle of a 
DLP-Country Party merger. 
However, in the midst of negotiations the Bulletin, a weekly magazine, leaked the story which 
made negotiations much more difficult.  Some Country Party members saw the proposal as a 
chance to urbanise the party.  Kane (1989:184) observed that the DLP in Victoria opposed the 
whole idea.  After the DLP’s poor showing in the 1973 Victorian state election the idea died 
because the DLP had too few votes to offer the Country Party overall (Henderson 1975:80-81). 
This merger exercise indicated that the DLP had no structure in order to make an effective 
decision on the merger proposal.  The DLP was a federal party, one in which the state branches 
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were autonomous in theory and in practice.  The extra parliamentary organisation had no formal 
powers over the parliamentarians (the five senators) thus the senators ran the party at both 
federal level and at the respective state levels (Vic, Qld and NSW).  On the amalgamation with 
the CP the Victorians who opposed the whole idea simply refused to play ball. 
Henderson saw a problem with the DLP’s decision making structure at the federal level, and he 
quoted the issue of the proposed merger between the DLP and the CP as an example.  In fact, 
Henderson posits another view for the DLP’s demise.  He claims that through its history – and 
especially in recent years – there has been considerable interstate rivalry and personal animosity 
within the party.  He claims that very few of the political journalists were aware of this ill 
feeling.  However, he offers no proof or examples of this ill feeling or interstate rivalry.   
This attempted amalgamation exercise showed that a powerful state can pose a major threat to 
the decision making of the federal council of the party.  The DLP’s very powerful Victorian 
State Council was strongly opposed to such a merger, while the NSW and QLD State Councils 
were all for a merger.  The proposal was never put to a vote of the Federal council of the DLP 
because it was feared that a merger could split the Party, with the two Victorian Senators 
splitting from the two Senators from Queensland along with the one from New South Wales.  
The Final Scandal - The Gair affair 
The replacement of Gair as leader by McManus in 1973, lead to the Gair Affair in April of the 
next year.  The Whitlam government realised that if Gair could be persuaded to resign, the ALP 
would very probably win his Senate seat at the next Senate elections.  The bait the ALP 
Government dangled in front of Gair to get rid of him was the Ambassadorship to Ireland and 
Gair eagerly accepted.  Gair’s Senate term was due to expire on 30 June 1977 which was three 
years away.  However, if the Labor government could persuade Gair to resign at the time of the 
1974 half Senate election, his seat would be vacant thus Queensland would have six Senate 
vacancies and not five.  The Labor Party considered it could win three and the Liberal Country 
Party coalition the other three. 
The offer of the appointment as Australia’s Ambassador to Ireland would have been a great 
temptation for Gair to accept and take up.  He was a devout Roman Catholic and he had recently 
lost the leadership of his party in circumstances not of his liking. 
However, two train of events gave the Gair Affair a sense of notoriety and publicity. These 
factors were the quick actions of the Queensland Country Party Premier Joh Bjelke Peterson 
and the actions of Gair himself.  
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Bjelke Peterson was advised by his fellow party members in the Senate very early on that Gair 
would be resigning.  Bjelke Peterson reacted immediately by issuing writs for a Senate election 
for five vacancies only and not six on 2 April 1974.  At the time of the issue of writs, neither the 
Premier nor the Governor of Queensland had been formally advised by the Prime Minister, or 
the Senate President of the vacancy caused by Gair’s resignation. This would mean that the 
DLP nomination for Gair’s replacement would sit in the Senate filling the casual vacancy until 
the next Senate election three years away. 
Dr Peter Wilenski one of Whitlam’s senior advisers wrote to the Secretary of the Attorney 
General’s department regarding the issue of writs for the Senate election.  Clarrie Harders the 
Secretary of the Department, responded on 18 March 1974 advising that under section 12 of the 
Australian Constitution, the power to issue writs for Senate elections rests with the Governor of 
the State in question and not the Governor-General    
The second issue was equally significant in respect of Gair’s actions; that is the timing of his 
resignation from the Senate.  His appointment as ambassador was made public on 2 April 1974. 
On 3 April 1974, Gair wrote a letter the President of the Senate, in that letter, Gair noted that he 
had publicly announced on the previous day that he had accepted the appointment as 
Ambassador to Ireland and it was an office of profit under the Crown. Gair in his letter did not 
actually resign his seat in the Senate on a given day, in that respect, the letter was vague, 
perhaps deliberately so. 
The President considered that it was up to the Senate itself to determine whether Gair had 
resigned his Senate seat and if so, when.  On 8 April 1974, the Senate resolved that on 3 April 
1974, Gair had not resigned his Senate seat. 
The government failed to obtain from Gair a letter addressed to the President of the Senate 
resigning his seat and from a given date.  However, the question of five vacancies or six, and 
whether or not Gair had resigned only helped to give the whole affair more publicity and put the 
spot light on a member of the DLP being ‘bought’ and lured from the Senate by an 
ambassadorial appointment. 
Significantly Gair was paid as a Senator up to and including 11 April 1974, notwithstanding that 
in the view of the Solicitor General, Gair ceased to be a Senator from 14 March 1974.  
However, his ambassadorial salary commenced from 22 April 1974 through the Department of 
Foreign Affairs.  
The Gair Affair caught the remaining DLP Senators by complete surprise and they all expressed 
great outrage that Gair would accept what they saw was no more than a very cunning bribe.  
More importantly many of the DLP’s traditional supporters considered that the Gair affair 
125 
 
severely damaged the party’s credibility, portraying DLP Senators as people who could be 
‘bought’. 
Samuel (1974) observed that ‘the greatest warrior of this party of principle that had sacrificed so 
much for the sake of its beliefs had been bought off by their deadliest enemy.’ 
With regard to the Gair Affair, Fairbairn (1976:133) comments that the appointment of Gair as 
Australia’s Ambassador to Ireland was ‘a most dishonourable move to take out a man who was 
elected with support from the right wing and replace him with a Labor supporter.’  Fairbairn 
went on to comment that with six vacancies in Queensland, ‘there almost certainly would have 
been three from each side returned’ Labor ‘could have had a controlling majority in the Senate.’ 
As ambassador, Gair was something of a disaster. Stevenson (2007:503) comments on Gair’s 
very poor grasp of the art of diplomacy.  Gair was not averse to commenting publicly on 
Australian political events and politicians.  Little wonder then that on coming to power in late 
1975, the Liberal coalition government wasted no time in having Gair recalled from the Ireland 
post.  In Ireland, Gair’s very familiar approach to women was well known (Stevenson 
2007:500-501). In fact, in a ‘non-official personal’ letter dated 9 June 1975 from Mr Tom 
Holland in the Australian Embassy in Ireland to Mr AL (Tony) Vincent in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in Canberra, Holland complains strongly about Gair’s tactlessness and 
undiplomatic behavior, he kept his contacts to himself, ignoring any of the contacts of his 
predecessor in the role.  Holland also commented on Gair’s appalling behavior towards young 
ladies. 
Defeat and a Total Wipe Out – the 1974 Double Dissolution 
Election 
The DLP supported the Coalition parties in blocking the Labor government’s budget legislation 
in the Senate in April 1974.  Whitlam as Prime Minister responded by recommending and 
gaining a double dissolution of the Parliament and elections for both Houses of Parliament.  
This caught the DLP by complete surprise and unprepared.  The party was expecting only a half 
Senate election to be held before 30 June 1974.   
McManus was under the impression that Snedden, the Leader of the Liberal Party, had agreed to 
the Liberals running a joint Senate ticket with the DLP, which would have guaranteed 
McManus a winnable Senate spot. But this joint ticket did not eventuate.  
Wanting to run a ‘joint ticket’ with the Coalition parties showed that going into the 1974 
election, the DLP had no distinct identity or separate policies from the Coalition parties.  Instead 
the DLP was content to make an attempt to ‘tag along’ with the Coalition parties.  This attempt 
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failed.  But in making the attempt the DLP damaged its sense of a being a separate political 
party with distinct policies.  
The DLP was so short of funds leading up to the 1974 election that it only stood candidates for 
the Senate and not the House of Representatives.  However, in Victoria the party stood 
candidates for both Houses.  A sure sign that a party is fading out and declining, is the party 
moving from endorsing candidates for all, or nearly all, electorates to endorsing candidates for 
only a handful or no electorates. 
At the elections in May 1974, the DLP lost all of its five Senate seats, the DLP polling only 6.4 
per cent of the Senate vote in Victoria.  This was notwithstanding the high level of support for 
the DLP at the 1970 Senate elections and the election of the Labor government in December 
1972.   
Minor parties usually do not want to give the electorate the impression that they are being 
purely ‘obstructionist.’  However, in supporting the double dissolution election and voting 
against the ALP which had only been in government a little over 12 months, the DLP showed it 
was obstructionist.  The DLP’s actions yet again showed it was a party of hate and revenge. 
Commenting on the results of the election, Santamaria (1974:1) commented that ‘Defence is not 
currently regarded as an important issue, perhaps by as high a proportion as approximately 90 
per cent of Australians.’  The reason he gave for this view was not because of ‘careful 
consideration’ by the voters but ‘lack of education of the electorate’ by the leaders of the major 
parties.  This raises the question, if the electorate does not see defence as a major issue, why 
campaign on it?  Santamaria also gave as reasons for the DLP’s poor showing the ‘weak 
position of the opponents of communism’ with the international relations policy of ‘peaceful co-
existence’.  The second reason Santamaria gave for the DLP’s wipe out was the ‘catholic party’ 
tag applied to the DLP by its opponents.   
In making that comment Santamaria acknowledged that the Catholic Church’s attitude 
regarding many issues, including communism, was ‘softening’ with ‘little stomach for 
identification with ‘hard’ positions’. Santamaria’s remarks show that the DLP entered the 1974 
election with irrelevant polices and failing to notice that the world around the DLP was rapidly 
changing. 
The DLP showed in the 1972 federal election that it could no longer keep the ALP out of 
government, which was one of its major objectives.  What the DLP should have done in early 
1974 was to allow the ALP government’s budget through the Senate.  In this way, the DLP 
would have shown respect for the ALP’s mandate to govern which it had received from the 
electors in December 1972.  However, the DLP was so tied up in its hatred of the ALP that it 
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could not let that happen.  Thus, it supported a new election when it was given the chance and in 
doing so was rejected by the electorate, falling below the representation threshold. 
The DLP After 1974 
McManus ran for the Senate again at the 1975 election following the fall of the Whitlam 
government, but was not elected, his vote falling to 5.8 percent. In 1976 he resigned as leader.  
In providing his fellow members of the DLP with some thoughts on the future of the DLP, 
Curtis (1976:5) considered that ‘a long hard look must be taken at the DLP and what it can hope 
to achieve.  A searching examination of worldwide social trends is necessary and then some 
conscious decisions must be taken and followed through.  In his opinion in 1976 the DLP had 
five options.  They were:- 
1. Complete disbandment; 
2. Incorporation into another political organisation; 
3. Aimless or half-hearted continuance; 
4. To become a grass roots pressure group, rather than a political party; or 
5. To rebuild itself from the bottom up and to adopt a purposeful strategy’ 
In terms of Pederson’s lifespan curves, options one and four would mean the party’s lifespan 
ceasing altogether while option two would see the DLP moving into another party’s lifespan 
and being subject to the party’s rises and falls in electoral support.  Aimless or half-hearted 
continuance or even rebuilding from the bottom up would mean the party’s lifespan most 
probably remaining below the representation threshold, bearing in mind it is very hard for a 
party that has fallen below the representation threshold to cross over it for a second time.  With 
no representation and a lack of high profile leaders, how could the DLP successfully adopt ‘a 
purposeful strategy’ and regain its representation? 
Ironically complete disbandment was to be the DLP’s fate a little under two years later in 
early1978.  Incorporation into another political organisation was considered in 1973 with the 
proposal to merge with the then Country Party.  That proposal, as noted previously in this 
chapter, came to nothing for a number of significant reasons.  
If the party was to become a grass roots pressure group, it would be in competition with other 
such similar groups, such as the Defend Australia League, and possibly the RSL on defence 
issues.  Santamaria’s National Civic Council could also be seen as a pressure group, given its 
newspaper ‘News Weekly’ and its television segment ‘Point of View’ all headed up by B A 
Santamaria with his contacts with numerous parliamentarians and cabinet ministers.   
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Various churches were also vocal pressure groups on what they saw as moral issues on such 
issues as abortion, marriage and censorship.  If the DLP was to give up contesting elections and 
operated as a pressure group, it would be competing strongly for attention. 
End of the DLP March 1978 
In 1978 after the party’s defeat in the 1974 double dissolution election and its failure to win any 
Senate seats in 1975 or 1977 and with no success in the various State parliaments, the DLP in 
all States decided to disband.  The process was the most spectacular in the State of Victoria 
which had provided the party’s strong point.  The motion to disband the party was put at a 
special State conference of the Victorian DLP in March 1978.  The conference was very 
emotional and the motion to disband was only just passed, 110 votes for and 100 votes against.  
(Brosnan 1978:1) 
As a result, the DLP terminated its rental lease on its party headquarters in Victoria and 
presented all of its files and records to the State Library of Victoria, as historical records.  
However, in order to protect the names and details of its members, supporters and other 
financial backers, it destroyed its financial records.  It also held a special finance appeal 
amongst its members for finance to payout its party officials and pay off its debts.  (Curtis 2010) 
Many of those who voted against the party disbanding in Victoria in 1978 set up a new party the 
Democratic Labor Party of Australia (the full title of the disbanded party was the Australian 
Democratic Labor Party.)  Over the years, the party contested various Federal and Victorian 
State elections winning a very small number of votes.  In 2010 federal election the party won a 
seat in the Senate with John Madigan as its candidate.  (Curtis (2010) pointed out that the 
‘Madigan DLP’ was very much different to the old DLP that was dissolved in 1978.  In Curtis’ 
view the Madigan DLP was a totally different party altogether.  The Madigan DLP is not 
considered in this thesis. 
With regard to the members of the DLP after its demise, few seemed to have remained actively 
involved in the Party.  McManus ran again in 1975 and 1977, Little returned to his previous 
occupation as a newsagent. Dowling the Victorian secretary of the party and Senate candidate 
died in unexpected circumstances in November 1974 some six months after the Double 
Dissolution election which saw all DLP Senators defeated.  In Queensland Gair was expelled 
when he accepted the diplomatic posting while Byrne returned to the QLD Bar and resumed 
practising as a barrister, while in NSW Kane set up an industrial relations consultancy. 
In Conclusion 
The demise of the DLP can be attributed firstly to its very negative image and rhetoric.  It was 
hampered by the presence of BA Santamaria and his organisation, Santamaria was not ever a 
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member of the DLP.  The DLP’s image was also in jeopardy because the exact role of the DLP 
was not clear.  Was the DLP’s purpose to be a third party, a replacement for the ALP or to 
eventually re-unite with the ALP?  The DLP’s poor parliamentary leadership was another factor 
with its Senators in the late 1960s onwards, seen as old ‘fuddy duddies’. 
The DLP also was handicapped by its declining relevance in a rapidly changing world.  Its 
policies centred around a perceived continual threat from invading communist forces and the 
need for increased defence spending.  The ‘perceived threats’ of concern to the DLP included 
the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean which merely involved Russian vessels in 
international shipping lanes and not in the territorial waters of any country. 
The final reason for the DLP’s demise was seen in the shrinking percentage of the vote for its 
House of Representatives candidates.  This was coupled with an allocation of second 
preferences to the coalition parties for no continual real return apart from defence spending.  
The DLP also second preferenced Liberal candidates regardless of the candidate’s views on 
moral issues that were so dear to the DLP.   
The DLP failed to attract a primary Senate vote in the years before Senate Group preferencing.  
Had the DLP hung on until 1984, it may well have survived due to the new electoral rules. 
The DLP’s image of being a moralistic party together with poor relationships with the press did 
not enhance the Party’s election prospects. 
A better alternative to the split of the ALP would have been to stay in the ALP and fight from 
within as other parliamentarians such as Fred Daly and Arthur Calwell had done.  The split was 
a significant reason for the ALP remaining on the opposition benches for 23 long years.  The 
ALP had the image of a divided party in the early stages of the split and was denied government 
by the channeling of DLP second preferences to the Liberal and Country parties, allowing them 
to win government. 
The rise and fall of the DLP both serve as a useful lesson for other minor parties to monitor such 
decisive factors as leadership and relevance if they wish to survive. 
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Chapter Six: The Rise of the 
Australian Democrats 
Introduction 
The formation of the Australian Democrats was in fact a fusion of two existing minor parties, 
the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement.  Some of the earlier Democrat Senators were 
members of one of those two parties.  For example, John Siddons and Sid Spindler were 
members of the Australia Party and Jack Evans was a member of the New Liberal Movement.  
This chapter explores the formation and then the decline of the Australia Party and the Liberal 
Movement before going on to discuss the fusion of these two parties and in effect, rise again 
with the rise of the Australian Democrats. 
Gauja (2010:488) notes that  
Hailed as a party of the new politics movement, the Democrats tried to differentiate 
themselves from the major parties by offering progressive policies to the electorate and by 
adopting an internally democratic structure that presented novel opportunities for political 
participation. 
This chapter firstly traces the formation, rise and then decline of both the Liberal Movement and 
the Australia Party.  These two parties did not meet their demise but rather merged in 1977 to 
form the Australian Democrats along with people who were never members of one of those two 
parties.   
The main catalyst for the formation and rise of the Australian Democrats was the former Liberal 
Party minister, Don Chipp, who in 1977 had been a member of the Federal parliament for 17 
years.  Chipp had a very high profile as a man with progressive ideas in such areas as 
censorship.  Chipp’s image was clearly not an ‘old fuddy duddy in a boring grey suit’, and his 
philosophy was principally ‘small l Liberal’ (Allison 2006:42). 
This chapter discusses the factors that lead to the successful rise of the Australian Democrats, 
which include the adoption and use of participative democracy and the adoption of a ‘watch 
dog’ role with the catch cry ‘keep the bastards honest.’  The Australian Democrats in the 
beginning saw themselves as a ‘centralist party’ located in between the Liberal National Party 
Coalition on the one hand and the ALP on the other.  The parliamentary party grew in numbers 
until it held the balance of power in the Senate.  In the course of support for legislation, armed 
with the balance of power, the Democrats were able to negotiate a number of changes to various 
pieces of legislation. 
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This chapter concludes that while the rise of the Australian Democrats promised great future 
achievements with the usage of the balance of power in the Senate, there were possible 
problems on the near horizon for the party.  Holding the balance of power in itself presented 
problems, as did the functioning of the parliamentary party after the retirement of Don Chipp.  
These problems will be discussed in the next chapter.  
The Australia Party 1966 (1969)-1977 
The Australia Party started up in a somewhat unique way.  On 22 October 1966 Gordon Barton, 
a leading Sydney businessman placed a full page ‘open letter to President Johnson’ of the USA, 
in The Australian newspaper protesting about Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.  In 
that open letter, Barton commented that the Vietnam War was a dirty war and civil war. He 
went on to observe that the government in South Vietnam was unstable inefficient and corrupt. 
Further, that a number of Vietnamese resent and oppose Australia’s intervention in their affairs. 
Barton concluded that:- 
People all over the world are tired of military solutions and power politics. They are tired of 
anti-Communism as a substitute for common sense (Everingham 2009:108-109). 
Barton advised, that he wrote the letter out of ‘personal conscience’, ‘as one having no 
connection or influence with any political party’ (Blackshield 1972:35).  Within days Barton 
was inundated with support. 
Everingham (2009:109) went on to comment that ‘Barton’s letter was published when 
disappointment with, and alienation from, the major parties was high’. 
At a subsequent public meeting the Liberal Reform Group was formed.  In the 1966 Federal 
election, in which the major issue was conscription, the party ran candidates.  The Liberal 
Reform Group gave its second preferences to the ALP.  Warhurst (1997:24) comments in 
relation to the coalition’s 1966 election win that: 
The political party contest was still shaped by the 1950s Cold War politics. The DLP was 
still ensuring office for the coalition parties and was holding the balance of power in the 
Senate. The ALP was struggling to emerge from the trauma of the Split. The Liberal party 
was at odds with itself. The Country Party was little changed. 
In 1967 the Party’s name was changed to the Australian Reform Movement and in 1969 the 
name was changed to the Australia Party.  Members of the new party highlighted the policies 
and inactivity of the major parties in terms of the Vietnam War and other issues.  Blackshield 
(1972:37) noted the name change from Liberal Reform Movement to Australian Reform 
Movement came brought about because in 1966, the name Liberal Reform had apparently 
embarrassed the Liberal Government.  Blackshield went on to comment that:- 
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By 1967 the word ‘Liberal’ tended rather to embarrass the reform group. To use the word 
‘Australian’ instead was to widen the Movement’s aims and its professed electoral base; 
though it also tended to emphasise the oddly short strain strand sometimes found in the 
Movement’s thinking. 
Blackshield (1972:37) noted that the name ‘The Australia Party’ was chosen by telegram ballot 
from a short list of options submitted by post to 800 actual or potential members. 
The Australia Party only ever had one representative in the Federal Parliament.  Tasmanian 
Senator Reg Turnbull who was a medical practitioner and won his seat as an independent in the 
Senate.  As the table below shows, he joined and led the Australia Party for a short period.  In 
fact, he led and campaigned for the Party during the 1969 Federal election. 
Table 14:  Australia Party Members Australian Senate 
Name State Term Remarks 
RJD Turnbull Tasmania 1969-1970 Previously an 
Independent and 
became an Independent 
again after resigning 
from the Australia 
Party 
What did the Party Stand for? 
The party’s major policy interest was in reconceptualising Australia’s defence policy.  Their 
emphasis could be seen as a response to the other third party, the DLP, with its anti-communism 
and strong involvement in the Vietnam War with National Service.  In a move away from the 
influence of the Cold War, the Australia Party’s original policy was opposition to Australia’s 
involvement in the Vietnam War and opposition to National Service.  With also ‘cultivation of 
the American alliance to a degree consistent with the preservation of an independent Australian 
foreign policy’. 
On domestic policy, the Australia Party’s policy was ‘general adherence to Liberal Party 
principles with special emphasis on the preservation of private enterprise and free competition’.  
Other policies included ‘a complete revision of Australia’s welfare legislation, with particular 
emphasis on the problems of the aged’.  The party also proposed the abolition of the social 
security means test. 
Participatory Democracy 
Participatory democracy basically meant involving the party members in decision-making in 
relation to the party’s policies, rather than party state and federal conferences.  It can also 
include other decision making such as voting for the parliamentary leaders of the party, instead 
of only the members of the parliamentary party having the right to vote in those ballots.  
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Australia Party Councillor Geoffrey Loftus-Hills (1980:4) believed that:- 
The very important political legacy which the Australia Party bestowed on this Nation was 
the demonstration that is was practical to determine party policy by a fully democratic 
method in which all the members had an equal say by direct secret postal ballot. 
Cole (1975:223) comments that ‘the Australia party has a dual basis.  The first is the party 
journal ‘Reform’ and the second is the Branch structure.’  Both were important vehicles to 
encourage grass roots participation. 
The fledgling party was structured with a national executive, state executives and a branch of 
the party in each federal electorate. Cole (1975:223) comments that ‘branches range from very 
strong and very active to fairly small and weak’.  According to Cole, the functions of the 
branches were to  
 Promote interest in the Australia Party in the area; 
 To nominate and select candidates for elections (in co-operation with the State 
Executive); 
 To raise funds; and 
 To run local election campaigns 
Cole notes that in addition some Branches had developed ‘special interest areas’ relevant either 
to the local area or of wider interest. 
The journal ‘Reform’ was started in 1969 in the aftermath of the party’s poor showing in the 
1967 Senate election.  The results of that election left members of the party in a ‘somewhat 
demoralised state’ (Cole 1975:225).  The objectives of ‘Reform’ were to ‘pull together the 
scattered and demoralised membership and to facilitate more active membership participation in 
policy debates and decisions’. 
The introduction of participatory democracy into the Australia Party was sponsored by the first 
editor of ‘Reform’, Laurie Hull.  ‘His principal interest lay in the concept of participatory 
democracy’ (Cole 1975:225).  In 1968 Hull produced his Treatise on participatory democracy 
‘The Way Ahead’.  He used ‘Reform’ to guide a participative democracy environment.  
According to Cole (1975:223) members had the right to publish opinions and ideas and to 
debate policy issues.’  In addition, ‘ballot papers are distributed via . . .  (Reform) so that all 
members may participate in the policy making process.’ 
Siddons (1990:143) noted that the Australia Party had a broad policy base and as such the 
concept of participatory democracy came to the fore.  He went on to comment that:- 
Being made up of people who whose overriding concern was to protest against the Vietnam 
War, the party had a very diverse range of opinions on other political issues. The only way 
it could speak with a common voice was that was supported by the majority of its members 
was to initiate a process that arrived at a consensus. 
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Tony Blackshield (1972:47) stated that:- 
The point is not that other parties contain no men of initiative and integrity, but the 
parliamentary party structure has tended to damp their effectiveness. The party machine has 
shut out and stifled individual views; or party dogma, vote buying expedients, and the drive 
to score off one’s opponents, have become effective substitutes for any real views at all.  
The Australia Party seeks above all to counteract that sort of tenancy.  It sees itself as 
giving its members an organisational instrument, not a straitjacket. 
However, Blackshield also went on, sounding a warning about participatory democracy.  That 
warning was, as voting by the members was not compulsory, apathy set in with a 
disappointingly few members brothering to vote on the various policies.  
Electoral Performance 
The party contested seven elections from its founding in 1966 to its merger and transition into 
the Australian Democrats in 1977. 
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Table 15:  Australia Party – Electoral Performance 
Election Year Senate  
percentage vote 
House of Reps 
percentage vote 
Number of Seats 
Contested 
1966 (Reps only) n/a  12 seats NSW, 10 in 
Vic plus casual senate 
vacancy 
1967 (half Senate) (2.3 6NSW, 0.66 Vic) - 5 in NSW and 2 in Vic 
1969 (Reps only) n/a- 0.9 37 seats, plus two 
casual Senate 
vacancies 
1970 (half Senate) 2.9   
1972 (Reps only) n/a 2.4  
1974 (double 
dissolution) 
1.4 2.3  
1975 (double 
dissolution) 
n/a 0.4  
 
From the above table, it can be seen that the party’s overall share of the vote was minuscule. 
Blackshield (1972:35) observed that:- 
. . . In 1972, as in the past, the greatest difficulty . . . was people who have never heard of 
the Australia Party; for whom it has not the wrong image, but simply no image at all. Party 
leaflets urged the public find out about the Australia Party. But the Party’s main growth 
mechanism is word-of-mouth and the process is a slow one. 
Second Preference Allocation 
At the 1966 Federal elections, the party decided to second preference the ALP due to the ALP’s 
strong opposition to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.  It continued to give its 
second preferences to the ALP into the 1970s.  Loftus-Hills (1980:3) claimed that:- 
The Australia Party grew in political strength for two federal elections, and its preferences 
directed to the ALP in 1972 and 1974 were responsible for that Party’s election to 
government. 
However, Sid Spindler in a draft ‘letter to the editor’ after the 1972 election commented that:- 
The Australia Party dislikes having to recommend preference allocations.  We regard both 
the major parties as innately handicapped by their obligations to trade unions and big 
business respectively.  But one evil can be less than another (Spindler ND). 
In federal elections, voters had to allocate preferences by filling in every square on the ballot 
paper and candidates and their parties were free to recommend by a how-to-vote card as to how 
this allocation should be done.  The allocation of preferences is not about a party’s weaknesses 
but which party is preferred over another.  Furthermore, the allocation of preferences 
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particularly by a minor party can be traded and be the subject of negotiation with any of the 
major parties.  Spindler could have also borne in mind that in marginal seats preferences from 
minor parties can be decisive in determining the eventual winning candidate in the electorate. 
The Decline of the Australia Party 
Siddons (1990:147) stated that ‘a few months after joining the Australia Party and seeing what 
kind of an organisation it was:- 
I thought I had made a big mistake. I found myself among people are shifting commitments 
and fluctuating enthusiasm. The administration and organisational structure of the party 
was based on voluntary labour. I could admire the spirit and the principle of the people with 
whom I become involved, but as someone who had come from the business world where 
organisational efficiency was the name of the game . . . I felt the unpredictability of the 
party machine rather frustrating.’ 
Warhurst (1997:35) comments that the Australia Party:- 
did not ever fully come to terms with the tension between . . . . (their) new ideas and 
competing as a political party in the Australian competitive electoral system. . . .  For most 
of its members the ultimate aim was parliamentary representation.  (After Turnbull) . . .  the 
Party was searching for another ready-made parliamentary leader, whether it be Hall, 
Gorton or ultimately Chipp. 
The Party also suffered a perception of ‘being male dominated’, notwithstanding that 45 per 
cent of the party members were women, which was higher than in the other political parties 
(Blackshield 1972:41).  Warhurst (1997:35) commented that ‘The Australia Party remained 
largely a male party, at least in the upper echelons and among the Parliamentary candidates.’  
The Australia Party had attracted high profile members and candidates but in the 1970s was still 
searching for a high profile acceptable leader.  In addition, the 1975 election saw polarisation 
between the two major parties.  In other words, a battle between two leaders rather than between 
two parties.  Loftus-Hills (1980:3) considered that in respect of the Australia Party:- 
In the fiery contest between Liberal – NCP and ALP in 1975 its support largely vanished, 
the voters concentrating on the struggle.  The Australia Party lacked a political front-man, 
since its founder, Gordon Barton, did not stand as a candidate. 
Blackshield (1972:49) in attempting to see a future for the Australia Party claimed:- 
slow slogging remains –either the Party share of the vote will slowly increase until ten 
years hence? – it becomes an effective force; or, losing momentum, it will fall back (at 
best) to a ‘pressure group’ role.   
Above all in spite of high profile candidates and party members, the Australia Party was 
hampered by disappointingly low levels of support at successive elections and no candidates 
being elected.  If the party wanted candidates elected to Parliament and become a force in the 
Australian party system, it desperately needed a well-known leader with a high profile to get the 
party’s message out into the electorate. 
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The Liberal Movement (1972-1977) 
The Liberal Movement was formed in the aftermath of the ‘Playmander’ in South Australia. The 
Playmander caused the SA electoral system to be ‘heavily weighted in favour of the rural areas 
of the State, was strongly partisan in its political effects and provided a government with a clear 
majority of voting support for most of the period’ (Jaensch 1970:96). 
By way of background, in 1933 at the South Australian State elections the conservative Liberal 
Country League defeated the Labor government.  The LCL went on to win the next nine 
elections from 1938 to 1962, finally being defeated by Labor in 1965.  A major cause of that 
long period of success was an elaborate gerrymander (the Playmander named after the Premier 
Thomas Playford).  The Playmander was put in place at the electoral redistribution of 1936, 
‘modified slightly in 1955 and finally replaced in 1969’ (Jaensch 1970:96). 
After its defeat in 1965, the LCL elected a ‘new “young image” leader’ Steele Hall, possibly to 
counter Don Dunstan the rising Labor leader who was the deputy leader of the parliamentary 
Labor Party.  In the State elections of 1968 the LCL was returned to power ‘on the shoulders of 
the sole independent’ (Jaensch 1970:97) as both LCL and Labor had won 19 seats each.   
A redistribution of electorates took place in 1969.  That redistribution which was a compromise 
that retained some bias to rural areas.  However, it was seen by Labor as a step in the right 
direction (Jaensch 1970:97).  The redistribution saw the end of the ‘Playmander’.    Hall’s 
government had ‘reduced rural overrepresentation in the lower house . . . Rural 
overrepresentation had grown with the expansion of urban populations to the point that the 
smallest rural seat contained about 10,000 electors and the largest urban seat 100,000’ but 
despite this imbalance, ‘right wing LCL politicians opposed democratisation’, that is “one vote 
one value”.  However, Hall ‘remained determined to complete electoral reform by 
democratising the upper house’ (Adamson 2009:2-3).  In the 1970 election Labor returned to 
Government winning 27 of the 47 seats. 
The Liberal Movement came into being as a faction of the Liberal Country League (LCL) on 15 
March 1972.  On that day in the South Australian Parliament, Steele Hall the leader of the LCL 
resigned his leadership of the party and announced the formation of the Liberal Movement of 
which he was the leader.  The final straw for Hall was the carrying of a motion earlier that day 
in the Liberal Party room which required the election of members of the Liberal party front 
bench or parliamentary executive.  Hall held the strong view that a party leader must have the 
right to hire and fire his ministers, if he is to assert and maintain proper discipline in his cabinet. 
A number of Liberal members of the upper house, the Legislative Council, considered that they 
were not being considered for front bench positions, principal amongst them was Reginald De 
Garis a very high profile and popular member.   
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In his statement, Hall said:- 
‘Our party . . . has publicly acknowledged the fact that it will not follow me in my 
endeavours to govern and legislate for the broad section of the South Australian 
community.  It prefers to bind itself tightly to a few individuals who will put party before 
state.  This I cannot accept and it provides the background and reason why I have vacated 
the leader’s seat.’ 
Adamson (2009:2) notes that the Liberal Movement’s formation was announced in March 1972.  
However, the Liberal Movement did not decide to become a political party in its own right until 
31 March 1973. Adamson goes on to comment that:- 
The Liberal Movement was intended to reform the Liberal and Country League (LCL) by 
creating with in the League a group of pro-democratic progressives who would by 
persuasion and taking control of branches, bring about fundamental changes to party policy.  
The critical objective was to persuade the LCL to pursue democratic electoral reform of the 
Legislative Council.  When he was Premier from 1968 to 1970, Steele Hall had reduced 
rural over representation in the lower house the House of Assembly. 
In April 1972 Hall advised that the Liberal Movement:- 
Is a response to the demand from many people in South Australia who want involvement in 
political change.  It is not for the apathetic.  It is for that group of people who are 
disenchanted with existing political parties.  The Liberal Movement is committed to the 
fulfilment of the Liberal concept.  It is for those who are looking for dynamic democracy 
rather than political catch-cry. 
Steele Hall stood for the Senate in the 1974 Double dissolution election and won a seat.  On 4 
July 1974, in a letter to the then Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, Hall was able to say: 
I represent a party with a well organised base in South Australia which supports three 
members in the state Parliament as well is me as a senator. Its electoral support is currently 
increasing as evidenced at the Senate election, and in the following state by-election for the 
seat of Goyder. 
In addition, the Liberal movement intends to establish branches outside of South Australia 
before the end of the year. 
Policies of the Liberal Movement 
The Liberal Movement held its first policy convention on 2 June 1972 while still a group within 
the Liberal Country League.  The Liberal Movement’s policies were grouped around the policy 
areas of Agriculture, Censorship, Education, the Environment, Health, including social welfare 
and South Australian Constitutional reform.  Later policies included state aid to independent 
schools and local government council amalgamations. 
In his policy speech for the 1974 double dissolution elections, Hall stated ‘we are not another 
DLP.  We intend to eventually merge with other Liberal Forces in Australia’, but not according 
to Hall, with the Liberal Country League, ‘which is so obviously redundant in South Australia.’  
(Hall 1974:3).   
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Hall also claimed that  
Too many people see the LCL as a party tied to conservative traditions.  We must show 
voters that we can move with the times, we are ‘with it.’  (Jaensch 1997:39) 
The Liberal Movement was primarily concerned about electoral fairness, or the lack of it, in 
South Australia in the light of the ‘Playmander’.  Doing something about such a significant 
electoral rort such as the ‘Playmander’ would certainly show that a party was ‘with it’ in terms 
of fairness and equity.  At the same time, it is hard to see ‘gerrymandering’ as a part of 
‘conservative traditions’. 
Electoral Performance 
In the South Australian State election in 1975, the party won 18.27 per cent of the vote in the 
Legislative Assembly and 18.18 per cent of the vote in the Council.  This resulted in the 
Movement winning two seats in each House.  The parliamentary membership of the party is 
shown in the following table. 
Table 16:  Liberal Movement Members South Australia 
Name Term of Office Party Remarks 
Robin Millhouse MP 
Mitcham 
1955-73 Liberal 
1973-76   
1976-77  
1977-82  
Liberal 
Liberal Movt 
New Lib Movt 
Aust Dems 
Cabinet Minister in LCL 
Govt 
Founded the New LM 
Resigned to become 
Supreme Court Judge. 
Steele Hall MP 
Goyder 
 
1959-1973 
1973-74 
Liberal Party 
Lib Movt 
 
Resigned to run for the 
Senate (successfully) 
David Boundy 
Goyder 
1974-76 
 
1976-77 
Liberal Movt 
 
Liberal Party 
Won by-election in Hall’s 
electorate 
Re-joined Libs Defeated 
John Carnie MLC 1975 – 1976 
1976-1982 
Liberal Movement 
Liberal Party 
 
 
Retired 
Martin Cameron MLC 1971 -73 
1973-76 
1976-90 
LCL 
LM 
Liberal Party 
 
 
Retired 
 
A significant feature of the above table is the significant number of members who did not chose 
to join ‘the New Liberal Movement when it was formed in 1976, instead joining up with the 
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Liberal Party in 1976.  This is to be expected as the Liberal Party provided the Liberal 
Movement with electoral fairness in terms of electoral boundaries.  With the ‘Playmander’, this 
was the Liberal Movement’s major difference with the LCL. 
In the Federal parliament, The New Liberal Movement contested the two double dissolution 
elections in 1974 and 1975. 
Table 17:  The New Liberal Movement Electoral Performance 
Election Year Senate House of Reps Seats Contested 
1974 9.8% (SA) 1% (Nat) 8.2% (SA) 0.8% (Nat) Reps SA 12 
1975 6.5% (SA) 1.1% (Nat) 6.2% (SA), 3.3% 
(ACT) 0.6% (Nat) 
Reps SA 12, ACT 2 
 
From the above table, it is clear that the party’s strength was in its home state of South 
Australia.  In fact, South Australia provided the party with its sole member in the Federal 
parliament, namely the high-profile Steele Hall.  Hall’s election to the Senate was also aided by 
the fact that the two elections in question were double dissolution elections, meaning the quota 
for election was a lot less than a normal senate election for only half of the Senators.  As can be 
seen in the table below, Hall also joined the Liberal Party in 1976.  He did not associate himself 
with the ‘New Liberal Movement.’  In fact, Hall served in Federal Parliament for a number of 
years as the member for the electorate of Boothby. 
Table 18:  Liberal Movement Members Australian Senate 
Name State Term Party Remarks 
Steele Hall South Australia 1974-76 
1976-77 
LM 
Liberal Party 
 
Did not contest 
1977 election. 
Later Liberal MP 
for Boothby in 
House of Reps 
Second Preference Allocation 
At the 1974 Federal elections, the Party decided to second preference the Coalition parties over 
the ALP, notwithstanding that the Coalition parties chose to punish the Liberal Movement by 
allocating second preferences the ALP over the Liberal Movement.  In the 1975 Federal 
election, the Liberal Movement again second preferenced the Coalition parties. 
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The Decline of the Liberal Movement 
Originally the Liberal Movement was formed as a faction of the Liberal Country League (LCL) 
but later became a party in its own right.  A few years later the Liberal Movement re-joined with 
the LCL and the merged Party renamed itself the Liberal Party of Australia (SA Division).  
Steele Hall led the Liberal Movement in the South Australian Parliament from 1972 until May 
1974.  He then ran for the Australian Senate as a Liberal Movement candidate for South 
Australia in the 1974 double dissolution election and was elected.  He was re-elected 1975 for 
the Liberal Movement, but did not recontest his Senate seat in 1977.  In 1976 he re-joined the 
Liberal Party of Australia.   
However, a segment of the Liberal Movement refused to re-join with the LCL and this group 
renamed itself ‘the New Liberal Movement’ and it was this party faction that combined with the 
Australia Party to form the Australian Democrats under Don Chipp’s leadership. 
The Australia Party and the Liberal Movement Lifespans  
The Lifespan curves for both the Australia Party beginning in 1966 and Liberal Movement 
beginning in 1973 are shown in the following graph.  
 
Each party rose sharply as they both came into existence in a very short time frame.  They met 
their demise at the same time in 1977 when they both became part of the Australian Democrats.  
The Lifespan of the Australian Democrats is discussed at the end of this chapter.  The Australia 
Party crossed the representation threshold briefly in 1969 1970 when the independent Senator 
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Turnbull agreed to be the Party’s leader.  However, the Liberal Movement by comparison 
enjoyed a much longer period above the representation threshold.  The Liberal Movement 
included high profile Liberals such as Steele Hall and Robin Millhouse who were instrumental 
in the Movement’s formation.  The Australia Party’s point of culmination was the period of 
Turnbull’s leadership and the Liberal Movement’s culmination point was in 1975 at the height 
of its representation in the South Australian Parliament and in the Australian Senate. 
The Australia Party and the Liberal Movement Enter Into 
Negotiations 
West (1977:105) claims attempts to merge the Australia Party with the new Liberal Movement 
were not so successful.  However, Loftus-Hills’ papers give a different picture.  Loftus-Hills 
was on the Council of the Australia Party.  His records give a very strong impression that the 
Australia Party was all for the merger with the New Liberal Movement and it was the New 
Liberal Movement that had reservations and misgivings about the idea of a merger of the two 
parties.  Loftus Hills (1977:1) explained that:- 
The New LM in South Australia, the only State where it operates, comprises those 
members of the original Steele Hall Liberal Movement who refused to return with him to 
the Liberal fold.  The policies of the new Liberal Movement were very close to those of the 
Australia Party.  While Steele Hall finally chose to go with the strength, and many followed 
him, including some state members of Parliament, a resolute group, including Robin 
Millhouse, chose to stick by their principles and policies.  Thus, on performance as well as 
on platform they are good people to have with us. 
However, in fairness to West, Loftus-Hills’ remarks are in sharp contrast to those of Siddons 
(1975:6) who, not two years prior, had advised voters that:- 
The Liberal Movement is a peculiarly South Australian phenomenon.  It has flourished in 
that state because the Liberal Party there is controlled by reactionary, almost feudal 
elements.  Make no mistake, the Liberal Movement is part of the mosaic of the right.  Like 
most other minority parties which have sprung up in Australia in the last two decades it 
funnels its preferences straight back to the Liberal Party.  Because it directs all its 
preferences to the Liberal Party, a vote for the Liberal Movement could not even be 
considered a protest vote. 
Loftus-Hills’ remarks set the stage for the ensuing talks leading to the amalgamation of the two 
parties followed by the leadership of Don Chipp.  Siddons (1990:159) commented that ‘it 
became clear that the media were never going to take the Australia Party seriously until we 
attracted some well-known political figure.  Then along came Don Chipp.’  Who was Don 
Chipp and what was his background? 
Don Chipp and his background 
Don Chipp had been a Liberal member of the House of Representatives since winning a by-
election in 1960.  According to Whittington (1964:132) Chipp:- 
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Had few, if any, academic interests or pursuits, and was essentially a young businessman 
with more than average ability and a particular flair for publicity and organising. . . . he 
impressed his party leaders  . . . with his energy and application 
Whittington went on to note that Chipp was eager to ‘tackle any job in the party interest.’ 
Chipp had been Minister for the Navy and later Minister for Customs and Excise.  He was a 
minister in the McMahon ministry which in late 1972 lost government after 23 years to the 
Labor Party led by Gough Whitlam. However, as Minister for Customs and Excise, Chipp was 
very popular with a very broad section of the community.  The reason was simple, Chipp had a 
very broad and progressive approach to censorship, and was seen as ‘trendy’.  In 1972 Chipp 
incurred much angst from the DLP Senators and various moralistic groups over his decision to 
allow the import of the publication ‘The Little Red Schoolbook’.  This publication aimed at 
secondary school students aimed to give the students some direct advice on such issues as sex, 
abortion and censorship.  Significantly when the Liberal Nationals Coalition returned to 
government in late 1975 under Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister, Chipp was not included in 
the Fraser Government’s ministry.  This was a big disappointment for Chipp and he remained a 
Liberal Party back bencher for just over 12 months before announcing his resignation. 
Don Chipp Resigns from the Liberal Party 
Don Chipp announced his resignation from the Liberal Party in a statement to the House of 
Representatives on 24 March 1977.  In a well-structured statement, Chipp after some 
introductory comments stated that:- 
I feel that my continual membership of the Liberal Party, as it is now led, managed and 
structured, would be incompatible with my beliefs and would constitute an act of 
hypocrisy. 
Chipp did not draw any comfort from the current attitudes and policies of the ALP opposition, 
accusing it of mismanaging the economy when it was in government and not learning from its 
failures.  Chipp concluded his statement by commenting that perhaps it was time to test the 
proposition for the emergence of a third political force. 
Chipp’s resignation came as a shock to both the Liberal Party and the general public.  However, 
Loftus-Hill was very keen to seize upon both Chipp’s resignation and the reasons for it.  In a 
report to Members he stated:- 
Those members of the Australia party who heard Don Chipp’s magnificent speech in the 
House (of representatives) on March 24 in which he announced his resignation from the 
Liberal Party may well have felt, that when he spoke of policies, that he was speaking for 
the Australia Party (Loftus-Hills (1977:1). 
Loftus Hill went on to comment that:- 
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It was . . . a tremendous source of satisfaction to all of us for him to say that there was a 
need in Australia for a third political force in the middle ground, that if existing groups 
could come together (and he referred specifically to the Australia party and the New LM) to 
form the basic organisational structure for such a party, he would certainly consider joining 
it. 
In early 1977, the Australia Party approached Chipp to see if he would be interested in joining.  
Chipp responded by saying he always admired the Australia Party and could be interested in 
joining them.  In Siddons’ view Chipp was not interested in joining the Australia Party unless 
the move made a big political splash, Chipp wanted to advance his cause and at the same time, 
the Australia Party wanted to advance its cause. 
Loftus Hills (1980:4) recalled that:- 
After 16 years in parliament Chipp was prepared to give the game away, but was prevailed 
upon to agree that if the two parties in the middle ground, the Australia Party and the new 
Liberal Movement could come together, he would consider joining this united party. 
The two parties did come together, adopting and further developing the ultra-democratic 
methods of the Australia Party.  The members decided that the new party would be called 
the ‘Australian Democrats’. 
In fact, the new party took on the participative democracy mantle of the Australia Party and 
from the Liberal Movement the party adopted the principle of the right of a parliamentary 
member of the party to vote against the party line if they saw fit to do so. 
Don Chipp’s resignation from the Liberal Party came at an opportune time.  According to 
Siddons (1990:163) less than a fortnight after Chipp’s speech, the national executive of the 
Australia Party met and Siddons successfully moved a motion which provided for the formation 
of ‘a new political force’ with Don Chipp as its parliamentary leader and that this new force 
consist of the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement with a new name.  Members of 
the Australia Party came up with a suggested name for the new political force, ‘the Australian 
Democrats.’ 
West (1977:101) commented that:- 
Many small parties have been sparked into existence when a charismatic leader splits a 
major party to create a new one.  The Australian Democrats formed around just such a man 
Don Chipp, who resigned from the Liberal Party on 24 March 1977. 
Don Chipp did not split the Liberal Party when he resigned from it in 1977 – he was the only 
one who resigned from the party and did not take other members with him.  However, his later 
entry into the new Australian Democrats party certainly enhanced that party’s electoral 
successes.   This is readily seen when the Australian Democrats results in the 1977, 1980 and 
1983 Federal elections are compared to the results of the Australia Party at the 1969, 1972 and 
1974 Federal elections. 
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After Chipp’s resignation from the Liberal Party and the move to form a new party which would 
include both the Australia Party and the New Liberal Movement, public meetings were 
convened around Australia.  These public meetings were very well attended.  For example, in 
Perth Chipp along with Siddons held a lunch time press conference ‘which was very well 
attended and the Perth town hall that evening was packed’.  Chipp spoke for ‘over an hour’, the 
audience ‘believed he was the man of the hour’ (Siddons 1990:164). 
A poster advertising one of those public meetings is reproduced below. 
 
 
The Australian Democrats (1977-2010s) 
The Australian Democrats were mostly anti-sectional and anti-material (existing parties were 
seen to be dominated by sectional interests.)  The Australian Democrats became a third political 
force representing middle of the road policies that owed no allegiance to any outside pressure 
group and they appealed to voters’ spirit and not their hip pocket.  The Democrats talked the 
language of ‘soft sentiment’ (honesty, tolerance and compassion and they strongly believed in 
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no cynicism, sectional pork barrelling and polarising confrontation).  (West 1980:343-4).  The 
Australian Democrats were described as ‘a party of new ideas’ (Warhurst 1997:23). 
In its policy papers, under its objectives, the Australian Democrats advised it was a party to be 
beholden to no group or groups in the community to serve the best interests of all Australians. 
The party also advised that its aim was to use its position as a party in the middle ground even-
handed to capital and labour, to reconcile their real interests by encouraging industrial 
democracy and all other forms of cooperation. 
The new (as yet unnamed) party wasted no time in communicating with its newly found 
supporters.  A ‘National Journal’ was commenced in June 1977.  The first issue posed the 
question ‘what shall we be’ in other words what will be the name of the new party?  The name 
was to put to a ballot in the third issue of the National Journal.  In that first issue Don Chipp 
hinted ‘I like the name “Australian Democrats”’.  In that issue the National Steering Committee 
members were named.  They included Don Chipp, Robin Millhouse, John Siddons, Jack Evans, 
Colin Mason, ‘plus a representative from each Division’ (a State). 
In the third issue of the National Journal some of the suggested names for the new party were 
published.  They included, ‘Dinkum Democrats’, ‘Members Independent Democrats’, 
‘Democratic Centralists’, ‘Peoples Participative Association’ and ‘The United Democrats 
Party’.  That issue of the National Journal also included the ballot paper for members to vote 
upon the new name for the Party.  Members could make their choice from 56 possible names!  
The name finally chosen by the members in that ballot and announced in the fifth issue of the 
National Journal in September 1977 was ‘The Australian Democrats’ which was the ‘interim’ 
name for the party.   
In that first issue Don Chipp in an article titled ‘Getting into our stride’ commented about what 
was required in setting up a new party.  The steering committee according to Chipp, set down an 
‘interim constitution and adopt a ‘provisional name’ and ‘set down at least as thought 
promoters, some bare bones of the kinds of policies which could arise from the principles I have 
talked about since resigning from the Liberal Party’. 
Chipp went on to remind the new members that:- 
A distinguishing feature of our party is that policies are determined and voted upon by you 
and other members, not dictated to you from some outside source.  I ask you therefore . . . 
to work hard on policy.  The doors are wide open for your ideas to come forward. 
 In his reminder Chipp was stating that the Australian Democrats would operate under a system 
of participative democracy – just as the Australia Party had done.  Blackshield had pointed out 
that a big problem with participative democracy in the Australia Party was many people were 
apathetic and therefore did not both to vote on the various policies.  Had Chipp and the 
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Australian Democrats learnt from the problems experienced by the Australia Party?  This 
question will be addressed under the participatory democracy in the next chapter which 
addresses the demise of the Australian Democrats.  
Chipp also suggested to the members as well as using the ‘bare bones’ policies that they also 
‘get a hold of’ some Australia Party or New Liberal Movement policy material.  This was a very 
smart idea in that way the former members of those two parties could feel a stronger ‘empathy’ 
with the new party.  Chipp also counselled the members to be ‘forward looking in policy 
development’.  Chipp spoke of a policy framework in which:- 
Kindness, generosity and wisdom can compete on better than equal terms with the greed, 
materialism and mere cleverness which characterises so much of our present society. 
In the second issue of the National Journal, issued on the fourth July 1977, the reader was 
advised that the ‘provisional name of the new party was ‘The Australian Democrats’.  
Furthermore, the journal would be published ‘every three weeks’ which sounded very 
ambitious. 
In that issue Chipp was able to report that ‘we are going like a rocket’.  In just over eight weeks 
the party has 133 branches operating in five states and one territory.  The party would be 
launched in Tasmania on 7 July and in the Northern Territory on 27 July.  This would make the 
party truly national, operating in all states and territories.  Chipp went on to advise that he was 
receiving ‘over 100 letters a week requesting details of membership’.  He went on to state that:- 
The media, both public and private have been magnificent in their co-operation and 
impeccable in their fairness. 
Chipp went on encourage the members to build up the party’s finances, have preliminary 
discussions on ‘what we might do with preferences’ and consider ways to increase membership. 
Finally, Chipp encouraged the members to respect differences in opinions.  Chipp counselled 
the members:- 
Diversity of view and personality can cause divisiveness among human beings – however, 
diversity can also be a source of enormous strength to the Australian Democrats because 
one of the most exhilarating and satisfactory experiences a human being can have is 
showing tolerance to a different view and being big enough to agree to disagree with 
another person and still maintain a close relationship.  In doing this we all grow a little 
taller and with us the party grow to a greater strength. 
However, Forell (1994:41) defines a political party as:- 
Not merely a group of like-minded members of Parliament.  It is an organisation of people 
of broadly similar ideas or interests, whose aim is to gain political power 
In his encouragement, Chipp seems to be far too simplistic and idealistic.  Conflict and strong 
differences of opinion are inevitable in a political party.  The challenge that Chipp ignored in his 
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comments was that it is important to keep any such conflicts within the party and not relayed to 
the press.  Secondly, party members have to show strong support for the party.  A party member 
might not get all that they want in a policy area, but with strategies such as ‘win win 
negotiating’ they can achieve a good outcome. 
In the third issue of the National Journal, the Editor reminded members that as a ‘centre party’:- 
Because we are even handed to capital and labour, neither the trade unions nor big business 
are going to pay us to look after their interests.  Money will be a perineal problem. . . . for 
the immediate future we are going to have to (a) put a lot of our time and energies into 
money raising (b) keep digging into our own pockets. 
The editor was highlighting a significant problem for minor parties, namely; money.  The DLP 
also had money problems in terms of fighting elections and employing office and field staff as 
well as rental of office space.   At least for the Australian Democrats the problem was lessened 
with the payment from the public purse for each first preference vote when the party polled 
greater than four per cent.   The editor also advised the members that on 30 July 1977, the 
Australian Democrats were truly a national organisation with over 5,000 members. 
In the fifth issue of the National Journal dated 5 September 1977, the party structure was 
explored.  The structure was portrayed in the following diagram. 
 
 
 
 
The national steering committee explained that it did not want ‘filters’ for the exchange of ideas 
between groups of the party.  Therefore, in the opinion of the National Steering Committee ‘any 
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member may have direct contact with either state or national executive or any other body 
established by these executives.’  A branch is ‘the focal point of getting people together to 
discuss policies campaigning and other responsibilities contained in the constitution.  Branches 
are not precluded from putting motions to either the National or State Executives should they so 
desire. 
The model shown above may look good on paper, but in practice it would have some annoying 
problems.  Under that model a branch of the Australian Democrats could communicate with the 
National Executive and bypass the State Executive.  Would the National Executive or the 
Branch ‘copy’ the State Executive into any communications?  From the above diagram, it seems 
keeping the State Executive ‘in the loop’ is not a requirement.  The model is about ‘the 
exchange of ideas between groups in the party’, therefore it would seem an individual member 
of the party would have to at least go through their branch in order to communicate with the 
State and Federal executives and any subcommittees of those two bodies. 
In the sixth edition of the National Journal dated 26 September 1977, the editor excitedly 
reported the election of Robin Millhouse to the South Australian Parliament for the Legislative 
Assembly electorate of Mitcham.  Millhouse had originally entered the SA Parliament in 1955 
as an LCL member holding the safe LCL electorate of Mitcham.  He became Attorney-General 
and Minister for Social Welfare in Steele Hall’s government.  In 1973 Millhouse joined the 
Liberal Movement.  But while other break away members, such as Steele Hall later re-joined the 
Liberal Party, Millhouse formed ‘The New Liberal Movement’ which along with the Australia 
Party, formed the Australian Democrats.  Millhouse with his vast parliamentary and ministerial 
experience was like Chipp a valuable acquisition for the Australian Democrats. 
In the eighth issue of the journal dated 14 November 1977, Don Chipp commented on the 
forthcoming Federal election on December 10.  Chipp claimed the only thing the party lacked 
was money- ‘because of our principles of honesty.’  Chipp also commented that:- 
The old parties are at it again, fighting, name calling, smearing and remaking those false 
promises which they have broken time and time again.  We must walk taller than they do. 
In making that comment Chipp appears to be very sanctimonious.  The old parties, being the 
two major parties and the National Party, would be fighting in terms of alternative policies and 
name calling in terms of highlighting any perceived weaknesses in the other party’s policies.  In 
fact, the same fate could await the Democrats in an election, when that party’s policies are being 
debated and when the Democrats debate or analyse the policies of the other parties.  As for 
‘false promises’, ‘broken time and time again’, all parties in government make promises that in 
government they cannot keep for some reason or other, such as the economic conditions not 
being conducive to the policy in question.  In making those remarks Chipp is merely attempting 
to appeal to the average person in the street who was prejudiced against politicians.   
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That election saw the election of Don Chipp to the Senate for Victoria and Colin Mason in the 
Senate for New South Wales.  They took their places in the Senate on 1 July 1978.  However, in 
South Australia, with the retirement of Steele Hall from the Senate and his election to the House 
of Representatives as a Liberal, Janine Haines was nominated by the South Australian 
Parliament to take Steele Hall’s place in the Senate.  Hall was a Liberal Movement Senator, as 
the Liberal Movement was a part of the make-up of the Australian Democrats.  The new Senator 
was chosen from that party.  Haines sat in the Senate until 30 June 1978.  She returned to the 
Senate as a Democrat senator in July 1981 for a six-year term. 
In the first issue of the National Journal for 1978 issued on 13 February, Chipp encouraged the 
members to:-  
Work hard to quickly erase the debts we had to incur, to obtain new members, to look 
forward to a bright and indeed glorious future, and to firmly consolidate the marvellous 
foothold we have gained. 
 In the second issue of the National Journal for 1978 the editor warned members that  
Our biggest enemy is . . . ourselves.  If we indulge in any petty internal arguments about the 
less important things we will not achieve our fantastic potential. . . . we have no executive 
and no person who can impose policy on our members.  The members have the ultimate 
say. 
The editor then went on to point out the distinction between, ‘the policy formulation function’ 
of the party, and ‘the administrating campaigning function’ of the party. 
The editor made a very timely point which is applicable to all parties.  These two functions are 
quite distinct.  In other parties ‘participative democracy’ is displayed in annual party state 
conferences to formulate policy which is presented to the State conference by way of motions 
carried at meetings of the respective party’s branches and electoral councils. 
In fact, the Democrats put this forward as the ‘legislative function’ of the party, ‘through an 
organic system based on the principle of direct democracy’.  The responsibilities of this function 
are:- 
 Election of an executive; 
 Purpose and constitution; 
 Policies; 
 Strategy in relation to other parties (e.g. preferences); 
 Major decisions affecting finance; and 
 Selection of candidates 
The party saw the executive function as not policy decisions but administration and 
campaigning to win elections.  These functions can also involve branches of the party.  
Administration includes:- 
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 Recruitment of new members; 
 Co-ordination;  
 Finance; and 
 Communications (within the party and to the public). 
This division of responsibilities is a very good breakup and division of responsibilities in any 
political party.  In fact, the Chapter on the fall of One Nation will show that One Nation 
suffered much embarrassment about ‘printing money’ and cheap loans when the officer 
responsible for administration, barged into the policy debate, making a very poorly thought out 
public contribution.  
Siddons put forward the view that people join a Branch of the Australian Democrats for a 
variety of reasons, for example:- 
- To stand up and be counted; 
- To have a say in running the party; 
- As a protest against the older parties; 
- To support the leader; 
- Because they believe in a third force; 
- To be a candidate; 
- To help their fellow man; 
- Participate in Australian politics; and  
- Promote democratic ideals. 
Siddons finally warned members of the party that new members ‘come to us with high hopes – 
don’t disillusion them! 
The reasons Siddons gave would be the reasons any active member would want to join a 
political party.  However, a member of a major party would not join ‘because they believe in a 
third force’!  Many people join a political party by paying their annual membership fee and that 
is the extent of their involvement with the party.  Siddons’ comment that new members come to 
the Australian Democrats with high hopes and not to disillusion them is very important.  Some 
of the new members would have joined the Democrats because they were disillusioned by party 
politics in general or with a particular party they had previously supported. 
A key source of disillusionment among the traditional parties would be if party members were 
treated as a handy source of labour to address envelopes or hand out how-to-vote cards, rather 
than contribute to policy debates and formulation.  The Democrats strong emphasis on 
participatory democracy would give new members an involvement in policy formulation and 
debate as well as voting on the parliamentary leaders.  However, in other parties branch 
meetings and state conferences of the party should give members the chance to contribute to and 
debate policies of the party. 
Chipp in this early stage was really steering and guiding the party very closely and had a strong 
formative influence on the fledgling party. 
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Participatory Democracy 
Like the Australia Party, the Australian Democrats adopted a participative democracy structure, 
which ultimately created problems for the party.  These problems will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Drawing from the participatory foundations of its forerunner the Australia party, the Australian 
Democrats embraced the ideals of consensus, rational debate, and citizen participation in 
political decision making (Gauja 2005:73). 
Policy formulation by the Australian Democrats under participative democracy was a complex 
process with many stages.  The overriding purpose was to give every member of the Party the 
opportunity of an equal and direct say in determining policy.  The process utilised the following 
steps.  
 State divisions were asked to nominate ‘national policy conveners’ for the 26 or so 
policy areas.  These conveners would have knowledge in the policy area.  
 The national policy conveners were then selected with a wide a national scatter as 
possible.  These conveners assembled a working group of 5 to 7 people and engaged in 
intense discussion and research in the policy area, taking into account contributions and 
suggestions from other members of the party. They then prepared a draft policy paper of 
around 2500 words.  
 The draft policy paper was then published in the Democrats monthly National Journal 
for comment and discussion by members. These contributions were all published.  Even 
members of other political parties, relevant associations appropriate to the subject 
matter and interested citizens were invited to criticise and comment on the drafts.   
 After an appropriate time, usually three months the policy was then put to the direct 
postal vote of members. They were asked to approve or reject the general approach 
policy paper and to then approve or reject each policy item including all those which 
party members had suggested in the discussion, to choose between alternative 
suggestions where these have come forward, and to approve or reject changes of 
wording. Two thirds of those voting must have approved before a policy paper or policy 
item is adopted.  
 Finally, the policy papers were rewritten to accord with the results of the ballot. 
Siddons the national president advised that while other parties are combinations of state 
organisations, the Democrats from the beginning have been organised on in Australia wide 
basis. The policies presented have been formulated with the help of contributions from members 
in all parts of Australia. 
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He went on to advise that the vital democratic principle of the Australian Democrats is the right 
of every member to have a direct an equal say in all the legislative affairs of the party-policies, 
Constitution, office bearers, allocation of preferences, selection of candidates. These are unique 
and precious rights. 
The operations and implications of participatory democracy will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
The 1977 Federal election 
The Party’s first major electoral test was the 1977 federal election for the House of 
Representatives and half of the Senate. 
At the 1977 Elections in the Senate Chipp from Victoria and Colin Mason from New South 
Wales were successful in being elected to the Senate, taking their places on 1 July 1978.  On the 
first sitting day of the Senate, Le Grand (2015:2) reports that Mason stated that ‘the reception 
from MPs from both major parties was frosty. . . Both Labor and Liberal felt we were intruders 
that we shouldn’t be there.’ 
West 1977:108) concluded that the Democrats had emerged ‘as a political party to be taken 
notice of’.  West went on to observe that the Democrats ‘cannot remain political virgins forever.  
The new Senators, Chipp and Mason will have to choose sides in the Senate and the party must 
ultimately face the problem of allying or merging itself with one of the major parties.’  West 
went on to remind his readers that neither Lang Labor nor even the DLP were able to retain 
supporters forever. 
What West was saying was that given the Australian Democrats ideas of being a watchdog and 
‘keeping the bastards honest’ along with not being beholden to any one party, the Democrats 
will still have to side with one party instead of the other when it comes to voting on legislation 
that one major party supports and the other one opposes. 
 Usage of the Senate Balance of Power and Longevity 
The Australian Democrats first won enough seats to hold the balance of power at the 1983 
double dissolution election.  The Australian Democrats adopted a ‘negotiating style’ in their 
usage of the balance of power.  With respect to the Labor government, the Australian 
Democrats used the balance of power lever to successfully negotiate amendments to legislation.  
When the Labor government accepted the Democrat amendments, the legislation passed through 
the Senate with Democrats support.  They were then able to claim the credit both for the 
amendments and for getting the legislation through the Senate.  The Democrats did not view the 
balance of power as an instrument of veto. 
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The Party’s Second Preference Allocation Strategy 
When the Australian Democrats formed in 1977, the party made a tactical decision not to direct 
its preferences to any of the major parties.  This decision is consistent with the remarks of 
Chipp’s resignation speech in the House of Representatives in March 1977 when he said:- 
‘The parties seem to polarise on almost every issue, sometimes seemingly just for the 
sake of it, and I wonder whether the ordinary voter is not becoming sick and tired of the 
vested interests . . .  and yearn for the emergence of a third political force, representing 
the middle of the road policies which would owe allegiance to no outside pressure group.’  
Sharman et al (2002:548) call this approach ‘no allocation’ of preferences, meaning Democrat 
voters were not directed but given a split how-to-vote alternative. 
In subsequent elections, the Australian Democrats continued to issue a ‘split how-to-vote card 
which directed voters on how to direct their second preference to either the ALP or to the 
Liberals Nationals Coalition.  Given that the Australian Democrats were appealing to both 
disillusioned Liberal and Labor supporters, disciplining the Party’s second preferences to a 
single party would have been very difficult. 
However, this policy was abandoned by the mid-1990s as the Australian Democrats started to 
look upon preference allocation as a useful strategic device, not to be ignored and ‘the party 
went on to use preference allocation ‘as a way of influencing the political process, signaling 
their place on the political spectrum and securing partisan advantage in both Houses of the 
Commonwealth Parliament.’ (Gauja 2010:492), (Sharman et al:2002).  This approach included 
using an ‘ideological similarity’ approach (Sharman et al 2002:548), whereby preferences were 
given to Greens parties in 1990. 
In the 1998 Federal election, the Australian Democrats preferenced a number of minor parties 
ahead of both the Labor and Liberal Parties.  The Democrats second preferenced the Australian 
Greens, with third preferences directed to the Nuclear Disarmament Party.  Parties that were at 
opposites to the Democrats, such as the Fred Nile Group, were preferenced after the two major 
parties.  The complete Senate preference allocation by the Democrats at the 1998 Federal 
election was as follows: 
Table 19:  Australian Democrats – Preference allocation 
Preferences to Labor Party Preferences to Liberal/National 
Australian Democrats Australian Democrats 
Greens Greens 
Nuclear Disarmament Party Nuclear Disarmament Party 
No Aircraft Noise Party No Aircraft Noise Party 
Unity Unity 
Natural Law Party Natural Law Party 
Labor Party Liberal/National Party 
Liberal/National Parties Labor Party 
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Fred Nile Group Fred Nile Group 
Mouldfield Group Mouldfield Group 
Schollbach Group Schollbach Group 
Lees Group Lees Group 
Melville Group Melville Group 
Democratic socialists Democratic socialists 
Socialist Equality Socialist Equality 
Ungrouped Candidates Ungrouped Candidates 
Citizens Electorate Council Citizens Electorate Council 
Poulos Group Poulos Group 
Reduce Immigration Reduce Immigration 
Gallagher Group Gallagher Group 
Abolish child Support/Family Court Abolish child Support/Family Court 
Australia first Party Australia first Party 
One Nation One Nation 
Source: NLA Manuscripts MS Acc 05.133 Australian Democrat Whips Files Box 5 folder 
‘Preferences strategy’ 
This preference allocation chart is instructive for a number of reasons as well as the provision of 
a how to vote card in respect of each of the major parties.  Firstly, the Democrats have 
preferenced One Nation Last and the other anti-immigration party Australia First, second last.  
Also of note the ‘ungrouped candidates’ were preferenced ahead of a number of parties.  
Ungrouped candidates are usually unknown and a diverse group of candidates and parties. 
Later on, the Democrats feeling the threat from the rise of the Australian Greens began trading 
off their second preferences in the House of Representatives in return for receiving second 
preferences in the Senate.  This was done primarily with the ALP (Gauja 2010 492).  The 
interactions between the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens will be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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Table 20:  The Australian Democrats in the Senate 1977 – 2008 
Year new 
Senate 
appointed 
ALP Lib/NP AD Greens Others ADs Balance 
of Power 
1978 26 35 2  1 no 
1981 27 31 5  1 shared/ 
negate 
1983# 30 28 5  1 yes 
1985 34 33 7  2 yes 
1987# 32 34 7  3 yes 
1990 32 34 8 1 1 yes 
1993 30 36 7 2 1 shared 
1996 29 37 7 2 1 shared 
1999 29 35 9 1 2 Shared/negate 
2002 28 35 8 2 3 shared 
2005 28 39 4 4 1 no 
2008 32 37 0 5 2 no 
 
Note 
 # Double dissolution election.   
 In 1975, the number of senators increased from 60 to 64 with two senators being elected for each of the two territories.   
 From 1985 the number of Senators increased from 64 to 76  
The above table show the rise of the Australian Democrats from their formation in 1977.  The 
rise continues up to 30 June 2002 where the party had nine senators in the Senate.  The reasons 
for the fall in the number of Democrat senators at subsequent elections will be considered in the 
next chapter. 
The party’s strongest point was the period from 1983 to 30 June 1990 when it held the balance 
of power in its own right.  The party’s second strongest point was the period straight after that 
from 1 July 1990 to 30 June 2002 when with between seven and nine senators it shared the 
balance of power. 
In respect of longevity, in January 1997 the then leader Cheryl Kernot was excitedly able to 
report to the Party members:- 
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This January we mark another milestone.  We eclipse the DLP’s nineteen years and one 
month of parliamentary representation.  We’ve now had continuous federal representation 
since Janine Haines’ appointment as our first Senator in 1977 (Kernot 1997:3). 
Kernot went on to advise the members ‘1996 was a golden year for our party’. 
It was the year that we came from behind to win, with a model election campaign. 
Unfortunately, we were very reliant on my own image (and stamina).  It was sometimes a 
little confronting to see myself plastered on posters and super-size billboards around the 
country.  Luckily, I was too busy to ever see our television advertising, although it was 
widely remarked upon. 
As leader Kernot carried a certain amount of prestige and as leader attracted additional support 
and votes.  It is natural therefore for the party to rely upon its leader.  In a minor party the leader 
is often the most well-known of all of the candidates and in some cases the only known 
candidate. So of course, the party was ‘very reliant’ on Kernot’s ‘image’.  Kernot went on to 
advise the members that with the election result the major achievement ‘was to secure a future 
for the party’.  Kernot concluded with the comment:- 
I hope that more and more people come to see the Democrats as being more than Cheryl’s 
party, because it is.  It is a vibrant professional and compassionate team of progressive 
politicians.  A team of which we can all be proud. 
The Party’s Lifespan 
The lifespan of the Australian Democrats is shown in the following graph. 
 
The Australian Democrats crossed the representation threshold very early in its existence with 
the appointment of Janine Haines to a casual vacancy following the resignation of Senator 
Steele Hall in South Australia.  Haines held office until 30 June 1978 (the balance of Hall’s 
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term).  On 1 July 1978 Chipp and Mason came into the Senate for a six-year term following 
their election at the 1977 elections.  Not holding the balance of power at this point the 
Democrats have not crossed the threshold of relevance.  From 1 July 1981, the party shared the 
balance of power with an independent Senator, thus the party has crossed the threshold of 
relevance.  From the double dissolution election of March 1983, the party held the balance of 
power in the Senate.  When the Democrats reached the balance of power, the life-span curve 
slopes upwards because of the rise of both Chipp’s influence and the Democrats usage of the 
balance of power.  The lifespan then slopes downwards because of the departure of Chipp and 
the rapid change of leaders after that.  Leadership problems and the attempts to solve them, 
robbed the Democrats of stability and authority.  In addition, future leaders did not have Chipp’s 
political skills, personality or high profile. 
The party held the balance of power for a decade until 1 July 1993, from when they shared the 
balance of power.  This loss of the balance of power in its own right was the Democrats first 
point of culmination.  From 1 July 2005, they lost half of their Senators and the balance of 
power and slipped below the threshold of relevance.  Its remaining senators seemed to be shell 
shocked and without high profile leadership and on environmental issues it had strong 
competition from the Australian Greens.  From 1 July 2008, having lost all four remaining 
Senators in the 2007 elections, the party fell below the representation threshold.   
Until the Australian Greens entered the political spectrum, the Australian Democrats pattern of 
representation and relevance was the strongest pattern that any minor party had achieved.  Only 
the Greens managed to exceed this achievement by mobilising the youth environment lobby in 
the 1990s and beyond. 
The revised party life-span clearly shows the Democrats Life-span with a dispersion over 30 
years and skewing to the left.  This indicates that the party rose quickly and suddenly appeared, 
but disappeared over a six year period from the lead up to the 2004 election until the last 
Australia Democrat Senators retired from the Senate in 2008, after their defeat at or not 
contesting the 2007 federal elections. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the rise and fall of the Australia Party and the Liberal Movement.  
These two parties in fact rose again by amalgamating to form the Australian Democrats led by 
the high profile and charismatic Don Chipp, a former Liberal. 
The Australian Democrats got off to a strong and prominent start with good press coverage and 
the leadership and guidance of Don Chipp.  However, in the Party’s structure and method of 
operation there were threats to the Party’s unity and stability lurking below the surface that 
could impede the Party’s progress and even very existence. 
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The interactions of these threats with the party and the outcomes will be discussed in the next 
chapter which explores the demise of the Australian Democrats. 
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 Chapter Seven: The Demise of the 
Australian Democrats 
Introduction 
This chapter will consider the factors that led to the decline and demise of the Democrats 
including leadership problems and unity of the party, the party’s brokerage role in the Senate 
and problems with the operation of participatory democracy particularly its associated time lags.  
A significant issue in the demise of the party was its decision to support the introduction of the 
Howard-Costello Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation.  In addition the party’s problems 
of unity lead to some very public and damaging arguments by party officials and members. 
The Democrats had a significant turnover of leaders with only two leaders in the first 14 years, 
while the next 17 years saw nine leaders of the party.  A number of these leaders resigned from 
the party in bitterness at the end of their leadership.  To make matters worse, the parliamentary 
party also experienced some very public disputes and conflicts, which did not help its public 
image of a united party.  The party’s leadership rivalry within the parliamentary wing along 
with the party’s inability to deal with this problem because of its organisational arrangements, 
which were designed to empower the membership, was the major reason for its poor 
performance at the 2004 and 2007 elections. (Economou and Ghazarian (2008)).  Other reasons 
for the Democrat’s decline and fall include the single member electoral system, the lack of 
finance and the party’s small membership base (Warhurst 1997:6).  However, the party’s 
decision to support the GST was the real catalyst for the party’s decline. (Economou and 
Ghazarian (2008)).  The party voted for the introduction of the GST, after gaining some 
concessions, but the parliamentary party split on the vote.  Many rank and file members of the 
party were not happy with the parliamentary party for supporting the GST legislation.   
Gauja (2010:488) commented that 
In 2001, following a period of turbulent leadership and what proved to a largely unpopular 
negotiating strategy with government over taxation reform, the Democrats vote began to 
decline steadily.  Leadership and internal party tensions, the increasing popularity of the 
Australian Greens as another alternative to the major parties and the return of the Senate to 
government control from July 2005 to 2008 were all regarded as factors that contributed to 
the Democrat’s electoral demise. 
The interactions of the Australian Democrats with the rising Australian Greens Party is also 
another reason for the Democrats demise.  The impact of the Australian Greens on the 
Australian Democrats is considered later in this chapter. 
A nagging problem for the party and its followers was what role was the party fulfilling?  Was 
its role to be a watchdog or as a third force in politics putting forward the party’s own policies?  
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For some reason, many saw those two roles as inconsistent with each other.  However, this 
chapter argues that these two roles are in fact compatible, if handled properly. 
Gauja (2010:488) observed that the Australian Democrats, membership never exceeded 8,000 
members and the party never polled higher than 11.3 per cent in the House of Representatives 
and no more than 12.6 per cent in the Senate.  Both results were in the 1990 federal election 
(Gauja 2010:489). 
The Democrats also had problems with apathy amongst its members.  This was shown in the 
operation of participatory democracy with often very low voting responses to the various votes 
on party policy.  Apathy was also a factor in the doomed ‘Ambassadors Program’ that the party 
attempted to set up.  This chapter also discusses the Ambassadors Program and questions its 
efficacy. 
This chapter concludes that like the DLP there was no single reason for the demise of the 
Australian Democrats but several.  The Party itself, with some strategic planning and decision-
making, could have solved many of the problems that ultimately lead to the Party’s demise. 
Recognition Factor - What Was the Role of the Democrats? 
Throughout the lifespan of the Australian Democrats, there was much confusion over what role 
the Australian Democrats chose to play.  Was the party a ‘watchdog’ in the Senate ‘keeping the 
bastards honest’ or was the role of the Democrats to provide alternative policies to the major 
parties and to use the opportunities provided in the Senate to put forward these policies by way 
of private members legislation or amendments to government legislation? 
Lewis (2004) claimed that no one knew who the ‘bastards’ were.  At first glance the ‘bastards’ 
were the two major parties.  In fact, in his resignation speech from the Liberal Party, Chipp 
expressed dissatisfaction with the major parties along with the vested interests who attempted to 
influence the major parties. 
Cassandra (1999:9) put forward the view that:- 
keep the bastards honest’ . . . doesn’t really mean a whole lot except, hey look at us we’re 
the referees.   
Undoubtedly, if a party holds the balance of power in the Senate it could function as a referee, 
deciding which of the two major parties to support.  In addition, there are other ways a party 
could ‘keep the bastards honest’ such as by skilful use of the parliamentary committee system.  
A party who has the ‘referee role’ of holding the balance of power could introduce its own 
private member’s legislation into parliament and negotiate support for the legislation from one 
of the major parties. 
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Siddons (1990:231) recalled that:- 
At the time of writing, Chipp was still saying publicly he hoped the Democrats would never 
become a major party, because if it did it would not be able to maintain its principles. 
Madden (2009:2) noted that the dichotomy between keeping the bastards honest and the drive 
for more left wing policies and be an active partner in government, produced tensions within the 
party and possibly led to voter disillusionment.  This led to a perceived inability of the party to 
clearly articulate what it stood for in a more competitive political arena and to get its message 
heard.  In addition, the party had a brand recognition problem.  In other words, ‘who were the 
Australian Democrats and what did they stand for?’ 
It is very hard to pinpoint the party’s ideology or its central platform. 
From the outset, West (1980:343) identified the dilemma:- 
Looking forward from the 1977 election, the basic problem for the Democrats was that they 
had secured their initial electoral success as a movement; yet to protect and expand this 
success, they had to recognise the accepted requirements for a political party. 
West went on to state that:- 
While the whole thrust of their campaign had been against the current party system, the 
Democrats themselves had become part of it – whether they liked it or not – with the 
election of two senators of their own and one Lower House member in South Australia.  
Now that they had become a parliamentary party, it was no longer enough for the 
Democrats to project themselves as the nation’s political conscience by preaching the 
politics of vague goodwill. 
At the 1977 Federal election, the Democrats became part of the party system to which they had 
been so opposed.  Therefore, the party would find reforming that party system to be a very hard 
and demanding task.  Put bluntly, vague comments by themselves do not constitute reform. 
West went on to observe:- 
They also had to have something concrete to say about a wide range of specific policy 
issues.  The continuing risk for the Democrats was that precise policy stands would lose 
many votes previously won through ambiguity and through an emphasis on the values and 
style of the political environment. 
West’s comments are significant.  A party’s policies need to give the general thrust of the policy 
and not join up all of the dots – that is the role of the public service and not a political party.  
The influence of interest groups and peak industry bodies will come into play and be influential 
at the time the legislation is introduced into parliament and not so much if at all, beforehand.  
By providing too much detail or ‘over explaining’ the Democrats ran a very big risk of getting 
potential supporters off side.  Hewson made the same big mistake with his ‘Fightback!’ 
package, which also got the press in on the act of asking minute policy detail questions. 
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By siding with one of the major parties in relation to legislation being debated in the Senate, the 
Democrats would undoubtedly offend some electors who had supported the party at the 
previous election.   In voting on legislation in the Senate, the Democrat Senators had to make a 
choice to support the Labor Party or the Coalition and in making that decision, offending some 
of the party’s supporters would be inevitable. 
Organisational Structure of the Party and Participatory 
Politics 
The previous chapter gave a description of participatory politics as practiced by the Australian 
Democrats, namely polling of all party members on policy issues and leadership of the party, 
including the parliamentary party.  However, with regard to the Australian Democrats, it can be 
argued that the party’s ‘participatory ethic’ (Warhurst 1997:10) was another reason for its 
demise. 
While participatory politics looks good on paper is it almost impossible in practice.  The 
Australian Democrats found that it slowed down the decision-making process that other parties 
left to their parliamentary party, such as the election of the leadership of the parliamentary 
party.  This slowing down caused a sense of uncertainty in the broader community and even 
division within the party.  For example, the election of the parliamentary leader and deputy 
leader of the Australian Democrats being open to all financial rank and file members of the 
party and not just the parliamentary party, meant that a leadership ballot could last for over a 
month or more.  While in other parties with only the parliamentary party members voting, the 
ballot could be completed in less than a few hours.  Therefore, election of the parliamentary 
leaders became a long and drawn out process.  Furthermore, the leader elected by the rank and 
file members could be a member with whom none of the other parliamentary members could 
work.  Again, the new leader could have had poor leadership skills, which were known to the 
parliamentary party members well before the leadership ballot.  
Incredibly, a petition of the membership of the Australian Democrats, with a minimum of only 
100 signatures could declare the leadership of the parliamentary democrats vacant and elections 
called to fill the leadership.  This petitioning process was another long drawn out process that 
reflected uncertainty in the leadership of the parliamentary party.   
Other parties in Australia usually leave the election of the parliamentary leaders of the party up 
to the members of the parliamentary party2.  Members of the parliamentary party are in fact 
accountable to the rank and file members of the party at party conferences and more 
significantly through the party electoral councils.  It is these councils that preselect the party’s 
                                                     
2 Since the Rudd reforms of 2013, the Federal Labor party now jointly elects its leader by a vote of party 
leaders and caucus 
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endorsed candidate for the particular electorate and a number of members of parliamentary 
parties have been defeated when they have come up for preselection, sometimes in the party’s 
‘blue ribbon or safe electorates’. 
Gauja (2010:491) argued that leadership of the party was ‘crucially important’ to the Party’s 
electoral success.  She goes on to note that ‘the strong electoral effect of leadership is not 
uncommon to minor parties’.  Given the effects of leadership and the change of leadership in the 
Democratic Labor Party and the high-profile leadership style of Pauline Hanson, that is a very 
true statement. 
Gauja (2010:494) commented that:- 
The Australian Democrats were considered to be the most democratic party in Australia 
during its time, at least on paper.  A party of the new politics movement, embracing the 
ideals of consensus, rational debate and citizen participation in politics. 
That is true but other parties including the minor parties embrace these ideals through party 
membership and interaction with interest groups and community bodies including local 
government in terms of city, town and shire councils. 
Yet Gauja (2010:495) went on to note that ‘participation in intra party activities remained very 
low throughout the party’s history’.  ‘While party members liked the idea of participating, 
actually exercising it was another matter.’  In other words, like the Australia Party apathy was a 
major problem with a participatory democracy model. 
West (1980:343) had earlier made the telling comment about the Australian Democrats version 
of parliamentary democracy:- 
the most practical parliamentary policy would not necessarily be arrived at by the kind of 
commitment that the Democrats had originally expressed to policy making by rank and file 
postal ballot. 
Later events in the lifespan of the Australian Democrats proved West correct in her analysis of 
participatory democracy. 
Gauja (2010:495) later reflected  
Intra party democracy tends to create debilitating internal tensions when divergent opinions 
are encouraged, yet need to be reconciled.  The strain on the party was most acute when the 
parliamentary party was forced to make difficult and contentious decisions in exercising its 
balance of power position. 
Intra party democracy was never unique to the Australian Democrats.  In fact, other parties 
exercise intra party democracy at branch meetings and state and federal conferences of the 
party.  With regard to exercising the balance of power in the Australian Senate or a state upper 
house, parliamentary parties that have been in that situation were empowered by their party rank 
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and file to make a decision on which way to vote.  This was on the understanding that the 
parliamentary members could be called to account by the party rank file to explain and justify 
their decision. 
Siddons (1990:231) bluntly argued that:- 
If the Democrats had nurtured the principle on which they were founded - the principle of 
participatory democracy – instead of bypassing it as the parliamentary wing of the party has 
done so repeatedly, there is no way the Democrats could lose their integrity. 
Siddons’ comment neglects to realise that the Australian Democrats failed to restrict 
participative democracy to policy development, as the Australian Greens have done.  The 
Australian Democrats did not allow the parliamentary party to elect its own leaders instead 
insisting that the parliamentary leaders be elected by the membership of the party.  This meant 
that the parliamentary leaders were elected by party members who did not know the candidates 
that well and had little if any idea of either their ability to lead a parliamentary party and work 
with other members of the parliamentary party. 
West (1980:343) also noted that:- 
In 1977, the typical Australian voter still saw politics in terms of conflicting vested interests 
and was loyal to whichever established party seemed best to represent whatever interest 
was most personally relevant. 
An example of a ballot paper used in the Australian Democrats is shown below.  Some of these 
ballot papers were one page others were two pages and some were four pages.  The ballot paper 
would be enclosed with the monthly copy of the Australian Democrats National Journal as an 
insert.  Some discussion of the issues being balloted would appear in that copy of the Journal. 
The size of the ballot paper was big, not only could a member vote on the policy as a whole, but 
the member could vote on the policy section by section.  This could be a time-consuming task.  
It also meant members were freely invited to vote of the details of a policy area they knew 
nothing about or were totally disinterested in.   
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From the above ballot paper, it can be seen that as well as voting on general approval for the 
aboriginal affairs policy a member was also asked to consider and vote on 52 separate policy 
items.  Other political parties vote on policy issues at party annual state and federal conferences.  
Policy issues are raised as motions sponsored by various branches of the party.  At a party 
conference as a policy motion is being debated, the party delegates, usually in groups, can hear 
firsthand the reasons both for and against the motion and then they decide how they will vote. 
West (1980:344) concluded that 
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In theory, of course in the light of the 1977 result, the Democrats best electoral hopes 
seemed to lie in an ineffective government and an unacceptable opposition. 
Such a situation would have provided the ideal opportunity for the Democrats to ‘keep the 
bastards honest’.  However, like all minor parties some of the support for the Democrats would 
have been protest votes, from voters who normally voted for one of the major parties voting for 
the Australian Democrats instead as a form of ‘protest’.  A protest vote in the Senate elections 
would not defeat the government.  The support from a protest voter is by no means guaranteed 
at the next election. 
The approach West presents could also lead to a professional ‘balance of power party’ which 
the Australian Democrats ultimately became.  This a big difference to the operations of minor 
parties in the Senate at this point in time, where the balance of power is shared between a 
number of minor and micro parties. 
Electoral Performance as an Indicator 
A major problem for the Australian Democrats was that the party’s vote was very widely 
dispersed throughout the Australian states and thus the party could not concentrate its vote in a 
few areas and thus gain representation in the House of Representatives.  Bartlett (1998:3) stated 
that ‘redoubling our efforts in Lower House seats is the only opportunity for our party to 
continue to grow.’ 
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Table 21:  Australian Democrats Electoral Performance:  
Year Reps Senate 
 Percentage 
of vote 
Percentage of 
vote 
Variation 
from 
Reps 
vote 
Seats Won Total 
Representation 
1977 9.4 11.1 1.7 2 2 
1980 6.6 9.3 2.7 3 5 
1983* 5.0 9.6 4.6 5 5 
1984 5.4 7.6 2.2 5 7 
1987* 6.0 8.5 2.5 7 7 
1990 11.3 12.6 1.3 5 8 
1993 3.8 5.3 1.5 2 7 
1996 6.8 10.8 4.0 5 7 
1998 5.1 8.5 3.4 4 9 
2001 5.4 7.2 1.8 4 8 
2004 1.2 2.1 0.9 - 4 
2007 0.7 1.3 0.6 - - 
(note: * double dissolution election) 
Source Madden (2009:5) (modified)  
Significantly, unlike the DLP, the party was able to win seats at the 1983 and 1987 double 
dissolution elections and in addition, increase its number of elected Senators. 
Unlike the DLP in 1967 and 1970 and later the Australian Greens, the Australian Democrats 
were never able to win a Senate quota in their own right in a half Senate election.  In a half 
Senate election, the Democrats have always had to rely on preferences to get a candidate 
elected.  In the 1983 double dissolution election with reduced quotas for the election of twice 
the number of Senators, the Australian Democrat candidates Don Chipp from Victoria and 
Janine Haines from South Australia won a quota of the votes on first preferences.  In Victoria, 
the Democrat’s second candidate John Siddons lost out on the final Senate vacancy for Victoria.  
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In the other states, Colin Mason was re-elected in NSW winning the final Senate vacancy for 
that state, in Queensland Michael Macklin was elected in the ninth spot and in WA Jack Evans 
was elected in the final Senate vacancy.  In the 1987 double dissolution election, seven 
Democrat Senators were elected with two from SA and one each from NSW, Vic, Qld, WA and 
Tas.  The lead Democrat candidates in NSW, Victoria and South Australia won quotas in their 
own right, not requiring a flow of preferences.   
The Democrats gained from the advantages of the lower quota in a double dissolution election.  
This was beyond the DLP at both the 1974 and 1975 double dissolution elections. 
Table 22:  Australian Democrats Primary votes and Quotas gained in three elections 
Election NSW Vic QLD SA WA Tas 
2001 240,867 
0.43 
228,212 
0.55 
143,942 
0.47 
122,195 
0.88 
64,773 
0.41 
14,273 
0.32 
2004 87,377 
0.15 
55,867 
0.13 
49,898 
0.15 
23,118 
0.16 
22,603 
0.14 
2,614 
0.05 
2007 37,193 
0.06 
52,596 
0.11 
45,584 
0.13 
8,908 
0.06 
12,604 
0.07 
Did not 
contest 
Source AEC data 
In the 2001 election after the allocation of preferences, the Democrats were successful in having 
four candidates elected to the Senate.  In Tasmania where the Democrats were unsuccessful in 
getting a candidate elected, the Australian Greens obtained 42,568 votes (13.79 per cent of the 
vote) and 0.88 per cent of a quota.  In that election, the Australian Greens in Tasmania only had 
one candidate, the high profile Dr Bob Brown who was elected to the Senate. In 2001, 
competition from the Greens was starting to impact on the Australian Democrats. 
The sharp decline in the Democrats vote in both the 2004 and 2007 federal elections is quite 
evident.  The Democrats’ vote in 2004 more than halved from its 2001 result of 7.2 per cent in 
the Senate.  The four Senators up for re-election all lost their seats in the Senate as did the 
remaining four Senators in 2007.  In Victoria in 2004, the ‘new’ DLP outpolled the Democrats.  
In 2007 the slightly higher results in Victoria and Queensland, (011% and 0.13%) resulted from 
serving Democrat Senators contesting the election, both lost their seats in the Senate.   
In the 2004 and 2007 elections, the impact of the Greens increased. Two Greens Senators were 
elected in 2004 and three in 2007.  After the 2007 election, the Greens had four Senators while 
the Democrats had no candidates elected to the Senate. 
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As well as a decline of votes in 2004 and 2007, the Democrats did not attract large numbers of 
preferences from other parties.  For example, in Victoria, the Democrats received 54,925 
primary votes.  At the point in the count where the Democrat lead candidate was eliminated, the 
number of votes had increased by only 7,819.  In both elections, the Democrats supported the 
Family First Party over other parties. This seems as a strange choice for a post materialist party 
such as the Democrats with its policies supporting a very conservative and moralistic party.  
However, in WA in 2004 the Democrats preferenced the Australian Greens. 
In South Australia in 2004, the lead Democrat Senator won 22,472 votes.  By the time the 
candidate was excluded he had picked up 12,502 votes in preferences.  After exclusion, 26,917 
preferences went to Family First, 2,593 to the Greens and 1,472 to the ALP.  This was a similar 
result to that of Victoria for the Democrats. 
In 2007 in South Australia the lead Democrat candidate Russell, won 8,758 votes.  At the time 
of exclusion, the candidate managed to acquire a meagre 1,561 votes in preferences.  Most of 
the Democrat preferences, 9,568 went to the Greens with 851 preferences leaking to other 
candidates. 
In both the 2004 and 2007 elections, the Democrats suffered from a large slump in their primary 
vote and an inability to attract preferences from other political parties. 
Table 23:  Senate electoral performance by state – the Australian Democrats 1977-2007 
  77 80 83* 84 87* 90 93 96 98 01 04 07 
NSW Vote 8.3 6.3 7.8 7.3 9.1 11.8 4.9 9.5 7.3 6.2 2.2 0.8 
Seats 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Vic Vote 16.2 10.0 10.7 6.9 8.5 14.2 3.9 10.8 9.8 7.8 1.8 1.6 
Seats 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
QLD Vote 8.9 9.0 7.2 9.2 7.5 12.5 7.0 13.2 7.8 6.6 2.2 1.8 
Seats 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
SA Vote 11.2 11.8 10.7 11.2 11.2 16.4 9.8 14.5 12.4 12.6 2.3 0.8 
Seats 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
WA Vote 12.5 8.3 6.2 4.8 5.7 9.4 4.0 9.3 6.4 5.8 2.0 1.0 
Seats 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Tas Vote 5.8 2.9 6.3 6.1 6.8 7.9 1.6 7.1 3.9 4.6 0.8 - 
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Seats 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Total Seats 2 3 5 5 7 5 2 5 4 4 0 0 
*double dissolution election 
Like all minor parties, the Democrats had their areas of strength.  The Democrats polled 
strongest in Victoria, the home state of Don Chipp and in South Australia, the home state of the 
Liberal Movement.  Tasmania was a weak state for the party caused largely by competition 
from the independent Harradine and later the rise of the Australian Greens.  Given that NSW 
was the home state of Gordon Barton and the Australia Party, it is surprising that the Democrats 
did not poll stronger in that state. 
Table 24:  The Australian Democrats in the Senate 2002 – 2008 
Year ALP Lib/NP AD Greens Others ADs Balance 
of Power 
1999 29 35 9 1 2 Shared/negate 
2002 28 35 8 2 3 shared 
2005 28 39 4 4 1 no 
2008 32 37 0 5 2 no 
Note # Double dissolution election.  In 1975, the number of senators increased from 60 to 64 with two senators being elected for 
each of the two territories.  From 1985 the number of Senators increased from 64 to 76  
Table 26 shows the last years covered in table 22.  These years show the sharp decline in the 
party’s support.  In the later years, the increasing threat from the Greens to the longevity of the 
Democrats can be seen.  The Greens had two Senators to the Democrats eight in 2002.  
However, in 2005, the two parties had equal representation in four senators each.  However, this 
also spelt a reduction of the Democrats representation in the Senate by half.  Finally, the 
Democrats in 2008 had lost all of their representation while the Greens had five Senators and 
shared the balance of power with an independent.  The experiences of the Australian Greens and 
the balance of power will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Second Preferences and Kernot  
The Australian Democrat’s second preference strategy was discussed in the previous chapter.  
When Cheryl Kernot abruptly resigned from the Australian Democrats to join the ALP, the 
Democrats made the decision not to second preference Kernot in her House of Representatives 
electorate.  As a result, Kernot only narrowly won her seat and lost it at the next election.  This 
preference allocation by the Australian Democrats was an act of reprisal against Kernot. 
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In fact, MD Fisher (1998:11) considered that while considering Kernot to be ‘an opportunistic 
politician’, the Democrats were wrong in not giving her second preferences, claiming ‘we are 
undemocratic in not having preferences on how to vote cards decided by branch memberships in 
an open manner.’ 
As mentioned previously, at the end in 2004 and 2007, there seemed to be little if any logic in 
the Democrats preferencing strategy, with preferences being allocated to the Family First Party. 
Leadership 
Leadership is a very significant issue and one that is readily noticeable by the electorate.  The 
leader of a minor political party needs to be well known with a high profile and be able to 
stimulate and enthuse his or her listeners and in addition, be able to solve problems, conflicts 
and disputes. 
With respect to the Democrats party room in May 1990 the role of the leader was seen as 
having:- 
Lighter portfolio load/no committee load, but do more press conferences by holding joint 
press conferences/releases by portfolio holder; backing up colleagues in the chamber; 
protection and protection monitoring tactics; coordinating role; supervisory role; public 
face of leadership should allow responses regardless of the subject matter but always in 
consult with portfolio holder. 
The leader of the Democrats was seen by the party as its public face and an aid in its recognition 
among journalists and the voting public.  Another important role of the parliamentary leader 
was to ensure that the Democrat Senators worked as a team. 
The Democrats had a significant turnover of leaders.  In the first 14 years of its existence, the 
Democrats had two high profile leaders.  However, over the next 17 years the party had nine 
leaders, many of whom, unlike Kernot and Stott Despoja, had no profile.  In addition, the 
defection of Kernot to the ALP in 1997 left the Democrats in a leadership vacuum.  Also, the 
party experienced public and at times divisive battle between Lees and Scott-Despoja over 
leadership and the direction of the Party.  Warhurst (1997:5) considered that ‘the ructions in the 
parliamentary party have been one cause for the debilitating splits’.  
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Table 25:  Leadership – The Australian Democrats 1977-2007 
Leader Tenure Departure Means of election Other 
Candidates 
Don Chipp 1977-1986 retired Foundation leader n/a 
Janine Haines 1986-1990 Election loss (Hof 
R) 
Elected by 
membership 
(ratification) 
No other 
candidates 
Michael Macklin 1990 Six weeks later Interim leader while membership poll 
conducted 
Janet Powell 1990-1991 No-confidence 
party room -loss 
in membership 
ballot 
Elected by 
membership 
(ratification) 
No other 
candidates 
John Coulter 1991-1993 Loss in 
membership ballot 
Elected by 
membership 
Meg Lees, Janet 
Powell 
Cheryl Kernot 1993-1997 Defected to the 
ALP 
Elected by 
membership 
John Coulter 
Meg Lees 1997-2001 Loss in 
membership ballot 
Elected by 
membership 
(ratification) 
No other 
candidates 
Natasha Stott-
Despoja 
2001-2002 Resigned 
leadership 
Elected by 
membership 
Meg Lees 
Brian Greig 2002 Six weeks later Interim leader while membership poll 
conducted 
Andrew Bartlett 2002-2005 Resigned 
leadership 
Elected by 
membership 
Brian Greig 
Lyn Allison 2004-2008 Election loss 
(Senate) 
Elected 
unopposed 
(ratification) 
No other 
candidates 
(Source Economou and Ghazarian 2008) 
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Although in some leadership elections there was only one candidate, under the rules of the 
Australian Democrats, that candidate had to be ratified by the membership before taking on the 
leadership role. 
The first leadership change came with the retirement of the party’s founder Don Chipp.  
Following his retirement, Janine Haines was elected leader of the Democrats.  Chipp admitted 
Haines was his preferred successor to take over the leadership. (Chipp 1987:101).  Don Chipp 
was the only leader of the Australian Democrats who led the party for almost a decade (nine 
years.) 
Leadership changes also spelt a change in policy emphasis in addition to leadership style.  For 
example, Powell and Coulter emphasised radical environmentalism, while Kernot presented an 
economic and industrial emphasis, while as a leader, Lees could be considered a deal-maker 
(Madden 2009:14).  Lees ‘deal making was evidenced in part by her willingness to negotiate 
with the coalition government over the GST legislation’. 
Economou and Ghazarian (2008) consider that the party’s leadership rivalry within the 
parliamentary wing along with the party’s inability to deal with this problem because of its 
organisational arrangements (which were designed to empower the membership) was the major 
reason for its poor performance at the 2004 and 2007 elections. 
Siddons (1990:220) has provided a telling perspective of this issue.  He believed that Chipp set 
up a party structure that provided that all paid staff of the parliamentary party report directly to 
the leader of the parliamentary party and not any other member of the party.  These staff relied 
on the leader for their jobs and thus their loyalty to the leader was assured. 
Siddons also pointed out that the parliamentary leader’s principal private secretary was also the 
Victorian State president of the party. In Siddons’ view, this arrangement allowed Chipp to have 
influence over the Victorian State President.  In addition, the Principal Private Secretary could 
campaign for re-election for that role in strong position being able to meet members and 
influence than compared to a person who campaigned for State President and who at the same 
time had to hold down a job to earn a living.  
Siddons 1990:167) commented that when Chipp became a Senator ‘he seemed to lose a lot of 
interest in the administration and what was going on in the party . . . it was a great pity he did 
not make a greater effort to maintain closer links with the party administration because he had 
enormous influence with the members’.   
There is also evidence that Don Chipp was nursing a vengeance against Meg Lees.  Floyd 
(2014:118) noted that Don Chipp did not support Meg Lees. There was history between them 
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and Chipp was not one to forget a rebuff. His subsequent support for Stott-Despoja almost 
guaranteed her success in a ballot.   
In addition, Floyd (2014:118ff) reported that Stott-Despoja needed to reunite the party under her 
leadership but five of the eight senators were not happy with the way things had been handled. 
To add fuel to the fire in the first months of her leadership, Floyd (2014:120) reported that the 
allocation of staff members by Stott-Despoja caused friction. Some new staff members were 
insufficiently aware of the way matters had been handled previously and had stepped on toes. 
Furthermore Floyd (2014:120) went on to report that while she was good at self-promotion and 
communication, Stott-Despoja couldn’t find a way to deal with tensions in the party room. Her 
presidential style grated with others in the team and she was difficult to contact. Her schedule 
was hectic, her phone was often in silent mode and had no voicemail and when messages were 
received she did not always return calls. 
The retirement of Don Chipp who was also a steady guiding hand, with a wealth of experience 
in parliamentary and government matters was a big loss to the party.  Chipp was also capable in 
resolving conflicts within the party and thus keeping the party united.  However, Chipp failed 
by not grooming future leaders in a structure way in the long term as John McEwen had done in 
the Country Party.3 
Kernot the Party Leader Defected to the ALP 
Likewise, the defection of Kernot to the ALP turned out to be a significant death knell of the 
Australian Democrats in that her defection turned them into ‘just another party’.  By defecting, 
Kernot destroyed the ‘Democrat brand’ further there was no obvious leader to take over (Van 
Onslen 1998:np).  The defection of Kernot destroyed the image of trust and unity within the 
parliamentary party. 
For quite a while it was clear ‘to a lot of good judges’ that Kernot was ‘wasted as a leader of a 
minor party, she was a natural who was charismatic.  However, Kernot had enemies within the 
ranks of the Democrats, these included Chipp, Coulter and Janet Powell’ (O’Reilly 1998:387). 
Floyd (2014:118) reported that:- 
Some thought the departure of Cheryl Kernot in 1997 and the surrounding media frenzy 
was the beginning of the end of the Australian Democrats. Liz Oss-Emer, president of the 
National Executive between 2001 and 2002 told me that that was not so: 
                                                     
3 By comparison, a former leader of the Country Party, John McEwen took three of the younger members of his 
parliamentary party and groomed then for future leadership (Reid 1969:101).  Two of these members ultimately led 
the Party; one of them in fact replaced McEwen when he retired.  At that stage, the Country Party had a history for 
retaining its Parliamentary leaders for many years. 
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I think the time when Cheryl actually left was an event that brought everyone together, 
tightly together.  I remember the first National executive meeting happened to be in 
Brisbane after she left, and the feeling of cohesion was very strong there.  Everyone was 
very focused on making sure that we stabilised and Meg came in as leader then and she was 
a very good leader-she worked very hard to keep everything together. 
While the Kernot defection might not have harmed the unity within the Party, it damaged the 
standing and image of the party in the eyes of the general public. 
Following the Kernot departure, at the 1998 federal election Meg Lees led the Australian 
Democrats and nine Democrat Senators were returned to the Senate. 
Resignations of Senators 
The resignation of a number of Democrat Senators was another factor in the decline of the 
party.  These resignations being of a sitting member of parliament were very public and 
attracted much publicity.  The leadership of the party seemed unable to prevent these 
resignations.  For example, Siddons resigned from the Australian Democrats on 26 November 
1996, the decisive issue was the decision of the Australian Democrats or more particularly its 
leader Haines to vote against the government legislation to abolish the subsidy paid to farmers 
for the purchase of imported agricultural fertilizers.  In the vote on the legislation in the Senate, 
the Australian Democrats split, with three of its seven members crossing the floor and voting 
with the other side. 
The Victorian Division met on 14 December 1996 at a ‘special general meeting’ to consider 
Siddons resignation.  The minutes read in part: 
Senator Janet Powell stated that the four senators who voted against the government’s 
fertilizer bill did not act against party policy (but under our rules would have been free to 
do so if their action had been against party policy).  In substance, it was a decision between 
reducing costs for farmers (the position the 4 senators took) or providing support for 
manufacturers.  In general Australia will need to face the challenge of gradually reducing 
protection of our industries in the process of making us more competitive in the world’s 
markets. 
David Vigor a Senator from South Australia was a founding member of the Liberal Movement 
and in 1977, a founding member of the Australian Democrats.   
Vigor resigned from the Democrats on 5 June 1987 joining Siddons in the Unite Australia Party, 
the party that Siddons had founded.  Siddons in January of that year in a statement described the 
Democrats as a ‘stinking decaying compost heap from which any self-respecting individual 
should escape’.  Along with Siddons, Vigor lost his seat in the Senate at the 1987 double 
dissolution election.  He then attempted to re-join the Australian Democrats, having moved 
from South Australia to Canberra to live.  As a matter of course, the Democrats enquired into 
his membership of the Unite Australia Party.  Vigor argued that he moved parties so that 
preferences from the Unite Australia Party would flow to the Democrats and bring about the 
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election of Senator John Coulter in South Australia.  Vigor claimed this would not have been 
possible if he was not the Unite Australia Party candidate.  However, his argument did not 
convince the National Executive of the Democrats who voted to expel him from the party in 
1988 (NLA Schneider Papers series 3 Folder 10). 
Vigor’s actions, honorable as he may have seen them, did not enhance the unity and stability of 
the party.  In addition, his colleagues saw him as being a bit ‘wacky’.  He was impractical and 
did not appear to think issues through.  As a Senator, Vigor asked lots of questions in parliament 
often tying up resources to research the answers but he never bothered to read the answers to his 
many questions in fact he would be interested in an idea one week and completely lose interest 
in it the next. 
Table 26:  Australian Democrats Resignations from the Party to another Party or 
Independent 
Name State Elected to the 
Senate for ADs 
Resigned from the 
Party 
Remarks 
Siddons, John Vic 1 Jul 1981 (to 4 
Feb 1983) and 1 
July 1985 
Nov 1986 Ind from Nov 1986, Unite 
Australia Party from 
March 1987 to June 1987 
Defeated 
Vigor, David SA 1 Dec 1984 June 1987 Unite Australia Party from 
June 1987 Defeated 
McLean, Paul NSW 1987 1991  
Powell, Janet Vic 26 Aug 1986 Jul 1992 Ind from July 1992 to 30 
June 1993 Defeated 
Coulter, John SA 1987 1995  
Kernot, Cheryl QLD 1 Jul 1990 15 Oct 1997 Joined ALP 
Woodley, John QLD 1993 2001  
Lees, Meg SA 4 Apr 1990 July 2002 Ind from July 2002, 
Australian Progressive 
Alliance from April 2003 
to 30 Jun 2005 Defeated 
 
The only member of the Australian Democrats who resigned from their seat in the Parliament, 
and not from the Democrats as well, was Don Chipp.  All of the other resignations from the 
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Senate were also resignations from the Party.  Some resigned from the Parliament as well while 
others stayed in the Parliament either as independents or as members of other parties in most 
cases parties that they founded and were its sole parliamentary member. 
In the 1990s an unfortunate moniker stuck to the party.  The Labor Senator Peter Walsh the then 
Minister for Finance, used the unflattering title the ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’ to 
describe the Democrats on 28 October 1987 in the Senate.  He was responding to a question 
from Senator Jenkins, a Democrat Senator from WA.  Walsh seemed to be determined that the 
title stuck to the Democrats as showing them as a party out of touch with reality.  In the Senate 
on 25 November 1987, Walsh in answer to a question from Senator Powell, again referred to the 
Democrats twice, as ‘the fairies at the bottom of the garden party’ (Senate Hansard (1987:2384).  
Later in that question time, Walsh in response to a question from Senator Coulter again referred 
to the Democrats as ‘fairies at the bottom of the garden’.  For good measure in that response 
Walsh referred the Democrats ‘agricultural wing’ as ‘Lygon street farmers’ (Senate Hansard 
(1987:2391-2).  ‘Lygon Street’ is a Melbourne street renowned for its trendy and up market 
coffee shops and eateries.   
As can be seen from the following cartoon from Geoff Pryor of the 1 August 1992 edition of the 
Canberra Times, following the resignation of Senator Janet Powell in 1992, the press took up 
‘the fairies at the bottom of the garden’ description of the Democrats.  The cartoon also 
highlighted two major problems in the Party, namely frequent leadership changes and numerous 
resignations.  
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Resignations of Party Officials and Members 
The Democrats were also plagued with some very public and well-publicised resignations by 
party officials.  Resignations in four states stand out, South Australia, Victoria, Queensland and 
Western Australia. 
South Australia 
In the lead up to the State election of 1985, the Democrats candidate for the Legislative Council, 
Mr Don Chisholm was ousted from the number one spot on the party ticket.  As a result, Bob 
Tripp the party’s ballots officer resigned from the party and other members including Lance 
Milne MLC, disassociated themselves from the party’s Legislative Council ticket (Abraham 
1985).  In the final week of the election campaign, the retiring leader of the parliamentary party, 
Lance Milne MLC resigned from the party stating that the party was now controlled by the Left 
and had swung away from the middle of the road course.  
The News of 4 December 1985 in an article titled ‘Democrats split highly possible’ reported 
Bob Manhire Port Adelaide branch deputy chairman as saying ‘a split was looming, but most of 
us are hoping to hold on until we can work out some kind of compromise’.  The Adelaide 
Advertiser in its editorial for 2 December 1985 counselled- 
it would have been better to work for change from within the party, rather than for Mr 
Milne to turn his back in what could be construed as a destructive move.  
Manhire went on to authorise and place an advertisement in the Adelaide Advertiser of 4 
December 1985, which was a ‘statement in support of Lance Milne’.  The statement reiterated 
‘Lance Milne’s public warnings against the dangers of the changed direction of the party and its 
alliance with a limited spectrum of special interest groups.’  The statement concluded:- 
Finally, we wish to record publicly our firm belief that there is a continuing role for the 
original concepts of the Democrats.  We pledge to do all that we can to see that these ideals 
and practices do not fade into obscurity. 
Mr Milne has done that and we publicly applaud his stand.’ 
It seemed that Manhire wanted to work for change within the party as the advertiser suggested.  
If so why not do it quietly and not in such a publicly divisive way? 
In the Adelaide Advertiser of 2 December 1985, in an article entitled ‘Conservative Wing of 
Democrats plans to counterattack’, it was reported that ‘conservative forces’ within the 
Democrats supported Milne in his resignation and attacked the leadership of the Democrats in 
SA.  The spokesperson for this group was Jo Bailey a. member of the Australian Democrats in 
SA a state council representative and a campaign manager for the 1985 state elections. 
The article reported that the conservative group claimed that:- 
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The party’s power structure has been perverted, with control now coming from the top 
rather than grassroots. 
The Democrats were supposed to be different from the other parties in the way decisions 
were made; that is no longer the case in South Australia. 
At a meeting of the National Executive of the party on 5 6 July 1986 an attempt was made to 
expel Bailey from the party for ‘acting against the interests of the party (section 4.2 of the 
Party’s National Constitution) this motion was later amended to a ‘severe reprimand’ and 
carried by the meeting. 
Section 4.2 provides that the National Executive may expel from the party any person who is 
found by three quarters of the National Executive to have acted against the interests or 
objectives of the party. 
Victoria 
The Victorian division also had resignation problems.  On 21 May 1986, three members of the 
Victorian division announced their resignations at a press conference.  These three members 
were: 
 Mr Jim Cockell, vice president of the Victorian division; 
 Mr Michael Nardella, the division’s representative on the national executive of the 
Democrats; and 
 MK Capon president of the Casey branch of the party. 
The three members put out a press release announcing their resignation (NLA Schneider Papers 
- series 3, folder 4).  In the press release, they gave as a reason for their resignation:- 
The Australian Democrats especially in Victoria have moved so far from the stated aims 
and aspirations of the party, that they should no longer use the name ‘Democrats’. 
They went on to claim that:- 
The Australian Democrats are fast becoming only the political arm of the ACF, PND, NDP 
(sic) and radical splinter groups who are disillusioned with the conservative actions of the 
ALP.  Lip service only is paid to other issues. 
They also claimed that ‘the decline and non-renewal of membership, and resignations have 
taken their toll of ‘moderate’ democrats’. 
In the subsequent press conference elaborating on their reasons for resigning, they blamed poor 
communication and that membership views had not been taken into consideration.  They also 
highlighted falling numbers in Democrat branches.  Cockell also claimed many members had 
joined the party on single issues.  However, all political parties experience both falling numbers 
and the fact that people join the party on a single issue, such as social welfare, the environment 
or even defence. 
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This round of resignations was very public complete with press conference with questions from 
the journalists who attended.   
The Age of 22 May 1986 in an article titled ‘Democrats in turmoil over election row’ quoted 
Cockell as saying ‘unless something is done, the Democrats will be a spent force’.  The Age 
went on to comment that, ‘the resignations were the latest in a series of internal ructions within 
the Victorian Branch’ (Carney 1986:3). 
Such resultant adverse publicity did not help the party, which had been in existence for just on 
nine years.  Furthermore, these resignations were just before Chipp’s resignation as 
parliamentary leader of party.  It is surprising that Chipp did not have a role in this episode of 
conflict.  In any political party, conflict of some sort is to be expected.  It is surprising that the 
three unhappy Democrats did not seek out Chipp as a sounding board and source of advice.  
Alternatively, as a leader of the party it is surprising that Chipp did not intervene as a mediator.  
It is quite possible that the first any party member, including Chipp, heard about the resignations 
was the issue of the press release.  If that was the case, it would strongly indicate that the three 
who resigned from the party either wanted to inflict damage on the party or even destroy it. 
Queensland 
In Queensland in August 1985, three senior members of the party publically resigned.  The three 
members were: 
 Mike West, a Queensland delegate to the party’s national executive; 
 David Dalgarno, state director of the Democrats; and 
 Stan Stanley the state director of the party. 
Betty Stanley the wife of Stan Stanley also resigned.  These very public resignations of such 
senior officers of the party, and the reasons for the resignations, attracted the attention of the 
press.  The Courier Mail proclaimed ‘Four top Democrats leave state branch’ . . . ‘the reason 
was a negative attitude among the membership’ (Hammond 1985).   
In a letter dated August 1985 to Democrat members in Queensland, Senator Michael Macklin 
described the resignations ‘followed by press comments’ as ‘undoubtedly a blow to the party in 
Queensland’ (Macklin 1985:1).  Macklin went on to claim that ‘the resignations were caused by 
the excessive criticism which exists in the party of those who get out and do the work.’ 
The Sydney Sun of 28 July 1985 reported Cheryl Kernot, the then Queensland state secretary of 
the party commenting that the resignations of the four senior party members as a ‘temporary 
hiccup’ which ‘would have no long-term effect’.  The reason for the resignations according to 
Kernot was ‘a difference of opinion over management style.’ 
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However, the Telegraph of 26 July 1985 reported Mike West, the party’s delegate to the 
national executive as blaming a ‘feminist faction’ which was ‘destroying the party in 
Queensland’ for the resignations.  In the article, West went on to claim that the party was ‘by 
nature, wide open to infiltration to sectional groups.’ 
The Courier Mail of 27 July 1985 carried a headline, ‘Parties say Democrats finished.’ And in 
the Sunday Sun of 28 July 1985, in an article titled ‘Democrats poll hopes grow thinner’ 
Malcom Farr commented that Queensland ‘has been too cleanly divided between 
Liberal/National conservatives and the ALP to allow room for a third group to really grow.’  
Farr went on to note that the ‘pioneers’ of the Australian Democrats have often been depicted as 
Volvo owners with a social conscience and little else.’  
Finally, Macklin warned the party members in Queensland:- 
We said we were starting a different party, but for some time now, State Council and 
management committee have begun to look very much like the corresponding groups in 
other parties.  Now is the time to take stock and admit that this was not what we want for 
this party of ours (Macklin 1985:2).  
The Western Australia Conflict 
The party experienced major conflict in Western Australia in July 1993 as a result of the WA 
division annual elections for office holders in the division. On 25 July near the end of the 
afternoon session of its meeting, after advising delegates that there ‘was a crisis in WA’, the 
national executive carried a motion that in effect requested five members of the Western 
Australia division namely, David Churches, John Samuel, Huw Grosssmith, Brian Jenkins and 
Jean Jenkins to:- 
withdraw any nomination they may have made for positions in the WA division current 
ballot, and asks that they refrain from nominating for or gaining party office for a period of 
two years 
In the absence of the members withdrawing, the national executive intended to take action under 
regulation 6.7.1 of the party’s constitution, which provides that if the national executive:-  
believes that it would be of significant benefit to the Party to do so it may without prejudice 
prohibit a member from nominating for or gaining election to a party office for a period not 
exceeding two years, reopen nominations for a ballot which is underway and take control of 
such a ballot. 
Significantly, regulation 6.7.1 had only been inserted into the party’s constitution that morning.  
The divisional council meet in an emergency meeting on 29 July.  Keith Lees was the delegate 
from WA at the national executive meeting and he advised the emergency meeting that with 
regard to:- 
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where the national executive obtained the ‘perceptions’ on which it based its choice of 
people to ban, he referred to general gossip (described as communications between people), 
a poor media coverage and a low electoral vote.  He did not refer to any formal reports and 
could not explain why no questions had been asked of divisional council or its officers 
before the relevant decisions were made. 
When asked why the membership could not decide by national ballot on such far-reaching 
powers as regulation 6.7.1 or decide by the normal divisional ballot process who to exclude and 
who not to exclude, Lees responded by stating:- 
This was a participatory democracy model, and participatory democracy went out with the 
ancient Greeks. 
This seems a very curious statement considering that Australian Democrat party objective 11 
stated in part:- 
To achieve and defend effective participatory democracy and open government. 
When Lees was asked by the divisional council to ‘name Jean Jenkins’ offence’ Lees responded 
that:- 
Jenkins was a ‘prominent member of the WA division and the ban was merely a ‘circuit 
breaker and not a sanction or indicating that the five members had done anything wrong. 
In his statement printed in the WA Division Newsletter Lees noted that the five members could 
not hold a ‘party position’ for a period of two years, they could however hold a ‘public position’ 
in other words they could be preselected as a candidate for the Democrats in a Senate election.  
He also commented that:- 
the feeling of the national executive was that ‘serious problems’ within the WA division 
were retarding the development of the party in the west and therefore nationally. 
Later in 1993, the motion against those members of the party in WA was withdrawn by the 
party. However, on 30 and 31 August 1994 the national executive of the party again expelled 
various members of the party’s WA state executive.  These members included Mr David 
Churches and Mr John Samuel.  These expulsions were designed to rid the party of those two 
men.  However, the expulsions were very public, leading to litigation in the Supreme Court of 
WA.   
Finally, in 1996 Hughes (1996) was able to report that:- 
After years of bitter infighting, expulsions and a long and confusing battle with a rival 
group, the West Australian branch of the Australian Democrats claims to be back on track. 
Hughes went on to state that Andrew Murray acknowledged that, ‘infighting has cost the party 
West Australian votes in the past.’ 
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However, the aftermath of this rather damaging public dispute carried on for a number of years 
including an unsuccessful application by Churches to the High Court of Australia on 24 October 
2002 for special leave to appeal. 
The Party and the Press 
The Australian Democrats were also critical of the press.  But in 1977-78 when the Australian 
Democrats were becoming established one could not help but notice the difference in the press 
treatment compared to the DLP.  All of Don Chipp’s rallies and speeches received significantly 
more coverage that the DLP press releases and electoral events. 
However, the Australian Democrats claimed the media did not give them the same amount of 
attention that was given to the two major parties (Madden 2009:15).  As a result, the Party’s 
work in the Senate was not publicised –the media only paid attention to the Party in times of 
leadership tensions or party disagreements.  The Party’s problems with what was its real role; 
policy making or a third force with a balance of power function and the tension this caused 
within the party along with getting its message heard was discussed earlier in this chapter.  The 
Australian Democrats as a political party was not one of the major parties, thus it would be 
unreasonable to expect the same level of media attention as the party in government or the party 
in opposition (the alternative government.) 
In the Australian Democrats changing leaders frequently and splits in the party attracted press 
coverage that damaged and did not help the party increase its share of the vote.  Cassandra 
(1999:9) detailed the problems the Party had with the press when Stott-Despoja came into the 
leadership of the Party.  From the beginning, she attracted attention because of her gender and 
her age, she entered parliament at age 25, the same age as Paul Keating and Malcolm Fraser.  In 
April 1999, Stott-Despoja travelled to Albania to visit the Kosovo refugees.  Cassanda stated 
that:- 
‘a series of strategic leaks lead to reports in the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Mail alleging 
that she had variously:- 
 Travelled to Albania for 24 hours and then spent weeks shopping in Rome; 
 Travelled to Albania without advising the Senate; 
 Travelled to Albania without properly advising her party; 
 Travelled to Albania whilst the GST debate was on. 
According to Cassandra what really happened was that Stott-Despoja stopped over in Rome 
only between connecting flights for a few hours.  Her trip to Albania was not a secret in fact it 
was well known and she had all necessary approvals from her Party, the Senate and the 
Government.  As for the GST debate, it began in the Senate the day before she returned to 
Australia.  Stott-Despoja was not even the Democrats’ tax spokesperson!  Cassanda commented 
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that during the GST debate there had been ‘at least 30 Members absent from Parliament for 
various reasons.’ 
The ‘Ambassador Program’ 
In 1985, shortly after the Federal election, Senator Sid Spindler from Victoria wrote a paper ‘An 
Agenda for Reform’.  In that paper, Spindler considered that the Party needed to build up 
electoral support in ‘a determined and carefully planned way’ (Spindler 1985:4).  In that paper, 
Spindler drew up a plan for what he termed ‘The Ambassadors’ Program’.   
Freeman (ND:2) defined the ‘Ambassador Program’ as a scheme whereby: - 
Each Australian Democrats Senator will have an ambassador in each State who will liaise 
with groups working in key areas which the Senator is spokesperson for. 
In getting started with the Ambassador’s program party members were instructed to find at least 
four to six members to form a task group and then ‘examine the Democrats’ record in your 
particular area’.  The next stage was to list any current or possible future issues, define 
Government and opposition positions.  One would have thought a member of parliament and a 
shadow minister in particular would have carried out this stage as a matter of course. 
The next stage was to:- 
make contact with relevant interest groups and leading advocates or experts; ascertain their 
objectives and compare with Democrat policies and objectives; offer assistance and co-
operation to achieve common aims. 
The final stage in getting started was to:- 
Develop a political action program in consultation with the Senator’s office and relevant 
interest groups/activists. 
On an ongoing basis ambassadors, and presumably the party’s Senators, were instructed to:- 
Maintain political action in accordance with the program, i.e. organise letters and articles to 
both general media and specialist publications, press statements, telephone campaigns, 
functions and meetings, further research, parliamentary action – i.e. Questions, Notices of 
Motions, Speeches, Amendments, Private Members Bills; arrange for Democrat members 
to join relevant interest groups and take part in public activities. 
Ambassadors were also to ‘suggest new initiatives to Senator (sic) and his/her staff.’  One 
would have thought that this task would be a role for any party member or branch of the Party. 
The purpose of that program was for members of the party (ambassadors) to operate on behalf 
of a specific senator with respect to one of that Senator’s shadow portfolios, for example health.  
The ambassador would move around his or her state and meet up with interest groups and peak 
industry bodies relation to health (for example in this case such groups as the Australian 
Medical Association, the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons and the Australian Nurses 
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Federation and put these bodies in touch with the Democrat shadow minister for health.  In 
addition, the ambassador would draw the details of these organisations and the principal 
spokespersons to the attention of the shadow minister. 
This was another proposal from the Australian Democrats that looked and sounded impressive 
but that was about all.  In other parties, a shadow minister would have had a pretty fair idea of 
who were the relevant interest groups and peak industry bodies and their spokespersons (a 
minister in government would have that service provided by his or her department).  In addition, 
most peak industry bodies and interest groups would be rather keen to touch base with a shadow 
minister – particularly if that shadow minister’s party held the all-important balance of power in 
the senate! 
The ‘Ambassadors Program’ folded because of a lack of ‘ambassadors’ from the Australian 
Democrats.  Members were just not interested in and rather apathetic about taking on the role. 
So once again, apathy made its presence strongly felt in the Australian Democrats. 
A problem common to many Minor Parties - Money Problems 
When the Party rose up in 1977 it relied heavily on donations for its funding and did so until 
payment for first preference votes from the public purse became law.  In those early years, the 
party was able to receive commissions from insurance policies taken out with a certain insurer.  
The same arrangement was in place for travel arranged by a specific travel agent.  For many 
years, the National party used this funding raising method with insurance brokering.  The party 
received a commission for every policy negotiated by the broker on behalf of a party member.  
Interestingly the DLP had no such arrangement relying instead in a yearly ‘silver circle’. 
Although for quite a bit of its lifespan the Australian Democrats benefited, if their vote was high 
enough, from public funding for each first preference vote the party received.  The party had to 
receive greater than four per cent of the primary vote in each state to be eligible for this payment 
from the public purse. 
Ghazarian (2015:107) reported that:- 
By the 2004 election, the infighting and instability had taken its toll on the Democrats.  The 
party’s membership had fallen and it struggled to find the human and financial resources 
necessary to mount an effective election campaign. 
This infighting was reflected in the Party’s falling vote at elections, which resulted in a greater 
reliance on donations to the Party and increased general fund raising. 
188 
 
Grass roots Members versus the Parliamentary members 
Bennett (2011) commented on the state of play in the Democrats towards the end of the party’s 
parliamentary life in 2007. 
Bennet considered that the majority of the party’s membership was from the hard left.  The 
issue was should the ‘hard left’ have the right to dictate to the parliamentary wing of the party 
how they should vote and conduct their internal affairs.  Bennett went on to note that this issue 
of external control over the Australian Democrats parliamentary wing is one which now 
threatens to destroy the party because the Australian Democrats claim to political legitimacy has 
historically rested on its parliamentarians being free from (and being perceived to be free from ) 
external control, when exercising their parliamentary votes.  Since their emergence in 1977, a 
founding principle was that a parliamentarian’s conscience vote could take precedence over 
party policy. 
Conscience voting came from the New Liberal Movement – participatory democracy from the 
Australian party.  By comparison, the Liberal Party allows its members to ‘cross the floor’ on 
matters of conscience.  However, the Liberals would not tolerate crossing the floor on a major 
issue such as supply or a confidence motion.  In the ALP, a party decision made in the party 
room is binding on members when they vote in the parliament. 
If a Senator ‘crossed the floor’ and voted against his or her parliamentary party colleagues, then 
that Senator would be accountable to the Party for his or her decision to cross the floor.   The 
ultimate test would be the Senator’s accountability to the Party members when the Senator 
faced pre-selection.  In fact, if ‘crossing the floor’ was really unpopular it would not doubt 
encourage party members to challenge for pre-selection either by forcing a preselection meeting 
for the Senator’s position or by standing as a candidate when pre-selection next took place. 
Members versus the parliamentary members may have been a reason for the demise of the 
Democrats but it is certainly not the main reason.  In fact, differences between the parliamentary 
party members and the rank and file party members happens in other parties and it is usually 
resolved at party meetings and party state and federal conferences. 
Supply, Retrospective Legislation and the Balance of Power 
The Australian Democrats were determined that there would be no repeat of 11 November 1975 
with the denial of supply by the Senate.  In 1981 in the Budget, the Liberal Fraser government 
introduced legislation to impose sales tax on printed materials such as book and newspapers 
along with building materials.  This proposal created much opposition, with the Labor 
opposition prepared to vote against the imposition of sales tax on what was seen as ‘the 
necessities of life’. 
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The question for the Democrats would the voting against the Sales Tax legislation be a 
‘blocking of supply’?  Don Chipp as leader thought such an action would in fact be an act of 
‘blocking supply’.  However, Siddons Chipp’s fellow Victorian Senator considered such a move 
was not an act of ‘blocking supply’. 
Siddons (1990:172) noted that the Party’s policy was one of no sales tax on the necessities of 
life.  Siddons went on to argue that supply was the appropriation legislation ‘which appropriated 
money to pay ordinary annual services of government; in other words, the money to pay the 
salaries of the civil service’.  In fact, Siddons was correct in his thinking.  It was this legislation 
that was blocked in 1975, not any taxation legislation.  The concept of ‘supply’ is the approval 
by parliament for the government of the day to spend money.  ‘Supply’ in itself is not where the 
money comes from or how it is raised in the first place.  Siddons (1990:173) commented that 
Chipp ‘was very nervous about interfering with any budget bill’. 
In the end, Chipp was admitted to hospital with a heart attack before the legislation was voted 
on in Parliament and Mason was the acting leader.  The other Senators agreed with Siddons’ 
stance.  They also considered the legislation was both unpopular and most unfair.  In the end the 
Democrats voted against the legislation and it became one of the ‘triggers’ for the 1983 double 
dissolution election that saw Fraser’s government defeated and the start of the Hawke Prime 
Ministership. 
Retrospective tax legislation was another issue that caused conflict in the Democrats party 
room.  The Fraser government introduced legislation into the Parliament to outlaw certain tax 
avoidance schemes.  The starting date for this legislation was backdated to well before its 
announcement or in other words the legislation was made retrospective.  Siddons and Mason 
supported the retrospective legislation, while Chipp, Haines and Macklin intended to vote 
against the retrospectivity of the legislation.  Siddons (1990:177) commented that ‘at the time 
the issue rose in parliament the Democrats had not laid down a position on retrospectivity’.  In 
Siddons’ view what should have happened in that situation under the principles of participatory 
democracy, the members of the Australian Democrats should have been polled in order to vote 
for or against the usage of retrospective legislation.  
Supporting Unpopular Legislation - The GST 
Supporting a significant measure that is clearly unpopular to the vast majority of the party’s 
members and supporters is another factor that could cause a lasting decline in the party’s 
support.  An example is the Australian Democrat’s decision to support the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) legislation.  
Gauja (2010:495) considered that  
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disagreement as to whether the outcome of the negotiations by the Democrat 
parliamentarians in accepting a goods and services tax actually reflected or contravened 
party policy caused irreparable ructions both within the membership and the parliamentary 
party and resulted in two separate attempts to remove the leadership.  The party never 
recovered from this fundamental breakdown in its democratic processes and the Democrats’ 
dysfunctional organisation  
Gauja (2005:75) reports that the Australian democrats draft taxation policy was officially 
balloted in June 1998.  Although the policy did not specifically mention the GST, it did contain 
a proposal ‘for tax to be levied on the provision of services as wells as on the production of 
goods’ (item 7(b); National Journal June 1998.  The party all along supported a tax on services 
but not on essential food items.  
Prior to the 1998 election Prime Minister John Howard announced his intention to legislate for a 
goods and services tax and the Australian Democrats prepared by sending teams to each state 
division to discuss the issues. A membership policy ballot took place to determine Democrat 
policy on the GST. The question on the ballot paper was difficult to interpret (Floyd (2014:111).  
In an interview with Floyd (2014:111) Liz Oss-Emer (President of the Democrats) stated that:- 
It wasn’t just their vote in the Senate that was really the issue that caused a lot of division.  
It was actually the policy ballot that preceded that.  It was the most confusing thing 
designed not actually to elicit a clear result.  I think there were pockets of members from 
that time that just didn’t accept that it was the right way to go.  I remember when the GST 
was being debated at a Queensland state council meeting which is about 30, 40 or 50 
people Andrew Bartlett just took a straw poll of the room to get a (and this is branches from 
all over the state) feeling of it, and it was split one third accept the GST as it was proposed, 
one third oppose under any circumstances and one third modify.  So I think that it was 
pretty indicative of how members were feeling.  
The result was that the Democrats would pass the tax reforms of whichever party won the 1998 
Federal election but would support the GST only if food and other necessities of life were 
exempted. 
When the Tasmanian independent Brian Harradine refused to vote for the GST in the Senate, 
the focus then turned to the Australian Democrats. 
Floyd (2014:111) comments that Meg Lees John Cherry and Andrew Murray met with John 
Howard and his Treasurer Costello to negotiate terms on which the Democrats might support 
the bill in the Senate. The angst and disillusionment regarding the GST was added to by the fact 
that the Party’s parliamentary leaders showed very poor negotiating skills and a lack of 
preparation for the very serious negotiations involved.  They also failed to consult with the rest 
of the parliamentary party before committing the party’s support to the government.  
Lees and the team achieved many but not all the concessions she wanted. The bill passed in 
June 1999 (prior to Ridgeway and Greig taking up their position in the Senate) after Lees agreed 
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to support the legislation the Democrat Senators Stott Despoja and Bartlett crossed the floor to 
vote against it.  
Gauja (2005:75) commented that:- 
The decision to subvert the standard process by publically releasing the Democrats taxation 
position before releasing the results of the policy ballot to members may have alienated and 
angered many of the party’s rank and file, creating the impression that the taxation policy 
was being hijacked by the parliamentary wing. 
The party voted for the introduction of the GST, after gaining some concessions – but the 
parliamentary party split on the vote.  Many members of the Democrats were not happy with the 
parliamentary party for supporting the GST. 
Embarrassingly for the party when the GST legislation was being voted on in the Senate the 
Democrat Senators divided, with two of the Senators voting with the Labor Party to vote against 
the GST.  Meg Lees resigned the leadership of the party.   
The party membership elected Stott-Despoja as the new leader.  A major task for Stott-Despoja 
was to urgently reunite the Democrat parliamentary party.  However, she was hampered by her 
problematic leadership style which was discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Ghazarian (2015:105) comments that after the change of leader to Stott-Despoja in 2001:- 
The party continued to be embroiled in internal bickering between the supporters of Stott-
Despoja and Lees. . . the party had spent the period since the last election squabbling of the 
position of the party in the senate, manifesting in the GST debate, and resulting in the 
leadership change 
Stott-Despoja’s leadership continued to be marred with internal conflict.  This spilled over and 
into the public domain.  She resigned the leadership of the Democrats after only 16 months as 
leader.  The party room won out against the leadership vote of the membership of the party.  
The election of Stott-Despoja as parliamentary leader by the membership instead of the 
parliamentary party highlighted problems in this method of leadership election.  An 
inexperienced leader was elected who could not work harmoniously with the other 
parliamentary members. 
Floyd (2014:156) reports that:- 
Senior party members saw Natasha as the future of the party.  She was young and vibrant 
and was attractive to the media, but was she ready? 
However, Floyd (2014:156) went on to note that:- 
Allan Ramsay did not share that view and wrote, ‘she was all about herself . . . she paraded 
herself . . . it wasn’t about politics, anything she could get her hands on particularly, 
television . . .  She was the leader, and you thought, hang on, what about the Democrats? . . 
. What about the party; what about policy? 
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Working with the Australian Greens 
Competition and from a party that had views similar to the Australian Democrats occurred very 
early in the lifespan of the party with competition from the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP).  
In the 1984 Senate election that party was successful in getting a Senator elected from Western 
Australia. 
In giving his report at the Democrats national executive meeting held on 10 February 1985, 
Chipp advised with respect to the NDP senator – The Australian Democrats will be ‘nice to her 
and helpful.’ 
Chipp went to observe that the net result of what the NDP did was to split the anti- nuclear vote.  
If it had not entered the field, the Australian Democrats would now have six long-term senators.  
Three years from now (1988) six Senators will be retiring and therefore by 1988 Australia could 
be devoid of any anti-nuclear voice. 
Chipp also noted that ‘the media only wants a two-party system so gave NDP extraordinary 
amount of publicity’. 
The chapter on the demise of the DLP explored a possible amalgamation with the Country Party 
(now the Nationals).  In that light, could a possible amalgamation with the Australian Greens 
have allowed the influence of the Democrats to survive in parliament? 
A major problem for the Australian Democrats in their relationship with the Australian Greens 
was while the two parties had much in common in their respective environmental policies and 
other polices, they have a distrust for each other. 
Spindler (1989:1) reported that in 1989, Bob Brown of the Australian Greens:- 
agreed in principle that greater co-operation between the Democrats and Greens is desirable 
and stated that it should go beyond a mere exchange of preferences. . . .  
He made two other relevant comments – 
1 That he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms when he approached Don Chipp in 1984 with 
the suggestion of an alliance of some sort. 
2. That this negative attitude of the Democrats also came across during Janine’s visit to 
Tasmania during the last campaign. 
Wright (1989:3) comments that Janine Haines leading the party in 1989 at a National Press Club 
speech, called for:- 
Green candidates to exchange preferences tightly with the Democrats at the next federal 
election, warning that conservation and peace candidates could be wiped out. . . . the 
Democrats has always directed their preferences to candidates with similar values, and all 
she was asking for was reciprocity. 
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In 1991 according to a Canberra Times report of 10 April, the then leader of the Democrats 
Janet Powell supported ‘a merger of the Australian Democrats and an as yet unformed national 
greens party’.  ‘Such a merger was proposed by independent Tasmanian MP Bob Brown’. 
This was the time of the Gulf War and the Australian Democrats along with the various green 
groups were the parties that opposed Australia’s involvement in the first Gulf War.  Ghazarian 
(2015:98) commented that:- 
Janet Powell seem to be quite willing to see a merger between her party and the general 
broader environmental and disarmament movements including its party manifestation the 
Greens WA. 
Two newly elected Senators, Meg Lees and Cheryl Kernot were not so enamoured with the 
idea of a Democrat-Green merger. 
The end result was a challenge to Powell’s leadership and her subsequent defeat by the 
uninspiring John Coulter from South Australia.  Powell’s sense of timing for amalgamation 
negotiations was very poor.  She was in effect attempting to amalgamate with six different state 
green parties or at best with a federated green party that was still very much in its gestation.  
Amalgamation talks should have taken place with the federated green party when it was formed. 
A possible amalgamation strategy was for the Democrats to merge with the Australian Greens 
with the high-profile Bob Brown as party leader.  That amalgamation could have produced 
difficulties as the Democrats were the larger of the two parties and its members would have 
expected the leader to come from that party.  Further would the high-profile Bob be happy after 
the amalgamation being led by a leader that was a member of another party prior to the 
amalgamation. 
In the end, the Democrats suffered at the hands of the Australian Greens a party free from 
infighting and squabbles.  In addition, there were continual negotiations regarding preference 
allocation, such as in 2004.  These negotiations flowed smoothly at least in NSW with an 
agreement between the two parties to preference each other in the 2004 Senate election in that 
state (Jackson and Wheeler 2004:1).  
However, Brown (2000:1) as leader of the Greens warned Meg Less as Leader of the 
Democrats:- 
The Australian Greens is a confederated party.  The directioning of preferences is decided 
at electorate level for the House of Representatives and at state level for the Senate. 
The ‘confederated’ nature of the Greens would make negotiations with the Democrats harder 
with most of the preference decisions made at the federal level. 
Distrust of the Greens did not stop, for example in August 2006 in a letter to the editor of The 
Victorian Democrat, a member, Don Walters, claimed:- 
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The Greens voting record also shows, that at the federal level, if they are faced with making 
anything like a difficult decision, and if it is not a conservation issue, they have no policy.  
So, they turn to Bob Brown to make policy on the run.  If they are still stuck, they turn to 
the Democrats for guidance. 
For good measure Mr Walters concluded:- 
The Greens holding any balance of power is frightening. 
In reality, the Democrats and the Greens were two different styles of party.  As Ghazarian 
(2015:90) notes the Democrats were a fragmentary party, that is a party that was a fragment that 
split off a major party.  While Chipp split from the Liberal party in 1977, the Liberal Movement 
split from the Liberal Country League in 1973.  The Australian Greens on the other hand were, 
in Ghazarian’s view, an issue competitive party attempting to increase the importance of 
environmental and peace issues in policy making by government Ghazarian (2015:13). 
The End is Nigh! 
Wanna (2005:278) reported that at the 2004 Federal election:- 
The Democrats were virtually wiped out, losing all three positions up for election and 
reducing their numbers to just four (all facing re-election in 2007.  The Democrats changed 
leader after the election from Bartlett to Senator Lyn Allison. 
Three years later Wanna (2008:294) speaking of the 2007 Federal election, commented that:- 
The big losers in the Senate were the Australian Democrats (a party that had often enjoyed 
holding the balance of power) which was wiped out after so much internal discord and 
leadership problems.  They had gone into the election with four sitting senators but finished 
with no senators in the new Senate that would commence sitting in July 2008. 
Wanna (2008b:616) reviewing events in the Federal sphere from 1 January to 30 June 2008, 
noted that:- 
The last four remaining Democrat Senators gave their valedictory addresses to the Senate in 
June.  Their departure brought to an end the representation of the Australian Democrats in 
the parliament after 30 years of continuous representation. 
By comparison, the DLP were represented in the Senate for 19 years, One Nation for eight years 
and the Australian Greens are still in the Senate after 20 years.  
Wanna went on to comment that:- 
At their heyday, the Democrats had held nine senate seats (1999 to 2002) and regularly held 
the balance of power with seven to eight senators.  There were many reasons given for their 
demise: lack of policies, political vacillation, leadership inaptitude, infighting and boorish 
behaviour, but another reason was that the major parties stopped preferencing them at 
elections. 
Hawker (2001:28) noted that:- 
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Tasmania has had no Democrats senator since Robert Bell’s defeat in 1996 and the fear in 
the party is that the pattern established there will recur elsewhere – that is, the Greens will 
take over the Democrat’s old constituency. 
Subsequent events proved Hawker correct 
In Conclusion 
The Australian Democrats started off on a high note having a high profile and well-liked leader 
in Don Chipp.  The party played the honest broker role well and gained much from the profile.  
The party outlasted the Democratic Labor Party in the Senate.  However as noted in this chapter 
the Democrats had issues with the operations of participative democracy.  In the end, this style 
of operating hindered the party more than it helped it.  In addition, the Democrats went through 
a number of leaders in a very short period of time.  Potential leaders of the party were not 
identified and groomed for leadership.  They were just voted into the position and then left to 
fend for themselves and learn from their own experience. 
The support for the GST was a significant cause in the demise of the Democrats.  The concept 
of supporting a GST but not on the necessities of life, such as food, was very poorly articulated 
to the electorate.  Even in the vote for the GST as apart of participative democracy, the GST 
issue was poorly polled with the members of the party.  Furthermore, in the negotiations with 
the Prime Minister and Treasurer, Meg Lees as leader along with the party’s treasury 
spokesperson were poorly prepared for the negotiations. 
The ‘Ambassador Scheme’ folded through a lack of interest, but arguably it never should have 
been set up in the first place because it attempted to do the work any effective shadow minister 
should be doing, namely circulating around the relevant industry leaders and peak industry 
bodies and other groups relevant to the shadow portfolio. 
Gauja (2010:500) concludes that:- 
Somewhat ironically, it appears that as though those features of the party that contributed to 
its success (distinctive organisation, legislative influence and electoral performance) also 
brought about the party’s decline.’ 
The usage of participative democracy certainly added to the Democrat’s problems, given that 
participative democracy also entailed a vote of the membership for the parliamentary leader and 
deputy leader.  Another annoying factor was that only 100 votes were required to force a 
leadership spill of the parliamentary party.  It is amazing that only 100 members could throw the 
party into uncertainty in the federal parliament as the decision to replace the parliamentary 
leader was made by persons outside the parliament (the faceless persons) and further, the 
replacement process could take a month or more to be completed. 
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From another perspective, the Democrats largely used state and federal conferences as 
informational and training purposes.  While other political parties use these conferences to 
convey information in such opportunities as the leader’s address to conference, time is also set 
aside to debate policy motions submitted by branches and electorate councils of the particular 
party.  The submission and debate of those motions are both exercises in participative 
democracy.  In those parties, participative democracy does not extend to areas such as the 
election of the leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party, where it would be a 
hindrance and cause problems for the party down the track. 
In the end, the party made some very poor decisions and compromised their role.  Also, the 
party lost both the support of the electorate and preference flows from the major parties.  As 
with the DLP, the major parties became tired of having to preference the Democrats, ‘another 
minor party’ with a list of demands.  Other minor parties sprung up that attracted major party 
preferences were the Greens in respect of the ALP and Family First in the case of the Liberal 
Party.  The ‘gaming’ of preferences in elections for the Senate was also starting to make an 
impact at the time of the Democrat’s demise, with the election of a Family First candidate. 
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Chapter Eight: The Accidental and 
Meteoric Rise of Pauline Hanson 
and her One Nation Party 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party (PHON or One Nation) 
beginning with Pauline Hanson’s campaign for and election to federal parliament in 1996, 
followed by the formation of the Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM), and then the 
formation of PHON as a formal entity. The chapter then explores the fledgling party’s twin 
debut in the Queensland and federal elections held in close proximity in 1998. The chapter 
argues that One Nation moved through a number of key phases; from an accidental start when 
Pauline Hanson was unexpectedly elected to parliament as an independent in March 1996, after 
which she managed to enhance her profile and build some popular support.   This was followed 
closely in February 1997 with the establishment of the political party, Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation (PHON).  In the Queensland state election in July 1998, One Nation received over 
22.6% of the state-wide vote and managed to get 11 members elected to the Queensland 
Legislative Assembly.  Immediately after, at the federal election of October 1998, One Nation 
won almost one million votes (936,621) in the House of Representatives and over one million 
(1,007,439) nationwide in the Senate.  Despite this level of popular appeal, Hanson as party 
leader lost her seat in the House of Representatives, and only a single One Nation Senator was 
elected in Queensland.  The candidate won a full quota with a small surplus (1.04). 
Why was Hanson so spectacularly popular in such a short time frame, and why did she make it 
into parliament and go on to form a political party? In Paul Kelly’s view Hanson’s power and 
appeal was in ‘her racial chauvinism, isolationist purity and opposition to economic rationalism’ 
(Kelly 2009:365).  Duffy (2004:198) reports that the former leader of the Labor Party Mark 
Latham said of Hanson:- 
Voters wanted the raw edged convictions politician. . . . No airs and graces, no tricky news 
grabs.  I think that’s why Pauline Hanson was the clear example of someone who just cut 
through all the sophisticated bullshit and went straight to the people.  She hit a raw nerve.  . 
. .  She was able to cut through.   
This chapter concludes that the party’s representation in parliament was thwarted by the 
cartelisation of the major parties, in particular the refusal of both major parties to give their 
second preferences to One Nation.  In addition, with Hanson losing her seat, the party was then 
without its main player in parliament, and its most significant vote winner. 
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In the Beginning 
Pauline Hanson, who was a fish and chip shop owner in Ipswich Queensland, was the Liberal 
Party’s endorsed candidate in the federal electorate of Oxley for the 1996 federal election, 
which saw the election of the Howard Government.  Hanson joined the Liberal Party in August 
1995.  She had served on the Ipswich City Council until she lost her seat at the Council 
elections earlier that year. 
In the midst of the election campaign, but after the close of nominations for candidature, 
Hanson sent a letter to the editor of the Queensland Times on 6 January 1996.  In that letter, 
Hanson stated:- 
I would be the first to admit that, not many years ago, the Aborigines were treated 
wrongly but in trying to correct this they have gone too far.  I don’t feel responsible for 
the treatment of Aboriginal people in the past because I had no say but my concern is for 
now and for the future.  How can we expect this race to help themselves when 
governments shower them with money, facilities and opportunities that only these people 
can obtain no matter how minute the indigenous blood is that flows through their veins 
and that is what is causing racism. 
She next wrote a letter to the Brisbane Courier Mail in February 1996 in which she stated that 
Australia is subject to ‘reverse racism’ in which Indigenous people were being advantaged at the 
expense of white Australians. 
Some of Hanson’s supporters such as John Pasquarelli regarded Hanson’s letter to the 
Queensland times in Ipswich as ‘clumsily constructed’ but ‘totally innocuous’ (Pasquarelli 
1998:31).  However, one of Hanson’s fellow councillors in Ipswich, Cr Paul Tully of the ALP, 
‘made a great song and dance about the letter’ and Tully’s reaction turned the letter into a ‘cause 
celebre’ (Pasquarelli 1998:33).  
This letter gained much unwanted and embarrassing publicity for the Liberal Party.  On 
Howard’s insistence, the Liberal Party dis-endorsed Hanson as a Liberal Party candidate on 14 
February 1996.  However, as the dis-endorsement took place after the close of nominations at 
12 noon on 9 February 1996, Hanson nevertheless appeared on the ballot paper as a Liberal 
Party candidate.  As a result of a massive swing against the lacklustre ALP candidate and a 
popular endorsement from electors who sympathised with her strident views, she was elected to 
parliament and quickly developed a high recognition becoming a household name throughout 
Australia. At the time, Pasquarelli (1998:33) claimed that Hanson’s election was attributable to 
the poor performance of her Labor predecessor, Les Scott, as the local member.  Pasquarelli 
argued that Scott was a poor replacement for Bill Hayden, as he was a smug and complacent 
performer who took his loss to Hanson hard (Pasquarelli 1998:33). 
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Pauline Hanson’s instantaneous high profile came from the fact that she was prepared to speak 
out on controversial topics, speaking her own mind in plain, blunt language against the 
prevailing orthodoxy of political correctness. She drew attention to many (populist) touchstone 
issues and rallied people to her cause.  Scott (2009:25) has commented that in retrospect 
‘Hanson’s emergence was partly a backlash against multiculturalism and Aboriginal 
reconciliation; but it was also in part a backlash against market liberalism’.  She was largely 
speaking out against the conformity of the major parties appealing to old-style Queensland 
populism. In Kelly’s assessment, Hanson was elected entirely by accident and, having been 
thrown out of the Liberal Party, became a vociferous opponent of the newly-elected Howard 
Government (Kelly 2009:367). 
How did Hanson win Liberal Party endorsement in the first 
place? 
Pauline Hanson’s interest in politics came from the fact that she was a local business owner who 
had some local government experience.  Running her fish and chip shop for the locals allowed 
her to gauge community sentiments. Indeed, ‘customers would come and order . . . and gripe 
about the whole place going to the dogs.  Hanson was all ears’ (Lesser 1996:20). Lesser 
(1996:21) claimed that a ‘local Liberal heavyweight’, Steve Wilson, was instrumental in 
Hanson winning Liberal Party pre-selection over two other candidates. According to Lesser, 
Wilson was a ‘staunch church goer, fierce advocate of corporal and capital punishment, as well 
as opponent of homosexuals and ‘anyone else morally wanting’.  In Wilson, Hanson had a 
strong supporter and advocate for her pre-selection. Wilson considered Hanson as ‘a good bit of 
gear at the beginning of the race’, she was a small businesswoman who worked hard, had her 
fair share of the knocks and had a genuine concern for the people.  A classic Liberal . . . she was 
pick of the bunch’.  Hanson’s pre-selection speech to the Liberals, however, was all about 
unemployment and the pain of working class families.  There was no mention, it seems, of 
immigration, Asians or Aborigines. 
Hanson was somewhat photogenic and actively courted controversy, emerging as a charismatic 
leader for her largely elderly and regional constituencies. Her populist views and blunt style of 
expression made her appealing to a large number of voters in Oxley in 1996. She managed to 
win electoral appeal as ‘an ordinary person who had by a series of accidents slipped through the 
fine mesh net that is supposed to stop ordinary people from getting elected’ (Duffy 2004:157). 
After the national notoriety gained from her letter-writing to local newspapers, the Gold Coast 
Bulletin (4 March 1996) reported that Hanson herself believed ‘she was not a racist and simply 
wanted a fair go for all Australians, but held firm to her view there was community resentment 
about the benefits received by Aboriginal people’ (which was a potent sentiment in certain 
sections of the community). 
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In retrospect, stripping Hanson of Liberal Party endorsement over her comments about 
Aboriginals seems to have been an overreaction by the Liberal Party.  The act of taking party 
endorsement from her as a Liberal candidate immediately gave her the status of a political 
martyr, in that she could claim that she was treated unjustly by the Liberal party simply for 
writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper.  Her divisive views together with her very visible 
public dis-endorsement immediately assured her valuable nation-wide publicity, not least 
because Howard had question marks over his attitudes towards other races and could not be 
seen to condone racially-inspired statements from endorsed candidates without taking action to 
dis-endorse the offender.  
Had she won the seat as a Liberal candidate, she would be subject to the decisions of the 
Liberal’s party room, but at the same time have some freedom to speak her own mind.  Other 
Liberals had some independence in their remarks such as Billy Wentworth and Kevin Cairns in 
the House of Representatives and Ian Wood and Reg Wright in the Senate.  None of those four 
were ever stripped of their Liberal Party endorsement.  In fact, all four were re-elected on a 
number of occasions and two of them, Wentworth and Cairns served in the McMahon Ministry 
in 1971-72. 
Hanson the new Member for Oxley 
Reactions to Hanson’s surprise victory in Oxley were swift.  Letters to the editor of the Brisbane 
Courier Mail on 7 March 1996 regarding Hanson’s recent win were mixed, with some writers 
considering her as racist and anti-Aborigines, while others praised Hanson for having the 
courage to stand up and reflect community views.  The former Liberal Senator Neville Bonner 
claimed that Hanson ‘had hurt a lot of people in her electorate’.  Bonner went on to comment 
‘picking on the blacks is a sure winner for an election campaign . . . they have been doing it for 
years’.  Bonner went on to say that Hanson was ‘ignorant of Aboriginal issues’.  He concluded 
by saying ‘it was clear that whatever Ms Hanson’s power might be in Canberra as an 
independent, she did not carry Aboriginal goodwill’. 
On winning the seat, Hanson sought political advice and turned to maverick advisers with some 
political experience to assist her in the transition into a federal member. During the election 
campaign itself, Hanson’s campaign manager was a local insurance salesman, Morrie Marsden, 
but according to Pasquarelli (1998:12) Hanson soon came to consider him ‘not qualified for a 
senior officer’s position’. Marsden’s role ended once the election was held and Hanson looked 
to others for assistance.  
When she entered parliament after the 1996 election, John Pasquarelli became Hanson’s ‘senior 
political adviser’.  Pasquarelli had been employed in the office of Graeme Campbell, the former 
Labor MP for Kalgoorlie in WA.  Campbell had resigned from the ALP but was re-elected to 
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parliament in March 1996 as an independent.  At this time, Pasquarelli was in the process of 
leaving Campbell’s office.  He was watching Hanson on the television where he said, ‘the 
media were all over the top of her and hemmed her in’ and ‘she looked extremely strained and 
had almost lost her voice’ (Pasquarelli 1998:8).   
It seemed initially that Pasquarelli’s move to join Hanson’s staff was not so much to assist 
Hanson but to strengthen Campbell’s support in the parliament.  During discussions over lunch, 
Pasquarelli suggested to Campbell that ‘he would need an independent ally in the parliament to 
second motions and private members’ bills and that Hanson seemed to be generally in tune with 
him on the Aboriginal issue’.  He ‘put it to Graeme (Campbell) that it would be chivalrous and 
politically sensible to offer Pauline Hanson advice and support during a politically stressful 
time’ (Pasquarelli 1998:8). Campbell suggested that he make contact with Hanson.  Hanson 
accepted Pasquarelli as a staff member to ‘help her with the media and the very important job of 
setting up her electorate office’ (Pasquarelli 1998:9).  In Duffy’s opinion, neither Hanson nor 
Pasquarelli had much experience in research (Duffy 2004:157). 
But others saw darker motives at play. The Australia Israel Review (1996:1) described 
Pasquarelli as ‘Pauline’s puppeteer’. In fact, the journal posed the question: ‘you’ve seen her on 
your TV, but who is Pauline Hanson really?  And who is pulling her strings?’  The Review 
added ‘she markets herself as a simple working woman from Ipswich who talks from the heart.  
But her appeal to the Far Right is increasingly disturbing and she has polarised a nation with her 
intolerance and racism’ (1996:6). 
Speaking of Pasquarelli in particular, The Australia Israel Review (1996:7) commented rather 
emotionally that ‘he runs . . . Pauline Hanson’s office and by all accounts he runs her too’.  Yet, 
a major role of a senior adviser in a parliamentarian’s office is to run the office and give 
considered advice to the member and as such the adviser would have almost limitless access to 
the member and be somewhat influential in guiding the member’s thinking. 
It turns out that Pasquarelli drafted Hanson’s first speech to parliament, presenting it to her 
ready to deliver.  It seems surprising that Hanson did not have much of a role in any of the 
drafting of such an important and significant speech, although she would have spoken to 
Pasquarelli many times in the lead up to it.  
Most of Hanson’s first speech was concerned with the issues of Aboriginals and native tile, 
along with immigration and multiculturalism.  Other issues received passing attention in the 
speech.  These issues included unemployment and job creation projects, the reintroduction of 
national service, family law and the child support scheme and the promotion of Australian 
industry and businesses. 
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Surprisingly in some ways, Hanson did not mention guns legislation or access to firearms in her 
first speech.  But even at this early stage in her political career, Hanson had a reputation for not 
reading material put in front of her (Balson 2000:19; Pasquarelli 1998:112) and Whiteside 
19QQ:LL).  In Duffy’s view her maiden speech contained a ‘number of wild statements and 
incorrect facts’ (Duffy 2004:138). 
The Maiden Speech – Outside the Conformist Box – Venturing 
Where Others Feared to Travel 
Some members give their first speech to parliament in the first sitting week of the new 
parliament while others wait a while.  Hanson waited, giving her first speech on 10 September 
1996, just after Joe Hockey gave his first speech.  Hanson’s first speech was an eagerly awaited 
event.  It raised many racial and xenophobic issues as its major themes, including the abolition 
of both multiculturalism as a policy framework and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), along with a criticism of Aboriginal privileges.  Hanson also spoke about 
foreign ownership of Australian businesses and resources and various inequalities.  However, it 
was immigration, particularly of Asians, that gave the speech enormous publicity.  Hanson 
said:- 
I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. . . . They have their own culture 
and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate.  Of course I will be called racist but, if I 
can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who 
comes into my country.  
Hanson did not provide evidence to support her provocative claims regarding ghettos and failure 
to assimilate.  In the media over the next few days it was her attack on Asians and immigrants 
that received most attention.  For example, The Sydney Morning Herald reported her speech 
under the heading: ‘MP Debuts with Attack on Asians’, and reported a comment from her 
speech: ‘I believe that we are in danger of being swamped by Asians’.  The Australian reported 
that ‘Hanson targets blacks, immigrants’ and said that Hanson ‘launched a scathing attack on 
Aboriginal welfare and multiculturalism’.  The Australian also reported the ‘swamped by 
Asians comment’ and the claim of forming ghettos and not assimilating.  While the Daily 
Telegraph reported that parliament was ‘treated to the Gospel according to Pauline’.  The Daily 
Telegraph concentrated on Hanson’s comments on the ‘special treatment of Aborigines’. 
Significantly Hanson’s comments on Australian manufacture and small business received very 
scant attention by the press. 
Reactions to her first speech were immediate. The mainstream media tended to publicly portray 
Hanson as some sort of energized racist bigot. This portrayal did not assist Hanson; in fact it 
was a major reason why neither major party gave their second preferences to One Nation in the 
subsequent Federal elections in 1998. However, her entire speech was essentially compromised 
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by her comments on Asians and Aborigines.  Her other messages from her first speech, of being 
a ‘real Australian’, not being listened to and the problems of small business did not get the 
publicity she would have hoped. 
Lesser (1996:21) reports that Dr Stephen Fitzgerald, the former Australian ambassador to 
China, commented that Hanson’s claims were without foundation; ‘Asians do not form ghettos 
anymore that people from Europe did. . . . in the first stage of immigration, people concentrate 
in a particular area, but once they get established they start moving out’. 
In Queensland, the National-Liberal Party coalition government felt compromised by Hanson’s 
growing reputation and would soon move to direct their preferences to her One Nation party.  
By contrast, the state Labor party opposition in Queensland were immediately vocal critics of 
her stance. Very soon after Hanson’s maiden speech, Stephen Robertson, Labor Member of 
Sunnybank gave a notice of motion which commenced with the sentence ‘that this Parliament 
condemns the disgraceful and racist comments by the member for Oxley, Mrs Pauline Hanson, 
during her maiden speech to the Federal parliament’ (Robertson 1996:2710) 
On 9 October 1996, Henry Palaszczuk, the Labor member for Inala gave the following notice of 
motion: 
In view of the concerns raised by the Queensland Canegrowers Association, the Tourism 
Taskforce and the Tourism Council of Australia, this House calls on the Premier to show 
moral leadership and disassociate his Government from the anti-Asian comments of Mrs 
Pauline Hanson, the member for Greenslopes, and the public show of support for Ms 
Hanson by the Minister for Emergency Services and the Government Deputy Whip 
(Palaszczuk 1996:3137). 
The Queensland Parliament, then, reacted critically to Hanson’s first speech, but how did the 
Howard government react to the sentiments Hanson vented in her first speech?  At the time, 
Howard’s silence as leader of the government was quite noticeable.   Kelly (2009:363) reported 
that ‘Howard’s initial approach as prime minister was an equivocal response’.  The foreign 
minister, Alexander Downer on the other hand, took a strong stand against Hanson as did the 
treasurer Peter Costello and the deputy prime minister and Nationals leader, Tim Fischer, the 
latter branding Hanson as ‘dumb and divisive’.  Nevertheless, Howard remained reluctant to 
confront Hanson, preferring to ignore her in the hope that the lack of publicity and recognition 
would destroy her.  At this point in time Howard was advised by his political adviser (and soon 
to become chief of staff) Grahame Morris who perhaps (mis)calculated that not engaging with 
Hanson would deny her oxygen, and ensuring her meteor burned out faster. 
By late 1996 Hanson had developed a strong presence in the Australian media.  In Asian 
countries too her comments had been noted and this was observed by Downer’s department.  
Kelly (2009:363) commented that the diplomatic service was in shock at Howard’s behaviour in 
ignoring Hanson altogether.  The secretary of Downer’s department, Phillip Flood, attempted to 
204 
 
bring his department’s concerns to Howard’s attention, however he claimed he was 
‘stonewalled’ by Grahame Morris who was Howard’s principal adviser.  Morris apparently did 
not want ‘Howard’s domestic strategy disrupted by such ripples’.  Fischer believed that Morris 
was loading Howard up within the ‘softly, softly’ tactic’ (Kelly 2009:364, 365). Ashton Calvert, 
who succeeded Flood as DFAT Secretary commented that ‘the Hanson issue was damaging 
because it was seen as an example of the way Howard thought.  He saw Hanson in narrow 
domestic terms, not in foreign policy terms’ (Kelly 2009:365). 
Howard’s reaction to Hanson will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
The Ascendancy Begins – The Pauline Hanson Support 
Movement 
Hanson’s maiden speech soon came to the attention of Bruce Whiteside, a retired businessman 
who lived on the Gold Coast and who has earlier campaigned against foreign ownership in 
Queensland.  Eight years prior to Hanson’s election, Whiteside organised a public meeting at 
the Miami Great Hall to protest about the high level of foreign, mainly Japanese, ownership of 
Gold Coast properties.  Some 1500 people attended that meeting in support of Whiteside.  As a 
result, the media branded Whiteside a racist, although ‘the embers of his movement continued 
to burn and provide the initial impetus for his latter-day support movement for Hanson’ (Balson 
2000:12).   
Whiteside was so impressed with Hanson and what she stood for, that he hired the Gold Coast 
Albert Waterways Convention Centre at his own expense and convened a public meeting on 28 
October 1996, - almost two months after Hanson gave her first speech to parliament. Having 
decided to act, he phoned Pauline Hanson before the meeting, making contact with her for the 
first time.  
I felt that as a matter of good manners I owed her the courtesy of informing her of my 
reasons for holding a public meeting in support of what she was doing. It was a strange 
conversation. There was neither enthusiasm nor reproof; if I thought Hanson would be over 
the moon, then I was disappointed. In fact, she seemed stuck for words. I gathered from her 
hesitancy that she was not sure how to respond, to not knowing I guess, how to gauge the 
effect it might have on her position. This was a natural enough reaction, but after assuring 
her that she had nothing to worry about, I terminated the stilted conversation (Whiteside 
2011:3-6). 
At that meeting, Whiteside spoke to a meeting of 800 people and 122 immediately joined the 
newly created Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM) that night.  The meeting went 
largely unreported in the national media, but it received coverage in Queensland, especially over 
the radio (Balson 2000:QQ). 
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In the course of his speech entitled ‘Pauline Hanson Giving Government Back to the People’ 
Whiteside said with regard to Hanson’s first speech to parliament:- 
She voiced the thoughts of the man in the street.  She gave him a voice.  . . . She has 
ventured where weak men have feared to tread and lifted the pall of social inequality that 
has bedevilled Australians for too long (Whiteside 1999:6). 
With regard to the proposed support movement, Whiteside stated: 
So it is we come here tonight to help form a national support movement for a lady who 
strangely for a politician has put the interests of people before herself. 
He continued. . .  
This proposed organisation will not speak for Pauline Hanson; rather it speaks in defence of 
her. . . .  The Pauline Hanson Support Movement is an independent expression of the 
people’s appreciation for an honest politician, one who stands up for the people, not the 
dictates or demands of a party, but the logic of common sense, not racism but pragmatism 
(Whiteside 1999:8).  
According to Whiteside, the initial aspiration was to establish a Pauline Hanson 
support movement across Australia, with the movement’s objectives being to:   
1. lend practical and moral support.  
2. actively participate in the spreading of Pauline's concerns.  
3. respond individually or collectively to all adverse criticisms.  
4. negate the accusations of racism, redneck etc.  
5. go onto the offensive in the publicity sense where this is possible.  
6. consciously wear down the climate of political correctness.  
Whiteside intended that the organisational structure of PHSM would require the movement: 
1. To set up an organisational structure nationally.  
2. Register and incorporate the name.  
3. Allow local autonomy in other groups within limits.  
4. Initially all practical participation in administration will be voluntary (Whiteside2011:4-
2, 4-3). 
Whiteside’s objectives and organisational structure were very general, providing the support 
group with much latitude.  He was (naturally) elected as spokesperson for the Support 
Movement by those attending the meeting. 
But relations between Hanson and Whiteside soon broke down.  Just before Christmas 1996, 
Hanson paid a visit to the PHSM.  In Whiteside’s opinion:- 
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her intent was clear; she did not want me as the founder and Chairman of the PHSM 
speaking to the press. There was a very animated clash between us, so much so that some 
threatened to walk out if I did not back off and fall into line with this lady who at that time 
was championing free speech. What Hanson did not realise is that I was spokesperson, 
media officer and public relations officer, democratically elected (Whiteside 2011:2).   
Looking back and writing about the PHSM and the launch of PHON, Whiteside 
(2011:3) stated that ‘I had a clear-cut view as founder of what I wanted for the 
movement that bore Hanson’s name. My idea was to form an army of support behind 
Pauline. That support was detailed in a set of objectives, which expressly stated that we 
were apolitical’.  It is strange and indeed contradictory that Whiteside considered the 
Movement to be ‘apolitical’.  The very fact that it was actively supporting Hanson in 
what she stood for made the PHSM political from the outset. 
However, Whiteside gave as his reasons for forming an apolitical movement,  
Hanson’s controversial stand was going to polarise the press against her. I knew 
there were thousands of people ‘out there’ who silently endorsed much of what she 
said, but that was never going to help her, unless it could be converted to a visible 
groundswell of support that the media could not dismiss. But as I have indicated 
Australians are much more comfortable keeping their opinions quiet, talking about 
them at barbeques or among the boys at a pub, than standing out front and saying 
‘Look I think this woman is talking common sense’. 
Whiteside may have believed that ordinary Australians (the ‘silent majority’) could 
become supporters of PHSM and even join but that they would not want their support 
readily known. Therefore the Movement must be apolitical.  However, many people 
join a political party and contribute money to it without publishing their membership or 
their financial support.  In fact, the formation of a political movement with a large 
number of members could also ‘be converted to a visible groundswell of support that 
the media could not dismiss’. 
Whiteside went on to say that:- 
I told Pauline once that we did not aim to become a political ‘party’ organisation, 
nor a platform for such… The idea was to build up the movement to and past the 
next Federal election, where I believed that we could have amassed anything from 
100 to 200,000 people. This great push behind Hanson, would be difficult for other 
politicians to deal with and would cause any government great difficulty in 
quantifying the real impact… I suggested to Pauline that she should ‘cut her teeth’ 
in the Parliament for the first three years, work hard in her electorate for re-
election and AFTER the election begin looking at the membership for likely 
candidates to form a ‘loose association of independents’. I told her that ‘these 
people would come under the Hanson umbrella but not necessarily embrace all that 
she articulated. These people will answer first of all to their electorate’.  
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Whiteside remembered that:  
The PHSM that I formed was always going to be independent of Hanson, open to people 
of all political persuasions ...as indeed it proved ...and act as a protective shield against 
attacks from the media. It was never formed to 'mould' her political views, nor to influence 
her. 
What Whiteside appears to be saying in the above paragraph is that the PHSM would be no 
more than a type of interest group and quite separate from a political party.  But surely a 
support group would be ‘the eyes and ears’ out in the broader community and as such it would 
be reporting on the feelings and attitudes of that community.  Which in turn would influence or 
mould in some way the ‘political views’ of the member of parliament and his or her political 
party?  All Whiteside was doing was sowing the seeds for the formation of a Pauline Hanson 
based political party, which was indeed what finally happened. 
Pasquarelli expressed alarm to Hanson about the rise of a ‘support movement’.  He feared the 
‘sudden appearance of groups created no doubt with all of the best intentions in the world, that 
could act as vehicles for all sorts of people wishing to promote their own agendas’ 
(Pasquarelli:1998:242).  
Hanson’s take on the Support Movement is in sharp contrast to that of Whiteside.  After 
Whiteside advised Hanson that he wanted to set up a Pauline Hanson Support Movement, 
Hanson (1997:113) claimed that:- 
I thanked him but told him I was not interested in a support group, and was happy to remain 
as an independent.  Due to . . . (Whiteside’s) persistence I told him they could start up a 
Pauline Hanson Support Movement but told him nobody was ever to speak for me, or on 
my behalf.  He agreed and that’s how the support movement was established in late 
September 1996. 
In fact, Ettridge (2004:18) commented that ‘Pauline had not sponsored or initiated this Support 
Movement . . .   But the support group was useful at this early stage as a measurement of the 
strong effect Pauline was having on Australians’.  For the Support Movement to have ‘attracted 
such a large crowd was indeed an ominous warning to the major political forces in Australia’.  
Ettridge went on to describe the Support Movement as ‘the soon to become defunct Support 
Movement’ (Ettridge 2004:25). 
At this time, Hanson was attracting support from various letter writers.  For example, Mr Sab 
Bonelli from Canberra wrote to Hanson and she responded to him.  She informed him that ‘the 
politics of economic rationalism and political short-sightedness are a very real danger to this 
country’s future’ (Hanson 1997A).  She went on to advise him that:- 
You can rest assured that I will be doing everything I can to make sure the Government – 
regardless of the Party in power – thinks more about us and less about the wishes of the 
minority and special interest groups that have had its ear for too long. 
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In her letter to Mr Bonelli Hanson made no reference to Asians or immigration, but instead her 
concern was economic rationalism and ‘political short-sightedness’ which could be defined as 
governments governed week by week for the very short term and paying no attention to the 
long-term future and its problems and concerns.  The reference to ‘special interest groups that 
have had its ear for too long’ is significant.  Hanson in her own way seems to be making an 
oblique reference to the cartelization of the major parties.   
On 26 October 1996, Noel Crichton-Browne, a right-wing Liberal Senator from WA wrote a 
letter to Hanson.  In that letter, Crichton-Browne stated: ‘what [do] you wish to achieve from 
politics?  You currently have a great groundswell of support which obviously extends beyond 
Oxley into many parts of Australia.  However, it is the type of support which will dissipate over 
time’. He told her she had two options to capitalise on her present level of support: ‘diverting it 
into votes for your re-election in Oxley, or to mobilise it into Australian wide support through 
candidates in the Senate and in strategic seats in the various State elections. . . In other words, 
the voter support in Oxley in the long term will very much equate to the national media 
coverage you are able to attract’. 
Crichton-Browne then went on to advise:- 
It is not desirable for you to have a branch structure.  The danger is that you will attract 
people into office bearing positions in the branches who may be thoroughly undesirable and 
over whom you will have no control.  You most certainly will not have the resources to vet 
and monitor them. 
A much more desirable system is to have a national membership controlled directly by you.  
Candidates who run under your banner should be vetted and checked by people whose 
judgement you can completely rely on.  One or two people with political nous are required 
in each state’ (Crichton-Browne 1996:1-2, in Pasquarelli 1998:317). 
These initial attempts to form a stronger movement soon saw others get on board and form an 
eponymous party.  Pauline Hanson with her well-known name and smart dress sense was the 
Party. Supporters flocked to her and they identified with her and her policies. 
Pasquarelli (1996:236) states that on 4 November 1996, following strong support for Hanson 
candidates in a recent public opinion poll, that she only had two options; thank her supporters 
but limit her activities to her electorate of Oxley, or embrace the support and convert it into a 
‘political institution’ to win seats in the Senate at the expense of the Greens and the Australian 
Democrats. 
Pasquarelli then advised Hanson:- 
To retreat to Oxley would simply result in her electoral death by a thousand cuts . . . to be a 
force in Australian politics she had to try and win the balance of power in the Senate. It was 
the most effective strategy to adopt. 
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That advice to Hanson would indicate that Pasquarelli was advising Hanson not to recontest the 
lower house seat of Oxley but instead run for the Senate in Queensland at the next Federal 
election. Pasquarelli (1998:237) recalled that Hanson responded:- 
Well I suppose I could just go back to be the little old Member for Oxley and do the best 
job I can or…  I can try and do something to get this Country out of the mess that it is in. 
As it turned out, Hanson chose to re-contest the House of Representatives, but standing for the 
new electorate of Blair instead of running for a Senate seat, or possibly even securing two 
Senate seats. 
After the formation of One Nation as a formal party where did the support movement fit in?  
Hanson (2007) clarified that:- 
After the launch of the Party . . . a meeting was held with the executive of the support 
movement in October 1997 and it was agreed to wind it up as memberships had expired. 
Sutter (1998:186) observed at the time that:- 
For many ‘working class or rural Australians’ Hanson was a welcome change from the 
slick politicians who dominate the main parties.  It is clear she (was) closer to mainstream 
Australia than the people who would like to shut her up. The Hanson phenomenon is the 
Australian manifestation of the politics of anger. 
With such a feeling in working class and rural Australia, the transition from independent 
member to heading Pauline Hanson’s One Nation came as no surprise.  The Pauline Hanson 
Support Movement had a very short life in which it at best, garnered some extra support for 
Pauline Hanson.  It was very clear that the best way forward was as a political party in the 
parliament and not a series of independent members who would have voted any way they 
pleased.  The party on the other hand would work as one, meeting in the party room to 
determine whether or not the party would support the legislation of the major parties and in the 
parliament putting forward a united and consistent point of view in parliamentary debates. 
Rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the two Davids 
Around the same time as ‘Pauline Hanson Support Movement’ was formed by Bruce Whiteside, 
Hanson was herself engaged in setting up ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ (PHON).  She was 
assisted and advised in this task by the ‘two Davids’ – David Ettridge and David Oldfield.  
Oldfield at that time was working for Tony Abbott but Hanson (2007:109) recalled that by 
November 1996 Oldfield had; 
Encouraged me to start a political party, justified by the support I had received after making 
my maiden speech.  After further talks, he told me of a long-time friend of his who would 
be very good at organising, structuring, managing and marketing the party. 
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That ‘long-time friend’ was David Ettridge.  Thus, on the advice of the two Davids, Oldfield 
and Ettridge, Hanson decided to establish her own political party. One Nation was born, with 
the new party coming into existence in April 1997. 
Ettridge first met Hanson in November 1996, and discussed the potential for a new party. Much 
of David Ettridge’s working life to that point was involved in ‘sales, sales management and 
shopping centre promotions’ (Ettridge 2004:5).  Ettridge’s first reaction to Hanson’s first speech 
in Parliament was ‘she delivered a stunning maiden speech’.  He considered her speech had 
three major themes: multiculturalism, political correctness and globalisation.  On globalisation 
Ettridge claimed that it ‘was fuelled by greed’ and ‘produced a loss of industry and employment 
for Australians’ (Ettridge 2004:15). Ettridge (2004:17) believed that a new political party 
would:- 
Be more responsive to the needs of the majority of Australians who agreed with Pauline’s 
views and who were becoming victims of political correctness and the effects of 
globalisation.  
In Ettridge’s view, at that time business was suffering and jobs were no longer plentiful 
(Ettridge 2004:17).  It would appear that Ettridge was attracted to Hanson primarily over her 
stand against globalisation and the Liberal government’s unbridled support for ‘market forces’ 
to dominate economic policy – a philosophy which also captured the thinking and policies of 
the National Party, particularly its then federal parliamentary leader John Anderson. 
Ettridge (2004:17) acknowledged that he, Hanson and Oldfield all agreed that:- 
A new political party was needed to represent the will and interests of many Australian 
voters.  Pauline advised she was enthusiastic about a new party. 
Ettridge saw his role in supporting Hanson, given his commercial background as administering 
and developing the new party.  Hanson and Ettridge agreed that David Oldfield would lie low, 
given that Oldfield was still working in Tony Abbott’s office and Ettridge would take the 
preliminary steps in getting the new party up and running. (Ettridge 2004:18). 
Oldfield was a self-employed businessman who had an interest in politics and had been elected 
to the Manly Municipal Council as alderman in 1991 (holding the position until 1998). He had 
stood as an unsuccessful Liberal candidate for the state seat of Manly at the NSW state election 
of 1995. By early 1996 Oldfield worked for Tony Abbott as his private secretary – a job he held 
until late 1997. Abbott (2010:51) described Oldfield as: 
Capable and intensely ambitious but had . . . a brutal way of expressing views that were 
teetering over the edge of respectability . . . working for me might have turned him into 
more of a team player.  Instead he began secretly moonlighting for Hanson. 
One Nation (PHON) was launched on 11 April 1997, in Ipswich by Hanson.  Her speech at the 
launch contained many platitudinous statements but injected a strong sense of injustice and 
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defiance, for example she retorted that ‘by dis-endorsing me they thought they could finish me.  
They were wrong’.  In the course of her speech, Hanson commented on high unemployment and 
the removal of tariff protection, she said:- 
The government’s enthusiastic removal of tariff protection has forced manufacturers 
overseas.  Asia  . . . manufacture(s) our goods to their benefit and at the cost of our jobs. 
One Nation’s internal objectives immediately caused some confusion, suggesting the 
party was cobbled together rather expediently.  Balson (2000:44) commented that 
when he joined PHON and examined his membership ticket, ten bullet points were 
listed on the back of the ticket, five were Hanson’s political goals and five were former 
goals of the Support Movement.  The fifth point read ‘to remain a non-political 
organisation which exists only to support Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’.  
Significantly at the same time as One Nation was launched, the youth wing of the party 
was also launched, it was known as ‘Young Nation’.  This was undoubtedly a strategy 
of the party’s executive group to appeal to and attract the support and membership of 
young people. 
The principal party members of PHON were just three people, Hanson, Ettridge and 
Oldfield, who together formed the party’s executive.  Anyone else who supported 
PHON was not a formal member of the party but merely a ‘supporter’ and a member of 
‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (Membership) Incorporated with no power in the 
party’s decision making or party conferences.  This incorporated entity organised its 
supporters and selected candidates for election.  This entity also had responsibility for 
fundraising.  Having overarching control was ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited’ 
which comprised Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield along with a few others. 
At the time the internal party structure of One Nation was not widely known and the 
shareholders in Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Limited did all they could to conceal the 
exact structure of One Nation. The reason Hanson decided on this structure was in 
order to prevent the right-of-centre party being ‘taken over by extremists’.  While it 
may have achieved that aim, it was questionably legal and could hardly be called a 
democratic structure in a democratic country.   
Arguably Hanson and her advisers should have considered an earlier legal ruling on party 
infiltration – namely the case of Barker v Liberal Party of Australia (SA) 1997 68 SASR 366.  In 
that case, Mrs Barker (a Shooter’s Party advocate) applied to join the Liberal Party and filled in 
an application form.  However, her application for membership was rejected by the Liberal 
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Party in South Australia. The Liberal Party in South Australia had put out a press release on 24 
June 1996, titled ‘Membership Applications from Shooters’ that stated: 
The State Executive of the Party has expressed the firm and unanimous view that it would 
not tolerate any single-issue group, particularly one directed by an outside organisation, 
attempting to take over a section of the Party.  
In fact, the State Executive unanimously agreed to reject approximately 500 applications for 
party membership of the SA Division that had been lodged by the Combined Shooters and 
Firearms Council of SA.  
Under the Liberal Party’s constitution, the State Executive could decline to admit a person to 
membership without giving any reason. Any rejection must be effected within one month of a 
membership application being received.  
The applicable sections of the Constitution of the Liberal Party read as follows:-  
Eligibility for Membership  
5.1 Any person who is over the age of 16 years and who supports the Objectives of the 
Division and who agrees to be bound by this Constitution may apply to become a member 
of the Division.  Application for Membership  
5.2 A person applying to become a member of the Division shall submit an application to 
the State Director in the form prescribed by the State Executive accompanied by the 
appropriate membership fee.   
Commencement of Membership  
5.3 Membership shall commence one month after the State Director receives an application 
unless:- 
(a) the State Executive in the meantime acting upon the recommendation of a Branch or 
upon its own motion, declines to admit a person to membership which it may do without 
giving any reason therefore 
(b) the State Executive gives special permission for an earlier commencement of 
membership."  
In the course of his judgement, the judge said:- 
Mrs Barker has no contractual right to membership (of the Liberal Party) and as an 
applicant for membership has no proprietary interest in the funds of the Liberal Party. Mrs 
Barker has sought membership of an incorporated body which happens to be a political 
party and had her application declined. No question of contract, of unilateral contract, or 
election through invalid rejection arises. The Liberal Party acted according to its 
constitution. No relationship known to the law was ever established between Mrs Barker 
and the Liberal Party, of one with the other. She had no ‘special interest’ entitling her to 
any order from the Court. She was merely, along with many others, a disappointed 
applicant. It all would have been different had Mrs Barker been admitted to membership 
and then had her membership purportedly cancelled that is been dismissed or struck off. 
The question of natural justice would have arisen. All that has happened here is that a 
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person has sought to join a political party and been denied admission.  
The original membership application form a person would complete in order to join One Nation 
was in the following format. 
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Form 8.1: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation – 1997 Application form 
 
What is significant about the above application form is there is no mention of the word ‘party’ 
anywhere on the form.  An applicant would be joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’, but were 
they joining a political party or merely a support group?  In fact, the organisation is referred to 
not as a ‘party’ but as a ‘movement’.  The application form is very confusing as to what type of 
organisation one was joining. 
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The subsequent revised application form, which came out in 1997 and was used until 2001, 
followed the following format: 
Form 8.2: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation – 1999 Application form 
 
This later application form had some improvements compared to its predecessor. The applicant 
was still joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’, but there was now a commitment to ‘loyalty to 
the Party’ and commitment to ‘working to achieve the objectives of the Party’.  The lack of the 
word ‘party’ in the title was not new; a previous party was ‘The Australian Democrats’. 
The next application form, which came out in 2001 was in the following format: 
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Form 8.3: Pauline Hanson’s One Nation – 2001 Application form 
 
 
This latter form appears to have been designed and put into use following the round of court 
cases that brought about Hanson’s imprisonment and court order to repay money to the 
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Queensland Electoral Commission.  On this 2001 membership application form, there was 
absolutely no doubt the applicant was joining a political party.  The word ‘party’ has even been 
worked into the title. 
Once One Nation was formally launched it is interesting to gauge how the major parties 
responded.  Of particular interest were the responses of the leaders of the two major parties, the 
Liberal Party and the Australian Labor Party to the rise of a new competitor.  In May 1998 John 
Howard was interviewed for the Australia Israel Review ‘in light of Anxiety over the 
Government’s handling of Pauline Hanson’.  In the course of that interview Howard stated 
supporters of Pauline Hanson were middle aged to older people, predominately from rural and 
regional areas.  Many of them have felt the impact of economic change, but these supporters 
were not racist.  He considered Hanson’s economic and political comments to be ‘a mixture of 
inaccuracy and harebrained economics. She is a narrow, backward looking person who would 
cost this country jobs and cost us markets in the rest of the world’ (1998:11). 
Three weeks later, the Australia Israel Review interviewed Kim Beazley the Leader of the 
Labor Opposition.  In the course of that interview, Beazley commented that ‘Hanson stands for 
things on race relations which are simply wrong, simply wrong and that has to be pointed out to 
her supporters’.  Beazley went on to warn that ‘Hanson’s attitudes to race relations cannot be 
adopted without a penalty flow on to the nation’.  Beazley also commented that ‘as well as 
damage to the ALP vote and damage to the Nation the real damage from Hanson is to the 
National Party’ (Kapel and Greason 1998B:8-11).  
Kelly (1998:89) explained that the rise of One Nation was as ‘a protest movement with populist 
targets – Asians, Aboriginals, banks, international capital, immigrants, multiculturalism’.  In his 
view, Hanson made three claims: ‘the political system is not working, the elites have betrayed 
the Country and its values and Australia has been on the wrong track for the last 25 years’.  He 
commented that ‘Almost anybody will agree with some of these sentiments and this is her 
appeal’.   
Brett (1998:26) considered that Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’s rise was:- 
Due to the failure of the established political parties . . . to give the people what they want.  
Many Australians had lost confidence in politicians, the parties and the political system 
generally, Australians and their political institutions have been drifting apart. Nearly two 
decades of economic liberalism have left many people worse off. 
The Party’s Policies 
This section of the chapter provides an overview of the policies of One Nation in order to show 
the main issues that were of concern to the party.  The next chapter will discuss a number of the 
policies of One Nation in some detail and show the shortcomings of those policies.  That 
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chapter then argues that these shortcomings in various policies became yet another reason for 
the demise of One Nation. 
George J Merrit (1997) published a tributary paperback book entitled ‘Pauline Hanson the 
Truth’.  The publication was in two parts. Part one contained copies of Hanson’s maiden speech 
and other key speeches, including the speech launching the party in 1997.  Part two of the 
publication was a series of papers on such topics as ‘In Defence of Pauline Hanson’, 
‘Surrendering Australia’ and ‘The Gun Debate’.  The preface advised that the publication was 
assembled by Pauline Hanson’s support team, including members of the Pauline Hanson 
Support Movement (1997:iv).  As this publication was published in 1997, with a second 
printing in May 1997 (after the launch of the Pauline Hanson One Nation party) the ‘support 
movement’ would have been Ettridge’s support movement and not the original Whiteside 
support movement. 
The publication contains many general and broad sweeping statements, but no real suggestions 
for any policy changes or indeed future directions.  The chapter on the gun debate for instance 
provided a good example; it speaks emotionally of a restriction of freedom to own certain guns 
and the need for compensation.  However, there is no mention of what an alternative policy on 
gun ownership ought to be. 
At that early stage in the party’s development, a clearer indication of its policies and vision for 
the future may have given the party additional recognition and credibility building into extra 
support leading into 1998 with elections in both Queensland and federally. 
In the lead up to the Queensland state and federal elections in 1998, the new party set about 
formulating policies.  Kelly (1998:90) commented that ‘Pauline Hanson’s speeches and One 
Nation’s policies have assumed a unity based on an assembly of grievances’.  While 
immigration and aboriginal affairs would be two significant areas, in the light of the events at 
Port Arthur and the Federal government’s subsequent guns legislation, the party also formulated 
a policy on firearms.  That policy was announced on 16 May 1998.  The policy preamble stated 
‘firearms legislation should provide for safe and responsible ownership and use of firearms’.  
The guns policy proved to be very popular in Queensland and provide much support for PHON 
in the final weeks of the Queensland state election.  Reynolds (2000:179) commented that ‘the 
gun lobby found ready champions in the ranks of ONP.’   
The 1998 Queensland State Election 
The first electoral test for PHON was the Queensland state elections held on 13 June 1998.  In 
that campaign, the National-Liberal coalition decided to exchange preferences with One Nation 
whereas the Australian Labor Party refused to give One Nation any preferences (which 
effectively meant ALP preferences would flow to Coalition candidates ahead of PHON 
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candidates).  In the state campaign One Nation captured enormous attention and arguably set the 
agenda.  It stood candidates across the state and won 11 seats with a vote of 22.68 per cent state 
wide.  Coalition preferences to One Nation helped the minor party win eight of the 11 seats that 
they won at the election.  
In the election, much of One Nation’s support came from the rural, regional and outer-
metropolitan areas of the state.  In those areas of Queensland One Nation won 29.8 per cent of 
the vote, mostly at the expense of the National Party, who with 27 per cent of the vote suffered a 
large swing of 23.1 per cent (Newman 1998:4).  Overall across the whole of Queensland, One 
Nation won 22.68% of the vote. 
In fact, Coalition preferences on average flowed 60 per cent to One Nation and 15 per cent to 
the ALP with the remaining 25 per cent of the vote being exhausted.  Six seats were won by 
One Nation from Labor and five from the Nationals.  In July and August 1998 soon after the 
state election and before the Parliament sat, the One Nation parliamentarians received assistance 
and advice from the former premier Sir Joh Bjelke Petersen. 
Significantly, Heather Hill, the state leader of the One Nation team of candidates failed in her 
attempt to win the seat of Ipswich from the ALP.  The very self-confident and articulate Hill 
was one of One Nation’s better performers.  It is very possible that One Nation’s subsequent 
performance in the Queensland could have been much more impressive and beneficial for the 
party’s supporters with Hill as their parliamentary leader.  
Table 27:  One Nation Members of the Queensland Parliament after the 1998 State 
Election 
Member Electorate Won 
from 
Former 
Occupation 
Term of 
Membership 
in PHON 
After 
Quitting 
PHON 
Black, 
Harry 
Whitsunday Labor Produce 
Store Owner 
13 June 1998 
- 14 Dec 1999 
CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Dalgleish, 
David 
Hervey Bay Labor Truck Driver 
Sole Parent 
13 June 1998- 
14 Dec 1999 
CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Feldman, 
Bill 
Caboolture Labor Police SGT 13 June 1998- 
14 Dec 1999 
CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
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Member Electorate Won 
from 
Former 
Occupation 
Term of 
Membership 
in PHON 
After 
Quitting 
PHON 
Kingston, 
John 
Maryborough Labor Vet, 
Agricultural 
Economist 
13 June 1998- 
23 Feb 1999  
Independent 
re-elected.  
Resigned 
parliament 24 
Mar 2003 
(ill-health) 
Knuth, 
Jeff 
Burdekin Nationals Painter and 
decorator 
13 June 1998 
23 Feb 1999 
Independent 
– CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Nelson, 
Shaun 
Tablelands Nationals Ex-soldier 13 June 1998-
6 Feb 1999 
Independent 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Paff, Jack Ipswich West Labor Police Sgt 13 June 1998- 
14 Dec 1999 
CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Pratt, 
Dorothy 
‘Dolly’ 
Barambah Nationals Business 
woman 
13 June 1998-
6 Feb 1999 
Independent 
– re-elected. 
Didn’t stand 
2012 state 
election 
Prenzler, 
Peter 
Lockyer  Nationals Vet 13 June 1998- 
14 Dec 1999 
CCAQ 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
Rappolt, 
Charles 
Mulgrave Nationals Commercial 
Pilot 
13 June 1998-
4 Nov 1998 
(resigned) 
Resigned 
seat. Died 2 
Aug 1999 
(suicide) 
Turner, 
Ken 
Thuringowa Labor Commercial 
fisherman, 
Santa Claus 
13 June 1998-
6 Feb1999 
Independent 
Defeated 
2001 state 
elections 
 
Table 28:  One Nation Members of the Queensland Parliament after the 2001 State 
election. 
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Member Electorate Won from Occupation Term of 
Membership 
After PHON 
Flynn, 
Bill WB 
Lockyer CCAQ Police Officer 17 Feb 2001-7 
Feb 2004 
Defeated 2004 
State elections 
Lee Long, 
Rosa T 
Tablelands Independent 
(ex PHON) 
Grazier, small 
business 
owner, public 
servant 
17 Feb 2001 – 
20 March 2009 
Defeated 2009 
State elections 
Roberts, 
Eliza M 
Gympie  Soldier ARA 17 Feb 2001-18 
Apr 2002 
 
Independent 
Defeated 2006 
elections 
The 1998 Federal Election 
Following the astounding success of the party’s first outing in Queensland state election, the 
party’s second electoral test was later that same year in the federal election held on 3 October.  
Again, at this election, the Labor Party refused to give its second preferences to One Nation.  
However, significantly at this election the Liberal Party and the Nationals also did not allocate 
preferences to One Nation, instead giving them effectively to Labor.  Thus, One Nation was in 
the position of having to allocate its preferences to one of the major parties but receiving none 
in return.   
One Nation stood candidates in almost every electorate in Australia as well as for the Senate in 
each state and territory.  The implications of Hanson’s pre-selection methods will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  Pre-selection was quite often done over the phone without Hanson even 
knowing the potential candidate or their background.  Hanson’s major aim seemed to be having 
a candidate for the party in every electorate in Australia.   
Margo Kingston (1999:107) saw One Nation’s election campaigning in the federal election as:- 
Trying to establish a new political alignment by leaching support from all three major 
parties. Hanson wanted Labor battlers suffering the squeeze on blue collar labour. From the 
Nationals, she wanted family farmers watching the disintegration of their independence and 
way of life through the relentless momentum towards big corporate holdings, and rural 
workers rendered jobless with the introduction of new farm technology. From the Liberals, 
she wanted struggling small business people, especially in the regions, and older, socially 
conservative self-funded retirees. 
An examination of the results of the Queensland state and the federal elections as shows much 
of One Nation’s support coming from dissatisfied Liberal and National Party voters. 
Abbott (2010:50) commented that ‘the impact of the Hanson party had been to take votes away 
from the only conservatives who were ever likely to be in power.  . . . voting for Hanson would 
not produce a more hard working conservative movement but a more divided one.’ 
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Nationally, in the 1998 federal election PHON as a new party received 8.43 per cent of the vote, 
while the Coalition suffered a swing of -7.73 per cent.  The Labor Party had an increase in 
support of 1.34 per cent.  In the state of Queensland, which was PHON’s strongest state, the 
party enjoyed a level of support of 14.35 per cent.  The Coalition suffered a swing of -14.36 per 
cent and the ALP a swing of -2.94 per cent (Bennett, Kopras and Newman 1999:14 and 17). 
In the Queensland state election, Newman (1998:3) comments that ‘the three major parties all 
suffered a decline in voter support with the advent of One Nation’.  Newman goes on to observe 
that One Nation received 22.7 per cent of the vote, while the Nationals suffered a swing of -11.1 
per cent, the Liberals -6.7 per cent and the ALP -4 per cent. 
At the federal election of October 1998, One Nation followed an ambitious lower house 
strategy. Its aim was to capture as many lower house seats as possible, hoping perhaps to hold 
the balance of power in the chamber where governments are made and unmade. The party 
operated with a groundswell of enthusiasm but with little or no organisation. 
One Nation announced a number of key policies, such as immigration restrictions, relaxed gun 
control, low interest loans for business, curfews for youths and citizen initiated referenda.  
These policies will be analysed in the next chapter. 
In that election, Hanson received 35.97 per cent of the primary vote in her own electorate, but 
without any formal preferences she lost to the Liberal candidate who won just 21.69 percent of 
the primary vote (securing also the Nationals and Labor preferences). Consequently, she lost her 
seat in the House of Representatives.  However, One Nation candidate Heather Hill did win a 
Senate seat in Queensland, defeating the National Party Senator, Bill O’Chee. But after a court 
decision voiding her qualifications to stand, her seat in the Senate was taken by the second-
placed One Nation candidate on the Queensland Senate ticket Len Harris, who served one full 
term.  Nationally, One Nation polled 8.48 per cent of the vote. 
Davey (2006:391-2) reports that the Nationals weathered the One Nation onslaught better than 
many expected, despite some enormous swings in heartland seats.  For example, One Nation 
won 26.33 per cent of the primary vote in the electorate of Wide Bay, the Nationals’ primary 
vote going from 59.55 per cent in 1996 to 31.46 per cent in 1998.  In New South Wales, in the 
electorate of Gwydir, One Nation polled 20.77 per cent, while the Nationals vote went from 
62.32 per cent in 1996 to 46.14 per cent in 1998. 
In the NSW Senate election, the voting preference flows of One Nation resulted in the loss of a 
Nationals Senator, Sandy McDonald, to the Australian Democrat candidate Aiden Ridgeway. 
Paradoxically, One Nation was responsible for the reducing the representation of the Nationals 
and increasing the representation of the Australian Democrats. 
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Warhurst (2004:164) has commented that ‘the entry of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation from the 
1998 election onwards further weakened the major parties and complicated the flow of 
preferences’. 
The state by state break down of the One Nation vote at the 1998 federal election is shown in 
the following table.  
Table 29:  1998 Federal election - One Nation vote state break down  
STATE One Nation % Vote 
New South Wales 8.9 
Victoria 3.73 
Queensland 14.35 
Western Australia 9.22 
South Australia 9.81 
Tasmania 2.46 
ACT 5.08 
Northern Territory 8.12 
NATIONWIDE 8.48 
Source: AEC 
It can immediately be seen that One Nation’s main support was in Hanson’s home state of 
Queensland with 14.35 per cent; this phenomenon is common to other minor parties that tend to 
have their main strength in one state.  One Nation also polled a higher percentage of the vote in 
SA, WA and the NT, while the party’s results poorest in Victoria, Tasmania and the ACT. 
A comparison of One Nation’s performance compared to other right wing parties in the 1998 
election is shown in the following table. 
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Table 30:  Senate vote for PHON and other right-wing parties 1998 election 
STATE One Nation % Vote Australia First Citzs Elect Cncl 
New South Wales 9.66 0.76 0.15 
Victoria 4.03 0.21 0.03 
Queensland 14.66 0.26 0.08 
Western Australia 10.17 - 0.28 
South Australia 9.77 0.66 0.08 
Tasmania 3.68 - - 
ACT 4.85 - - 
Northern Territory 10.35 - - 
NATIONWIDE 8.42 0.24 0.08 
Source: AEC 
 
One Nation convincingly out polled both the Citizens Electoral Council and Australia First.  
One Nation’s major impediment was the lack of second preferences following from the two 
major parties. 
Table 31:  One Nation members of the Federal Parliament 1996 - 2005 
Member Electorate or State Terms of Office Remarks 
Hanson, Pauline Oxley 1996-1998 Lost seat – (ran for 
Blair) 
Hill, Heather Queensland none Election declared void 
by Court of disputed 
Returns (did not 
renounce British 
citizenship) 
Harris, Len Queensland 1999-2005 Lost seat 
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The Rise of One Nation in other states 
The following tables show the parliamentary representation of One Nation members in the 
states of WA and NSW.  The table very clearly shows these members were very few and lasted 
only one term in the parliament. 
Table 32:  One Nation Members of WA and NSW Parliaments (upper houses) 
Member House Occupation Term of 
Membership 
After PHON 
Oldfield, 
David E 
NSW Upper Adviser 27 Mar 1999- 
23 Mar 2007 
Did not 
contest 2007 
NSW State 
election 
Embry, P WA Upper 
South West 
Region 
Farmer 10 Feb 2001-
15 May 2003 
Independent,  
joined New 
Country 
Party on 30 
Nov 2004 
Defeated 
2005 State 
elections 
Fischer, JD WA Upper 
Mining and 
Pastoral 
Region 
Business 
Proprietor 
10 Feb 2001-1 
Jun 2004 
joined New 
Country 
Party 
Defeated 
2005 State 
elections 
Hough, FC WA Upper 
Agriculture 
Region 
Business 
Proprietor 
10 Feb 2001-1 
Jun 2004 
joined New 
Country 
Party 
Defeated 
2005 State 
elections 
In Conclusion 
The result for the fledgling One Nation party in the Queensland 1998 state elections was most 
spectacular and surprising with 11 members elected.  For those members to succeed and make 
an impression in Queensland politics, they faced a very steep learning curve, especially in terms 
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of being confident with parliamentary procedure and working together as a political party.  
However, for the new One Nation parliamentarians internal conflict and disunity was not far 
away and this would soon have a devastating impact on the party, along with an inability to be 
taken seriously by the rest of the parliament and the press.  
The prospects of any significant growth in the party’s representation in the federal parliament 
was thwarted by the refusal of both major parties to give their second preferences to One 
Nation.  In addition, the party was without its main player in the federal parliament once 
Hanson lost her seat, becoming the de facto leader of the party from outside parliament.  If that 
wasn’t enough, the party was without its keen and energetic elected Senator, Heather Hill, who 
was replaced through an eligibility technicality by the number two candidate Len Harris.  A 
fumbler and a poor speaker, Harris was no match for the drive and general tenacity that Hanson 
had shown in the previous parliament.   
The way ahead after the initial electoral baptism was shaping up to be very uncertain and 
problematic for the new party. The decline of One Nation, equally as sudden and spectacular as 
its rise, will be explored in the next chapter. 
The next chapter will also analyse the political resurrection of One Nation at the 2016 Federal 
election.  In that election One Nation rose from the death of electoral wilderness to sharing the 
balance of power in the Australian Senate with four senators, including Pauline Hanson herself. 
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Chapter Nine: The Fall of Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the demise of One Nation as a political party.  The seeds of destruction of 
Pauline Hanson’s confected party seemed virtually assured from the outset.  She was politically 
inexperienced but ignited a firestorm of protest and popular outrage; she established a 
‘company-model’ political party which was meant to protect her from infiltration but which was 
legally problematic; she attracted a variety of supporters and people prepared to be One Nation 
candidates but did not vet them carefully and soon found she was losing influence over these 
representatives; splits occurred in the party causing electoral damage; the public funding she 
received was not ploughed back into party development or strategic advertising; the policies 
outlined by One Nation were often ill-conceived or incoherent and nothing more than populist 
sentiments; and she made some poor tactical decisions such as choosing to stand for the lower 
house seat of Blair in 1998 instead of running for the Senate.  Although in parliament for 
approximately three years (1997-1999) the reverberations her crusading party made were felt for 
many years to come. 
During 1998, triumph soon turned to tragedy for the new party. After achieving national 
notoriety, and capturing 11 seats in the Queensland parliament and a quarter of the state vote, 
the party was soon brought back to earth, confronted with the problems of building on this 
success. From late 1998 the party spectacularly began to implode under its own internal 
difficulties. While Hanson and her candidates secured relatively strong regional electoral 
support, One Nation’s parliamentarians were virtually ineffective in the legislature (and she 
herself only managed to hold an elected office for a little over two years). Her main influence, 
nonetheless, was on the major parties themselves (especially the Coalition parties) who 
gradually made some policy accommodations to One Nation’s constituency while ruthlessly 
moving to isolate her political impact by denying her party any preference flows at the ballot 
box. If One Nation was a major player in the federal arena from 1997-98, by 2004 with the 
defeat of its only Senator, it was a spent force; and at the state levels its representation gradually 
dwindled away and by the end of March 2009 no One Nation representative sat in any 
Australian parliament.  The last One Nation repreentative, Rosa Lee Long, who was also One 
Nation’s longest serving MP, was defeated at the 2009 QLD state elections. 
Shortly after the party’s demise, one observer argued:  
Many political commentators regarded the party as an expression of political atavism, the 
last screaming gasp of a style of politics that would be lucky to see the turn of the 
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millennium.  And sure enough, lacking anything resembling party discipline or effective 
organisation, the whole thing self-combusted after some initial successes in Queensland and 
New South Wales, at State and Federal levels (Arena 2006:81). 
This chapter argues that that the demise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation can be traced back to 
its unstable origins, its identification with one polarising leader, and the swift reactions from the 
major parties who contrived to protect their cartelisation of Australian politics.  
Early Tensions with the Pauline Hanson Support Movement  
With hindsight, it appears that the failure to manage and control the Pauline Hanson Support 
Movement was the One Nation Party’s first real big mistake – it magnified impressions of a 
rocky start to the party’s existence.  From the start, both David Ettridge and John Pasquarelli 
were concerned about the unsupervised activities of the Support Movement and its growth.4  
They were determined that the PHSM supporters would not become formal members of the 
party. They conceded that a support movement was an appropriate boost for an Independent 
MP, but that there were dangers in messaging and branding. Support members were simply 
enthusiasts who were not subject to party rules or discipline of the formative One Nation. 
It was strange, if not totally incongruous, that PHSM’s leader, Bruce Whiteside, considered that 
he could speak on behalf of Pauline Hanson. This matter quickly came to a head, when Ettridge 
wrote a letter to Whiteside on 6 February 1997, praising him for his work but at the same time 
advising Whiteside that ‘our own ambitions can only be achieved within a well-managed 
organisation.  There is no other way’.  He went onto say (Ettridge 1997:1):- 
Pauline is very strong and very clear on what she wants to say and do and no one will speak 
for her . . . your concern for being gagged is unfounded.  You have never had any right to 
speak on Pauline’s behalf, a restriction which is placed on everyone. 
Whiteside’s days of heading the Support Movement were numbered.  On 1 April 1997, Ettridge 
again wrote to Whiteside, dating his letter ‘April Fool’s day 1997’.  Ettridge commenced his 
letter by saying (EttridgeA 1997:1): 
Today you lost the respect and admiration of many people who only ever knew who you 
were because you were part of a popular and important movement for change... You 
destroyed the position you created for yourself as one of the initiators of an organisation 
that was never yours to own and certainly never yours to destroy. 
                                                     
4 The relationship between One Nation and the Pauline Hanson Support Movement may superficially seem similar 
to the relationship between the DLP and the National Civic Council, with its leader Bob Santamaria (like Bruce 
Whiteside) not being a member of the DLP and thus not subject to the party discipline of that party. However, the 
DLP and NCC had a fairly institutionalised relationship backed by the resources and influence of the Catholic Church, 
whereas PHSM was much looser congregation of supporters resembling something of a rabble. 
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Ettridge concluded the communication with a blunt warning: 
If you have any dignity, you will now withdraw and have nothing more to do with our 
organisation and we will have nothing more to do with you.  We will move confidently 
forward as any fallout from today’s incident will last only for a day.  The media will have 
other stories tomorrow, however your day of media notoriety will harm you and your 
reputation for years.  
Hearing of the dispute, the Sydney Morning Herald ran a story on 1 April 1997 stating: ‘Hanson 
suffering delusions: sacked worker’.  In the article, Whiteside was reported as accusing Hanson 
of ‘hijacking’ the National Support Movement and of suffering delusions about her importance.  
Whiteside was also reported as claiming that he ‘was asked to stand aside’ as the Support 
Movement’s convener.  He was quoted as saying: ‘you support her (Hanson) and she turns 
around and kicks you in the teeth’. 
A few days later, Ettridge sent a copy of the SMH article to Whiteside with a handwritten 
endorsement: ‘Dear Bruce now that you have got this off your chest, please do us all a favour 
and resist any more damaging media interviews.  You only serve to feed our media opponents 
who desperately need this sort of dissent.  You will harm everything we want for Australia’. 
On 3 April 1997, Ettridge wrote to Paul Trewartna who was the National Vice President and 
Gold Coast Branch President of the Support Movement regarding Whiteside.  Ettridge 
suggested disassociating the Support Movement from Whiteside but not in a ‘public way’, ‘as 
such would only create further negative media.  We will simply cease all contact, and reject any 
correspondence or dialogue from Bruce’ (Ettridge B 1997:1).  The same day, Ron Paddison, the 
Secretary of the Support Movement’s Steering Committee, wrote to Whiteside informing him 
that his membership of the Support Movement had terminated (Paddison 1997:1). 
However not to be outdone, Whiteside wrote to the Secretary of the Support Movement on 8 
April 1997, stating that his letter was ‘not so much of a letter of resignation, but rather one of 
separation’.  Whiteside went on to complain that the main issue for many supporters was not 
Pauline Hanson herself, but the intricacies of the workings under a committee, ‘working on the 
constitution’ while worrying about ‘dotting the ‘i’s and crossing the ‘t’s . . . [and] running like 
hell when there was any work about’ (Whiteside 1997:1).   
Whiteside had a conversation with Trewartha on 1st May and asked for the reasons for his 
dismissal from the Support Movement.  Trewartha responded in writing the next day advising 
Whiteside that the reasons were ‘inability to constructively co-operate with Pauline’, ‘disregard 
for the Committee’s opinions and decisions’ and ‘inability to leave all major media comments 
to Pauline’.  The letter concluded by requesting the return of all Support Movement property as 
soon as possible (Trewartha 1997:1). 
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The Party’s Peculiar Structure and the Two Davids 
A little explored but key factor in the decline and disintegration of One Nation was the peculiar 
structure of the party. A two-tiered membership/supporter arrangement was internally imposed 
whereby three full members of the party were shareholders in a company called Pauline 
Hanson One Nation Party, consisting of Hanson, Oldfield and Ettridge, who together formed 
the Party’s National Executive. Others who wanted to join PHON did so not as formal 
members of the party but merely as ‘supporters’ linked to ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(Membership) Incorporated’ with no power in the party’s decision making or party 
conferences.   
At its establishment, the National Management Committee of the Pauline Hanson Support 
Movement resolved, on 24 May 1997, that there be two levels of membership in the party:  
(1) One Nation members who have full voting rights; and  
(2) Pauline Hanson One Nation supporters who have all rights of membership other 
than voting rights. 
Hanson and the two Davids decided on this structure in order to prevent the Party being ‘taken 
over by extremists’ and to some extent it achieved that aim.  But the unusual structure allowed 
critics to claim ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation was never a political party, merely a fan club’ 
(Balson 2000:iii).  Tony Abbott (2009:50, 51) also described One Nation as ‘a private 
company masquerading as a political party’ and as ‘a company owned by three directors rather 
than a political party democratically controlled by its members’.  This issue could also have a 
bearing on whether or not One Nation was entitled to any government funding for federal 
elections. 
The internal party structure was not widely known and the shareholders in Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation Limited did all they could to conceal the exact structure of One Nation (Balson  
2000:314).  Supporters who applied to join One Nation filled in an application form which 
implied they were joining ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ party, but which instead gave them a 
$5 membership of the support organisation. The form also stipulated that to be elected to hold 
office in a support movement branch, the person needed to be a ‘One Nation member’. The 
various membership forms for PHON were shown in the previous chapter.  Later membership 
application forms made it very clear that the applicant was joining ‘the party’ but decision 
making was almost exclusively in the hands of the three-person National Executive and as 
mentioned later in this chapter this was a major cause of the walkout from the Party by five 
members of the Qld Parliamentary Party. 
Rutherford (2001:192) interviewed a number of One Nation MPs and former MPS and 
reported that one, Jack Paff, advised: 
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It was very autocratic the way it was run.  You would do as you were told or get out.  Or 
you were called a white ant and you were rubbished.  It was a disgrace. 
Another One Nation elected representative, Heather Hill, complained to Rutherford that the 
party’s constitution: 
Basically implanted three people into positions of absolute power . . . what we’ve got isn’t 
a party for the people it’s very top heavy . . . Freedom of speech was there until someone 
said something that was disagreeable to a few people. . . you literally had to agree . . . they 
were shooting the messengers. 
Rutherford (2001:193) also commented that Brett (1998:33) anticipated the upcoming problems 
One Nation would face, by arguing that ‘One Nation lacked ideological unity, organisational 
structure and political skills necessary to unify a disparate collection of individuals into a 
modern political party’.  In Rutherford’s view the three members of the Party’s National 
Executive ‘purged all voices of dissent and created a fundamentally unstable party’. 
One Nation was simply not established as a democratic party.  It was directed by the powerful 
National Executive who would not entertain alternative points of view to their own. When the 
Queensland Parliamentary Party requested elections for the National Executive, Pauline Hanson 
was ‘elected’ on the basis of the following statement made by David Oldfield to the party’s 
conference: ‘is there anyone present who doesn’t want to vote for Pauline Hanson?’ (Rutherford 
2001:198), whereas Oldfield and Ettridge were also elected unopposed abruptly closing off the 
nomination of any other challengers for a position on the executive.  As time soon showed, One 
Nation ‘members’ soon became exasperated with this structure and their inability to express 
their own points of view without being considered to be ‘white ants’. 
Hanson as Party Leader 
From the outset, Pauline Hanson had a lot of personal support. For example, (Balson 1998) 
reported that at the commencement of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (Queensland) state 
conference in Townsville on 28th and 29th November 1998: 
The agenda item to drop ‘Pauline Hanson’ from the title ‘Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’ 
party was overwhelmingly defeated with the voting recorded as 129 against the motion 1 
vote for the motion and 4 delegates abstained from voting. All delegates voted to give 
Pauline Hanson their unanimous support and to retain Pauline Hanson as the National 
President. 
Regarding the leadership style of Pauline Hanson in One Nation Balson (2000:iii) has 
commented that: 
. . . she can lop off long term friendships with good friends or dedicated supporters without 
batting an eye lid, without missing a beat and without considering the consequences. Deep 
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down she is a heartless woman who many believe has used and discarded countless good 
men and women.  She takes no prisoners.  
As Power (2004:11) has observed, a leader needs to be recognisable – not as an individual, but 
as an ordinary person.  A leader should fit in with the crowd - be ‘one of us’.   
Hanson certainly was one of the people, as she said in her maiden speech:- 
I come here not as a polished politician but as a woman who has had her fair share of life’s 
knocks. 
My view on issues is based on common sense, and my experience as a mother of four 
children, as a sole parent, and as a business woman running a fish and chip shop. 
Hanson was wooed by the media, who had shown boredom with the new Prime Minister John 
Howard and uninterested in Labor who were soundly defeated in the 1996 federal election.  
Hanson did the unbelievable in winning a safe Labor seat with a swing of 19.31 per cent.  She 
was not a university graduate but a fish and chip shop owner and a battler.  Savva (1996:24 
commented that Hanson had ‘mega star treatment from the minute she rose in Parliament to 
deliver her maiden speech.’   
Hanson clearly had novelty value.  Kelly (1998:100) commented that Hanson ‘was made a 
celebrity (by the media), she was a fresh commodity; and she drew confrontation like a missile 
searching for a target.’  Drawing confrontation in this way and not running from it ensured 
Hanson of continued media attention, at least until for some reason the media tired of her. 
Unlike the leaders of minor parties without a seat in parliament, Hanson had the advantage of 
incumbency as a member of the federal parliament in making her maiden speech and setting up 
the One Nation party.  Thus, she could speak with the added authority as a member of 
parliament and use the resources of parliament in spreading her message. These resources would 
have included travel, secretarial support and research support.  For a party that had not crossed 
the representation threshold, these resources would have had to have been provided at the 
party’s expense. 
One Nation’s Populist Policy Appeals  
One Nation was principally formed as a protest movement motivated as a party more by what it 
opposed than what it advocated; but gradually the idiosyncratic pieces of a policy jig-saw were 
put in place as the party fought to be taken seriously. During the 1998 Queensland state and 
federal elections, One Nation released a number of policies that were aimed to secure the 
support of its core constituencies. These policy commitments were often symbolic statements or 
headline pronouncements meant to catch the media’s attention and give the party added traction 
amongst disaffected communities. Having said that, many of these pronouncements were 
plucked from unorthodox sources (and some from cranks), often driven by nostalgia or 
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conspiracy theories. Accordingly, many of One Nation’s policies were considered impractical or 
insufficiently thought through by the mainstream political establishment.  It was often very easy 
to find fundamental flaws or overlooked defects in the party’s policies.  Examples include: the 
‘easy tax’ taxation system, citizen initiated referenda and ‘printing money’ for cheap loans to 
farmers, as well as the idea of imposing youth night-time curfews to reduce petty crime. This 
section of the chapter analyses six announced policies of the party: two economic policies (the 
‘easy tax’ and low interest business loans); two law and order policies (namely its guns policy 
and youth curfews); and finally, two populist policies (the idea of introducing a citizens-
initiated referenda and reduced immigration quotas). 
Economic Policies 
i. The ‘Easy Tax’ 
The ‘easy tax’ system proposed replacing all existing taxation such as income tax, sales tax, 
fringe benefits, capital gains tax and withholding tax with a comprehensive sales/transfer tax on 
economic activity. A skeletal description of the ‘easy tax’ and its purported benefits was 
contained in the party’s national policy document on taxation in 1998. 
A 2% tax is applied to the sale price at each change of ownership of property, goods and 
services and  . . . on wages. There are no exemptions or thresholds. In the case of wages, the 
employer pays the 2% tax on the take home pay. The current take-home net pay of 
employees will be preserved at present levels and any pay rises or additional income 
earned, for example overtime, will be taxed at only 2%. In the case of business, the 2% tax 
on gross sales turnover is collected at the point of sale and in addition, the wages drawn 
(their net profit) by businesses operated by sole traders or partners are taxed at 2%. In the 
case of imports, the 2% tax is collected by the importer. In the case of exports, the 2% tax is 
collected by the exporter.  
In its taxation policy document, One Nation clearly saw the ‘easy tax’ as a solution to all of 
Australia’s economic problems.  The party claimed the easy tax would ‘reduce the cost of 
government and there will be increased economic activity, and a reduction in social security 
costs.’   
However, commentators soon criticised the easy tax policy as having a number of fundamental 
flaws. For example, the tax was based on ‘gross sales turnover’ rolling forward, meaning that 
businesses would receive no taxation deductions for business inputs such as the purchase of raw 
materials. The tax was to be levied on exports as well as imports, therefore the cost of exports to 
Australia’s trading partners would be more expensive. The policy was also based on a number 
of assumptions, such as ‘employees and the self-employed will increase productivity willingly’, 
they might not, they could for example, choose to work less hours. The policy speaks of 
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decreased costs, taxation might decrease but there is no mention in the policy of wages, salaries 
and other commercial costs decreasing. 
ii. Low Interest Business Loans - Printing Money 
One Nation also proposed a policy to offer low interest loans to businesses through a ‘people’s 
bank’.  In June 1998, Hanson’s adviser, David Ettridge, proposed that the government ‘print 
money’ to fund those low interest loans.  His proposal quickly received stern criticism from 
various quarters.  For example, economist Chris Richardson claimed such a policy ‘would send 
us broke fast’ and it was an invitation to corruption, would help inflation and stunt economic 
growth as well as diminishing purchasing power (The Australian 19 June 1998). 
As a result, One Nation quickly disowned Ettridge’s comments.  According to AAP (18 June 
1998), Oldfield advised that it was not party policy and that Ettridge had been banned from 
‘commenting on party policy’. According to The Advertiser of 19 June 1998 Oldfield accused 
Ettridge of ‘misrepresenting party policy’…’he issued the national director (Ettridge) with a 
humiliating dressing down, banning him from making further comments on any policy issues.  
Mr Ettridge is the national administrator and he has no position to really be discussing either 
policy or economics or anything else, or politics relating to One Nation Mr Oldfield said’. 
Oldfield’s comments would suggest a degree of conflict and public disagreement between 
Oldfield and Ettridge. Hanson told Ettridge, ‘David, don’t do that again’ an action she described 
as a reprimand, at a press conference. 
Law and Order Policies 
iii. Relaxation of the Firearms Policy – Liberties Under Attack 
Under the One Nation guns policy, legislation would be provided for ‘safe and responsible 
ownership and use of firearms’.  Measures would be introduced to ‘to control and apprehend 
those who illegally or irresponsibly use firearms’. However, such legislation would not ‘be 
used as tools to obstruct, harass or penalise legitimate law-abiding firearm owners’. Licences 
would be issued ‘on a lifetime basis with a nominal fee’ and licences would ‘be subject to 
review in the case of an offence’.  Once the licence had been issued, the licence holder would 
be ‘free to obtain a firearm of the type suitable to their purpose’. The granting of a firearms’ 
licence would require mandatory theoretical and practical firearms’ training by the applicant.  
The policy was based on the following principles:  
 Shooting is a legitimate sport and pastime and participants should be treated 
accordingly.  
 Australians have the right to defend themselves and their families in their own homes.  
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 Disarming law abiding Australians is not in the national interest and will do nothing to 
reduce crime.  
This policy announced on the eve of the Queensland state election gave One Nation support 
from the Queensland electors as the policy was in direct contravention to the Howard 
government’s gun buyback policies and the firearms policies of the ALP.  ‘The gun lobby, 
while failing to elect any candidates in their own right nevertheless found ready champions in 
the ranks of One Nation’ (Reynolds 2000:179).  After the Port Arthur incident, Howard’s guns 
buyback was controversial in regional Australia.  Many primary producers were critical of the 
National Party’s support for the Howard gun policies and gun buyback scheme. 
iv. Youth Curfews 
Hanson had long advocated youth curfews as a result of her Ipswich experiences as a local 
shop-keeper. Her proposal was to enforce a complete curfew on young people 16 years of age or 
younger being out on the streets at night-time.  If the police caught a young person on the streets 
during the curfew, the young person would be returned by the police to their parents, 
The youth curfew policy was designed to attract the support of homeowners who were worried 
about localised crime of youths wandering their streets, but it was in some ways a surprising 
policy given the party’s stated desire to attract young people to One Nation as members of 
‘Young Nation’.  
As Senator Natasha Stott Despoja (1999) pointed out at the time, a youth curfew was at best a 
band-aid solution which would do nothing to address why young people were out on the streets 
after dark and possible reasons could include homelessness and difficulties faced in the home. 
The policy painted young people as criminals simply because they were out at night, which then 
also placed young people in a conflict situation with the authorities, to say nothing of doing 
little if anything to foster respect for the police among young people.  It was furthermore 
suggested by professional experts that existing laws could adequately deal with young people 
who actually offend when they were out after dark or any other time. 
Populist Policies 
v. Tighter Immigration Controls and resisting the ‘Asianisation’ of Australia 
The One Nation Party considered that ‘inappropriately high levels of immigration combined 
with the policy of multiculturalism had led to a serious breakdown in the social cohesion of 
Australia’.  Essentially the thrust of the policy is that, with ‘all due fairness, Australia must have 
an approach to immigration that will benefit not burden the existing population’. The party 
advocated for the abolition of multiculturalism.  One Nation wanted immigration levels to be 
based on a zero-net gain.   The immigration policy, according to One Nation, was non-
discriminatory. According to the One Nation policy document for the 1998 election, ‘genuine 
refugee numbers would be maintained at the current level, and if possible, refugees will return 
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to their own country when the unrest in their homeland had been resolved’.  Furthermore, 
‘illegal migrants would not have access to taxpayer-funded legal aid and the appeal process’.  
With regard to multiculturalism, One Nation believed that while there is ‘an understandable 
desire’ for migrants to maintain their culture in Australia, ‘the desire Australians have to 
maintain their culture, history and traditions must take precedence.’   
One Nation believed that the end result of the federal government’s policy of increased 
immigration would lead to the ‘Asianisation of Australia’. It also believed that the major parties 
both concurred with the policy of increased Asian immigration and that they did so without 
providing any justification or defence of their stance.  One Nation believed that: 
70% of our immigration program is from Asian countries. Consequently, Australia will be 
27% Asian within 25 years, and as migrants congregate in our major cities, the effect of 
Asianisation will be more concentrated there. This will lead to the bizarre situation of 
largely Asian cities on our coasts that will be culturally and racially different from the 
traditional Australian nature of the rest of the country.  
With this ostensibly populist policy One Nation challenged the need for, and the legitimacy of, 
multiculturalism, and the need for increased immigration from Asia in particular.  However, the 
party did not define in its policy statement what it understood multiculturalism to mean or what 
would be implied if it were abolished. Although the party’s immigration policy sought to appeal 
to traditional nationalistic values, the Party arguably did a very poor job of marketing this policy 
to the electors and using the press effectively as part of the process of selling these ideas.  
vi. The citizen-initiated referenda proposal 
The citizen based referenda idea was adopted as a One Nation policy at both the Queensland 
and the federal elections of 1998.  ‘Proposals’ for referenda questions would come from the 
people. Simply put the policy would work as follows: 
 a sponsoring committee of 12 electors would collect a minimum of 44 signatures in 
support of a proposal; 
 if ‘the electoral commission’ assesses the proposal as being able to be given legal effect, 
the sponsoring committee then has 12 months to gather the signatures of two per cent of 
electors on the roll from more than 50 per cent of the electorates; 
 Legislation would then be drafted.  The legislation would then be presented to 
Parliament, who could pass the legislation or make recommendations for its 
improvement; 
 if parliament does not pass the legislation, it is automatically referred for a referendum 
at the next election; 
 however, if the number of signatures equals five per cent of electors, the proposal must 
go to a referendum in three months; 
 if the proposal is approved by a majority of voters in more than 50 per cent of 
electorates, the proposal is ‘presented to the government for assent’ following assent the 
proposal becomes law. 
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This ‘ultra-democratic’ policy appeared as an example of a policy that looked good on paper but 
was questionable in practicality.  It had a number of flaws and short comings.  The proposal 
would be costly to implement and time consuming during which key factors in the referendum 
issue could change dramatically.  However, the proposal also circumvented the operations of 
parliament and elected governments.  Significantly there would be no consideration of the 
possible interaction of a successful referendum proposal with other legislation.  
Prime Minister John Howard enters the Fray... (at last) 
One Nation’s influence in federal politics was severely diminished in 2001 when the Liberal 
Prime Minister John Howard decided to adopt One Nation’s hard line approach to asylum 
seekers, which rendered the maverick party redundant as a protest movement (Henderson 
2002:42). Arena (2006:3) observed that: 
While One Nation drew the rough sketch, it took a more sophisticated set of hands and 
more refined style to fill in the nuance and details. 
Howard chose his timing well (immediately after 9/11) and employed rhetoric to evoke 
nationalistic sentiments (‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come’). As Howard oozed reassurance after the attack on the World Trade centre, 
his election speech in October 2001 effectively cut the ground from under One Nation as a 
force of disaffected mobilisation. By contrast, Hanson began to reinforce the image that she 
was out of her depth as a political leader, a risky and inexperienced alternative on the cusp of 
the ‘War on Terror’, and continued to appear a little tactless in media interviews. 
According to Arena, from 2001 the Howard government pushed the Hanson agenda much 
further than even she could have anticipated – ‘thus guaranteeing One Nation political 
marginalisation’.  
The Major Parties Collude and Refuse to Allocate Second 
Preferences to One Nation 
The major parties soon came to the uncomfortable conclusion that the best way to defeat One 
Nation was to refuse to give the party any second preferences at each of the subsequent federal 
and state elections. Labor was the first to make this decision, and federally announced their 
intentions in a letter dated 24 June 1997, issued by the then leader of the parliamentary Labor 
Party Kim Beazley, who advised that: 
(Hanson) is not about making things better for Australians – she is simply about race and 
division.  This short sighted and discriminatory view can only damage our future and is 
utterly rejected by the Australian Labor Party.  We will not support Pauline Hanson, the 
One Nation Party or their objectives in any way.’ (Beazley 1997) 
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The conservative Coalition was slower to come to the same decision (and some resistance was 
expressed by some Nationals in regional electorates), but following the Victorian Liberals and 
then the confirmation of the federal party the Coalition locked in behind Labor.   
This tactical decision was one of the major reasons for the decline in One Nation support.  
Starved of oxygen, with no flow of preferences from other parties, meant that One Nation had to 
win seats purely on its primary vote alone.  In effect, in most lower house seats, One Nation 
candidates were second preferencing another party but receiving no support in return. For the 
two major parties in Australia, their uncomfortableness meant that to effectively deal with the 
threat of PHON, they had to effectively preference swap with each other before One Nation, and 
deliberately put PHON last on their preference distribution list.  Usually at elections the two 
major parties gave each other the last preference on the ballot paper and preferenced all variety 
of minor parties or independents first.  But by preferencing against PHON the two major parties 
were able to stymie the development of the minor party and frustrate its chances of gaining 
representation.   
In the 1996 federal election Pauline Hanson’s performance is shown in the following table.  
Note that this was before the formation of PHON and she ran as a disendorsed Liberal 
candidate. 
1996 Federal election Results for the electorate of Oxley 
Candidates   Party Votes % Swing 
  WYLES, Carl   765 1.09 1.09 
  SCOTT, Les ALP 27,497 39.36 -15.18 
 
HANSON, Pauline LP 33,960 48.61 22.86 
  PULLEN, David Roy DEM 4,248 6.08 0.56 
  ROBB, Victor IND 1,094 1.57 1.57 
  McKEON, John 
Robert 
GRN 1,870 2.68 2.68 
  CHAPMAN, Bill AIP 433 0.62 0.62 
  ..... CAP     -2.90 
  ..... NP     -3.86 
  ..... QG     -4.42 
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  ..... OTH     -3.01 
    FORMAL 69,867 97.15 0.47 
    INFORMAL 2,049 2.85 -0.47 
    TOTAL 71,916 94.94 -0.92 
            
Full Distribution of 
Preferences 
  Party Votes % Swing 
  SCOTT, Les ALP 31,622 45.34 -19.31 
 
HANSON, Pauline LP 38,129 54.66 19.31 
  EXHAUSTED   116     
    
 
   
 
Exhausted votes are ballot papers which show no further valid preference for any candidate and 
must, therefore, be set aside from the count. 
In the next federal election in 1998, Pauline Hanson ran as a PHON candidate in a neighbouring 
electorate (Blair) as an electoral distribution had taken place.  Her performance is shown in the 
following table. 
1998 Federal election Results for the electorate of Blair 
Candidates Party Votes % Swing 
  McKENZIE, Neal DEM 2,478 3.64 -2.13 
  WHITE, Brett Ian NP 6,989 10.25 -6.91 
  BASSINGTHWAIGHTE, Owen David CEC 199 0.29 0.29 
  CLARKE, Virginia ALP 17,239 25.29 -0.18 
  CONNORS, Libby GRN 1230 1.80 -0.43 
  HANSON, Pauline HAN 24,516 35.97 35.97 
# THOMPSON, Cameron LP 14,787 21.69 -24.19 
  ROBERTS, Lee IND 556 0.82 0.82 
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Candidates Party Votes % Swing 
  SLOAN, Mark ACS 170 0.25 0.25 
  ..... AWP     -0.16 
  ..... AIP     -0.39 
  ..... AFI     -0.17 
  ..... OAP     -0.94 
  ..... OTH     -1.83 
    FORMAL 68,164 96.41 -0.98 
    INFORMAL 2,541 3.59 0.98 
    TOTAL 70,705 95.28   
Full Distribution of Preferences Party Votes % Swing 
  HANSON, Pauline HAN 31,766 46.60   
 
THOMPSON, Cameron LP 36,398 53.40   
As can be seen in spite of leading on primary votes, Hanson lost the seat and her place in 
parliament.  The important thing to note is the flow of the preferences of the excluded ALP 
candidate (Clarke) 73.8 per cent of her second preference votes flowed to the Liberal 
Thompson, and only 26.2 per cent of her votes ‘leaked’ to Hanson.   
This strategy of allocating second preferences by both of the major parties against a minority 
party could happen again against another minor that both major parties want to either defeat or 
seriously weaken.   
A number of other strategies, however, would have been open to One Nation regarding the 
allocation of preferences.  One Nation could have refused to allocate preferences to any one 
party, which is what they did in the end.  They could have made more of an impact with other 
strategies, for example, preferencing a given minor party.  On their how to vote cards One 
Nation could have left the choice of preference up to the voter, showing how to second 
preference both parties.  One Nation in safe seats could have preferenced the other major party, 
for example in a safe Labor seat preference the Liberal candidate and vice versa.  In marginal 
seats force a ‘bidding war’ for PHON preferences.  This could show that PHON preference were 
not to be taken for granted and treated lightly.   
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However Wanna and Arklay (2001:554) recorded that in relation to the 2001 Queensland state 
election, One Nation advised it would adopt a ‘spoiler role by preferencing against every sitting 
member – on the grounds that they were all part of an establishment elite who acted against the 
interests of the local electorate.’  This was assumedly done as a protest to the major parties for 
not allocating second preferences to One Nation. 
The Aftermath of the Queensland State Election and Terry 
Sharples’ Litigation 
Not long after the Party’s spectacular Queensland debut, cracks in the party’s unity began to 
surface.  One of the unsuccessful PHON candidates in the Queensland state elections was Terry 
Sharples, who stood for the seat of Burleigh.  He originally intended to stand as an independent 
candidate, but after meeting with Paul Trewartha (who Sharples believed was national vice 
president and national secretary of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation), agreed to join the new party 
and stand as the endorsed candidate for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. Trewartha at the time 
held only his positions in Pauline Hanson Support Movement Inc.  Sharples’ agreement was 
conditional on his controlling the giving of preferences, and his recovering 75 per cent of his 
personal campaign expenditure from Electoral Commission refunds passed on to the party after 
the election.   
Disagreement over Sharples’ allocation of preferences led, however, to a withdrawal of One 
Nation’s support for him just before the election.  He was not elected, although he received 
more than 4 per cent of the valid first preference votes, which bears upon the entitlement to 
electoral funding reimbursement.  He had personally spent more than $11,000 on the campaign, 
and sought reimbursement from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, but this was not forthcoming.  
As a result, Sharples started investigating One Nation to determine what entity to sue to recover 
his electoral expenses. 
In Canberra, Tony Abbott MP (then a junior minister in the Howard government), viewed the 
rise of One Nation with some alarm.  He had two concerns, the first was that he employed 
David Oldfield as his private secretary and while employed in that role, Oldfield was planning 
the formation and rise of One Nation.  The second concern was One Nation was attracting 
members and supporters, not from the ALP, but from the Liberal Party and the Nationals, this 
weakening of the conservative vote could result in a long-term Labor government. Abbott 
commented that ‘Having unwittingly helped to give birth to One Nation, I felt a personal duty to 
stop people from being taken in by it’. (Abbott 2010:51). 
Sharples, with the encouragement and assistance from Abbott, sued both the Queensland State 
Electoral Commissioner (O’Shea) and Pauline Hanson as a representative of PHON in the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, before Justice Atkinson.  In mounting his claim for 
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reimbursement, Sharples requested the court review the decision to register One Nation as a 
political party.  Justice Atkinson handed down the Court’s decision on 18 August 1999.   
Sharples argued that the ‘party’ did not have 500 members who were enrolled as electors in the 
state of Queensland; that it did not have as one of its aims and objectives the election of 
candidates to the Queensland Legislative Assembly; and thirdly, that the person who signed as 
secretary of the party was not in fact the secretary of the party. Sharples claimed he believed he 
had joined the political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, and he had stood as a candidate for 
it in the state election held on 13 June 1998. The name of the party, Pauline Hanson's One 
Nation appeared next to his name only because it was a registered party and he was endorsed by 
that party. His expectation of a refund of his electoral expenses was based on his expectation 
that the political party was registered and would receive electoral funding from which his 
expenses or a part of them would be reimbursed.  
The judge ruled that at the time of being granted registration Pauline Hanson’s One Nation did 
not have 500 members although the evidence shows that it had more than 500 people who 
believed themselves to be members.  Furthermore, she found that Hanson, Ettridge and 
Oldfield knew that the political party did not have 500 members and knew therefore that it was 
not entitled to registration.  
The Judge found that after reviewing the decision of the Electoral Commission, that its 
decision to register Pauline Hanson’s One Nation under the Queensland Electoral Act was 
induced by fraud or misrepresentation.  Accordingly, One Nation was not entitled to 
registration as a political party in Queensland as it did not satisfy the requirement of s.70 of the 
Electoral Act 1992.  
The Director of Public Prosecutions then became involved and Hanson and Ettridge were 
charged with fraud.  In October 2001, Hanson began her court appearances for fraudulently 
registering her party (and then receiving electoral funds).  Appearing with fellow accused 
David Ettridge, she was charged with illegally obtaining $500,000 from the Electoral 
Commission, which she had to repay before the subsequent state election in 2001 (Wanna 
2002:265).   
The committal hearing was heard in the Magistrates Court in April and May 2002, with both 
pleading not guilty to the charges.  Ettridge told the Magistrate that ‘Hanson was not capable of 
putting together the structure of One Nation, and had relied on him for the advice (Wanna 
2002:561).  In May 2002 police laid further charges of for misappropriation of funds from 
Hanson’s ‘fighting fund’.  The Magistrate ordered that they stand trial by jury over the charges 
that Hanson conspired to claim electoral funds dishonestly. 
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At their trial in the Queensland District Court, they were found guilty and sentenced to prison.  
Hanson and Ettridge then appealed to the full bench of the Queensland Supreme Court. In their 
judgement, the three Justices of that Court found that a separate organization, namely the 
political party Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, was constituted, by a resolution of Hanson, 
Ettridge and Oldfield on 23 February 1997. That organization was registered federally as a 
political party on 27 June 1997 and in Queensland on 4 December 1997.  
The Court held that that the applicants for membership became members of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation, the political party or more probably, of both that political party and the support 
movement. The Judges quashed the convictions of Hanson and Ettridge and entered verdicts of 
acquittal.   
These well-publicised bouts of litigation instigated by Sharples caused no end of embarrassment 
to Hanson and her newly formed party.  To add to her trouble her party in the Queensland 
Parliament with its inexperience and lack of guidance was starting to unravel and a rapid pace. 
The Implosion of One Nation in the Queensland Parliament 
In the lead up to the 1998 Queensland state elections, Hanson had no idea or knowledge about 
her nominated candidates.  In particular, she did not know anything about their particular 
backgrounds.  Notwithstanding, she sent to these prospective candidates membership and 
candidate kits.  There was no vetting or scrutiny of the individual candidate and no knowledge 
by Hanson or her office staff of the candidates’ experience of politics, public office or debating 
skills.  Importantly the all-important question for a candidate, - ‘is there anything in your past 
life, if it became known, could cause embarrassment to the party?’ was not asked. 
Significantly, the One Nation parliamentary party had advice from Sir Joh Bjelke Petersen at a 
party meeting, before taking their seats in the parliament. It is surprising that One Nation did not 
seek further advice from former parliamentarians and even parliamentary officials on life and 
strategies as members of the Queensland parliament.   
Wanna (1999:575) claims that ‘the parliamentary members of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation did 
not know each other before they sat together in parliament as a cross bench party.  The strain of 
working together with equally inexperienced strangers began to take its toll on personal 
relations with in the party’. Fairbrother (2001:3-4) also reflected that, ‘One Nation had a very 
tempestuous entrance into the (QLD) parliament… One Nation’s entrance into politics changed 
the face of parliament dramatically.’  Fairbrother offered as examples the usage of a 
parliamentary conference room for a party meeting and secondly and more significantly, the 
maiden speeches of the One Nation members, which Fairbrother stated ‘amazed and surprised 
many people’. 
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A maiden or first speech is a pivotal moment for a new member of parliament.  It is the new 
member’s chance to inform parliament of their visions for the future and their priorities.  It is 
parliament’s first glimpse of the new member’s speaking and debating styles and why they 
support the party they represent.  The maiden speech is an occasion that calls for a well-
researched carefully worded speech that makes a positive contribution and not for an exhibition 
of negativity, emotionalism and half-baked ideas as the new PHON members exhibited.  
When the One Nation members started to give their maiden speeches a number of the speeches 
contained some strange and fanatical comments.  For example, the member for Burdekin, Jeff 
Knuth, in a very emotional speech claimed that Prime Minister Howard’s reaction to the Port 
Arthur massacre was a knee-jerk reaction.  In Knuth’s opinion: 
Port Arthur had nothing to do with it.  That was only the excuse to slug Australians with 
extremist laws long hidden away in the files . . . awaiting the day when Australian law 
makers could be scared into passing laws hatched in a faraway foreign capital to better fit 
Australians into their glorified international mould (Knuth (1998:1470ff).   
He went to accuse federal politicians of ‘fiddling the books’, and also claimed without 
providing any evidence that, ‘the Premier is more interested in communist Vietnam.  The Prime 
Minister is more interested in building palaces in Africa’.  
While Charles Rappolt, the PHON member for Mulgrave, claimed that: 
It must be the duty of this parliament to get the firearms out of the ground and back on to 
the walls… so that Queenslanders can again hold up their heads in public and shout, “I am 
proud to be a militia man or reservist in the patriotic sense (Rappolt 1998:1454). 
Bill Feldman the leader of the PHON parliamentary party, also raised the spectre of communism 
by alleging that there were communist forces in Queensland schools and that they were creating 
‘hate and division’.  He called on the Labor government to stop ‘this particularly nasty form of 
political child abuse’ (Courier-Mail 6 August 1998). 
In such a short space of time, Hanson and her party officers had selected a great many 
candidates to contest the Queensland and federal elections who were weak and inexperienced 
and likely to be poor parliamentary performers.  One such candidate was the ‘young bumptious 
member for Tablelands, Shaun Nelson, the ‘enfant terrible of ONP’ (Reynolds (2000:173).  
Nelson had a harsh tactless style of debating, for example: 
. . . we will see how many Aboriginal children lying drunk in the gutter we stumble over.  
We will see how many Aboriginal children are standing outside pubs waiting for their 
parents to come out (Nelson 1998:1916). 
This was a strange statement from a member who advocated ‘equal rights, not extra rights’ or 
‘treat unequals equally’.  It is hard to see how the above statement by Nelson is supposed to 
empower aboriginal children and give them a sense of pride. Then on 5 August 1998 in a speech 
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complaining about the Ipswich City Council, Nelson challenged a Labor member to ‘step 
outside’ (Nelson 1998:1617) which is the usual challenge to go and sort out the differences 
physically.  
Much of the parliamentary performance of the One Nation members indicates poorly thought 
out speeches with no sense of strategy only knee jerk reactions. 
For example, on 25 August 1998 in the Qld Parliament, the leader of One Nation, Feldman 
moved a motion that five members of the Labor Party be ‘collectively charged with admonition, 
contempt of the House, and have committed criminal offences . . . and they be expelled from 
Parliament forthwith’ (Feldman 1998:1869).   
Jack Paff, the member for Ipswich West and a former policeman, was appointed as the One 
Nation member on the Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC).  At a reception at 
Government House on 28 September 1998, Paff spent some time speaking with a member of the 
Queensland police force.  In the course of the conversation, Paff made a series of serious 
allegations against serving police officers, all of whom strenuously denied Paff’s allegations. 
The specific officer to whom Paff made the allegations, considered Paff to be very indiscrete in 
raising the allegations in the circumstances in which he did (PCJC 1999:2).  Paff admitted that 
the allegations were ‘a total lie’.  Paff claimed he made the comments to the policeman merely 
in order to ‘shock him and get a reaction from him’ (PCJC 1999:4). The committee found that 
Paff’s conduct was unacceptable and inappropriate and the committee condemned Paff’s 
conduct (PCJC 1999:15).  Paff resigned from the committee on 3 March 1999. 
The activities of Paff show how inexperienced he was as a parliamentarian.  The PCJC is a very 
high profile committee and its members have serious obligations regarding their conduct and 
what they say about the activities of the committee.  Being an MP requires a high standard of 
conduct in terms of people’s reputations.  In addition, misleading the House in any form is a 
very serious offence.  At this point in time the One Nation members were Members of 
Parliament for less than 12 months.  
The Party’s Divisions Start to Deepen 
On 4 October 1998, the QLD PHON MP Charles Rappolt the member for Mulgrave, suddenly 
resigned from the Queensland parliament, citing health problems and media pressure as the 
reasons.  He later committed suicide.  The resultant by-election was won not by PHON but by 
the ALP from the Nationals after a close contest.  In fact, PHON with 15.6 of the vote was the 
first party eliminated from the count.  One Nation went from eleven members to ten in the 
parliament. 
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In the Queensland parliament on 5 February 1999 three One Nation MPs resigned from the 
party after their demands for the One Nation directors Hanson, Ettridge and Oldfield, who were 
the members of the party’s National Executive, to step down and face democratic elections were 
not met by the party. They had issued a challenge to One Nation on 3 February 1999 by lodging 
‘a ten-point set of demands with the members of the party’s National Executive’.  These points 
were ‘not negotiable, nor will any discussion be entered into’, apparently the members of the 
parliamentary party were not interested in any form of negotiating such as ‘win-win’ 
negotiations! The points included ‘MPs must be allowed to attend National and State 
Conferences with full voting rights’.  Point seven was curious, it read: 
All minor newspapers that are willing to support PHON should be given approval by an 
elected committee who will also examine all literature prior to print (Background Briefing 
1999:1). 
Point seven indicates an attempted form of censorship of the press by the party.  Furthermore, if 
a ‘minor newspaper’ wishes to print an article about PHON, they would hardly seek ‘approval’ 
to do so instead just going ahead and printing it. 
Once again, the parliamentary party showed a lack of thought and planning instead giving way 
to emotionalism and anger which detracted from their real concern which was the control and 
closed shop nature of the National Executive of PHON.   
In a letter to One Nation members, dated 18 January 2000, Pauline Hanson stated: 
Over the years lies and innuendos have been spread about the two Davids. It has come to a 
stage where dealing with perception is an endless battle. People are too often easily swayed 
by gossip and lies, and only hear what they want to. I have always tried to be honest and 
accountable to the members of One Nation and have worked to the best of my ability for 
our country. David Oldfield has been accused for years of wanting to take over the party as 
leader, and along with David Ettridge was said to be controlling me. David is a fine 
Parliamentarian and has worked tirelessly to help me achieve my goals. The people, who 
have accused him of this, are now actually the ones who have done the dirty deed. For the 
first five months after launching the party David Ettridge fully funded the National Office, 
paid the wages and worked to establish branches throughout the country. David Ettridge 
has been accused of misappropriation of monies over the years, yet no evidence to support 
these cowardly rumours has been produced. 
Miscalculations in the 1998 Federal Election 
The Party’s second electoral test occurred later that same year in the federal election held on 
3 October 1998.  Again, at this election, as with the Queensland State election, the Labor Party 
refused to give its second preferences to One Nation.  Significantly, however, in the federal 
election the National Party and the Liberal Party changed their second preference allocation and 
also did not give their second preferences to One Nation, instead giving them to Labor.  Thus 
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One Nation was in the position of having to give second preferences but receiving none in 
return.   
Hanson personally polled well in the election but still lost her seat in the House of 
Representatives. Hanson made a tactical mistake in running for the House of Representatives 
seat of Blair.  Due to the recent federal electoral redistribution in Queensland, Hanson’s seat of 
Oxley had been split into two by the Electoral Commission and the new Oxley would have been 
harder for Hanson to retain.  She then decided to contest the neighbouring electorate of Blair 
instead. In winning Oxley in 1996, there was no Liberal candidate but there was a Liberal 
candidate in Blair in 1998.  Many Liberals voted for Hanson in 1996 because they did not have 
a replacement endorsed Liberal candidate.  In an article headed ‘Hanson heads for the exit’ 
Richardson (1998:32) commented that Hanson was defeated in Blair the moment the Nationals 
decided not to second preference her.  In his view the only way she could have won was either 
on the primary vote or with ‘substantial preference leakages’.  Richardson went on to argue that 
if Hanson had run for the Senate she would have only needed 14 per cent for a quota and not 51 
per cent for an absolute majority and may have been able to secure two quotas. If Hanson had 
contested for a Senate seat (or two) this would have meant the whole state would have been her 
electorate and she would have been easily elected. 
The one positive for the party was that One Nation candidate Heather Hill did win a Senate seat 
in Queensland, defeating the National Party Senator, O’Chee. Nationally One Nation polled 
eight per cent of the vote or close to one million votes.   
Ironically the One Nation preferences in the NSW Senate election ensured the loss of the 
Nationals Senate Candidate (Sandy McDonald) and the election of the Australian Democrats 
candidate Aden Ridgeway.  Thus One Nation preferences ensured the loss of a candidate who 
would have at least had some sympathy with One Nation’s viewpoint, with a candidate who was 
very strongly opposed to One Nation and all it stood for. 
The refusal of the major parties to second preference One Nation was also the case in each of 
the subsequent elections.  This could be considered a major reason for the decline in One Nation 
support.   
After the mixed showings in 1998, One Nation operated on a Senate and states upper house 
election strategy.  The party realised the significance of Graham Richardson’s advice that it 
would be much easier to win a quota of votes in the Senate rather than an absolute majority in 
the House of Representatives. 
 
 
248 
 
Table 33:  PHON Parliamentary Members across the Australian Jurisdictions 1996-2007 
Parliament 1996 1998 1999 2001 2004 2007 Remarks 
Reps 1 0 0 0 0 0 Hanson’s seat 
Senate 0 1 1 1 0 0 Harris 
QLD 0 11 3 3 1 0  
NSW Leg 
Council 
0 0 1 1 0 0 Oldfield 
WA Leg 
Council 
0 0 0 3 0 0  
Further problems befell One Nation – leading to more legal 
challenges and resignations 
On 1 December 1998, Chuck Hong, a Sydney businessman, launched a High Court challenge 
against One Nation’s Heather Hill, questioning her eligibility to sit in the Senate due to her 
failure to renounce her British citizenship.  On 23 June 199, the High Court of Australia (sitting 
as the Court of Disputed Returns) held that Heather Hill was unable to take her seat in the 
Senate as she failed to renounce her British citizenship before the federal election (as had some 
other parliamentarians who had been elected).  In her stead, Len Harris took her place in the 
Senate.  Harris had health problems, and in addition he came across to the electorate as lacking 
in self-confidence as a parliamentarian and was very uncertain of himself in Senate committee 
hearings. 
PHON was officially deregistered in Queensland on 19 August 1999.  The Queensland Electoral 
Commission (QEC) immediately promised to recover the $500,000 in electoral funds paid to 
PHON after the 1998 state election.  Four months after that on 13 December 1999 the 
Queensland One Nation leader, Bill Feldman announced that he and four of his fellow 
parliamentary party members had registered One Nation Queensland as a separate, state based 
party.  However, on 22 December 1999, Feldman announced the Party’s name would be the 
City Country Alliance of Queensland (CCAQ), following a legal threat over the usage of ‘One 
Nation’.  
Table 34:  The Dramatic Decline in One Nation’s Vote 1998-2010 
Election House of Reps No of 
Candidates 
Senate No of 
Candidates 
1998 8.40  139 9.00 23 
2001 4.34 125 5.50 21 
2004 1.19 77 1.73 12 
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2007 0.26 35 0.42 12 
2010 0.22 21 0.56 10 
2013  15  9 
 
In the 1998 election, in which both major parties did not second preference One Nation, the vote 
for the party in the House of Representatives and the Senate is almost identical which would 
indicate that those who supported wholeheartedly the policies of One Nation voted for it.  In 
other words, the ‘doctrine’ of One Nation was supported.  There seems to be very little if any 
indication of a protest vote, where a voter will vote for a major party in the House of 
Representatives and for a minor party such as One Nation in the Senate.  This result could be an 
indicator that One Nation is very much a ‘doctrinal party’.  
Abbott (2010:52) commented that ‘Most One Nation voters eventually returned to the Liberal 
and National Parties partly because they saw through Hanson and partly because the economy 
started to improve but also, I suspect, because the Howard Government became better at 
demonstrating its conservative as well as its liberal credentials’. 
The Next Queensland State election of 2001 
Commenting on the policies of One Nation in the 2001 Queensland State election, Fells 
(2001:32) commented that:  
The policies presented by One Nation were non-specific and general, often seen to be 
motherly and mere catch cries which included little detail.  The election favourites of law 
and order, education, employment and health were trotted out.  One Nation forget me nots 
of indigenous issues and firearms were also covered. 
In the election PHON received 8.69 per cent of the first preference votes a swing against the 
party of minus 13.99 per cent.  PHON fielded 39 candidates.  Significantly, the CCAQ only 
managed 2.39 per cent of the first preference votes, fielding 25 candidates.  One Nation was 
‘runner up in 12 seats after the distribution of preferences’.  One Nation had ‘prominent support 
in Queensland’ (Wood and Rosenblum: 2001:60).   
All was not lost for One Nation.  The Party did manage to win three seats. It captured the seat of 
Gympie because according to O’Hara (2001:39) ‘the National Party failed to protect the primary 
and agricultural industries of the region from the effects of decentralisation’.  The successful 
One Nation candidate was Elisa Roberts, a former soldier.  However, on 18 April 2002 she 
resigned from the party and sat as an independent until she was defeated at the 2006 state 
elections.  In addition, the party also won Lockyer from the CCAQ, with Bill Flynn as 
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candidate.  Flynn was defeated at the next state election in 2004.  Finally, the party won 
Atherton from an independent who formerly represented One Nation.  The candidate was Rosa 
Lee Long who was a grazier and small business owner who held the electorate until the 2009 
state election when she was defeated.   
The 2001 Federal Election 
PHON failed to have a second senator elected in QLD, a warning sign for Harris that his 
campaign in the 2004 federal election would be a hard and difficult campaign (and Harris did in 
fact lose his Senate seat at the subsequent election).  In 2001 no PHON candidate was elected 
for either the Senate or the House of Representatives. The party’s vote in both houses had 
almost halved with 125 candidates running for the party in the House, a reduction of 16 from 
the 1998 election and 21 candidates for the Senate a reduction of two. 
One Nation’s Tumultuous Relationship with the Media – 
Novelty Value Turns to Disdain 
Pauline Hanson initially attracted a large amount of press coverage but did not effectively 
capitalise on it with strategies such as well-prepared press conferences and press briefings on a 
one to one basis to get the message ‘out there’.  It is surprising that One Nation did not employ 
qualified journalists who had been members of the parliamentary press gallery as press 
secretaries for Hanson and then Harris in the Senate.  It can be argued that One Nation and its 
parliamentarians and senior officers did not understand the press nor did they make any real 
attempt to so do. 
Hanson received a lot of free media publicity because in the eyes of the media, she had a certain 
celebrity and novelty value.  She attracted attention to herself in the press with her combative 
personality and her direct speech. She welcomed and used the free publicity, which initially was 
a smart strategy for a small, new party that cannot afford much paid advertising and had to rely 
on free media publicity.  Her antics and controversial views ensured that she received much 
media publicity, she capitalised on this.  As her first speech to the federal parliament has 
indicated, Hanson often began her messages and speeches with:  ‘I am a real Australian and we 
real Australians are not being listened to’, ‘I am a battler’, ‘I am not a politician, I am a 
parliamentarian’. Her gender and appearance were also important in generating attention; from 
her cat-like eyes to her dress codes. As McPate (2001:52 ff) commented, ‘the media had a field 
day analysing Hanson’s wardrobe rather than . . . (her) policies’.   
Ward (1998:241) has commented that during July 1997, One Nation held a series of recruitment 
rallies in several states.  The result, according to Ward, was ‘crowds of protesters as well as 
251 
 
supporters and a number of rallies ended in violence’.  This allowed Hanson the oxygen of 
publicity and an opportunity to cast her opponents as political terrorists’.  
One Nation’s relations with the press in Queensland were not helped by the leader of the party, 
Bill Feldman (QLD MP) who, when speaking on a condolence motion for the late Charles 
Rappolt attacked the Murdoch press in the Queensland parliament on 17 August 1999.  Rappolt 
was a former member of One Nation in the Queensland parliament, elected in the 1998 state 
elections, He resigned on 4 November 1998, citing the pressure of political life and the 
Queensland press as reasons.  He committed suicide on 2 August 1999. Feldman said: 
The Murdoch press achieved what 45 years of hard work could not do Charlie – pushed 
him not just to the edge but over it.  It is here that we should note the ethics of journalism, 
not just to pursue a man but to pursue him to death.  There is blood on the hands of some 
journalists in the Murdoch press today, and that stain will not be erased. 
These were strong words from a party leader, whose party needed all the positive press coverage 
it could get. 
The One Nation Party had a strong dislike for the Murdoch Press.  Balson (2014) advised that 
‘the media in Australia is controlled by Murdoch. Once a year Murdoch gets all his editors 
together and discusses HIS agenda. He is a sick power freak – look at phone tapping in the UK’.  
Balson went on to mention that, ‘One Nation never got a good run in the press – the press is the 
anchor behind the two-party system which hinges on media support. Murdoch loves power and 
a third political power would have taken that power away from him’. 
However, Wear (1998:256) presents a different account.  She observed that in the 1998 federal 
election campaign: 
The travelling press contingent subjected Hanson… to hostile questioning. Ms Hanson 
found the pressure difficult to cope with and on a number of occasions had members of the 
media ejected.  This early confrontation set the tone for One Nation’s relationship with the 
media culminating in the eviction of journalists seeking costings of the Party’s campaign 
promises three days before the poll. What was left of One Nation’s campaign after that was 
“media free”.  When it became clear on election night that Ms Hanson had lost Blair, the 
media were once again asked to leave. 
One Nation and its lifespan 
The party lifespan of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in the federal parliament and in the 
Queensland parliament is shown in the following diagram 
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The first noticeable point is the very small dispersion of the lifespan above the representation 
threshold of 12 years.  The election of a senator for a six-year term and a member of the QLD 
Legislative Assembly for 9 years accounts for most of that life-span.  In terms of flatness, One 
Nation falls in to the second polar category namely short lifespan, quick appearance, a quick 
apex and then disappearance, in this case very slowly over some years.   
After being elected in the federal election of 1996 as an independent, the party was formed and 
registered in 1997.  As the party already had representation in the federal parliament, namely 
Hanson, the party immediately crosses the representation threshold.  In the 1998 Queensland 
state election, the party’s strongest state in terms of support, the party won 11 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly.  A federal election was also held a little later in that year, and Hanson 
lost her seat in the House, but the party won a Senate seat in Queensland.  This result ensured 
the party continued above the strong representation threshold with their membership was widely 
reported in the press and there was a sense of anticipation of what this new party could do with 
such a strong Queensland result, notwithstanding one member had resigned from the parliament 
in October 1998 and his seat was won by Labor at the subsequent by-election. 
However, the storm clouds of party disunity soon gathered.  In March 1999, four members of 
the party resigned to become independents.  Their major grievance was the high level of control 
they saw over their activities from the leaders outside parliament namely Hanson Oldfield and 
Ettridge.  The new Senator took his seat in the Senate on 1 July 1999 in an atmosphere of party 
disunity and uncertainty of what would happen next. At that point, the party dropped down into 
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the representation weak threshold, due to the disunity and resignations but the One Nation’s 
troubles were not over.  In December 1999, the remaining five One Nation Members resigned 
from the Party, forming the new Party, the City and Country Alliance Queensland (CCAQ), this 
left only their Senator as a member of the parliamentary party.  The lifespan slipped again to be 
just over the representation weak threshold.  That Senator’s vote had no impact on the balance 
of power in the Senate and in addition the Senator was a very poor speaker and Senate 
committee performer with a very limited impact on the performance of the Senate.  The one 
glimmer of hope was at the 2004 Queensland state election in which a single One Nation 
member was elected to the Legislative Assembly.  
In the 2004 federal election, One Nation lost its seat in the Senate.  The party never enjoyed 
holding or sharing the balance of power in the Senate due to its short time span and its very 
small numbers. 
Fisher (1980:611) argued that ‘minor parties . . . serve as a testing ground for potential vote 
getting issues.’  This was true of One Nation and a significant cause in its decline.  One Nation 
was strong in its opposition to Asian immigration and queue jumping refugees trying to enter 
Australia.  In the lead up to the 2001 Federal election, Prime Minister Howard said that ‘we will 
decide who enters this country and the circumstances under which they will do so’.’   In saying 
this, he copied and took on a major policy of One Nation and reduced that Party’s influence. 
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Table 35:  The Power of PHON Preferences 1998-2001 
Federal 
Election 
Seats where 
some or all 
preferences 
Distributed 
Seats Won after PHON 
Preferences Distributed 
Seats where First 
preferences lead reversed 
by distribution of 
preferences 
Won by 
Coalition 
Won by 
Labor 
 
1998 12 12 (12 QLD) 0 1 (1 QLD) 
2001 10 10 (10 Vic) 0 Nil 
This table shows that second preferences in 1998 from One Nation were only decisive in one 
state, its home state of Queensland, with respect to 12 electorates.  In 2001, surprisingly, the 
impact moved to another state, Victoria, with 10 electorates relying on One Nation preferences 
for Liberal victory. 
The short-term future looked bleak for One Nation? 
One Nation disappeared from the parliamentary scene due to it being a divided party especially 
in the public forum of the Queensland parliament. The Party’s policies were in many cases not 
attractive to the electorate and the party was not second preferenced by either major party, who 
instead exchanged preferences.  Nation still officially existed and endorsed candidates in recent 
elections for example the 2013 Federal election and the 2015 QLD State election.  The few One 
Nation candidates received a very low percentage of the total vote, 0.17 per cent in the federal 
election and 0.92 per cent of the vote in QLD with 11 candidates.  However, Hanson herself 
unsuccessfully contested the seat of Lockyer at the 2015 QLD state election winning 26 per cent 
of the primary vote and outpolling the ALP candidate, but losing the election on preferences.  
That result shows that Hanson herself attracted a significant personal following. 
Suter (1998:189) has insightfully warned that: 
It is important to distinguish between Pauline Hanson and Hansonism.  Ms Hanson may 
have a short career in politics… but Hansonism as the Australian manifestation of the 
politics of anger will long exist. The conditions which brought it into being will not 
change for many years.  The politics of anger has three sources: economic and social 
change, the level of anxiety in the community, and a frustration with politicians. 
The significance of Suter’s remarks was borne out at the 2016 federal double dissolution 
election. 
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The Political Resurrection of One Nation – the 2016 Federal 
Election 
At the 2016 Federal election One Nation once again crossed the representation threshold with 
the election of four of its candidates to the Australian Senate.  One of these candidates was 
Hanson herself.  In the state of Tasmania, One Nation’s candidate failed to become the party’s 
fifth Senator by a mere 141 votes.  The election of that candidate would have further enhanced 
One Nation’s party status in the Senate, with additional staffing resources and other benefits for 
the party.  The revised party lifespan graph for One Nation is shown below. 
 
In chapter three of this thesis, it was mentioned that crossing the representation threshold after 
falling below it, is extremely rare.  The above diagram shows the second crossing above the 
representation threshold by One Nation.  In the new Senate, the party shares the balance of 
power with a number of other minor parties including the Australian Greens.   
The composition of the Senate is shown in the following table. 
Table 36:  Composition of the Australian Senate following the 2016 Double Dissolution 
Election 
Party Number of Senators 
Coalition 30 
ALP 26 
Australian Greens 9 
One Nation 4 
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Nick Xenophon Team 3 
Lambie Network 1 
Hinch Justice Party 1 
Family First 1 
Liberal Democrat 1 
Total 76 
 
However, if the Greens and ALP vote together on one side and the Coalition and all other minor 
parties vote on the other side, One Nation would be in a balance of power situation.  If the ALP, 
the Greens and Xenophon vote on one side and all other minor parties including One Nation 
vote on the other side with the Coalition, the vote would be tied at 38 each and the motion 
before the Senate would be defeated.  In its political resurrection, One Nation enjoys a powerful 
and influential position. 
The political resurrection of Hanson and One Nation was quite unpredicted because Hanson was 
seen and treated as a ‘serial candidate’, a minor party candidate that contests elections one after 
the other in a faint hope her candidature would make some sort of difference in terms of 
preference allocation or even that she would somehow get elected. 
A significant difference was firstly the 2016 election was a double dissolution election and 
therefore a much smaller quota was required for election; the second difference was that Hanson 
received valued publicity.  Errington and van Onselen (2016:114) bluntly observed that Hanson 
‘was paid for a regular spot on ‘Sunrise’ when she should have been paying for the publicity.’  
‘Sunrise’ is a popular early morning Australian television program hosted by the very high 
profile David Koch.  A third factor was her capitalisation on current fears.  In 1996 Hanson was 
concerned about Asians in Australia, while in 2016 her concern was Muslim immigration into 
Australia with its associated culture of dress and halal certification.  
One Nation Policies 
In the election campaign, One Nation’s policies included banning Australian companies and 
businesses from paying the ‘Halal certification tax’ on food and other items, and in addition, 
banning the burqa and any other full face coverings in public.  One Nation also proposed the 
holding of an inquiry into Islam to determine whether it is a religion or totalitarian political 
ideology. 
One Nation also supported a zero net immigration policy where those who leave Australia are 
replaced with immigrants who are ‘culturally cohesive’ with Australia and will ‘assimilate’.  
One Nation also opposed ‘full foreign ownership’ of Australian land and assets.  Another One 
Nation policy was a review and revocation of any free trade agreements that were not in 
Australia’s best interests. 
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One Nation also continued to support citizen initiated referenda and ‘responsible gun 
ownership’, as well as a referendum on same sex marriage.  
Relevance 
A key reason was that One Nation was seen to be relevant by those who supported and voted for 
the party.  Those supporters who were small business owners would have concerns about 
foreign ownership free trade agreements and globalisation.  Other supporters would have been 
concerned about immigration issues and halal certification of their products.  All of these 
supporters would consider One Nation to be relevant in the modern political environment, in 
terms of the party’s policies.  For other voters, One Nation served as a very convenient vehicle 
of protest against the major parties in an election that came very close to giving Australia its 
second hung parliament in six years. 
One Nation was ideally placed to act as a voice in the Senate for other far right parties, such as 
the Australian Liberty Alliance party, who have similar policies on such issues as Halal 
certification. 
Has One Nation learnt from its mistakes of the past? 
The rise of One Nation in the late 1990s had the involvement of ‘the two Davids’; neither David 
Ettridge or David Oldfield had much if any experience in the operation of a political party or an 
election campaign.  In the lead up to the 2016 election One Nation and Hanson had significant 
assistance from James Ashby.  Ashby was a former political staffer, with much strategic 
experience, to a former Liberal federal parliamentarian.  Ashby made his knowledge and 
experience available to One Nation. 
The previous chapter of this thesis which dealt with the rise of One Nation presented and 
discussed three application forms to join One Nation that appeared between 1997 and 1999 
inclusive.  In the lead up to the 2016 election, One Nation produced a new membership form for 
the party.  That form appears on the next page. 
In examining the 2016 application to join the party, it can be seen that as with the 1999 
application form there is no doubt that the applicant is joining a party, ‘Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation political party’.  The five questions on the 1999 form have changed on the 2016 form to 
a ‘declaration’.  The first three question on the 1999 form have been fused into one question on 
the 2016 form, ‘I/we believe in the values of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party. The question 
about special skills and talents does not appear on the 2016 form while the question regarding 
membership of another political party remains, with an additional question regarding previous 
membership of another political party.  Additional questions on the 2016 form relate to the 
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applicant ever having being refused membership of or being expelled from another political 
party.  A further question asks if the applicant has ever nominated as a candidate in an election. 
 
In the 2016 election campaign, candidate selection seemed to be much more stringent than it 
was in 1998.  Candidates were required to disclose previous party membership and state why 
they wanted to be a candidate for One Nation.  They also had to provide some background 
information about themselves.  But surprisingly, they were not required to advise One Nation 
whether, if they had been selected, there would there be anything in their previous history if 
known, will could cause the party or themselves, embarrassment.  
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What of the future? 
Following the double dissolution election, the first question on people’s minds was, ‘will the 
One Nation Senators serve for three year or six year terms?’  The Senate voted to use the ‘order 
of senators elected’ method in determining the terms of the Senators elected at that election, 
therefore Hanson as third senator elected for Queensland will serve a six-year term, the three 
other One Nation Senators being elected in either 11th or 12th position will serve for three years 
before facing re-election. 
One Nation received $1.6 mil from AEC in election funding, that funding will put onto a sound 
footing, the party’s finances for the next federal election.  Therefore, finance should not be a 
crippling problem for the party. 
The challenge for Hanson will be to keep One Nation united as a party in the Senate and not 
have mass resignations as was seen in the Palmer United Party and indeed in One Nation in the 
Queensland Parliament in the late 1990s. 
In Conclusion 
One Nation eventually imploded, but not before Pauline Hanson had cast her shadow over 
Australian politics (Warhurst 2004:166).  One Nation imploded because it failed to secure 
preferences from either of the major parties which would have given it majorities in some 
electorates and quotas in the Senate elections. 
The party was very young and inexperienced having a high-profile member of the House of 
Representatives and 11 members of the Queensland Parliament.  It grew too big too quickly and 
could not manage an effective relationship between its parliamentary wing and its organisational 
wing, leading to conflict.  It was also outmaneuvered by a wily Prime Minister who ran with its 
key immigration policy, couching it in more subtle and respectable terms and seizing the right 
time to announce such a policy. 
After its wipe out from parliament in the late 1990s, the 2016 federal election saw One Nation 
experience a spectacular resurrection from the political graveyard with the election of four 
Senators.  In that election 35.04 per cent of the electors voted for a minor party in the Senate 
and not one of the major parties.  One Nation came back in to the federal parliament through 
Pauline Hanson’s persistence, she kept on being a candidate election after election and therefore 
stayed in the public arena and got valuable press exposure in doing so.   
The rise of One Nation along with its decline and re-entry into the parliament was not so much 
the work of a select group of elites.  It was due to Pauline Hanson and her personality.  She 
presented to the electorate as an ‘ordinary Australian’ who was not born with a silver spoon in 
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her mouth.  Hanson tapped into issues that were of concern to a significant group of voters – 
significant enough to get her into parliament in 1996, a Senator three years later, and the large 
reemergence at the 2016 federal election.  
In the 2016 election the change in the Party’s policy emphasis from Asians and Aboriginals to 
Islamism gave One Nation a suite of policies that appealed to certain areas of the electorate that 
had a fear or concern regarding the perceived rise of Islamism.   
In returning to the federal parliament after a total wipeout of parliamentary members, One 
Nation achieved something that both the DLP and the Australian Democrats were never able to 
do. 
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Chapter 10: The Rise of the 
Australian Greens 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the rise of the Australian Greens in the federal parliament.  Unlike the 
DLP and the Australian Democrats discussed in previous chapters, the Australian Greens have 
not yet faced their decline or met their demise.  In addition, in contrast to the DLP, Australian 
Democrats and One Nation, the Greens have won seats in the House of Representatives in their 
own right.  Pauline Hanson represented One Nation in the Lower House in 1997-98, but she was 
not elected as a member of that party but as a dis-endorsed Liberal Party candidate.  She has 
managed to have Senators elected at the 1998 election and again at the 2016 election.  The 
Greens won Cunningham in NSW at a by-election in 2002, which the party then lost at the next 
federal election.  The Greens then won the seat of Melbourne contested by the Greens 
candidate, Adam Bandt, at the 2010 federal election and held the seat with an increased majority 
at the next two federal elections.  The Greens have also won lower house seats in Victoria where 
they won two metropolitan seats at the last election and in New South Wales where the party 
won two metropolitan seats and one country seat in the north of the state. 
The Australian Greens are fundamentally not a ‘break away party’.  The Greens did not split 
from another party to form a new party.  The Australian Greens originated as a social 
movement, and grew out of several wilderness and environmental movements.  Elements of the 
environmental movement restructured into a parliamentary party structure in order to contest 
elections and gain seats in parliament.  In this way, the Australian Greens is an ‘issues 
competitive party’ (Ghazarian 2015:56), attempting to force environmental and social issues to 
the forefront of the political agenda not merely within the Greens party itself but also changing 
the positions of the major parties themselves. 
The chapter discusses the origins of the Australian Greens and the party’s transition from social 
group to political party and the factors that brought out that transition.  The chapter also 
considers the change in leadership from the high profile Dr Bob Brown to Christine Milne, who 
were both Tasmanians, and then to the current party leader Senator Richard Di Natale, a 
moderate from Victoria.  It is very significant that each of these two leadership changes took 
place relatively seamlessly and without much overt conflict that could harm the party in the 
future.  This is in stark contrast to the DLP’s one leadership change and the several leadership 
changes of the Australian Democrats. 
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In addition, the Australian Greens party is a member of the Global Greens, a worldwide 
grouping of Greens parties.  The Greens membership of the Global Greens network and the 
advantages from that membership are considered.  These advantages include an international 
perspective on Green politics as well as a mechanism to remain relevant.  It is significant that 
none of the other minor parties considered in this thesis were members of a global network.  
The Australian Democrats’ attempt to join the world wide liberal movement was unsuccessful 
due mainly to apathy of the Democrat party members who for whatever reason failed to 
complete and submit the relevant paperwork. 
The Greens have put in place strict disclosure requirements for donations made to the party.  
These disclosure requirements are stricter than those of the Australian Electoral Commission 
and are discussed in this chapter. 
Finally, the chapter questions whether the Greens learnt any lessons from the demise of the 
other three minor parties that have been discussed in the previous chapters.  It concludes that the 
Australian Greens have indeed learnt lessons from the demise of the DLP and the Australian 
Democrats.   
In the beginning 
The Australian Greens had their genesis in a social movement, namely the United Tasmanian 
Group which came into some prominence during the 1972 Tasmanian State elections.  An 
increased concern for environmental issues saw an emergence of environmental groups in other 
states such as Western Australia with the Nuclear Disarmament Movement in that state and 
sections of the industrial left in New South Wales.  The Franklin Dam issue in 1982-83 with its 
associated High Court decision made a big impact on environmental groups around Australia.  
In the early days, the Australian Greens were in fierce competition with another environmental 
party, the Australian Democrats.   
Barry and Doherty (2001:588) posit that the Green movement was a social movement, insofar 
as the various kinds of Greens share certain characteristics.  The first of four characteristics that 
they put forward was ‘a collective identity’ that is ‘some sense of solidarity and common 
purpose’.  The second characteristic of a social movement was ‘that the groups and individuals 
involved within it are linked in a loose network’.  The third characteristic consisted of 
‘involvement in protests and challenges to opponents’.  Barry and Doherty (2001:590) argue 
that ‘a protest forces others to take sides’.  Dr Bob Brown’s involvement in and usage of protest 
movements as a strategy will be discussed later in this chapter.  Finally, the fourth characteristic 
was ‘Posing a challenge to existing forms of power’.  Along with other challenges to elites and 
the bureaucracy, ‘the power of large business in their opposition to wasteful and unjust forms of 
trade and consumption’ is challenged by a ‘call for major redistribution of wealth’.  This 
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challenge has been also used by the Greens to seriously question waste and duplication along 
with curbing the problems of pollution and damage to the environment through various forms of 
mining. 
Turnbull and Vromen (2004) believed that:- 
The Greens’ identity lies with their social movement base, the party developed from a range 
of social movements, most importantly the environmental movement. 
Turnbull and Vromen (2004) go on to observe that:- 
These movements and the values they encapsulate, are reflected in the Charter of the 
Australian Greens and in the party’s four pillars: economic justice and social equality, 
grassroots democracy, peace and non-violence and ecological sustainability. 
Turnbull and Vromen (2004) concluded that:- 
Building on their social movement foundations the Greens institutionalise a model of party 
organisation that supports participatory democracy in the forms of local decision making 
structures, consensus decision making and an active membership. 
Jackson (2016:34) placed the Australian Greens between a ‘movement’ party and an ‘electoral 
professional’ party.  For example, in terms of leadership and structure, Jackson described the 
Greens as ‘elected charismatic, mixed voluntary and professional’.  In terms of decision-
making, Jackson described the Australian Greens as ‘participatory with some centralised 
features’ such as the election of the leader and deputy leaders by the parliamentary Greens 
members, not the party membership.  
In 1989 the Greens won five out of 35 seats in the Tasmanian House of Assembly and Brown 
became their leader.  The Tasmanian House of Assembly is elected under a multi-member 
proportional representation electoral system.  The Greens agreed to support a minority Labor 
government, on the basis of a negotiated ‘Accord’ which was signed by Brown and the Premier 
Michael Field.  Under the accord, the Green independents agreed to support the budget but not 
‘motions of no confidence’.  The ALP made a number of agreements with the Greens including 
a more open parliamentary process and national parks protection along with public disclosure 
of bulk power contracts and royalties from mining companies.  This agreement, however, 
broke down over forestry issues in 1992.  The Tasmanian Greens were from the beginning, 
very much a single issue, pristine environmental party. 
Table 37:  Greens Members of the Tasmanian Parliament (Including Prior to the 
Australian Greens Party) 
Member Birth 
Year 
Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work before 
Parliament 
Brown Bob 1944 1983-1993 MB BS Medico 
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Member Birth 
Year 
Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work before 
Parliament 
Bates Gerry 1950 1986-1995 LLB PhD Lawyer 
Armstrong 
Lance 
1940 1989-1996 BEd Dip 
Theol 
Cleric 
Holister Di 1947 1989-1998 BEd Dip 
Phys Ed 
Teacher 
Milne 
Christine 
1953 1989-1998 BA(Hons) 
Cert Ed 
Teacher 
Putt Peg 1953 1993-2008 BA(Hons) Activist 
Foley Mike 1946 1995-1998 NG Activist 
Booth Kim 1951 2002-2015 NG Activist 
Morris Tim 1955 2002-2014 NG Activist 
McKim Nick 1965 2002- NG Activist 
O’Connor 
Cassy 
1967 2008- NG Activist 
O’Halloran 
Paul 
1950 2010-2014 BSc Dip 
Ed 
Teacher 
Dawkins 
Andrea 
NG 2015- Dip Mgt Alderman Business 
woman 
NG – not given or provided. 
The number of Greens in the Tasmanian Parliament’s House of Assembly, over the years, is 
shown in Table 40.  The number of Greens in the Parliament has ranged from one to five.  This 
means in a chamber of 25 members, at its peak the Australian Greens held 20 per cent of the 
seats in that chamber. 
Table 38:  Number of Greens in the Tasmanian Parliament 
Year of Election  Number Party Name Remarks 
1983 1 Independent Bob Brown on a countback 
1986 2 Independent   
1989 5 Independent, Green 
Independent from Dec 
1991 
 
1992 5 Tasmanian Greens from 
August 1992 
 
1996 4 Tasmanian Greens  
1998 1 Tasmanian Greens Decrease in number of 
members of Legislative 
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Year of Election  Number Party Name Remarks 
Assembly meaning an 
increase in quota for election 
2002 4 Tasmanian Greens Resurgence in popularity 
over building of pulp mill at 
Wesley Vale 
2006 4 Tasmanian Greens  
2010 5 Tasmanian Greens  
2014 3 Tasmanian Greens Greens suffered swing in 
light of Liberal landslide 
 
In the federal parliament, the Greens presence was very small from the beginning.  This is 
shown in the following table. 
Table 39:  Greens Members of Federal Parliament (Pre the Australian Greens) 
Member Birth 
Year 
State Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work before 
Parliament 
Valentine, Jo 1946 WA 1990-1992 Teaching 
Quals 
Teacher 
Chamarette, 
Christabel 
1948 WA 1992-1996 NG Pyschologist 
Margetts, 
Dee 
1955 WA 1993-1999 BA(Hons) 
Dip Ed 
Teacher Librarian 
 
Jo Valentine was a former member of the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) which was formed 
in 1984.  As can be seen, all of the above members came from Western Australia.  The West 
Australian Greens were more a ‘peace movement party’ than an environmental party.   
The State Parties Federate – the Australian Greens 
The Australian Greens grew out of the various state-based embryonic Green parties.  The 
confederated party was formed in August 1992 and is now part of the ‘Global Greens’.  Norman 
(2004:157) reported that:- 
In a café in the Sydney suburb of Newtown in 1992, a meeting of environmental and peace 
activists from Tasmania, New South Wales and Queensland resolved that the time was right 
to establish the Australian Greens as an official political party.  
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The confederate party was not the result of an automatic process, but rather a drawn-out reaction 
to a series of events such as the influence of economic rationalism on both major parties, and 
their disregard for environmental issues. 
Prior to the various Greens parties coming together, Miragliotta (2012:411-12) observed that 
regarding green politics, ‘in the 1980s, Australian activists were diffused and localised and 
struggling to consolidate parties at both the local and regional levels’.  Furthermore, claimed 
Miragliotta, the various Australian Green parties ‘were divided and squabbling about the terms 
and conditions under which they would unite’.  In addition, there was also a fear ‘that a national 
structure would stifle much of the energy of the local green groups and handing too much power 
to a small circle who might monopolise the real decision making.’ 
In addition, opposition to the establishment of a national green party ‘was initially nurtured by 
the absence of a political and policy space that a dedicated green party vehicle could colonise.’  
This ‘space’ was originally taken up by the Australian Labor Party and its environmental 
policies which included opposition to the building of the Gordon below Franklin dam in 
Tasmania, as well as building networks with various environmental interest groups Miragliotta 
(2012:411-12).  At that point in time, the Australian Democrats saw themselves as an 
environmental and green party.  The Nuclear Disarmament Party also had representation in the 
Senate as a peace and also environmental party. 
Jackson (2015:37) commented that:- 
The history of the Australian Greens is one of different strands intertwined: of broad social 
movements acting to save environmental treasures; of individual political actors such as 
Bob Brown and Drew Hutton welding together disparate party units to found a modern 
political party; of a politics founded in localities; that has spread to encompass a nation; and 
of the highs and lows of political competition. 
A major turning point for the establishment of a national structure for the Greens was the defeat 
of Bob Hawke as Prime Minister in late 1991 and his replacement by Paul Keating.  
Ghazarian (2015:57) observed that:- 
Keating’s approach to environmental policy contrasted sharply with that of Hawke, and the 
conservation movement’s ability to influence government policy declined as a result.  The 
conservation movement responded to this marginalisation by mobilising to create the 
Australian Greens.  By doing so the movement aimed to exert influence on the government 
in the electoral and legislative spheres since it no longer has a direct avenue to influencing 
government decisions outside parliament. 
Keating was seen by the Greens as an economic rationalist.  Ghazarian (2015:66-67) reported 
that as a result of the rise of Keating, Bob Brown and his parliamentary colleagues in Tasmania 
‘transformed the Green Independents into the Tasmanian Greens in 1992.’  Ghazarian (2015:66-
67) goes on to observe that Brown went further in his attempt to create a ‘broader national 
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Greens party’.  Brown led a series of meetings with representatives from Green parties in QLD 
and NSW and ‘it was agreed that these parties would form a new, confederated party: the 
Australian Greens.’ 
The turning point for the green movement in other states was Keating, as Prime Minister, going 
on to win the 1993 Federal election.  That election was billed as the ‘unlosable election’ for the 
Liberal National coalition after 10 years of Labor government.  But thanks to the unpopularity 
of the Coalition policy document, ‘FightBack!’ the Keating Labor government was re-elected. 
After its re-election, the Keating government moved to devolve Commonwealth influence over 
environmental issues.  In addition, the Keating government dismantled the Resource 
Assessment Commission and it ‘wound down’ the ecologically Sustainable Development debate 
which was a major forum for environmental groups. 
As a result, the Keating government’s actions in the environmental area left environmental 
groups with a reduced capacity to be involved in government decision making.  The Keating 
government’s actions influenced the decision of green movements in Victoria, South Australia 
and the Northern Territory to join the confederated Australian Greens Party (Ghazarian 
2015:66-67).  One can only wonder that if Keating was a little more receptive to the 
conservation movement, we may never have seen an Australian Green political party or, if so, 
one not as successful as the Australian Greens. 
It took time for the Greens in WA to join the Australian Greens.  Jackson (2016:59) commented 
that it took three separate votes before the Greens in WA finally agreed to join the Australian 
Greens in 2003.  The Australian Greens party was originally perceived by the WA Greens as ‘an 
eastern states entity’.  The WA Greens had lost their two Senate seats in 1996 (Chamarette) and 
in 1998 (Margetts).  The Greens in WA had to wait until the 2004 election to win a seat in the 
Senate as part of the Australian Greens.  The Australian Greens now have two Senators from 
WA with both being returned at the 2016 double dissolution election. 
In NSW Jackson (2016:21-22) reported that NSW delegates still use ‘blocking consensus’ in 
Greens federal meetings and conferences.  In the usage of ‘blocking consensus’ NSW Greens 
delegates will ‘withdraw’ their consent for a motion or proposal, if the delegates believe that 
there has been inadequate discussion of the proposal at state level.  In NSW the Greens will also 
withdraw their consent if it is considered that local branches have not had sufficient time to 
discuss issues.  With the principle of ‘blocking consent’ there is no ‘rushing through’ of motion 
or proposals through the voting process.  But it does in the federal scene that NSW being the 
only state to use ‘blocking consent’ is at odds with the other states and this can lead to conflict 
and division. 
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Middleton 2017:4) reports that NSW was also the home state of the Party’s splinter group, the 
Left Renewal Group which wanted to see the Australian Greens shift sharply to the left away 
from the conservative ‘tree tories’.  A major player in that group was Senator Lee Rhiannon 
whose involvement had ‘reignited a longstanding hostility’ with Bob Brown .  It was the Left 
Renewal Group, who was according to Middleton, known as the ‘watermelons’ ‘for being green 
on the outside but essentially red within.’  Middleton has also noted that candidates from 
Rhiannon’s group were defeated in two party preselections in the previous 12 months indicated 
a lack of support for that group and its members.  Since that time Rhiannon herself has lost 
Greens endorsement for her seat in the Australian Senate. 
Miragliotta (2012:418) also saw the electoral law changes of 1983 as a catalyst to the creation of 
a national Green party.  For a political party to receive formal recognition and registration it had 
to have at least 500 members.  If the party could not meet the requirements for registration, then 
the party could not have its name printed on the ballot paper and not receive any public funding 
if it received the required number of first preference votes.  These requirements and benefits 
gave the various green movements a significant incentive to move towards unity.  The green 
movements could request recognition as a ‘related party’, but that would mean having to 
comply with policy requirements of the green party that actually held registration. 
Miragliotta (2012:419) noted that:- 
The National structure adopted was a decentralised model that preserved much of the 
autonomy of the regional chapters, posing relatively little threat to the independence of the 
constituent bodies.  The adoption of a confederal rather than a strongly centralised structure 
that awarded significant powers to a national executive body was inevitable. 
Lohrey (2002.2) claimed the Greens were an organic party in the sense they had evolved over a 
lengthy period of time and out of several community campaigns organised at the grass roots.  
Overall their support had grown steadily.  The Greens were not founded through the personal 
fiat of one individual, as was the Australian Democrats and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation.  
They have evolved into a real constituency, something more than just a broad-based protest 
vote.  The Greens were not based on individual policy items, but on a new paradigm or grand 
narrative of what politics was all about, the ecological.  In this context the ‘real constituency’ is 
a party with its own policies and visions for the future and not merely a protest group of 
negativity in regard to the policies of major parties. 
Lohrey (2002:40) argued that ‘the environment will always return as an issue because it has to’.  
The environment impacts right across the policy spectrum, because many policy areas impact on 
the environment, areas such as mining and manufacturing but also in areas such as recycling and 
policies to encourage greater care of the environment.  In this way concern with the 
environment has always kept the Australian Greens relevant. 
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With this concern for the environment, Lohrey (2002:69) considered that the Australian Greens 
had a ‘rusted on’ core constituency unlike the Australian Democrats or the DLP. 
The Greens can be categorized as a ‘post materialist party’.  Post materialism was coined by the 
American political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1971) as a description of younger Europeans 
‘who were more likely to value political liberties’, while their elders were more likely to be 
‘acquisitive’ (Abramson 2011:1).  A post materialist is more concerned about ‘belonging, self-
expression and the quality of life’ rather than being concerned about ‘physical sustenance and 
safety’ (Inglehart 1981:880).  Safety would include defence and deterrence, while physical 
sustenance includes the earning of money and the acquisition of assets such as a house, motor 
vehicles and investments.  The quality of life includes policies relating to environmental issues 
such as mining and pollution and social issues such as same sex marriage and health care.  
In their policies, the Australian Greens are moving the policy emphasis from wealth and 
material goods to environmental issues and social policies such as same sex marriage and freely 
available health care. 
As a Greens party member Barham (2011:521) stated:- 
I joined the Greens because they represented a world view, a global set of principles that 
define a better future, which later was encapsulated by the early slogan for the Greens New 
South Wales, ‘Our Future, Vote Green’.  The Greens are often misunderstood as many take 
the colour as a representation of only the natural world rather than of life itself.  All aspects 
of life and society are our responsibility, hence the four principles of peace and non-
violence, social and economic justice, ecological sustainability and grass roots democracy. 
Barham’s comment also highlights that the Greens are more than an environmental party.  The 
Greens are also concerned with social issues such as world peace and economic justice.  Thus, 
the Greens could not be described as a sectarian party only concerned with environmental 
issues. 
The International Network of Global Greens 
The Australian Greens party is a member-based party and was in fact a driving force in the 
formation of the Global Greens network, which was formed in April 2001 in Canberra.  The 
Global Greens is an international network of Greens parties from a number of countries 
including Australia.  Currently the Global Greens has 75 full member parties, seven observer 
parties and two candidate member parties.  The primary role of the Global Greens is to 
implement the Global Greens Charter. 
Parties to the Global Greens Charter commit themselves to a global partnership and six guiding 
principles.  Those principles are:- 
 Ecological wisdom; 
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 Social justice; 
 Participatory democracy; 
 Nonviolence 
 Sustainability; and 
 Respect for diversity. 
The Global Greens are organised into four federations across the world and these are the 
Federation of Greens Parties of Africa, the Federation of the Greens Parties of the Americas, the 
Asia-Pacific Green Network (of which Australia is a member) and the European Green Party. 
Each of the four Greens federations elects three members to the Global Greens Coordination 
(GGC).  The GGC makes decisions on behalf of the Global Greens in between the periodic 
congresses.  Working by consensus, the main roles of the GGC are, facilitating global 
communication and networking, developing common views and campaigns, encouraging joint 
action, exchanging skills and support and finally, promoting Green ideas and values. 
The editor of Green Magazine, Chris Harris (2001:18) stated that:- 
The Global Greens Charter recognises that planet Earth is inter-connected – many issues 
just do not recognise political borders.  Like economic globalisation, like climate change, 
like genetic engineering. 
He went on to comment that:- 
Indeed, only a truly global-thinking and globally structured Green politics can realistically 
respond to this age of globalised ransacking. 
Seven years later looking back on the Global Greens, Blakers (2008:5) stated that:- 
It is self-evident that if every nation puts its own interests first, we will not solve the 
climate crisis . . . global issues . . . need concerted action in the global interest.  The global 
interest is not a national interest interpretation of global imperatives. 
The quotations from Harries and Blakers give some justification for a global network – 
considering global issues in a global context.  For the Australian Greens membership of a global 
network brings a number of advantages.  Through this network, as well as through sharing ideas 
and tactics, the Australian Greens have the means to draw on a wide range of international 
experience.  This international experience would be useful in keeping the party relevant in 
Australian society and providing advice in resolving conflict. 
The results of the Global Green Network for the Australian Greens are at best very subtle.  This 
is understandable because like any political party, the Australian Greens would not want to give 
the impression that the Party is controlled or strongly influenced by any external forces or 
influences. 
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Green Leadership in Australia 
In terms of stability, the Greens have had success with both high profile leaders and a very 
smooth succession to a new leadership team. 
Robert James ("Bob") Brown was the first leader of the Australian Greens.  As ‘a father figure’ 
of the party after his resignation from the leadership, Brown still holds a lot of influence in the 
party as a high profile and well known former leader.  He was born in 1944 and after leaving 
school he qualified as a medical practitioner.  As a medico, he achieved a certain degree of 
notoriety and fame at the Royal Canberra Hospital, when he and other senior medical staff took 
a pacifist stance by refusing to certify young men who did not wish to fight in the Vietnam 
War as fit to be conscripted.  
He moved to Tasmania in 1972, working as a general practitioner.  He became involved in the 
state's environmental movement, in particular the campaign to save Lake Pedder. He was a 
member of the newly formed United Tasmania Group, which could be described as Australia's 
first ‘green’ party.  
In 1978 Brown became director of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society. In the late 1970s he 
emerged as a leader of the campaign to prevent construction of the Franklin Dam, which if 
successful, would have drowned the Franklin River valley as part of a hydroelectricity project.  
Brown became well known before his parliamentary career, being frequently arrested at 
demonstrations.  By being arrested in this way, Brown was able to show the voters he was 
passionate about his causes, not against testing the law and importantly, willing to back his 
words up with actions.  In fact, Brown was among the 1500 people arrested while protesting 
during the campaign and as a result was sentenced to as prison term.  On the day of his release 
in 1983, he became a member of Tasmania's parliament for the House of Assembly seat of 
Denison after the Democrats MP Norm Sanders resigned to successfully stand for the Australian 
Senate; Brown was elected to replace him on a countback.   
In 1993 Brown resigned from the House of Assembly and stood unsuccessfully for the federal 
House of Representatives.  He entered the federal parliament at the 1996 federal election when 
he was elected to the Senate on the Tasmanian Greens ticket, joining with sitting Greens 
Western Australia Senator Dee Margetts to form the first group of Australian Greens senators.  
Brown became the national parliamentary leader of the Australian Greens from 1996 to 2012, 
enjoying a high profile.   
Brown and Singer (1996:83) commented that the influential German Green, Petra Kelly in a 
visit to Australia in 1984 urged the ‘various Greens in Australia (to) develop a national 
identity’.   
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The power of protest to Brown (1990:177) was an important political strategy to maintain 
momentum.  He considered that:- 
Without protest, without minorities causing trouble, without illegal or illegitimate foray by 
women or men bucking the system, our world would be a worse place than it is. . . . 
Universal education for children would be out: they would still be working in the mine.  
Women would not have the vote.  Workers would have no rights.  There would be no 
parliaments. 
Brown however went on to note that ‘to be used as a successful political weapon in Australia, 
direct action as protest is the last resort’. 
Brown (1990:178) stated that ‘a protest campaign will have some basic ingredients’. 
 Appeal to the public’s sense of fair play; 
 A well-researched economic and employment, as well as an environmental, case; 
 A determination not to get caught in personal slander and mudslinging; 
 Respect for the populace at large; 
 All conventional avenues of getting the right decision needs to be worked through; 
 Keeping the media well informed; 
 Lobbying of politicians, newspaper editors . . . business groups and so on; 
 The campaign must run on openness; 
 No one should be written off; and finally  
 Stay positive 
These ten principles of protest campaigns give some indicator of the Greens’ method of 
operation and strategy.  For instance, Bearup (2011) reported that the Labor powerbroker 
Graham Richardson claimed that ‘Brown’s big failing is that he has an “insatiable appetite”.  
After negotiating for three days, Richardson got Cabinet to agree to 23 per cent of Tasmania 
being declared world heritage.  Richardson then told Brown of that success, Brown’s response 
was ‘it’s not enough.’ 
Norman (2004:173) reported that on the 19 February 1996, Business Review Weekly in a cover 
story titled ‘The Green Menace’ the article’s author David Fordham described Brown as ‘a 
master of political brinkmanship’ and went on to say:- 
Brown is an evangelist for the environment and . . . he and the Green movement are there to 
literally save the world.   This means compromise is out of the question. 
The ‘Banyan’ columnist in the Economist of 18 April 2012 commented about ‘Brown’s 
commanding political presence’, stating that, ‘he has often managed to make opponents seem 
like midgets about sticking to their convictions’. 
McMahon (2013:22) commented that:- 
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The Greens also contain more than their fair share of energetic and aware activists, some of 
whom are proud of their isolation from the mainstream and will find it hard to subordinate 
their ideals to political necessity. 
In 2011, media speculation stated to arise regarding the leadership of the Australian Greens.  At 
the time, Bob Brown was turning 66 and as the Canberra Times pointed out, ‘few politicians 
elect to stay in parliament once they turn 70 and there is little reason to suppose that Mr (sic) 
Brown will be an exception to that rule.’  He resigned in April 2012 from both the leadership of 
the Australian Greens and from the Senate.  Brown was replaced as leader by his fellow 
Tasmanian Christine Milne.  Phillips (2012) commented that Bob Brown’s leadership was ‘one 
of calm reassurance.’  In interviews Brown ‘seemed to emphasise the reasonableness of his 
views’.  However, in Phillips’ view Milne on the other hand ‘seems always lecturing and 
peevish.’ 
The leadership transition from Brown to Milne was smooth, although there was a fierce contest 
to be her deputy.  The deputy’s position was contested by Sarah Hanson-Young and Adam 
Bandt, with Bandt being the winner.  Brown left at a time of his own choosing and Milne was 
the accepted leader of the parliamentary party.  This can be sharply contrasted to the conflict in 
the change of leaders in the DLP from Gair to McManus, where Gair relinquished the leadership 
of the DLP most reluctantly.  It can also be contrasted to the many changes of leadership in the 
Australian Democrats.  A number of those changes did not solve conflict but rather increased 
conflict within the parliamentary party.   
Both the Australian Greens and the Australian Democrats utilised participative democracy.  The 
major difference was that while the Democrats used participative democracy to elect the 
leadership of the parliamentary party, the Greens did not.  Therefore, the Greens parliamentary 
party did not have a leader thrust upon it by the membership that the party could not work with 
as leader nor one who was quite inexperienced for the role. 
In commenting on leadership of the Australian Greens, Cunningham and Jackman (2014) noted 
that:- 
When the confederation of state and territory Green parties joined together as the Australian 
Greens in August 1992 they were informed by arguments against the hierarchical 
structuring of existing social democratic and conservative parties, and explicitly worked to 
counter Michel’s (1915) famous ‘Iron Law’ proposal that all parties tend towards an 
oligarchic structure.  Essential AG structures were enshrined in its constitution (Australian 
Greens 2010) recognising and fostering horizontal leadership structures and alternative 
decision making processes.  These were coupled with a mode of participatory politics that 
emphasised inclusion and thus excluded the idea of a party with a leader, or at least with 
leaders with party-endorsed positional authority. 
Thus, unlike other parties, the Australian Greens were attempting to steer away from a purely 
hierarchical leadership structure, which could lead to an oligarchy in which decision-making 
and policy formulation are left to the select few in the higher echelons of the party (Michels 
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1962).   Such a structure would impede a rank file party member’s interaction with the party 
leadership and other groups within the party, such as the parliamentary party. Important to the 
‘horizontal leadership structures and alternative decision making processes’ was a system of 
participative democracy, but not to the extent of the party members electing the leadership of 
the parliamentary party.  Extending participative democracy to the election of the leadership of 
the parliamentary party was one of the causes of the demise of the Australian Democrats.   
In 2015 the leadership of the parliamentary party changed again.  On 6 May 2015 Milne, 
without warning, announced her resignation from the leadership of the Greens.  She also 
announced she would be retiring from the federal parliament at the next election.  Milne was 
effectively pushed, as she had lost the petrol excise vote.  Denholm (2015) noted that:- 
After 25 years in public life, she felt reluctant to commit to another six years in the Senate 
as the party sought pre-selections for the election due next year.  
The new surprise leader was not a Tasmanian but a moderate Victorian, Senator Richard Di 
Natale.  In addition, there was not a deputy leader of the party under his leadership but two 
deputy ‘co-leaders’, Senator Scott Ludlam from Western Australia and Senator Larissa Waters 
from Queensland.  The co-deputy leader system was new in Australia but the NZ Greens had 
used that system in New Zealand with some success. 
The election of each of these three Senators to leadership positions in the party appeared a wise 
choice.  Waters, a young Senator with degrees in Arts and Law, represented Queensland 
unquestionably the party’s weakest state.  Ludlam, a trained graphic designer, was a cool, calm 
and collected individual evidenced by his adjournment speech in the Senate in February 2014 in 
which he challenged the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott.  Ludlam’s softly spoken but hard 
hitting speech went viral on social media. 
Cunningham and Jackman (2014) go on to observe that ‘today Green leadership theory and 
parties’ practices are a more contested terrain.’  Global Green parties have moved to a leader, or 
president or national secretary from such leadership structures as three co-Speakers (rotational), 
Collective (Green commission) or again three co-spokes-persons. 
The Australian Greens party has always been led by one parliamentary leader and until the last 
leadership change, one deputy leader.  The current leadership of the Australian Greens in federal 
parliament of leader and two co-deputy leaders appears to be operating satisfactorily. 
Party Finance 
The fact that in the 2013 federal election the Greens vote dropped in both houses means the 
Greens received reduced funding from the public purse, as funding is provided on the basis of 
the number of votes received and is paid at so many dollars per vote.   
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Rootes (2014:169) argued that:- 
The Greens remain the third party both in seats won and share of the vote, but will have to 
operate with greatly reduced resources.  Because public funding of political parties is 
proportionate to the votes they secure at elections, the Greens funding falls from $7.1 
million in 2010 to $5.4 million.  This will make it more difficult for the Greens to defend 
the six Senate seats - one in every state – won in 2010.   
This raises the question of what are the party’s alternative sources of funds?   A strategy of any 
party should include provision for the fact that funding from the public purse is not static – if 
the party suffers a swing against it, the amount of that funding will fall and alternative sources 
of funding have to be considered.  The only other result would be a reduced campaign, and as 
Rootes argues above, with six senate seats to defend, a reduced campaign is out of the question. 
In the lead up to the 2010 election, a multi-millionaire, Graeme Wood, gave $1.6 million to 
fund the Greens campaign in that election.  According to Manning (2011), Wood stated that he 
was disappointed with ‘Labor and Coalition policies on climate change and the environment.’  
In the same article, Wood and Senator Brown both claimed there was no personal gain for 
Wood nor had he looked for any ‘favours’. 
The Greens have also experienced other problem areas with related controversy, for example 
their support for the ANZ share saga which had significant but brief impact on the share market 
(see below).  However, the support for the Greens has not suffered as a result from either the 
problem areas or the stricter funding disclosure rules.  
The Greens have put in place strict disclosure requirements for donations over an amount of 
$1,500 made to the party.  In Victoria, the amount is $1,000.  The actual amount of those 
donations, along with the person or body making the donation are listed on the Green’s website.  
The details remain on the website for a 12 month period up to the end of the last quarter. 
The Greens advise on their website that the purpose of this disclosure is to ‘uphold public 
transparency of the party’s funding’.  The Greens also highlight that this disclosure is stricter 
than the Australian Electoral Commission, where the threshold is $13,000. 
The Greens advise donors that:- 
In making this donation you are confirming that: 
 you accept that your name and the total amount of your donations during the last 
twelve months will be included on our public donor list should the donations accepted 
by the Party from you during this period total $1,500 or more, and; 
 
 you have every reason to believe that your donation will not give rise to public 
criticism of the Party's integrity and that our acceptance of the donation will not be 
contrary to the Party's internal donations policy. 
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Thus, potential donors are clearly warned by the Greens of the lower disclosure threshold.  It 
would also follow that like the Wood donation, there would be ‘no personal gain’ or ‘favours’ 
given to the donor by the Greens. 
Green Policy Positions 
The idea of a ‘Green’ party immediately brings up notions of a party solely concerned with 
environmental issues.  However, the Australian Greens are also concerned with other major 
policy areas particularly social policy.  This is notwithstanding that it could be argued that 
environmental policies impact on just about every other policy area.  Barry and Doherty 
(2001:587) consider that:- 
When people think of the green movement they think principally of groups that are 
concerned with protecting the environment.  Yet greens have always been concerned with 
broader political, social and economic issues, too.  
The following information on the party’s policies come from the party’s official policy 
documents. 
Environmental issues 
In terms of ‘ecological sustainability’, the Greens:- 
Seek to cultivate a global, ecological consciousness based on a long-term perspective in 
order to safeguard the interests of both existing and future generations and species. 
The Australian Greens believe that:- 
The scale and impact of climate catastrophe can be lessened by reducing our dependence on 
non-renewable resources and ensuring sustainable use of renewable resources. 
The Australian Greens recognise:- 
The interdependence between humanity and the rest of nature as we seek to move to an 
ecologically sustainable path. 
In relation to climate change the Australian Greens consider that:- 
The climate challenge is an opportunity to transform Australia into a carbon-neutral 
economy that creates new jobs and a healthier planet. 
In the view of the Greens:- 
An ecologically sustainable future relies on stable and enduring social, political and 
economic systems based on equity, justice and the support of human rights. 
The Greens believe that ecosystems-based management is the most sustainable and appropriate 
model for the management of Australia's marine territories.  In terms of waste management 
policy, the party has a zero-waste goal to conserve natural resources for future generations.  In 
regard to natural resources the Greens consider that resources should be managed taking into 
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account intergenerational equity, biodiversity conservation and respect for traditional 
ownership. 
Social Issues 
The Australian Greens believe that all people have equal economic, social and cultural rights, 
regardless of gender, age, race, ethnicity, class, religion, disability, sexuality or membership of a 
minority group. Everyone should have the opportunity for personal development and be able to 
fully participate in society without discrimination. A more equitable distribution of resources 
should eliminate poverty. 
Australia’s diversity is to be respected and reflected in our social institutions. The Greens 
recognize that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a unique relationship with the 
land, and their rights and obligations as custodians must be respected. 
The Australian Greens aim to develop a culturally rich, participatory and equitable society that 
enables the flourishing of progressive change and the promotion of an ecologically sustainable 
future. 
Moral issues 
The Greens are predominantly an anti-moralistic party, in that the policies of the party are not 
influenced directly or even indirectly by any one religion of group of religions.  The Australian 
Greens Policies document (2012) states as policy aims: 
 Sex, Sexuality and Gender Identity 
The Australian Greens want: 
The legalisation of marriage between two consenting adults regardless of sex, sexuality or 
gender identity. . . .  
Equal access, regardless of sex, sexuality and gender identity and marital status to 
adoption and fostering and assisted reproductive treatment. 
Women 
The Australian Greens want: 
All women to have access to legal, free and safe pregnancy termination services including 
unbiased counselling. 
The above extract from the Greens’ policies document indicates that the Greens policy 
supports abortion.  Other parties do not bind their members on that policy issue.  The 
Australian Greens’ stand on that issue, along with same sex marriage and euthanasia, is the 
complete reverse of the DLP, which as was shown in chapter five, to be a very moralistic 
approach.  This stand by the Greens regarding these personal issues could be a potential cause 
for a decline in popular support, especially with those motivated by environmental concerns.  
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Just as being seen as a morals party can cause a decline, being an anti-moralistic party could 
also lead to a party’s decline. 
It is significant that a policy of supporting same sex marriage caused problems in support for 
the Katter Australia Party in the 2013 federal election. 
Economic policies 
In a policy paper titled ‘New Economy” The Greens saw reforming negative gearing and the 
capital gains tax, progressive superannuation, banking and financial reform and taxation reform 
as key policy issues.  They considered the negative gearing, capital gains and superannuation 
tax breaks as being unfair, and propose reforms in these areas of taxation, including ‘removal of 
the Capital Gains Tax Discount’. 
In the view of The Greens:- 
In order to provide for the needs of present and future generations, economic management 
should prioritise improving the quality of life rather than the production and consumption 
of material output.  The pursuit of continuous material-based economic growth is 
incompatible with the planet’s finite resources. 
Measures of national progress should include indicators of ecological sustainability and 
social wellbeing. 
Other policy areas 
In relation to asylum seekers, The Greens plan to:- 
Create a safe way for people to seek asylum in Australia, giving them a better option than a 
boat journey and under cutting the people smuggler’s business model. 
The Greens policy on foreign aid is to:- 
Commit our fair share toward poverty alleviation and development by increasing our 
overseas aid contributions to 0.7% of GNI (Gross National Income) over the coming 
decade. 
In terms of defence and foreign affairs, The Greens approach is to:- 
Take a diplomacy-first approach to defence and foreign affairs, emphasising nonviolent 
global cooperation. 
The Greens also support Australia becoming a republic, the setting up of a ‘national anti-
corruption watchdog’ and putting ‘the freedom back into our Freedom of Information laws’. 
In terms of policy development in the Greens, Jackson (2016:154) reported that the party’s:- 
need for a clearer basis for parliamentary decisions precipitated an eighteen-month review 
of party policy, beginning in 2002.  The review used a staged approach involving all the 
states and territories and concluded in a national party conference before the 2004 election. 
Jackson’s comments indicate that the Greens were prepared to use party conferences for policy 
making, and unlike the Australian Democrats, not solely for the dissemination of information by 
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way of numerous speeches and training of party members.  The Greens not only use state and 
federal conferences for policy development, but also as a means of robust debate.  In fact 
Jackson (2016:154) goes on to speak of an:- 
extended and heated debate at the 2005 national conference which pitted Bob Brown and 
(future senator) Richard Di Natale, both medical practitioners, against each other. 
Electoral Performance 
In terms of who votes for the Australian Greens, King (2015:315) reported that Gerard 
Henderson, commented in an interview that:- 
Greens voters in the cities are a well-educated, articulate and vocal group and they project 
their ideological agenda much farther than any other group in the country because of their 
largely professional and well off background. 
Rootes (2002:146) commented that in the 2001 federal election ‘without the power to set the 
political agenda, the Greens were soon shaded’.  However, the Greens were the only party to 
oppose the Howard government’s policy on asylum seekers in the light of the Tampa issue.  
That election was dominated by the immigration of asylum seekers and international affairs, 
meaning ‘the environment was, for most voters, a minor issue’ (Rootes 2002:148).  However, 
Brown was re-elected and in NSW Kerry Nettle, the Greens NSW Senate candidate, was the last 
elected Senator from that state.  Nettle’s victory in NSW occurred with just 4.1 per cent of the 
primary vote.  With such a low primary vote, Nettle’s reliance on preference flows from other 
parties was very significant.  Until near the end of the count, Nettle had around half a quota.  
She then received a large number of preferences from the No GST party, followed by the 
majority of votes from the excluded One Nation candidate.  The One Nation votes gained Nettle 
a quota. 
It is debatable whether Nettle’s very radical maiden speech was an asset or liability to the 
Greens.  Nettle was very critical of the alliance between Australia and the United States of 
America.  Nettle took an active role in various issues.  Apart from being an environmentalist 
like other members of the Greens, Nettle was also a very strong supporter of gender equality, 
including women’s reproductive rights.  To show her support for women’s reproductive rights, 
during the debate on the abortion drug RU486, Nettle wore a t-shirt bearing the slogan ‘Mr 
Abbott get your rosaries off my ovaries’ into the Senate.  Tony Abbott was the Minister for 
Health responsible for the classification of the RU486 drug at the time.  Catholics considered 
Nettle’s t-shirt to be both tactless and in very poor taste.  The t-shirt did not do anything to 
increase Nettle’s support in the electorate.  Nettle joined with Brown in publicly making her 
opposition the treatment of US military prisoners known to President Bush by interjecting 
during his speech when he addressed both houses of parliament in Canberra. 
In her first speech to the Senate, Nettle observed that in her view:- 
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Final decisions that affect our basic services will be made in the cabinet room –or perhaps 
in the corporate boxes – but not in this parliament. 
That remark indicated a loss of confidence in the role and working of the parliament and it is an 
odd remark from a person who has newly arrived in the parliament and who is yet to observe 
and participate in the accountability measures of the parliament.  To date Kerry Nettle has been 
one of two members of the federal parliamentary Greens party to lose their seat in the 
parliament.  
In the 2001 election, the Greens were out-polled by the Australian Democrats.  But as noted in 
the last chapter that situation was to change in the 2004 federal election. 
Manning and Rootes (2005:403) noted that in the 2004 federal election the Greens increased 
their share of the vote by 50 per cent and doubled their representation to four Senators, while the 
Australian Democrats lost all four senate seats that were up for re-election.  In the new Senate, 
the Greens did not command the balance of power in the chamber, in fact the Howard 
government won control of the Senate for the next three years.  Manning and Rootes (2005:405) 
believed that the Greens lacked ‘luck and political guile’. In addition, they believed the Greens 
came out ‘almost empty handed’ from the preference deals.  In fact, the ALP and Democrats 
preferenced the Family First party ahead of the Greens.  This cost the Greens a Senator from 
Victoria as the Family First candidate Fielding won a Senate seat. 
In 2004, after the federal election, Bob Brown commented that:- 
We have grown to 8,000 members. . . and in 2004 won the support of 916,000 voters in the 
Senate.   We garnered over 20 per cent of the vote in two House of Representatives seats, 
double figures in a great many more and a significant vote in every seat in the country.  
With the demise of the Democrats, and right wing religious parties notwithstanding, we are 
clearly the third force in Australian politics.  We have leapt to a new level and must adapt 
to grow further. 
Manning and Rootes (2005:408) considered that the 2004 federal election ‘confirmed the 
Greens as the third force in Australian politics.’ 
In the 2007 Federal election, the Greens won 10.4 per cent in Victoria and 8.7 per cent of the 
federal vote in NSW, but did not win a Senate seat in either state.  However, in South Australia 
with only 6.6 per cent of the vote (the party’s lowest) the Greens won a senate seat.  In NSW 
and Victoria, the Labor vote in the Senate was down and therefore the end result was 
insufficient Senate preferences flowing from Labor to the Greens to elect Greens senators in the 
more populous states of NSW and Victoria.  As a result, in NSW Nettle lost her Senate seat.   
In the 2007 federal election Bob Brown won a quota in Tasmania in his own right with over 18 
per cent of the vote. 
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Commenting on the Greens performance in the 2007 federal election, Rootes (2008:476) noted 
that during the campaign, support for the Greens ‘firmed.’  A high point for the Greens was 
Labor’s decision to exchanges preferences with the Greens.  This included in Victoria, where 
‘animosity between Labor and the Greens was acute.’  Rootes went on to note that:- 
Labor’s best hope of achieving a workable Senate was by developing cooperation with the 
Greens.  Moreover, if the election were close, Labor would need Greens preferences to win 
sufficient House of Representative seats to form a government. 
Rootes (2008:478) made the claim that:- 
Commentators compare the Greens parliamentary performance unfavourably with that of 
the Democrats: the Democrats, it is said, achieved so much because they were willing to 
negotiate; the Greens achieved little because they were not.  If the commentators are right 
in blaming Brown for the Greens’ intransigence, it seems hardly likely to diminish in the 
wake of his impressive re-election. 
In the 2010 Federal election, up to that point the Greens ‘enjoyed their best electoral results on 
record, increasing their vote by some 50 per cent’ (Rootes 2011:410).  In addition, as well as 
having an all-time high of nine Senators, the Greens won a seat in the House of Representatives 
for the first time at a general election and not a by-election. 
Rootes (2011:412) put forward the view that in the 2010 election, the major parties engaged in 
‘sandbagging’ the seats the party held with the smallest majorities (the marginal seats) and 
hopefully as a result retain government.  As such, minor parties had the opportunity to shine and 
standout.  Rootes also went on to comment that the leaders of the major parties, Gillard of the 
ALP and Abbott for the Coalition, were both new to their jobs and consequently ‘exceptionally 
risk adverse and avoiding any commitment to a reform agenda’.  In this environment of 
uncertainty, the minor parties benefitted. 
For the first time The Greens had a Senator elected for each state.  In Tasmania and Victoria, the 
Greens won a quota on the primary vote, without having to rely on preferences and being 
elected in the fifth or sixth spot.  The overall result was that the Greens held the balance of 
power in the Senate in their own right. 
In the 2013 election, the Greens suffered a swing in the Senate vote of -4.5 per cent with 
Senators elected in four states only.  However, all of their sitting Senators were re-elected with 
an additional Senator voted in from Victoria.  With the re-election of the party’s candidate in 
Melbourne and the Victorian Senator, the Greens had 11 members in the federal parliament an 
all-time high.  The downside was that the Greens went from holding the balance of power in 
their own right to sharing it with a number of minor and micro parties such as the Palmer United 
Party. 
Rootes (2014:168) observed that:- 
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The gap between the Party’s performance in the Senate and the House which widened 
markedly in 2010, disappeared in 2013.  This suggests that the Green’s 8.6 per cent may 
represent the party’s new core level of support. 
Miragliotta (2013:712) suggested that it was possible that the number of ‘Green identifiers’ in 
2013 was actually greater than the 5.9 per cent who identified with the party in 2010. 
In the 2016 double-dissolution federal election, the Greens polled 10.09 per cent of the vote in 
the House of Representatives and 8.33 per cent in the Senate.  This was an increase of support 
in the House of almost 1.5 per cent, but a decrease in the Senate vote of 0.32 per cent.  Thus, the 
Greens level of support made no movement back to its all-time high levels of the 2010 election.  
In fact, in the Senate, support for the Greens had fallen by almost 5 per cent between 2010 and 
2016.  In the final result the Greens managed to have nine of their ten Senators re-elected as 
well as their sole member in the House of Representatives.  The reduction of funding that 
Rootes (2014:169) spoke of will continue through to the next Federal election.  The Greens 
continue to share the balance of power in the Senate, with a number of minor parties.  
To make a protest vote against the major parties, many voters will swing away from a major 
party to a minor party in a Senate election.  In this way, the voter can make a protest vote 
against the major party without impacting on the major party’s ability to form government in the 
lower house.  It is important for minor parties looking to become the third party, as is the case 
with The Greens, to realise that such votes are only protest votes against one or more of the 
major parties and not votes ‘rusted on’ to the minor party in question. 
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Table 40:  The Australian Greens Federal Elections Primary Vote 
Election 
Year 
House of 
Representatives 
Per Cent 
Senate 
Per Cent 
1990 1.40 2.80 
1993 1.90 2.90 
1996 2.90 3.20 
1998 2.60 2.70 
2001 5.00 4.90 
2004 7.20 7.67 
2007 7.79 9.04 
2010 11.76 13.11 
2013 8.65 8.65 
2016 10.09 8.33 
Source: AEC 
The Greens Second Preference Allocation 
The influence of the Australian Greens second preferences over three elections is shown in the 
following table. 
Table 41:  House of Representatives Elections The Australian Greens and their second 
preferences 
General 
election 
Seats won by Labor on 
Green Preferences 
Seats where First 
preferences lead 
reversed by 
distribution of 
preferences 
Liberal Win on leakage 
of Greens Preferences 
2007 25 Seats (NSW 4), (Vic 6) 
(QLD 7)  (SA 2) (Tas 3) 
(WA 3) 
9 Seats (NSW 3)  
(Vic 2) (WA 1)  
(Tas 2) (NT 1)  
13 Seats (NSW 2)(Vic 2) 
(QLD 4) (SA 2) (WA 3) 
2010 25 Seats (NSW 10) (Vic 5) 
(QLD7) (WA 3) (Tas 4) 
(ACT 2) (NT 1) 
7 Seats (NSW 3)  
(Vic 3)(QLD 1) 
10 Seats (NSW 2) (Vic 1) 
(SA 1), (QLD 6) 
2013 Seats (NSW 8) (Vic 8) Qld 
(WA 2) (SA 2) (Tas 1) (ACT 
2) (NT 1) 
8 Seats (NSW 2)  
(Vic 3) (QLD 3) 
4 Seats (NSW 2) 
 (Qld 1) (WA 1)  
(Tas 1) (NT 1) 
Source AEC data – the data for the 2016 election was not available at the time this thesis was finalised. 
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The Greens preference flow to the Labor party was very tight, with preferences flowing to the 
Labor party in excess of 75 per cent in many seats.  The Australian Greens preference strategy, 
according to the table of Sharman et al shown in chapter three, could be categorised as ‘policy 
influence’.  The party second preferenced the ALP very strongly because the ALP’s 
environmental policy could be seen as close to that of the Greens. 
Generally speaking, for a leakage of Greens preferences to elect a Liberal candidate, the Liberal 
vote would need to be around 45 per cent to 49 per cent, thus requiring only a small leakage to 
elect the Liberal candidate.  For example, in the 2013 federal election, in Macarthur (NSW) the 
Liberal candidate polled 49.38 per cent.  Significantly, in some electorates in that election, the 
Greens preference leakage was surprisingly high.  For example, in Swan (WA) the leakage was 
30 per cent and in Hinkler (Qld) it was 38 per cent. 
The Greens in the Senate 
The following table shows the number of Australian Greens in the Senate from the 1990 
election to the 2014 election compared to the other parties in the Senate.  The final column of 
the table indicates if the Greens held the balance of power and if so, if they shared it with 
another party or parties. 
Table 42:  Party Composition of the Australian Senate from 1990 to date 
Year ALP Lib/NP AD Greens Others Greens 
Balance of 
Power 
1990 32 34 8 1 1 no 
1993 30 36 7 2 1 Shared with 
Dems 
1996 29 37 7 2 1 Shared with 
Dems 
1998 29 35 9 1 2 Shared with 
Dems 
2001 28 35 8 2 3 Shared with 
Dems 
2004 28 39 4 4 1 no 
2007 32 37 0 5 2 Shared with 
cross bench 
2010 31 34 0 9 2 yes 
2013 25 33 0 10 8 Shared with 
cross bench 
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This table shows the rise of the Australian Greens over a 24 year period to the present time.  
The table also shows whether the Greens held the balance of power or if they shared it with 
another party.   
At the 2010 federal election, the result was a ‘hung parliament’ with neither of the major parties 
being able to form a government in their own right.  To ensure stability until hopefully the next 
election, a working relationship had to be formed with one or more of the minor parties in the 
lower house.  An additional problem for the major parties in government was the ability to get 
their legislation through the senate, where again neither major party had a majority. 
The Australian Greens and the ALP entered into a written agreement covering the term of the 
Prime Ministership of Julia Gillard over the life of the parliament.  The agreement ensured that 
the Greens would support the government in a no confidence motion and in the granting of 
supply.  In return for this support from the Greens, the government would support a reform of 
funding of political parties and election campaigns and in addition improve the processes and 
integrity of the parliament and establish a parliamentary budget office and a parliamentary 
integrity commissioner.  Significantly, the agreement required that the Prime Minster meet with 
the leaders of the Greens each sitting week to ‘discuss and negotiate any planned legislation’.  
In the areas of policy, the agreement spelt out proposals for climate change, dental care, high 
speed rail and the war in Afghanistan.  The ‘hung parliament’ gave the Greens as the largest 
minor party in the Senate, an unprecedented level of influence and power. 
This agreement meant the government would give a priority to key policy areas of concern to 
the Greens.  It also assured the Greens of a guaranteed access to the Prime Minister, other 
ministers and key public servants – such access was not normally made available to opposition 
or minor parties. 
It is significant that in spite of gaining an extra Senator in 2013, the Greens fell from holding the 
balance of power in their own right and had to share it with the crossbench.  Instead of sharing 
the balance of power with only one other party, the Greens share the balance of power with a 
number of minor and micro parties.  The end result for the Greens is a weakening of the party’s 
influence in the Senate. 
Table 43:  Changing Composition of the Australian Senate between 2014 and 2016 
Party Number of 
Senators 2013 
election 
Number of 
Senators 2015 
Number of 
Senators 2016 
election 
ALP 25 25 26 
Coalition 33 33 30 
Greens 10 10 9 
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Party Number of 
Senators 2013 
election 
Number of 
Senators 2015 
Number of 
Senators 2016 
election 
PUP 3 1 0 
FFP 1 1 1 
DLP 1 0 0 
Motoring Enthusiasts 1 1 0 
Liberal Democrats 1 1 1 
Jacqui Lambie Network 0 1 1 
Madigan Party 0 1 0 
The Glenn Lazarus 
Team 
0 1 0 
Xenophon 1 1 3 
One Nation 0 0 4 
Hinch 0 0 1 
 
This degree of sharing the balance of power makes the conduct of negotiations regarding 
support for legislation much more difficult and complex. 
A similar situation exists in the Legislative Council of Victoria which has a very similar voting 
system to the Senate, with the State of Victoria returning the same number of members for each 
province.  The table below shows a high number of minor parties with few representatives with 
none holding the balance of power in its own right. 
Table 44:  Composition of the Victorian Legislative Council of Victoria 2014 
Party Number of MLCs  
ALP 13 
Coalition 17 
Greens 5 
Shooters and Fishers Party  2 
Sex Party 1 
DLP 1 
Vote 1 Local Jobs 1 
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Lower House Representation 
In the 2010 federal election, the Greens saw their first electoral victory at a general election in 
the lower house with the election of Adam Bandt in the electorate of Melbourne.  Melbourne 
had been held by Labor for over 100 years. 
The following table compares the results in Melbourne for the last three federal elections (2007, 
2010 and 2013). 
Table 45:  The electorate of Melbourne electing an Australian Green Member 
Party 2007 2010 2013 
Votes Per cent Votes Per cent Votes Per cent 
ALP 43,363 49.51 34,022 38.09  
(-11.42) 
22,490 26.60 
(-11.54) 
Greens 19,967 22.80 32,308 36.17 
(+13.37) 
36,035 42.62 
(+7.03) 
Liberal 20,577 23.49 18.760 21.00  
(-2.49) 
19,301 22.83 
(+1.37) 
Minor 
Parties 
3,676 1.40 4,237 1.12 
(+0.54) 
5,596 2.00 
(+3.21) 
Informal 2,521 2.80 3,356 3.62 
(+0.82) 
5,348 5.95 
(+2.33) 
Source AEC 
The first point to observe from the above table is the significant swing to the Green candidate in 
2010, mainly from the Labor vote.  This was the election that elected the ‘hung parliament’, 
where The Greens benefitted from significant disillusionment with the major parties.  A second 
factor was the retirement of the high-profile Labor member Lindsay Tanner, who was highly 
regarded in the electorate and beyond as Minister for Finance.  In 2013 the Greens again 
benefitted from a further significant swing (seven per cent), again taken from Labor, and which 
put the Greens within ‘striking distance’ of an absolute majority with almost 43 per cent of the 
primary vote. 
Over the six-year period the ALP primary vote in Melbourne has fallen from 49.51 per cent of 
the primary vote to almost half with 26.60 percent of the primary vote.  Significantly, the 
rusted-on vote for the Liberal candidate has remained fairly constant, around 22 per cent, which 
suggests support for the Greens is at the expense of the Labor Party. 
Table 46:  Australian Greens Members of the NSW Parliament 
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Member Birth Year House Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education Level 
Paid Work 
before 
Parliament 
Ian Cohen 1951 Council 1995-2011 BA Dip Ed Teacher 
Lee Rhiannon 1951 Council 1999-2010 BSc Activist 
Sylvia Hale 1942 Council 2003-2010 BA LLB Local Govt 
John Kaye  Council 2007- PhD Academic 
Cate Faehrmann 1970 Council 2010-2013 BA Activist 
David Shoebridge  Council 2010- BA LLB Local Govt 
Jan Barham  Council 2011- TAFE Activist 
Jeremy Buckingham  Council 2011- Advanced 
Diploma 
Stone Mason 
Mehreen Faruqi  Council 2013- PhD Academic 
Jenny Leong  Assembly 2015- BA(hons) Activist 
Jamie Parker  Assembly 2015- BEc MPol Econ ng 
Tamara Smith  Assembly 2015- BA LLB Dip Ed Solicitor 
Teacher 
 
Table 47:  Australian Greens Members of the Victorian Parliament 
Member Birth 
Year 
House Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work 
before 
Parliament 
Greg Barber 1966 Council 2006- MBA Local Govt 
Colleen 
Hartland 
1959 Council 2006- Dip 
Community 
Development 
Community 
development 
worker 
Sue Pennicuik 1957 Council 2006- M Env Sc Project officer 
Samantha Dunn 1964 Council 2014- Secondary 
school 
Financial 
controller 
Nina Springle 1973 Council 2014- BA Consultant 
Sam Hibbins 1982 Assembly 2014- Grad Dip 
Policy and 
Research 
Public Servant 
Ellen Sandell 1984 Assembly 2014- BA BSc CSIRO 
researcher 
 
289 
 
Likewise, since the 2014 State elections, the Greens have representatives in the Victorian lower 
house, representing the electorates of Melbourne and Prahran.  The results in these electorates 
from the 2014 State election are shown in the following table. 
Table 48:  The Australian Greens - results in Melbourne and Prahran - 2014 State 
elections 
Party Melbourne Prahran 
Votes Per cent Votes Per cent 
ALP 10,830 29.27 9,586 25.91 
Greens 15,333 41.44 9,160 24.75 
Liberal 8,913 24.09 16,582 44.81 
Minor Parties 1,924 5.21 1,593 4.53 
After 
Preferences 
    
ALP 17,599 47.56 n/a n/a 
Greens 19,401 52.44 18,640 50.37 
Liberal n/a n/a 18,363 49.63 
Source: Victorian Electoral Commission 
From the above table, it can be seen that the percentage result in Melbourne is almost a carbon 
copy of the result for the federal seat of Melbourne in the federal election in 2013. 
However, in Prahran the results were much closer.  The final result was between the Greens and 
the Liberal candidates.  On the primary vote the Greens candidate was in third position, trailing 
the Labor candidate by 426 votes or 1.16 per cent. After preferences of the minor parties were 
distributed and only the three parties remained, the Greens were in second position and the ALP 
was in third, thus the ALP candidate was eliminated. 
At the 2015 NSW State election, the Australian Greens won three seats in the Legislative 
Assembly.  It is significant that in NSW the electoral system is optional preferential voting, 
which means that although preferences are distributed, an elector does not have to number every 
square on the ballot paper. In fact, the elector, only has to number the square of the candidate 
for whom they wish to vote for.  
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Table 49:  Results in three NSW Electorates won by the Greens in 2015 
Party Ballina Balmain Newtown 
Votes Per cent Votes Per cent Votes Per cent 
ALP 11,738 24.73 14,930 31.80 13,978 30.79 
Greens 12,824 27.02 17,556 37.39 20,689 45.57 
Coalition 17,392 36.65 11,682 24.88 8,074 17.79 
Minor 
Parties 
5,504 11.59 2,784 5.93 2,656 5.85 
After 
preferences 
      
ALP n/a n/a 16,557 45.27 15,532 40.73 
Green 21,528 53.12 20,019 54.73 22,605 59.27 
Coalition 18,996 46.88 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
In the electorate of Lismore, which like Ballina is also in northern NSW, the results were as 
follows. 
Table 50:  Results in NSW Electorate of Lismore 2015 
Party Votes Per cent 
ALP 12,056 25.63 
Greens 12,435 26.43 
Nationals 19,975 42.46 
Minor Parties 2,581 5.49 
After 
preferences 
  
ALP n/a n/a 
Green 19,309 47.14 
Nationals 21,654 52.86 
 
Significantly in Lismore, the Nationals candidate polled over 40 per cent of the first preferences, 
with other parties preferencing against that candidate.  Therefore, a preference leakage gained 
the candidate an absolute majority of the votes after preferences.  The Greens candidate led the 
Labor candidate by less than one per cent (0.80%) of the first preferences votes, which means 
the Greens candidate was close to being eliminated and the Labor candidate close to being the 
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runner up in the electorate.  A final observation is the significance of exhausted votes in an 
optional preferential voting system.  When should a party, such as The Greens, encourage its 
votes to allocate preferences and when should the voter be encouraged to ‘just vote 1’? 
The Greens in Parliament – Federal and State 
For a minor party the Greens are well represented in State parliaments as well as the federal 
parliament as shown in the following table. 
Table 51:  Number of Australia Greens in Australian Parliaments August 2016 
Parliament Upper House Lower House Total Members 
Federal 9 1 10 
NSW 5 3 8 
Vic 5 2 7 
QLD n/a 0 0 
SA 2 0 2 
WA 4 0 4 
TAS 3 0 3 
ACT n/a 1 1 
NT n/a 0 0 
Total 28 7 35 
 
The Greens are strongest in NSW, Vic and Tas, medium in SA and weak in QLD, SA, ACT and 
NT.  In two of the three strong states Vic and NSW along with the federal parliament the Greens 
have their biggest representation to date.  In some states and territories Green representation has 
declined (ACT, SA and Tas).  For example, in the ACT the Greens had four members in the 
Legislative Assembly in one parliament.  That number has now been reduced by three members 
losing their seats to leave one Greens member in the Assembly. 
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Table 52:  Australian Greens Members of Federal Parliament 
Member Birth 
Year 
State Term in 
Parliament 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Paid Work before 
Parliament 
Bandt, 
Adam 
1972 Vic 
(Rep)s 
2010- 
Melbourne 
PhD Barrister 
Brown, 
Bob 
1944 Tas 
(Senate) 
1996-2012 
Leader 
Post Grad Tas MP, Medico, 
Greens campaigner 
Di Natale, 
Richard 
1970 Vic 2010- Post Grad Medico, Farmer 
Hanson-
Young, 
Sarah 
1981 SA 2007- B Soc Sc Social scientist 
Ludlam, 
Scott 
1970 WA 2007- Grad Dip 
Policy 
Studies 
Graphic Designer 
Margetts, 
Dee 
1955 WA 1993-98 Post Grad NGO campaigner, 
WA Parlt 
 
McKim, 
Nick 
1965 Tas 2015- - Guide, Gardener 
Tas Parlt 
Milne, 
Christine 
1953 Tas 2004-2015 BA(Hons) 
Cert Ed 
School teacher 
Nettle, 
Kerry 
1973 NSW 2001-08 BSc(Hons) NGO Campaigner 
Organ, 
Michael 
1956 NSW 2002-2004 BSc(Hons) Academic 
Rice, Janet 1960 Vic 2013- BSc(Hons) Climate Scientist 
Rhiannon, 
Lee 
1951 NSW 2010- BSc Radical Activist 
Siewert, 
Rachel 
1961 WA 2004- BSc 
(AgSc) 
Research Officer 
Simms, 
Robert 
1984 SA 2015-2016 BA 
LLB(Hons) 
Local Govt 
/Academic 
Waters, 
Larissa 
1977 QLD 2010- BSc LLB Solicitor (Freehills) 
Whish-
Wilson, 
Peter 
1968 Tas 2012- M Econ Banker/Broker 
Wright, 
Penny 
1961 SA 2011-2015 BA LLB Solicitor 
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It is significant to note that to date, in the federal parliament, Kerry Nettle and Robert Simms 
are the only Senators to have lost their seats.  Overall it can be seen that Greens 
parliamentarians are well educated professionals, and on the average young. 
Table 53:  House of Reps elections - Highest DLP, Aust Dems and Aust Greens vote by 
State 
State DLP Aust Dems Aust Greens 
NSW 5.6 (1958) 10.2 (1990) 10.24 (2010) 
Vic 15.8 (1955) 12.4 (1990) 12.66 (2010) 
Qld 11.1 (1958) 11.6 (1990) 10.92 (2010) 
WA 10.5 (1958) 11.2 (1977) 13.13 (2010) 
SA 9.1 (1963) 15.2 (1990) 11.98 (2010) 
Tas 7.9 (1958) 8.6 (1990) 16.82 (2010) 
Source: AEC and Parliamentary Library 
The Australian Greens shortcomings and blunders 
A minor party’s shortcomings and blunders can seriously impact on its ability to survive, and 
poll well and get candidates elected at the next election.  The Greens have experienced some 
well publicised blunders and short comings, however these seemed to have very little if any 
impact on the party’s performance.  This is in contrast to the DLP and the Australian 
Democrats. 
On 7 January 2013, a media release on ANZ Bank letterhead announced that the ANZ bank had 
withdrawn its $1.2 billion loan facility to Whitehaven Coal.  The media release went on to 
advise that:- 
The decision is related to volatility in the global coal market, expected cost blowouts and 
ANZ’s Corporate Responsibility policy. 
The media release went on to quote the ANZ’s Group Head of Corporate Sustainability, Toby 
Kent, and also advised that the withdrawal of the loan facility became effective on the afternoon 
of 6 January, the day before the media release.  The media release was very quickly exposed 
later on 7 January to be a forgery, put out by Jonathon Moylan, who was a 26-year-old 
translator from Newcastle in NSW.  In the meantime, the value of Whitehaven Coal shares 
dived nearly 9 per cent on the stock exchange, before regaining their value later that day after a 
trading halt (Cubby and Ker 2013). 
When Moylan was asked why he performed the hoax he said his:- 
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Primary concern is the impact of this mine on the environment at the end of the day.  A lot 
of people were taken in by it, but when you compare the cost of that to the health of our 
forests and farmlands, it justifies it (Hamilton 2013). 
However Spence (2013) commented that:- 
Moylan engaged in identity theft by creating a false identity for ANZ Bank and then falsely 
impersonated one of the ANZ employees.  Stealing someone else’s identity for whatever 
misguided reason for whatever ends is ethically wrong. 
Spence went on to suggest that:- 
Moylan, a self-described environmentalist, chose to corrupt that environment is ironic and 
paradoxical.  For the informational environment, our shared info sphere is just as valuable 
and indispensable as our natural environment. . . . the use of unethical and nefarious means 
destructive to the integrity of our informational environment to promote concerns  about the 
natural environment is not justified. 
Against this public outcry, some of the Greens Senators were quick to show their support for 
Moylan and his fake press release.  Senator Lee Rhiannon wrote on Twitter:- 
Congrats (sic) to Jonathan Moylan, Frontline Action on Coal for exposing ANZ investment 
in coal mines (Jacob 2013). 
Swan, Ireland and Bright (2013) reported that the leader of the Greens, Senator Milne endorsed 
Moylan’s actions by saying his actions were:- 
Part of a long and proud history of civil disobedience, potentially breaking the law, to 
highlight something wrong. 
Cullen (2013) reported that:- 
Senator Milne says that she is ‘really surprised’ investors were duped by the fake press 
release because ANZ has been ‘quite happily’ investing in coal for a long time. 
And she backed the actions of Mr Moylan saying ‘the world’s facing a climate emergency’. 
‘Yes there are investors in Whitehaven Coal who may be affected, but everyone is affected 
by accelerated global warming,’ Senator Milne told ABC News. 
However, Milne neglected to acknowledge that Moylan used a false and deliberately misleading 
media release to express his viewpoint.  As Spence commented above, that media release also 
jeopardised the reliability of the information network.  What Milne was doing was attempting to 
justify an illegal and misleading act. 
Swan, Ireland and Bright (2013) commented that Milne and Rhiannon’s comments ‘come as the 
Greens try to appeal to new constituencies and recast themselves as less extreme in an election 
year’ and further, ‘last month the party revealed a new platform of policies aimed at presenting 
a smaller target.’ 
Kerr and Main (2013) reported that Labor Member of Parliament Joel Fitzgibbon ‘labelled the 
Greens’ actions as ‘extraordinary’ and ‘outrageously reckless’. 
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While the public support by Milne and Rhiannon for the fake ANZ bank media release was a 
rash act in that it supported an illegal activity, the Greens did not suffer any long-term damage 
or setbacks from it.  In fact, at the election later that year, the Greens increased their numbers in 
the Senate by one and retained their seat in the House of Representatives with an increase in the 
percentage of votes won. 
Rhiannon had a colourful past before joining the Australian Greens, eight ASIO files exist 
covering her involvement with various left wing and radical movements.  Yet her past has 
proved a significant problem.  Indeed, her presence in The Greens could be seen as an asset, 
given her involvement and ability to organise within those movements over the years.  This is to 
say nothing of her appreciation and knowledge of those organisations, many of which operate in 
an international or global setting. 
An area of concern for the Greens is their weaker states, in terms of electoral support, of NSW 
and Qld.  At the peak of the party’s support, while other states had two Greens Senators elected, 
those two states only managed one Senator each.  In respect of NSW, Faehrmann (2011) a 
Greens member of the NSW Legislative Council, commented that the 2011 NSW elections 
should be fought on local issues and not foreign affairs.  The basic problem was ‘bridging the 
gap between those who vote Green and those who agree with our values but don’t vote for us’.  
A problem for the Greens in SA is the level of competition for votes from the Nick Xenophon 
Team (NXT) a party very popular in its home state of SA.  A possible solution is for The 
Greens to be active in the areas that NXT is already very active in, namely gambling with 
particular concern for the impact of poker machines. 
An issue that frequently arises for minor parties is how to keep radical and fringe dwellers from 
joining the party and taking it over.  Like other parties, an applicant wishing to join the Greens 
is required to sign a declaration.  To apply to join the party in the ACT, that declaration reads:- 
I am not a member of another political party and will not join another political party while I 
am a member of The Greens.  I agree to abide by the Charter and Constitution of The 
Greens, and the Constitution of the ACT Greens.  I acknowledge that my membership is 
subject to approval by the ACT Greens. 
All other states and the NT have a similar declaration for prospective members to read and sign.  
The approval or ratification process allows the party to vet or screen potential members to 
determine background and any membership s of organisations with aims at odds with those of 
The Greens.  Joining the party in a state or territory also includes membership of the party on a 
federal level. 
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The Australian Greens and their detractors 
King (2015:315) reported that Gerard Henderson predicted ‘that the increasing support for the 
Greens Party among inner-city voters has the potential to stifle economic reforms in the future.’  
Henderson went on to state that the ‘economic reform process’ is ‘restricted’ by:- 
The emergence of the Greens and the tendency of the Labor Party, in order to preserve parts 
of its own inner-city base, to go with the Greens. 
The Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) and the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) have been 
two strong critics of the Australian Greens. 
Bennett (2012:30) in an article titled ‘Looking Behind the Green Façade’ in Policy, the journal 
of the CIS stated that:- 
The real challenge for society that arises from any polluting activity, including the 
extraction and use of fossil fuels, is to weigh the benefits we enjoy from the activities that 
involve pollution against the costs of those actions.  And one such cost is the damage done 
to people’s wellbeing from the pollution. 
For good measure Bennett then went on to put his thoughts another way. 
Another way of looking at this trade-off is to consider the balancing act that society faces 
between the costs of controlling pollution and the benefits enjoyed from having less 
pollution. 
Bennett’s comments are typical of the cries often heard about ‘the costs of compliance’ with 
various requirements such as environmental impact statements and pollution control 
requirements.  It is very doubtful that people in the street would dismiss ‘the damage done to 
people’s wellbeing from the pollution’ as a mere ‘cost’, but rather a health and environmental 
problem over time and a problem that is not easily solved after it has arisen.  Increasingly 
modern society is not dismissing such environmental damage as a ‘cost’. 
The Greens party life-span 
The Greens party life-span is shown in the following diagram. 
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This diagram tracks the Australian Greens since the party went national in 1992 with one 
Senator.  Therefore, the dispersion of the life-span stands at 22 years.  Before that time various 
state Greens Parties, such as Western Australia has one or two Senators with Greens credentials 
and some of these Senators were in the Senate when the Party went national and became a part 
of the Australian Greens Party.  Therefore, upon formation the party immediately crossed the 
representation threshold.  In 1994 the Party shared the balance of power and they did this until 
2005 when they lost it and fell back below the relevance threshold.  From 1994 to 2002 the life-
span sloped upwards, indicating the Party’s growth in power, its prestige and its recognition 
factor through the media coverage it received. 
At this time the Greens were overshadowing their rivals the Australian Democrats in terms of 
representing environmental policies and issues.   
In 2008 the Greens regained the shared balance of power and again crossed that relevance 
threshold.  In 2011, the Greens won the balance of power in their own right in the Senate and 
thus their life-span again moved upward.  However, it fell again on 1 July 2014 when the 
Greens lost the balance of power in their own right and shared it with a number of other minor 
parties, including the Palmer United Party.    
The life-span has skewed to the right and this indicates that the party won the balance of power 
in the Senate some years after it was started and not in its first years of life. 
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The point of culmination for the Greens was 1 July 2014.  That day, the party lost the balance of 
power in the Senate in its own right, having to share it with other minor parties.  The Greens did 
not regain the balance of power in their own right at the 2016 election.  An objective for the 
Greens at the next election in 2019 will be to regain the balance of power in the party’s own 
right and not have to share it with other parties.  In fact, that should be the party’s major goal at 
that election. 
In Conclusion - Have the Greens learnt anything from the 
demise of the other minor parties in Australia? 
In conclusion, this chapter of the thesis has considered the Australian Greens as a minor party in 
terms of its rise and indeed continual rise.   
In its continual rise, has the Australian Greens party learnt the lessons from the demise of the 
other three parties considered in this thesis?  The short answer to this question is yes.  The 
Australian Greens have been able to move from one party leader to another without conflict and 
assorted ‘teething problems’.  In addition, the party has remained relevant concentrating on key 
issues of the environment and various social issues that are of concern to the wider Australian 
community.  With its membership of the Global Greens, the party has been able to maintain an 
international footing, something none of the other three minor parties has been able to do.  This 
international footing has assisted in keeping the party relevant and in highlighting threats and 
problem areas in the Green movement. 
The party has been able to successfully weather any setbacks such as the support for a fake 
press release and conflict over environmental policies and their implications for mining and 
development.  Other minor parties considered in this thesis have suffered irreparable damage 
from setbacks from both the policies they have adopted and the resultant conflict.  
At this point in time, the Australian Greens are a successful minor party and appear to 
be here to stay because the policies of the party have retained relevance to its support 
base.  Its policies are not just about environmental issues but various social issues such 
as health services and education.  The party’s leadership for example Bob Brown and 
Christine Milne has enjoyed a very high profile in the media, and this high profile of the 
Greens leadership has assisted in the recognition factor by the mass media.  The party 
also appears to be able to effectively resolve its differences and divisions. 
 
The Greens 
Party finance and the unions 
Divisions in the party 
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NSW versus the rest 
Watermelons versus the deep greens 
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Chapter 11: In Conclusion 
The overall argument of the thesis is that minor political parties rise up through 
dissatisfaction with both of the major parties.  Those behind the formation of a minor 
party consider that the only solution to this satisfaction is the formation of another 
political party that in its policies and leadership will resolve this satisfaction.  A minor 
party meets its demise through one or more of a number of factors such as divisions in 
the party, poor leadership and policies that have not kept up with changing needs in 
society and are as a result irrelevant. 
This chapter draws out the empirical findings from the previous chapters as to why minor 
parties form and compete for office and then usually at some later date meet their decline. I have 
used the heuristic device of a party lifecycle to explore the formation, development and 
maturation of minor parties.  
As Pedersen (1982) has pointed out all parties have a lifespan that moves up through various 
thresholds.  This lifespan can last for hundreds of years or on the other hand, only a few years as 
in the case of many minor parties in Australia.  In fact, John Warhurst commented that:- 
The conventional wisdom has been that most minor parties have no success at all, but 
that if they do they flare up quickly and briefly before fading into oblivion (Warhurst 
1997:4). 
This thesis has modified Pedersen’s lifespans model to more accurately reflect the political 
climate of minor parties in Australia.  Federally, minor parties have power in the Australian 
Senate in voicing concerns to the parliament and asking questions of ministers, but even more 
so in parliamentary committees as ‘participating members’ of those committees.  This means 
that they can attend committee hearings (including Senate estimates hearings) question 
witnesses without being voted onto the committee. 
This chapter ties together the various issues considered in this thesis.  
The importance of electoral dynamics and the voting system 
In Australia, voting is compulsory.  For most electors, deciding not to vote because of 
dissatisfaction with the major parties is not an option as it is in numerous other countries 
(although a proportion of Australian voters do vote informal or not cast a ballot).  Therefore, 
minor parties have a captive audience to appeal to at the ballot box. In addition, the compulsory 
nature of voting in Australia can also lead to some disillusionment of traditional voters with the 
mainstream parties, thus making them more attracted to minor party overtures.  In the lower 
house elections fought over individual constituency territories, the second (or third) preferences 
of minor parties can ultimately be decisive in determining the eventual winner in the electorate. 
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This is especially true in marginal seats or where sitting members retire, where seats routinely 
‘go to preferences’ before they are finally determined. 
In the Australian Senate, minor parties are advantaged by the proportional voting system.  Since 
the 1949 federal election, the minor party only has to win a quota of votes to gain a seat in the 
Senate and not an entire electorate.  
With the use of that voting method for the Senate, the DLP was able to get a maximum of five 
senators elected over its lifespan, holding the balance of power in the Senate.  Exploitation of 
the new Senate voting system did not happen at the 1949 election but six years later at the 1955 
election after the rise of the DLP following the ALP ‘Split’.  But for many in the DLP their 
greatest success was not getting candidates elected to parliament but keep the ALP out of 
government!  Hatred can run strong in some political parties! 
The Formation of Minor Parties 
The reason minor parties are formed in the first place is usually because of divisions in one of 
the major parties, internal strife leading to a breakaway new party.  This was the case in the rise 
of the Democratic Labor Party in 1955.  Those members of the ALP who split from the party to 
form the DLP were dissatisfied with the ALP’s reaction to the rise of Communism in Australia.  
Communism rose up as a threat in Australia in the 1940s.  Communists were active in the trade 
unions as the Communist members exploited the apathy of the non-Communist members who 
were often so apathetic they would not attend meetings of the union or vote in elections for 
office bearers in the union and this included delegates to the ALP state conference. 
The anti-Communist crusade of the original DLP members was very actively supported by other 
groups including the Catholic church in Victoria under the controversial and high profile 
Archbishop Daniel Mannix.  Mannix was also instrumental in teaming up with BA Santamaria 
to set up the Movement as a supposed instrument of Catholic Action.  The Movement then 
teamed up with the ALP’s industrial groups to fight union elections and defeat any communist 
office bearers and candidates. 
However, the Movement and its grouper members of the industrial groups under Santamaria’s 
guidance over played their hand.  Not only did they seek out and defeat communist candidates 
they then turned on Labor members who they considered were not anti-communist enough.  
This was extremely subjective and very judgemental.  It was an unauthorised expansion of the 
role of the Groups and an abuse of power.   
In addition, Evatt the leader of the ALP was a poor leader could not cope with all of the conflict 
and division.  He was also suspicious and would not trust anyone making wide accusations.  
Evatt also allowed the mounting conflict to spill out into the public often through the 
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proceedings of the House of Representatives.  Grouper members such as Keon and Mullins 
would turn on other Labor members and even Evatt himself during sittings of the House of 
Representatives.  At the same time the motives of Keon and Mullens and their supporters should 
have been called into question by the leadership of the ALP, as a divided party loses support.  
The Liberal Country Party coalition benefitted greatly from such conflict, it kept them in 
government throughout the fifties, sixties and into the seventies. 
Looking back, the ALP should never have allowed ‘the Split’ to happen.  The Split kept Labor, 
a party blinded by hatred for the DLP, in opposition for the next 17 years.   Reconciliation 
between the two parties was right out of the question.  When the Labor party returned to the 
treasury benches in 1972, the party was very poorly equipped to govern with no real experience 
of leading and running a government. 
The disgruntled members who split from the ALP to form the DLP should have stayed in the 
ALP and aired their differences subtly within the party – not in public and in parliament.  Many 
Labor leaders, for example Calwell, were consumed by hate could not work with anyone with 
whom they disagreed with or who they thought did them a wrong.  The ALP split of 1955 
shows that the major parties have to work hard to preserve unity and resolve conflicts and 
parties need a good and effective leader to do that. 
The rise of the Democrats was not technically due to a split in the party but the creation of an 
alternative brand to the two major parties.  Its formation was more contingent on fusions of 
different political fractions. Firstly, the Australian Democrats emerged because Don Chipp had 
major political disagreements with the Fraser government and looked to form a new centrist 
party. Secondly, the Democrats gained traction because it was composed of the union of two 
other minor parties, the Australia Party which was set up largely as a response against 
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War and the New Liberal Movement that was a small 
scale split from the Liberal Country League of South Australia.  As such, this party was largely 
confined to South Australia.  In fact, most members of the Liberal Movement re-joined the 
Liberal Country League. The New Liberal Movement remained divided mainly over electoral 
reform.  When these two parties fought federal elections, they received only a small percentage 
of the vote.  Steele Hall the former South Australian Premier was however, successful in getting 
elected to the Senate.  He later re-joined the Liberal Party in South Australia. 
One Nation was also formed by a breakaway movement from the Liberal Party (and to some 
extent from the Nationals).  Pauline Hanson started her federal election campaign as an 
endorsed Liberal candidate, having some previous local government experience.  However due 
to some seemingly intemperate remarks about Aboriginals and Asians, Hanson was stripped of 
her Liberal Party endorsement, but only after nominations for the seat had closed.  Therefore, 
Hanson’s name and Liberal party affiliation remained on the ballot paper.  Howard the Liberal 
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leader, was strongly tipped to win the 1996 federal election and he did not want another 
distraction like he had in the 1987 federal election with the infamous ‘Joh for Canberra’ push.  
The Liberal Party and political commentators believed Hanson could not win such a safe Labor 
electorate.  Hanson did in fact win the electorate with a high swing in her favour. 
She took her place in the parliament as an independent and later in 1996 she gave her first 
speech to parliament.  After her first speech, the question was would Hanson form a new party 
and if so what would it be called?  The press gave Hanson much coverage and she even had a 
support movement, the Pauline Hanson Support Movement (PHSM), headed up by an admiring 
citizen of the Queensland Gold Coast.  In early 1987 Hanson announced her new party, Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation (PHON). 
The Australian Greens provide an example of a minor party that did not originate inside one of 
the major parties.  The Greens did not ‘break away’ or split from another party to form a new 
party.  Instead, The Greens originated as an environmental social movement, and grew out of 
several wilderness and environmental campaigns against development.  Elements of the 
environmental movement restructured into a parliamentary party structure in order to contest 
elections and gain seats in parliament.  In addition to the environment, The Australian Greens 
have also embraced other policies such as social policy.  The Greens have also won seats in the 
single electorate lower house in the Federal, New South Wales and Victorian parliaments.  
The Australian Greens party is the only party considered in this thesis that is a member of a 
global network of parties.  The Australian Greens are a member of the Global Greens, a 
worldwide grouping of Greens parties.  The Greens membership of that network provides 
significant advantages and these include; an international perspective on Green politics as well 
as a mechanism to remain relevant.   
Generally speaking, people join a political party to make a contribution at branch meetings and 
state and at party conferences, both state and federal.  If members of a political party feel that 
the party has neglected them, they will often resign from the party.  Such disillusioned former 
members provide an ideal source of members or supporters for a fledgling minor party.  This 
neglect by the major parties often occurs through the party embracing cartelisation for financial 
support and policy input. 
High Profile Leadership Assists Minor Parties 
Leadership is crucial to the fortunes of minor parties. The leaders of the DLP in 1955 namely 
Senator George Cole and Bob Joshua, came from the Senators and members who split from the 
ALP.  All members of the DLP in the House of Representatives lost their seats in the 1955 
election and from that time, no DLP candidate gained election to the House.  In the Senate Cole 
continued as leader of the parliamentary party until he lost his seat in 1964.  At that election 
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Gair the former Queensland Premier was elected to the Senate and the other DLP Senator 
McManus a well-known political activist in Victoria became his deputy.  Thus, the party 
continued to be led by high profile and well know leaders.  McManus succeeded Gair and led 
the Party until its defeat in 1974.  
At its beginning, the Australian Democrats party was led by the charismatic Don Chipp, a high 
profile former Liberal minister who announced his resignation from the Liberal Party in March 
1977.  He sat in the parliament for the rest of that term as an independent.  Throughout 1977 
Chipp spoke at numerous Australian Democrats membership rallies.  He stood as the Party’s 
number one candidate in Victoria at the 1977 elections easily wining a senate seat.  The 
Australian Democrats had a big advantage with the high-profile Don Chipp with his broad 
liberal views, leading the new party. 
Chipp accepted the invitation to join the new party and at the end of that year the new party was 
successful in having two senators elected to the senate.  Chipp’s leadership was successful in 
ensuring the party’s early growth.  At the 1980 election, the Party got another three senators 
elected and shared the balance of power.  In 1983 the double dissolution election where all 
senators were up for re-election the party got a total of five senators elected and held the balance 
of power in their own right in the senate. 
Pauline Hanson who continues to lead One Nation after its resurrection in the Australian 
parliament has enjoyed a high national profile, if somewhat controversial in nature.  She 
originally owned and operated a regional small business in Ipswich through which undoubtedly 
enjoyed many conversations with customers regarding local issues and politics as the fish and 
chips were simmering away.  She came across to the electorate as an everyday person and one 
of life’s battlers.  She has regularly been a smart dresser and is photogenic which helps her to 
connect with the press.  Pauline Hanson’s instantaneous high profile came from the fact that she 
was prepared to speak out on controversial topics, speaking her own mind in plain, blunt 
language against the prevailing orthodoxy of political correctness. She drew attention to many 
(populist) touchstone issues and rallied people to her cause.   
Throughout their continuing lifespan, The Australian Greens have had success with both high 
profile leaders and a very smooth succession to a new leadership team.  The Australian Greens’ 
first leader was Dr Bob Brown who was well known in Tasmania and beyond as a high-profile 
campaigner for green issues and as a protester who was quite prepared to be arrested, if need be, 
for his protest activities.  This preparedness to be arrested for his beliefs made Brown come 
across as both sincere about green issues and as one of the people.  This made him well known 
and respected.  By the time Brown led the Greens both in Tasmania and in the Federal 
parliament he had accumulated a wealth of experience in a long involvement in green politics 
and environmental issues.  Other factors that have continued to enhance the lifespan of the 
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Australian Greens was the party’s policy development in social policy issues and on two 
occasions a very smooth transition to a new leadership team in the parliamentary party.  The 
Greens have not faded away. 
Why Do Minor Parties Tend to Lose Influence and Often 
Decline 
Not all minor parties have declined; their decline is not inevitable or decreed.  The Australian 
Greens show no signs of being near their demise and besides their upper house presence have in 
fact had candidates elected to seats in the lower houses of parliament.  The party can very easily 
remain relevant with policies in place that relate to, and provide suggested solutions to problems 
confronting Australia at this time.  These problems include global warming and greenhouse gas 
emissions, a prominent concern for environmental issues and matching policies, will keep the 
Greens relevant.  Likewise, The Australian Greens’ attention to social issues is also assisting the 
party in remaining relevant in the eyes of the electors.  It is also significant to note that 
environmental issues very often impinge on just about every other policy area of government 
from taxation incentives for caring for the environment to environmental concerns for defence 
training on crown lands.  Indications are that the Greens concentrate strongly on remaining 
relevant and organising a seamless conflict free change of leadership.  The policy relevance is in 
stark contrast to the DLP which locked itself in a 1950s policy time warp of irrelevance.  The 
One Nation party policies reflect the party’s concerns with multiculturalism, political 
correctness and globalisation, these concerns resonated with significant areas of the electorate, 
resulting in the election of four One Nation Senators at the 2016 elections. 
One Nation’s purpose was portrayed as being an advocate of racism, anti-Aboriginal and anti-
Asian.  As well as immigration, the party had quite prominent polices on such issues as gun 
control and economic policies such as counteracting ‘market forces economics’ and its impact 
on farmers and small business people.  One Nation had, and continues to have, a concern about 
the Australian lifestyle and freedom in Australia and it was these concerns that led in some way 
to the party’s resurgence at the 2016 federal elections.   
One Nation experienced a massive decline in the late 1990s with the loss of its sole federal 
representative in the Senate.  In addition, it experienced massive resignations of its members in 
the Queensland parliament due to the structure of One Nation with its external control of its 
parliamentary members.  Significantly many of those members went on to form their own micro 
parties, a move that caused the One Nation party both electoral discomfort and much 
embarrassment. However, these micro other parties have declined and have not experienced the 
political resurrection that the main One Nation Party has achieved.  The resurrection of One 
Nation at the 2016 federal election indicates that the party had not lost relevance. 
307 
 
The loss of relevance is a major risk to a minor party and can be a significant cause in the 
demise of the party. This was the case with the DLP which faced a major problem keeping in 
tune with social attitudes. In the mid-1970s the party was still stuck back in the mid-1950s 
preaching anti-communism and increased defence spending.  The DLP took that attitude not 
withstanding that the Vietnam War with its supposed Communist threat, with the domino 
theory, was in its dying stages.  Furthermore, the party seemed unable to attract younger 
supporters given that the voting age had in 1973 lowered from 21 years to 18 years.  This 
change was in the pipeline for some years before 1973.  The DLP had a fixation with university 
students seeing them as no more than mindless rabble.  This attitude seemed to be based upon 
the activities of students at universities such as Monash in Melbourne demonstrating against 
conscription and the war in Vietnam two issues very dear to the DLP.   
The Australian Democrats faced a similar problem in its relevance to the political scene, 
especially over the question of the exact purpose of the party – what it stood for.  Were the 
Democrats elected to Parliament merely as a watchdog to indeed ‘keep the bastards honest’ or 
were they in parliament as a third party to formulate policy and present that policy to the 
parliament by way of private members bills or amendments to the government’s legislation.  
Some thought the two roles were incompatible.   
However, it could easily be shown that the two roles went hand in hand.  Part of being a 
watchdog surely would be to amend legislation to make it fairer or to remove problems or 
potential abuses.  To do this would require a party to have polices in most if not all areas.  In 
addition, voters vote for a party in terms of the policy it presents, in other words what it will do 
if it gets into parliament.  Nobody votes for a party that simply claims to be a ‘watchdog’ and 
nothing more.  To vote for a party voters expect the party to do something or some things for 
them not for a distant group of others or to serve as a type of quality assurance unit. 
The Australian Democrats operated under a system of participative democracy where the party’s 
rank and file were empowered to engage in the party’s policy making and leadership elections.  
To be successful such a system requires a keen interest from the party membership in policy 
making and policy analysis.  Unfortunately, apathy amongst the party membership was a 
significant problem for the Australian Democrats.  Turn outs to vote on party policy was very 
poor, often under ten per cent.  The Australia party who embraced participative democracy also 
found this problem.  Nevertheless, the Democrats expected its members to dutifully vote on 
policy measures using a ballot paper that more resembled a university ‘fill in examination 
paper’ than a ballot paper and this thesis includes some examples of such ballot papers which 
often extend to four pages.  To fill in such a ballot paper was a very time consuming exercise 
and there was no real guarantee that the party member had the interest or the expertise to be 
across all of the policy issues.   
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Other parties had alternatives to participative democracy.  The major parties acknowledge that 
they all have members who do no more than pay an annual membership fee and have party 
literature mailed to them, quite possibly left unread and discarded.  For those parties, policy is 
voted on at state conferences by delegates elected from their respective branch.  The state 
conference is a quick way to determine party policy – motions are included in an agenda and are 
debated at the conference delegates can speak for or against and as part of the debate, delegates 
are told the reasons for and against the policy motions. 
The Risk of Poor Leadership 
The age of the five DLP Senators was also an issue, they were portrayed as the old ‘fuddy 
duddies’ in boring grey suits – this was a serious image problem for the DLP as was Vince 
Gair’s abject skills on television and his very poor speaking style.  When Gair was finally 
replaced as leader he did not cheerfully accept the change.  This made him very amenable to the 
ALP: government’s offer of the ambassadorship to Ireland, where he was a total disaster as a 
diplomat. 
His replacement McManus was only four years younger than Gair.  McManus was soon seen as 
more of the same, an old man with outdated moralistic views.  In addition, as leader of the 
party, McManus hated flying, preferring to travel from Melbourne to Canberra and back by 
train.  Thus, a trip that should have taken a little over one hour, took several.  In addition, 
traveling by train it was very hard for journalists or anybody else to contact McManus.  
The better alternative to replace Gair was his fellow Queenslander Condon Byrne who was 
around 10 years younger than Gair.  Byrne took a very low profile within the DLP.  A lawyer by 
training, Byrne was a very accomplished speaker, preferring to analyse the issue and not 
personalities.  This made him highly regarded amongst Senators from other parties.  
Under the Australian Democrats participatory democracy model party members were entitled to 
vote for the leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party.  In addition, the members who 
did not have confidence in the parliamentary leadership, for whatever reason, could have the 
leadership positions re-balloted with a petition to the National Executive with as few as 100 
votes.  A poll of all of the party members for these two very important high profile positions 
was very time consuming, especially when it is remembered all of the other parties, minor and 
major, determine leadership of the parliamentary party in the party room.  A party room election 
results in a very quick result with very little if any delay.  In fact, often notice to move a spill of 
leadership positions and the resultant meeting and ballot of the parliamentarians happen on the 
same day.  Parliamentarians would also be able to ensure in the balloting and indeed in the 
nomination that they were voting for a potential leader that they knew they could work with.   
309 
 
By contrast, in the Australian Democrats, the time from the presentation of the petition with at 
least 100 signatures to the declaration of the membership ballot could take well over a month.  
The Australian Democrats solution to that problem was to appoint an interim leader which only 
provided more uncertainty and instability.  In addition, the result from the membership ballot 
could be a leader inexperienced in the ways of leading a parliamentary party and or a leader that 
could not work with the rest of the parliamentary members.  Overall then, this was both a 
cumbersome and time consuming operation and it also cost the party dearly.   
The retirement of Don Chipp was a big blow for the Australian Democrats.  Chipp came into 
the party with a very profile and a very liberal approach to policy areas.  But he also had almost 
20 years of service in parliament and with his wealth of experience, was able to gently guide 
and mentor the new party.  This became very obvious from reading his many contributions to 
the party’s national journal and at meetings of the National Executive of the party where Chipp 
would be called upon to give a report.  These reports were more often presented as very 
strategic pieces of advice.  This advice and indeed style of writing was missing after Chipp 
resigned from the leadership of the party.  Chipp had obviously learnt a lot from his time as the 
Liberal member for Hotham in the House of Representatives and he shared this knowledge and 
experience with his fellow Democrats.  After Don Chipp resigned as leader of the Australian 
Democrats, the party went through many leaders and interim leaders in very few years and this 
was very destabilising for the party. 
Unlike other minor parties discussed in this thesis which have for one reason or another had to 
change leaders, the Australian Greens have twice successfully changed leaders seamlessly.  The 
change from Bob Brown to Christine Milne in 2011 caused no conflict within the party.  
Likewise, the change from Milne to Richard di Nattale in 2014 also took place without any 
conflict.  Also in that leadership change the party also elected not one deputy leader but two co 
deputy leaders.  Each co deputy leader being responsible for leadership in respect of different 
broad policy areas. 
Second Preference Strategies 
As this thesis has stated, minor parties in Australia have significant power to determine other 
political outcomes in their choice of allocation of second preferences.  A minor party can 
exchange preferences with a major party and those second preferences can have the power to 
determine which major party ultimately gets elected in a marginal electorate.  A responsible 
second preference strategy can help and minor party, while a poorly thought out allocation of 
second preferences can harm a minor party’s credibility. 
For example, after the Labor split in 1955 until the party’s winding up in 1978 the DLP did not 
preference the main Labor party, the ALP, but instead the traditional enemy of Labor, the 
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Liberal Party of Australia and its coalition partner the Country Party.  This tactic kept the 
Coalition in government for a total of 23 years and the ALP languishing in opposition for the 
same period.  Many observers saw this action by the DLP a being very provocative to say the 
least.  But it illustrated quite clearly the power and strategic implications of a minor party’s 
second preferences.  Surprisingly the DLP asked very little in return for its allocation of second 
preferences, requiring little more than continual increased defence expenditure and foreign 
policy that was anti-communist.  There were no discussions on increased pensions or other 
social security measures, for example.  This was in stark contrast to the preference allocation 
strategies of both the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens, were negotiations and 
trade-offs were and still are very much commonplace.  
A second example is provided by the Australian Democrats.  That party’s second preference 
policy started off with no preference allocation at all and then a split ticket one side showing 
second preferences to the Liberals and the reverse side showing second preferences to the 
Australian Labor party.  The Australian Democrats seemed to be ignorant of the power they had 
in the decision of where to allocate second preferences which could decide the results in many 
seats and indeed change the leading candidate after the allocation of second preferences.  To its 
credit, the Australian Democrats later learnt to trade preferences for policy concessions and as a 
result the Australian Democrats second preferenced the Australian Labor party in exchange for 
very favourable environmental policies.  But the decision not to allocate preferences in the early 
years did not help the Australian Democrats credibility.  In fact, the split preferences ticket was 
ineffective because preferences often flowed around half to the Labor Party and half to the 
Liberal Party – thus the preferences cancelled each other out and could not be used as a method 
of bargaining with one of the major parties. 
What of the Future? 
Future studies on Australian minor political parties will be able to consider another group of 
minor parties that have risen and in some cases fallen.  For example, the rise and rapid fall of 
the Palmer United Party, along with the rise and growth of the Nick Xenophon Team.  
Significantly these two parties’ strength came from a single state, Queensland in the case of 
Palmer United and South Australia in the Nick Xenophon Team’s case.  While undoubtedly the 
future of One Nation and the Australian Greens will be observed and researched with great 
interest.  The Australian Senate does not have one minor party holding the balance of power, 
but a number of minor parties sharing the balance of power.  An area of interest in the future 
will be what action, if any, the major parties take to reduce the support for minor parties.  This 
reduction if it happened, would need to go much further than electoral reform of the Senate 
voting system.  For a start the parliamentary members of the major parties have to listen to the 
party’s rank and file or grass roots members and listen to problems and issues and bring them 
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before parliament.  Party rank and file members cannot be taken for granted or used merely as a 
labour force to hand out ‘how to vote’ cards on election day.  In addition, the major parties have 
to be seen to be actively considering the policy concerns that have helped the minor parties get 
members elected.  These policy concerns include the environment, globalisation and its impact 
as well as political correctness along with multiculturalism with its associated issues. 
Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis has added to the body of knowledge by showing that for a minor party to survive, it 
must remain united and relevant and to gain support its leader must be well known with a high 
profile and recognition factor.  A divided party particularly one that has irrelevant policies that 
show it cannot, or is unwilling to, move with the times will find it very hard at the next election 
to gain the required support to have its candidates re-elected. 
Minor parties emerge for a purpose such as disagreements with an existing party or to advocate 
a particular policy.  Entry into parliament is made much easier if the party is well lead and by a 
leader who is well known with a high profile. 
In this thesis, I have contributed to the research on minor political parties by an empirical and 
historical analysis of four Australian minor political parties.  I have discussed the circumstances 
that brought these parties into being.  In fact, some of those circumstances, such as the 
cartelization of the major parties, is a factor in the success of some of the modern day minor 
parties.  I have analysed the various factors that cause minor parties to lose voter support to the 
extent that the party just fades away.  These factors include relevance, unity of the party and 
quality of leadership and the transition of the leadership to another leader. 
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